D.R. Horton, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 3, 2012

357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (N.L.R.B. 2012)

D. R. HORTON, INC.
357 NLRB No. 184
2277
D. R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda. Case 12–CA–
025764
January 3, 2012
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS BECKER
AND HAYES
In this case, we consider whether an employer violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act when
it requires employees covered by the Act, as a condition
of their employment, to sign an agreement that precludes
them from filing joint, class, or collective claims address-
ing their wages, hours or other working conditions
against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.
For the reasons stated below, we find that such an
agreement unlawfully restricts employees’ Section 7
right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or pro-
tection, notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), which generally makes employment-related arbi-
tration agreements judicially enforceable.1 In the cir-
cumstances presented here, there is no conflict between
Federal labor law and policy, on the one hand, and the
FAA and its policies, on the other.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent D. R. Horton, Inc. is a home builder with
operations in more than 20 states. In January 2006, the
Respondent, on a corporate-wide basis, began to require
each new and current employee to execute a “Mutual
Arbitration Agreement” (MAA) as a condition of em-
ployment. The MAA provides in relevant part:

1 On January 3, 2011, Administrative Law Judge William N. Cates
issued the attached decision. The Acting General Counsel and the Re-
spondent each filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and an answering
brief. The Acting General Counsel filed a reply brief. In addition, the
Respondent filed a supplemental brief in support of its exceptions and
in opposition to the Acting General Counsel’s exceptions, and the Act-
ing General Counsel filed a letter in response.
On June 16, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board issued an in-
vitation to interested amici curiae to file briefs. Amicus briefs were
filed by American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations (AFL–CIO); Change to Win; Coalition for a Democratic Work-
place; Council on Labor Law Equality; Equal Employment Advisory
Council, HR Policy Association, Society for Human Resource Man-
agement, California Employment Law Council, and Employers Group;
National Retail Federation; Pacific Legal Foundation; Public Justice,
P.C., National Employment Lawyers Association, et al.; Retail Industry
Leaders Association; Service Employees International Union, Alton
Sanders, and Taylor Bayer; Spiro Moss LLP; United States Chamber of
Commerce; and United States Secretary of Labor and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Respondent filed three
answering briefs in response to the briefs of various amici.
Member Hayes is recused and did not participate in deciding the
merits of the case.
 that all disputes and claims relating to the em-
ployee’s employment with Respondent (with
exceptions not pertinent here) will be deter-
mined exclusively by final and binding arbi-
tration;
 that the arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s
individual claims,” “will not have the authori-
ty to consolidate the claims of other employ-
ees,” and “does not have authority to fashion
a proceeding as a class or collective action or
to award relief to a group or class of employ-
ees in one arbitration proceeding”; and
 that the signatory employee waives “the right
to file a lawsuit or other civil proceeding relat-
ing to Employee’s employment with the
Company” and “the right to resolve employ-
ment-related disputes in a proceeding before a
judge or jury.”

In sum, pursuant to the MAA, all employment-related dis-
putes must be resolved through individual arbitration, and
the right to a judicial forum is waived. Stated otherwise,
employees are required to agree, as a condition of employ-
ment, that they will not pursue class or collective litigation
of claims in any forum, arbitral or judicial.
Charging Party Michael Cuda was employed by the
Respondent as a superintendent from July 2005 to April
2006. Cuda’s continued employment was conditioned on
his signing the MAA, which he did. In 2008, his attor-
ney, Richard Celler, notified the Respondent that his firm
had been retained to represent Cuda and a nationwide
class of similarly situated superintendents. Celler assert-
ed that Respondent was misclassifying its superinten-
dents as exempt from the protections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), and he gave notice of intent to
initiate arbitration. The Respondent’s counsel replied
that Celler had failed to give an effective notice of intent
to arbitrate, citing the language in the MAA that bars
arbitration of collective claims.
Cuda filed an unfair labor practice charge, and the
General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining the
MAA provision stating that the arbitrator “may hear only
Employee’s individual claims and does not have the au-
thority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective
action or to award relief to a group or class of employees
in one arbitration proceeding.” The complaint further
alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4) and
(1) by maintaining arbitration agreements requiring em-
ployees, as a condition of employment, “to submit all
employment related disputes and claims to arbitration
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2278
. . . , thus interfering with employee access to the
[NLRB].”
The judge found that the MAA violated Section
8(a)(4) and (1) because its language would lead employ-
ees reasonably to believe that they were prohibited from
filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board. We
affirm the judge’s finding of a Section 8(a)(1) violation
in this respect, essentially for the reasons stated by the
judge.2
The judge dismissed the allegation that the class-action
waiver violated Section 8(a)(1). For the reasons stated
below, we reverse the judge and find the violation.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The MAA Prohibits the Exercise of Substantive Rights
Protected by Section 7 of the NLRA
1.
Section 7 of the NLRA vests employees with a sub-
stantive right to engage in specified forms of association-
al activity. It provides in relevant part that employees
shall have the right “to engage in . . . concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection . . . .” 29 U.S.C. §157. It is well settled
that “mutual aid or protection” includes employees’ ef-
forts to “improve terms and conditions of employment or
otherwise improve their lot as employees through chan-
nels outside the immediate employee-employer relation-
ship.” Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–566
(1978). The Supreme Court specifically stated in Eastex
that Section 7 “protects employees from retaliation by
their employer when they seek to improve their working
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial

2 The violation follows directly from the Board’s decisions in Bill’s
Electric, 350 NLRB 292, 296 (2007), and U-Haul Co. of California,
347 NLRB 375 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
where arbitration policies contained language that, if anything, was
more ambiguous concerning the preclusion of Board charges than the
MAA here. It is clear that the language of the MAA reasonably would
lead employees to believe that they were prohibited from filing charges
with the Board. Sec. 1 of the MAA states that all disputes between
employees and the Respondent “shall be determined exclusively by
final and binding arbitration,” and no exception for unfair labor practice
charges is made. Sec. 6 of the MAA, in turn, waives the “right to file a
lawsuit or other civil proceeding relating to . . . employment.” No
extrinsic evidence counters the clear implications of the MAA’s lan-
guage. True, the Respondent furnished its supervisors a list of fre-
quently asked questions about the MAA, together with appropriate
responses, and one response was to tell employees who expressed con-
cern about the scope of the MAA that they would still be able to bring
complaints to the EEOC or similar agencies. But there is no evidence
that the Respondent ever communicated this ambiguous clarification to
its employees.
We find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s 8(a)(4) finding, be-
cause that additional violation would not materially affect the remedy.
forums.” Id. at 565–566. The same is equally true of
resort to arbitration.
The Board has long held, with uniform judicial ap-
proval, that the NLRA protects employees’ ability to join
together to pursue workplace grievances, including
through litigation. Not long after the Act’s passage, the
Board held that the filing of a Fair Labor Standards Act
suit by three employees was protected concerted activity,
see Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 NLRB 942, 948–949
(1942), as was an employee’s circulation of a petition
among coworkers, designating him as their agent to seek
back wages under the FLSA, see Salt River Valley Water
Users Assn. 99 NLRB 849, 853–854 (1952), enfd. 206
F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953).3 In the decades that followed,
the Board has consistently held that concerted legal ac-
tion addressing wages, hours or working conditions is
protected by Section 7.4
Collective pursuit of a workplace grievance in arbitra-
tion is equally protected by the NLRA. When the griev-
ance is pursued under a collectively-bargained grievance-
arbitration procedure, the Supreme Court has observed,
“No one doubts that the processing of a grievance in such
a manner is concerted activity within the meaning of §

3 In Salt River Valley, supra the Ninth Circuit observed:
By soliciting signatures to the petition, [the employee] was seeking to
obtain such solidarity among the [workers] as would enable group
pressure upon the [employer] in regard to possible negotiation and ad-
justment of the [workers’] claims. If suit were filed, such solidarity
might enable more effective financing of the expenses involved.
Thus, in a real sense, circulation of the petition was for “mutual aid or
protection.” The [employer] argues that any legal rights to backpay
on the part of the [workers] were individual rights and that therefore
there could be no “mutual” aid or protection. But the [employer] ig-
nores the fact that “concerted activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid
or protection” is often an effective weapon for obtaining that to which
the participants, as individuals, are already “legally” entitled.
206 F.2d at 328.
4 See, e.g., Le Madri Restaurant, 331 NLRB 269, 275 (2000) (“the
filing of a civil action by employees is protected activity unless done
with malice or in bad faith”); Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp., 221
NLRB 364, 365 (1975), enfd. mem. 567 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied 438 U.S. 914 (1978) (same); United Parcel Service, 252 NLRB
1015, 1018, 1022 fn. 26 (1980), enfd. 677 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1982)
(class-action lawsuit alleging that employer failed to provide rest peri-
ods required by state statute was protected concerted activity). See
generally Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled
with Section 7 Rights?, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 173, 187–200 (2003)
(tracing doctrinal developments).
The Board’s position has been uniformly upheld by the courts of ap-
peals. See, e.g., Brady v. National Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673
(8th Cir. 2011) (“a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees
to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is ‘con-
certed activity’ under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act”) (em-
phasis in original); Mohave Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183,
1188 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (petition for injunction supported by fellow
employees and co-signed by a coworker was protected concerted activi-
ty).
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2279
7.” NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822,
836 (1984). And the same is true when the grievance is
pursued under a unilaterally created grievance/arbitration
procedure so long as its pursuit is concerted. Thus, the
Board held in 1976,

It is equally well settled that the advancement of a col-
lective grievance is protected activity, even if the griev-
ance in question is not formally stated or does not take
place under the auspices of a contractual grievance pro-
cedure. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9 (1962); NLRB v. Walls Manufacturing Co., 321 F.2d
753 (C.A.D.C., 1963); N.L.R.B. v. Hoover Design
Corp., 402 F.2d 987 (C.A. 6, 1968).

Clara Barton Terrace Convalescent Center, 225 NLRB
1028, 1033 (1976). See also Brad Snodgrass, Inc., 338
NLRB 917, 923 (2003) (nonemployee business agent was
“engaging in protected activity on behalf of Respondent’s
employees when as Local 20’s business agent he initiated
grievances and complaints on their behalf while he was
attempting to enforce what he believed to be . . . the appli-
cable collective-bargaining agreements”); UForma/Shelby
Business Forms, 320 NLRB 71, 77 (1995), enf. denied on
other grounds 111 F.3d 1284 (6th Cir. 1997) (elimination of
shift violated Sec. 8(a)(3) when done in retaliation for union
members’ pursuit of grievance to arbitration); El Dorado
Club, 220 NLRB 886 (1975), enfd. 557 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.
1977) (employee was unlawfully discharged for participat-
ing in another employee’s arbitration). Thus, employees
who join together to bring employment-related claims on a
classwide or collective basis in court or before an arbitrator
are exercising rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.
In enacting the NLRA, Congress expressly recognized
and sought to redress “[t]he inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association . . . and employers who are organized
in the corporate form or other forms of ownership asso-
ciation.” 29 U.S.C. § 151. Congress vested employees
with “full freedom of association . . . for the purpose of
. . . mutual aid or protection,” in order to redress that
inequality. Id. Both the Board and the courts have rec-
ognized that collective enforcement of legal rights in
court or arbitration serves that congressional purpose.
For example, the Ninth Circuit explained in Salt River
Valley, supra at 328, “By soliciting signatures to the peti-
tion, [the employee] was seeking to obtain such solidari-
ty among the [workers] as would enable group pressure
upon the [employer] in regard to possible negotiation and
adjustment of the [workers’] claims. If suit were filed,
such solidarity might enable more effective financing of
the expenses involved. Thus, in a real sense, circulation
of the petition was for ‘mutual aid or protection.’” Em-
ployees are both more likely to assert their legal rights
and also more likely to do so effectively if they can do so
collectively. Cf. Special Touch Home Care Services,
357 NLRB 4, 10 (2011) (“The premises of the Act . . .
and our experience with labor-management relations all
suggest that permitting an employer to compel employ-
ees to provide individual notice of participation in collec-
tive action would impose a significant burden on the
right to strike).5
Depending on the applicable class or collective action
procedures, of course, a collective claim or class action
may be filed in the name of multiple employee-plaintiffs
or a single employee-plaintiff, with other class members
sometimes being required to opt in or having the right to
opt out of the class later. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). To be protected by Sec-
tion 7, activity must be concerted, or “engaged in with or
on the authority of other employees, and not solely by
and on behalf of the employee himself.” Meyers Indus-
tries, 281 NLRB 882, 885 (1986), affd. sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487
U.S. 1205 (1988). When multiple named-employee-
plaintiffs initiate the action, their activity is clearly con-
certed. In addition, the Board has long held that concert-
ed activity includes conduct by a single employee if he or
she “seek[s] to initiate or to induce or to prepare for
group action.” Meyers, supra at 887. Clearly, an indi-
vidual who files a class or collective action regarding
wages, hours or working conditions, whether in court or
before an arbitrator, seeks to initiate or induce group ac-
tion and is engaged in conduct protected by Section 7.
These forms of collective efforts to redress workplace
wrongs or improve workplace conditions are at the core
of what Congress intended to protect by adopting the
broad language of Section 7. Such conduct is not pe-
ripheral but central to the Act’s purposes. After all, if the
Respondent’s employees struck in order to induce the
Respondent to comply with the FLSA, that form of con-
certed activity would clearly have been protected. See
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
Surely an Act expressly stating that “industrial strife” can
be “avoided or substantially minimized if employers,

5 Employees surely understand what several federal courts have rec-
ognized: that named plaintiffs run a greater risk of suffering unlawful
retaliation than unnamed class members. See Ansoumana v. Gristede’s
Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Ingram v.
Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 701 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Adams v.
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 82, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Slanina v.
William Penn Parking Corp., 106 F.R.D. 419, 423–424 (W.D. Pa.
1984). This risk of retaliation is virtually unique to employment litiga-
tion compared, for example, to securities or consumer fraud litigation.
Thus, in a quite literal sense, named-employee-plaintiffs protect the
unnamed class members.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2280
employees, and labor organizations each recognize under
law one another’s legitimate rights in their relations with
one another,” equally protects the concerted pursuit of
workplace grievances in court or arbitration. To hold
otherwise, the Supreme Court recognized in Eastex,
“could ‘frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right
of workers to act together to better their working condi-
tions.’” 437 U.S. at 567 (quoting Washington Aluminum,
370 U.S. at 14).
As stated above, the MAA requires employees, as a
condition of their employment, to refrain from bringing
collective or class claims in any forum: in court, because
the MAA waives their right to a judicial forum; in arbi-
tration, because the MAA provides that the arbitrator
cannot consolidate claims or award collective relief.
The MAA thus clearly and expressly bars employees
from exercising substantive rights that have long been
held protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.6
2.
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in” Section 7. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1). The MAA was im-
posed on all employees as a condition of hiring or con-
tinued employment by the Respondent, and it is properly
treated as the Board treats other unilaterally implemented
workplace rules. In evaluating whether an employer has
violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining such a mandato-
ry arbitration policy, the Board thus applies the test set
forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB
646 (2004). See U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB
375, 377 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (finding policy unlawful because employees would
reasonably read it to require resort to arbitration and pre-
clude filing of Board charges). Under Lutheran Heritage
Village, our inquiry begins with whether the rule explic-
itly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If so, the
rule is unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict
protected activity, the finding of a violation is dependent
upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees
would reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7
activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to un-
ion activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the
exercise of Section 7 rights. 343 NLRB at 646–647. We
find that the MAA expressly restricts protected activity.

6 The Respondent argues that the MAA’s restriction on class or col-
lective actions in arbitration is phrased as a restriction not on employ-
ees, but on the authority of the arbitrator. We find the distinction is one
of form and not substance. The MAA bars employees from pursuing
their claims in any forum except arbitration and precludes collective
actions in that arbitral forum. The result is that there is no forum in
which employees may pursue a class or collective claim.
That this restriction on the exercise of Section 7 rights
is imposed in the form of an agreement between the em-
ployee and the employer makes no difference. From its
earliest days, the Board, again with uniform judicial ap-
proval, has found unlawful employer-imposed, individu-
al agreements that purport to restrict Section 7 rights –
including, notably, agreements that employees will pur-
sue claims against their employer only individually.7
In National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350
(1940), the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s holding
that individual employment contracts that included a
clause discouraging, if not forbidding, a discharged em-
ployee from presenting his grievance to the employer
“through a labor organization or his chosen representa-
tives, or in any way except personally” was unlawful and
unenforceable. Id. at 360.8 The Court agreed that the
contracts “were a continuing means of thwarting the pol-
icy of the Act. Id. at 361. “Obviously,” the Court con-
cluded, “employers cannot set at naught the National
Labor Relations Act by inducing their workmen to agree
not to demand performance of the duties which it impos-
es.” Id. at 364.
Four years later, the Court reaffirmed the principle that
employers cannot enter into individual agreements with
employees in which the employees cede their statutory
rights to act collectively. In J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332 (1944), the Court held that individual employ-
ment contracts predating the certification of a union as
the employees’ representative cannot limit the scope of
the employer’s duty to bargain with the union. The Su-
preme Court observed that:

Individual contracts no matter what the circum-
stances that justify their execution or what their
terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the

7 See, e.g., Adel Clay Products Co., 44 NLRB 386, 396 (1942), enfd.
134 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1943) (finding unlawful employer’s condition-
ing employment on the signing of individual agreements not to engage
in self-organization and collective bargaining); Western Cartridge Co.,
44 NLRB 1, 7–8 (1942), enfd. 134 F.2d 240, 243–244 (7th Cir. 1943)
(same); Jahn & Ollier Engraving Co., 24 NLRB 893, 900–901, 909–
911 (1940), enfd. 123 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1941) (finding unlawful
individual “profit-sharing” agreements that forfeited employees’ right
to negotiate wage increases and to strike); Vincennes Steel Corp., 17
NLRB 825, 831–833 (1939), enfd. 117 F.2d 169, 172 (7th Cir. 1941)
(finding unlawful employer’s stock purchase plan, which required
subscribing employees to agree not to seek wage increases; “[t]he indi-
vidual agreements to refrain from requesting wage increases constitute
on their face, a limitation on the exercise of the right to engage in con-
certed activities and to bargain collectively regarding wages”).
8 The clause permitted the discharged employee to present facts con-
testing the reasonableness of his discharge, but provided that the “ques-
tion as to the propriety of an employee’s discharge is in no event to be
one for arbitration or mediation.” Nat’l Licorice Co., 309 U.S. at 360.
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2281
procedures prescribed by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. . . .

. . . .

Wherever private contracts conflict with [the
Board’s] functions [of preventing unfair labor prac-
tices], they obviously must yield or the Act would be
reduced to a futility.

Id. at 337.
During this same period of time, the Board held un-
lawful a clause in individual employment contracts that
required employees to attempt to resolve employment
disputes individually with the employer and then provid-
ed for arbitration. J. H. Stone & Sons, 33 NLRB 1014
(1941), enfd. in relevant part 125 F.2d 752 (7th Cir.
1942).9 “The effect of this restriction,” the Board ex-
plained, “is that, at the earliest and most crucial stages of
adjustment of any dispute, the employee is denied the
right to act through a representative and is compelled to
pit his individual bargaining strength against the superior
bargaining power of the employer.” Id. at 1023 (footnote
omitted). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board’s
holding, describing the contract clause as a per se viola-
tion of the Act, even if “entered into without coercion,”
because it “obligated [the employee] to bargain individu-
ally” and was a “restraint upon collective action.” NLRB
v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942).10 These
precedents compel the conclusion that the MAA violates
the NLRA.
Just as the substantive right to engage in concerted ac-
tivity aimed at improving wages, hours or working con-
ditions through litigation or arbitration lies at the core of
the rights protected by Section 7, the prohibition of indi-
vidual agreements imposed on employees as a means of
requiring that they waive their right to engage in protect-
ed, concerted activity lies at the core of the prohibitions

9 Paragraph 8 of the contract read:
8. ADJUSTMENTS. The Company will endeavor to adjust with the
Employee all complaints and disputes by negotiation, if possible. If it
cannot be so adjusted, the Employee hereby selects _________ as his
representative and arbitrator, and the Company selects its superinten-
dent as its representative and they shall promptly hear and adjust all
such complaints, or failing to do so shall select a third disinterested ar-
bitrator, which three shall promptly hear, adjust and arbitrate every
such complaint or dispute. The decision of a majority of such Board
to be final on both Employee and Employer.
33 NLRB at 1023.
10 For contemporary discussion of the case, see Recent Case, Labor
Law—National Labor Relations Act–Arbitration Provision in Individu-
al Contract Held to Be Unfair Labor Practice, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1391,
1392 (1942). The Seventh Circuit’s holding was anticipated by its
earlier decision in a case involving the same clause in an individual
employment contract. NLRB v. Superior Tanning Co., 117 F.2d 881
(7th Cir. 1941), enfg. 14 NLRB 942 (1939).
contained in Section 8. Understanding why this is so
requires consideration of the origins of Section 7 rights.
In construing the NLRA, we must “reconstitute the gam-
ut of values current at the time when the words [of the
statute] were uttered.” National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 fn. 5 (1967).
Modern Federal labor policy begins not with the
NLRA, but with earlier legislation, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act of 1932,11 which aimed to limit the power of Federal
courts both to issue injunctions in labor disputes and to
enforce “yellow dog” contracts prohibiting employees
from joining labor unions.12 Thus, Congress has aimed
to prevent employers from imposing contracts on indi-
vidual employees requiring that they agree to forego en-
gaging in concerted activity since before passage of the
NLRA.
In fact, the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
prohibit the enforcement of a broad array of “yellow
dog”-like contracts, including agreements comparable to
that at issue here. Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, which declares the “public policy of the United
States,” observes that the “individual unorganized work-
er is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of con-
tract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment.”
29 U.S.C. § 102. Accordingly, Congress determined that
workers should “have full freedom of association” and
“shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion
of employers” in “concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
Id. (emphasis added). In turn, Section 3 of the statute
provides that “any . . . undertaking or promise in conflict
with the public policy declared in” Section 2—not only
the “yellow dog” contract—“is declared to be contrary to
the public policy of the United States, shall not be en-
forceable in any court of the United States and shall not
afford any basis for the granting of legal or equitable
relief by any such court.” 29 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis
added). In specifying what acts are not subject to re-
straining orders or injunctions, Section 4 of the statute
identifies various types of activity, whether undertaken
“singly or in concert,” including “[b]y all lawful means
aiding any person participating or interested in any labor
dispute who . . . is prosecuting, any action or suit in any
court of the United States or of any State.” 29 U.S.C. §

11 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
12 See Edwin E. Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 Minn. L.
Rev. 638, 641–647 (1932). Since the enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, all variations of a “yellow-dog” contract are deemed
invalid and unenforceable, including “[a]ny promise by a statutory
employee to refrain from union activity or to report the union activities
of others.” Barrow Utilities & Electric, 308 NLRB 4, 11 fn. 5 (1992).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2282
104(d) (emphasis added).13 “Labor dispute,” in turn, is
broadly defined in Section 13 to include “any controver-
sy concerning terms or conditions of employment.” 29
U.S.C. § 113. Finally, Section 15 provides that “[a]ll
acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of
this chapter are repealed.” 29 U.S.C. § 115.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, in sum, protects concerted
employment-related litigation by employees against fed-
eral judicial restraint based upon agreements between
employees and their employer. Consistent with the terms
and policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, an arbitration
agreement imposed upon individual employees as a con-
dition of employment cannot be held to prohibit employ-
ees from pursuing an employment-related class, collec-
tive, or joint action in a Federal or State court. Such a
lawsuit would involve a “labor dispute” under Section 13
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: a “controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment.” The arbitration
agreement, insofar as it sought to prohibit a “lawful
means [of] aiding any person participating or interested
in” the lawsuit (Sec. 4) such as pursuing or joining a pu-
tative class action—would be an “undertaking or promise
in conflict with the public policy” of the statute (Sec. 3).
The NLRA, passed in 1935, built upon and expanded
the policies reflected in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, echo-
ing much of the language of the earlier law. As the
Board has observed, “The law has long been clear that all
variations of the venerable ‘yellow dog contract’ are in-
valid as a matter of law.” Barrow Utilities & Electric,
308 NLRB 4, 11 fn. 5 (1992). The agreement at issue
here, then, not only bars the exercise of rights at the core
of those protected by Section 7, but implicates prohibi-
tions that predate the NLRA and are central to modern
Federal labor policy.
3.
Some amici contend that employees’ Section 7 rights
are not impaired by the MAA because employees can
still discuss their claims with one another, pool their re-

13 The legislative history of the statute describes federal injunctions
that prohibited aid to employees who were being evicted from employ-
er-owned housing as a consequence of striking in violation of “yellow
dog” contracts and who challenged their eviction in court:
Federal judges have been in the habit of issuing injunctions restraining
outsiders … from doing anything to assist the laborer in a forcible en-
try and detainer case pending in the State court.
All persons are enjoined from furnishing bonds to take those cases up
on appeal. All persons are enjoined from paying any money in the
way of expenses in connection with such litigation in the State courts.
The injunctions often go far enough to prevent an attorney from giv-
ing any advice to the employee who is trying to hold possession of a
house belonging to the employer.
Sen. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (Feb. 4, 1932).
sources to hire a lawyer, seek advice and litigation sup-
port from a union, solicit support from other employees,
and file similar or coordinated individual claims. It is
true that the MAA does not interfere with employees’
right to engage in any of these protected concerted activi-
ties. But if the Act makes it unlawful for employers to
require employees to waive their right to engage in one
form of activity, it is no defense that employees remain
able to engage in other concerted activities. For exam-
ple, if an employer refrains from interfering with con-
certed protests short of a strike, that does not entitle the
employer to compel employees, as a condition of their
employment, to waive the right to strike. The same is
true here.14
Several amici urge the Board to endorse the narrow
theory of violation set forth in a memorandum issued in
2010 by the then General Counsel (“GC Memo 10–06”),
before the complaint issued in this case.15 GC Memo
10–06 takes the position that a class-action waiver is not
per se unlawful, so long as the waiver makes clear to
employees that they may act concertedly to challenge the
waiver itself and will not be subject to retaliation by their
employer for doing so. Thus, under the rationale of the
GC Memo 10–06, employees are free to bring an em-
ployment-related class action lawsuit, but the employer
may seek to have the suit dismissed on the ground that
the employees executed a valid waiver.16
We reject the construction of the Act advanced in GC
Memo 10–06 for several reasons. First, it takes the erro-
neous view that an individual who files a class or collec-
tive action typically is engaged in “purely personal” ac-
tivity outside the scope of Section 7. As explained
above, that view is at odds with Board precedent holding
that employees’ class and collective actions are protected
concerted activity in that they seek to initiate concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection. The memoran-
dum’s position is also clearly wrong as a categorical mat-
ter because many class and collective actions are initiated
by more than one named plaintiff, i.e., as a result of un-
deniably concerted activity.
Second, GC Memo 10–06 reasons that because choos-
ing to initiate or participate in a class action is a purely

14 Moreover, the MAA is not a narrow ban on only one form of col-
lective actions, pursuing a class action, but a broad ban on any form of
collective litigation, including class and collective actions and even
simple joinder of claims.
15 The Memorandum, which represents the then-General Counsel’s
advice to the Board’s Regional Offices, is not binding on the Board.
16 This is not the theory underlying the complaint in this case. It is
also not the theory advanced by the General Counsel during the litiga-
tion of this case. Therefore, there is no merit to the suggestion of Amici
Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. that the Board is limited to
passing on a theory of the case that is consistent with GC Memo 10–06.
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2283
individual act, waiving the right to do so is outside the
scope of Section 7. At the same time, GC Memo 10–06
states that the wording of mandatory arbitration policies
must make clear to employees that their right to act con-
certedly by pursuing class and collective claims is pre-
served. If a Section 7 right to litigate concertedly exists,
then it defies logic to suggest, as GC Memo 10–06 does,
that requiring employees to waive that right does not
implicate Section 7. Moreover, the memo’s rationale
cannot be limited to waivers of the right to file and join
class and collective actions. If choosing to initiate or
participate in a class or collective action is a purely indi-
vidual act, so is choosing to initiate or participate in any
activity protected by Section 7. Based on the logic of
GC Memo 10–06, an employer would be privileged to
secure prospective individual waivers of all future Sec-
tion 7 activity, including joining a union and engaging in
collective bargaining. The memo’s rationale is thus un-
tenable.
Third, the memo’s requirement that employers must
expressly preserve employees’ right to file a class or col-
lective action challenging the validity of the required
waiver has no substance. That is to say, GC Memo 10–
06 does not state on what ground such a challenge might
be brought. The memo could not have meant to suggest
that the challenge could be based on interference with
Section 7 rights, since the position of the memo is that
individual class-action waivers do not implicate Section
7. But even assuming that a waiver-validity challenge
would have a more than negligible chance of success, the
addition of language assuring employees of their right to
mount such a challenge, as GC Memo 10-06 requires,
would not erase the tendency of the required waiver itself
to interfere with the exercise of Section 7 rights. Em-
ployees still would reasonably believe that they were
barred from filing or joining class or collective action,17
as the arbitration agreement would still expressly state
that they waive the right to do so. Employees reasonably
would find an assurance that they may do so anyway
either confusing or empty, or both: confusing, because
employees would be told they have the right to do the
very thing they waive the right to do; empty, because
mandatory arbitration policies, such as Respondent’s, are
formal legal documents evidently prepared by, or with
the aid of, counsel, and employees reasonably would
assume that their employer would not go to the trouble
and expense of drafting and requiring that they execute a
legally invalid waiver.

17 See Bill’s Electric, 350 NLRB 292, 296 (2007) (finding mandato-
ry arbitration policy unlawful under Sec. 8(a)(1) where it reasonably
would be read “as substantially restricting” the filing of charges with
the Board).
Finally, GC Memo 10–06 recognizes, as it must under
Eastex, that Section 8(a)(1) would be violated if an em-
ployer threatens to retaliate against an employee for fil-
ing a class or collective action. It fails to recognize,
however, that this basic principle is fundamentally at
odds with the memo’s ultimate conclusion. When, as
here, employers require employees to execute a waiver as
a condition of employment, there is an implicit threat that
if they refuse to do so, they will be fired or not hired.
Moreover, as stated above, the applicable test is that set
forth in Lutheran Heritage Village, and under that test, a
policy such as Respondent’s violates Section 8(a)(1) be-
cause it expressly restricts Section 7 activity or, alterna-
tively, because employees would reasonably read it as
restricting such activity. That no employees are express-
ly threatened, disciplined, or discharged does not immun-
ize the employer under existing precedent. We therefore
reject the reasoning in GC Memo 10–06.
B. There Is No Conflict between the NLRA and the FAA
Under the Circumstances Presented Here
Our analysis does not end, however, with the conclu-
sion that the MAA restricts the exercise of rights protect-
ed by Federal labor law. The principal argument made
by the Respondent and supporting amici is that finding
the restriction on class or collective actions unlawful
under the NLRA would conflict with the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA). The Respondent and amici contend that
the Board has a duty to accommodate the FAA, and that
dismissal of the 8(a)(1) allegation is therefore necessary.
This is an issue of first impression for the Board.18 In
dismissing the allegation that the class-action waiver was

18 Various amici supporting the Respondent cite two decisions in
which Federal district courts have been presented with the issue and
have ruled that a class-action waiver does not violate the NLRA:
Slawienski v. Nephron Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 1:10-CV-0460-JEC,
2010 WL 5186622 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2010), and Webster v. Perales,
No. 3:07-CV-00919-M, 2008 WL 282305 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2008).
Although the results in those cases favor the Respondent, the courts’
reasoning does not.
In Slawienski, the district court simply wrote protected concerted ac-
tivity other than union activity out of Sec. 7 altogether: “There is no
legal authority,” the court said, “to support plaintiff’s position [that the
arbitration agreement violates Sec. 8(a)(1)]. The relevant provisions of
the NLRA . . . deal solely with an employee’s right to participate in
union organizing activities.” In support of that claim, the court quoted
Sec. 7 but omitted the provision that protects “concerted activities for
the purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection.” The court then
missed the point of the plaintiff’s argument, saying that Sec. 7 rights
were not implicated because plaintiff and those who would “opt in” to
the collective action were pursuing FLSA claims, not claims under the
NLRA. Slawienski, supra slip op. at *2.
In Webster, the employer required plaintiffs to sign an arbitration
agreement as a condition, not of employment, but of enrolling in an
injury benefit plan. The district court found that the class-action waiver
was not unlawful under Sec. 8(a)(1) because (a) plaintiffs “expressly
acknowledged that their agreement to arbitrate was made voluntarily
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2284
unlawful, the judge cited Supreme Court decisions that
he characterized as “reflect[ing] a strong sentiment favor-
ing arbitration as a means of dispute resolution,” and
circuit court decisions more specifically supporting the
use of arbitration to resolve employment disputes. He
also observed that there is no Board precedent “holding
that an arbitration clause cannot lawfully prevent class
action lawsuits or joinder of arbitration claims.” None of
the decisions cited by the judge, however, involved as-
sertions that an arbitration clause interfered with NLRA
rights.
The Board is responsible for administering the NLRA
and enforcing the rights that the Act confers. But in do-
ing so, the Board must be and is mindful of any conflicts
between the terms or policies of the Act and those of
other federal statutes, including the FAA. Where a pos-
sible conflict exists, the Board is required, when possi-
ble, to undertake a “careful accommodation” of the two
statutes. Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31,
47 (1942). That does not mean, of course, that the Act
must automatically yield to the FAA—or the other way
around. Instead, when two federal statutes “are capable
of co-existence,” both should be given effect “absent a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contra-
ry.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
Thus, when circumstances arise that present a conflict
between the underlying purposes of the Act and those of
another federal statute, the Board has recognized that the
issue must be resolved in a way that accommodates the
policies underlying both statutes to the greatest extent
possible. Direct Press Modern Litho, 328 NLRB 860,
861 (1999); Image Systems, 285 NLRB 370, 371
(1987).19 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that

and without duress, pressure, or coercion,” and (b) the employer did not
“threaten[ ] to terminate” employees who refused to sign the arbitration
agreement. Webster, supra slip op. at *4. Whether or not Webster was
correctly decided, here, in contrast to that case, signing the MAA was a
condition of employment.
19 The Respondent, citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), contends that whenever the Board’s choice
of remedies has conflicted with another federal statute or policy, the
Board has been required to yield. The Respondent quotes the Hoffman
Court’s statement that it had “never deferred to the Board’s remedial
preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal
statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA.” 535 U.S. at 144. We do
not understand the Court’s statement to suggest that the Board’s exer-
cise of remedial discretion under the NLRA must always yield to the
policies underlying other federal statutes no matter how important the
chosen remedy is to vindication of rights protected by the NLRA. Such
a result obviously would violate the principle that the Federal “courts
are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments.”
Morton, supra 417 U.S. at 551. Moreover, our holding here is that the
MAA violates the substantive terms of the NLRA; it does not rest on an
exercise of remedial discretion. Finally, our holding here does not
require the FAA to yield to the NLRA, but represents an accommoda-
finding the MAA unlawful, consistent with the well-
established interpretation of the NLRA and with core
principles of Federal labor policy, does not conflict with
the letter or interfere with the policies underlying the
FAA and, even if it did, that the finding represents an
appropriate accommodation of the policies underlying
the two statutes.
1. The FAA
The FAA was originally enacted in 1925. Its general
intent was to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements” and to place private arbitration
agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts.”
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24
(1991). The FAA manifests “a liberal federal policy fa-
voring arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone Mem.
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
It further requires that “questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration.” Id. The FAA’s primary substan-
tive provision, Section 2, states in relevant part:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2.20 The FAA permits the enforcement of pri-
vate arbitration agreements, but those agreements remain
subject to the same defenses against enforcement to which
other contracts are subject.
An agreement falling within the terms of the FAA may
provide for arbitration of federal statutory claims. See

tion of the two statutes. In short, nothing in Hoffman precludes this
result.
20 Sec. 1 of the statute exempts “contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. That exemption—which is not at
issue in this case—has been construed by the Supreme Court, based on
the statutory language, to cover only “contracts of employment of
transportation workers.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 119 (2001). The “legislative record on the § 1 exemption is quite
sparse.” Id. at 119. It seems fair to say, if immaterial to the Court’s
construction of the FAA, that the legislative history contains no discus-
sion evincing a congressional intent to bring employment contracts of
any sort under the statute. See id. at 119–121; see also id. at 125–128
(dissent of Justice Stevens, arguing that legislative history demonstrates
congressional intent, in response to concerns of organized labor, to
exclude all employment contracts from FAA).
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2285
Gilmer, supra. The Supreme Court has repeatedly em-
phasized, however, that the FAA protects the right of
parties to agree to resolve statutory claims in an arbitral
forum so long as “a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute.” Gilmer, supra at 26
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). Thus, arbitration
may substitute for a judicial forum only so long as the
litigant can effectively vindicate his or her statutory
rights through arbitration. Gilmer, supra at 28 (quoting
Mitsubishi, supra at 637).
2. Holding that the MAA violates the NLRA does
not conflict with the FAA or undermine the policy
underlying the FAA

Holding that the MAA violates the NLRA does not
conflict with the FAA or undermine the pro-arbitration
policy underlying the FAA under the circumstances of
this case for several reasons. First, the purpose of the
FAA was to prevent courts from treating arbitration
agreements less favorably than other private contracts.
The Supreme Court, as explained, has made clear that
“[w]herever private contracts conflict with [the] func-
tions” of the National Labor Relations Act, “they obvi-
ously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futili-
ty.” J. I. Case Co., supra 321 U.S. at 337. To find that
an arbitration agreement must yield to the NLRA is to
treat it no worse than any other private contract that con-
flicts with Federal labor law. The MAA would equally
violate the NLRA if it said nothing about arbitration, but
merely required employees, as a condition of employ-
ment, to agree to pursue any claims in court against the
Respondent solely on an individual basis. It is thus clear
that our holding, that the MAA conflicts with the NLRA,
does not rest on “defenses that apply only to arbitration
or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agree-
ment to arbitrate is at issue.” AT&T Mobility v. Concep-
cion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
Second, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the
FAA, permitting enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
federal statutory claims, including employment claims,
makes clear that the agreement may not require a party to
“forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.”
Gilmer, supra at 26. The question presented in this case
is not whether employees can effectively vindicate their
statutory rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act in an
arbitral forum. See Gilmer, supra.21 Rather, the issue

21 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) could be subjected to
compulsory arbitration pursuant to an agreement in a securities registra-
tion application.
here is whether the MAA’s categorical prohibition of
joint, class, or collective federal state or employment law
claims in any forum directly violates the substantive
rights vested in employees by Section 7 of the NLRA.
Gilmer addresses neither Section 7 nor the validity of a
class action waiver. The claim in Gilmer was an indi-
vidual one, not a class or collective claim, and the arbi-
tration agreement contained no language specifically
waiving class or collective claims.22 Here, although the
underlying claim the Charging Party sought to arbitrate
was based on the FLSA (specifically, the Charging Party
contends that the Respondent misclassified him and other
superintendents as exempt from FLSA requirements), the
right allegedly violated by the MAA is not the right to be
paid the minimum wage or overtime under the FLSA, but
the right to engage in collective action under the NLRA.
Thus, the question presented in this case is not whether
employees can effectively vindicate their rights under the
FLSA in arbitration despite a prohibition against class or

The plaintiff, employed as a financial services manager, had regis-
tered as a securities representative with several stock exchanges, and
the registration application provided for arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the various exchanges. After being discharged by his em-
ployer, the plaintiff brought an action in Federal court alleging that his
termination violated the ADEA.
The Court noted that not all statutory claims will be appropriate for
arbitration, but that, “having made the agreement to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”
500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628). The
Court stated that such intent, if it exists, must be shown by the party
seeking to avoid arbitration, and will be found “in the text of the
ADEA, its legislative history, or “an ‘inherent conflict’ between arbi-
tration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.” Id. (quoting Shear-
son/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)).
The plaintiff in Gilmer conceded there was no contrary intent in the
ADEA or its legislative history. The Court therefore focused on
whether there was an “inherent conflict” and found none. The Court
acknowledged the public policies underlying the ADEA, but found that
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or
her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will con-
tinue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” Id. at 28 (quot-
ing Mitsubishi, supra at 637). The Court then found that arbitration
would not undermine the EEOC’s role in enforcing the ADEA, be-
cause, inter alia, an individual ADEA claimant can still file a charge
with the EEOC, and the EEOC has independent authority to investigate
even absent a charge. Id. at 28–29. The Court also rejected various
challenges to the adequacy of arbitration generally, finding those argu-
ments “out of step” with current policy. Id. at 30.
22 The plaintiff did argue that enforcing his arbitration agreement
was inconsistent with the ADEA because “arbitration procedures . . . do
not provide for . . . class actions.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32. But the
Court pointed out that the arbitration rules actually at issue in Gilmer
“provide for collective proceedings.” Id. The Court, in dicta, then
stated, “the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of collec-
tive action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were
intended to be barred.” The Court’s evaluation of the intention behind
the ADEA is not relevant to the question of compelled waiver of NLRA
rights at issue here.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2286
collective proceedings, but whether employees can be
required, as a condition of employment, to enter into an
agreement waiving their rights under the NLRA.23
Any contention that the Section 7 right to bring a class
or collective action is merely “procedural” must fail.
The right to engage in collective action—including col-
lective legal action—is the core substantive right pro-
tected by the NLRA and is the foundation on which the
Act and Federal labor policy rest. The Respondent and
supporting amici argue that class-action waivers do not
implicate substantive rights under Section 7 because the
right of a litigant to employ the class action procedures
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (or in correspond-
ing State rules) or the collective action procedures under
the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) “is a procedural right
only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,
332 (1980). There is no substantive Section 7 right to
maintain a class or collective action, the Respondent and
amici contend. To the extent they mean that there is no
Section 7 right to class certification, they are surely cor-
rect. 24 Whether a class is certified depends on whether
the requisites for certification under Rule 23 have been
met. But that is not the issue in this case. The issue here
is whether Respondent may lawfully condition employ-

23 The court decisions holding that FLSA claims can be vindicated
effectively in an arbitral forum are therefore inapposite. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 297–298
(5th Cir. 2004) (finding no evidence that Congress intended to preclude
individual arbitration of FLSA claims); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc.,
303 F.3d 496, 503, 506 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); Kuehner v. Dickinson &
Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319–320 (9th Cir. 1996) (same). In any event, that
issue remains unsettled. See, e.g., Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., 11 Civ
2448, 2011 WL 5881926, at *12–17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (right to
proceed collectively under FLSA cannot be waived); Sutherland v.
Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding
class-action waiver provision unenforceable where prohibitive cost of
pursuing FLSA claim on an individual basis precluded plaintiff from
effectively vindicating her statutory rights). We note that the Secretary
of Labor and the EEOC, in an amicus brief filed with the Board, argue
that at least in some cases, FLSA rights cannot be properly vindicated
absent the ability to proceed collectively. If it were necessary to decide
that issue here, there might be reason to defer to the judgment of those
agencies, see, e.g., Kingston Constructors, 332 NLRB 1492, 1500–
1501 fn. 57 (2000), which are responsible for administering and enforc-
ing the FLSA, but our holding rests on an entirely separate ground.
24 Nothing in our holding guarantees class certification; it guarantees
only employees’ opportunity to pursue without employer coercion,
restraint or interference such claims of a class or collective nature as
may be available to them under Federal, State or local law. Employees
who seek class certification in Federal court will still be required to
prove that the requirements for certification under Rule 23 are met, and
their employer remains free to assert any and all arguments against
certification (other than the MAA). Further, if an employee seeks class
certification and fails–in other words, if the court determines that the
claim fails to meet the requirements of Rule 23 and therefore must be
pursued individually rather than as a class action–the resulting action
would be subject to dismissal under the MAA in favor of arbitration.
ment on employees’ waiving their right under the NLRA
to take the collective action inherent in seeking class
certification, whether or not they are ultimately success-
ful under Rule 23. Rule 23 may be a procedural rule, but
the Section 7 right to act concertedly by invoking Rule
23, Section 216(b), or other legal procedures is not.
The Respondent and amici also cite 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (2009), in
which the Supreme Court held that a union, in collective
bargaining, may agree to an arbitration clause that waives
employees’ rights to bring an action in court alleging
employment discrimination under Title VII and the
ADEA. It is well settled, however, that a properly certi-
fied or recognized union may waive certain Section 7
rights of the employees it represents—for example, the
right to strike—in exchange for concessions from the
employer. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350
U.S. 270, 280 (1956). The negotiation of such a waiver
stems from an exercise of Section 7 rights: the collec-
tive-bargaining process. Thus, for purposes of examin-
ing whether a waiver of Section 7 rights is unlawful, an
arbitration clause freely and collectively bargained be-
tween a union and an employer does not stand on the
same footing as an employment policy, such as the
MAA, imposed on individual employees by the employer
as a condition of employment. Although the Court in
Penn Plaza stated that it saw no “distinction between the
status of arbitration agreements signed by an individual
employee and those agreed to by a union representative,”
see 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1465, the Court was
addressing a different question: whether the agreement,
to which only the union was party, improperly waived
employees’ individual rights under Title VII and the
ADEA, not their right to engage in concerted activity
under the NLRA. Furthermore, the Court emphasized
that the decision to arbitrate Title VII and ADEA claims
does not amount to a decision to forgo those statutes’
substantive guarantees against workplace discrimination.
Id. at 1464 fn. 5. That statement highlights the material
distinction between the present case, on the one hand,
and, on the other, Penn Plaza and other cases applying
Gilmer’s analytical framework: here, a requirement that
employees’ work-related claims be resolved through ar-
bitration on an individual basis only does amount to a
requirement that employees forgo the NLRA’s substan-
tive protections.
Accordingly, finding the MAA’s class-action waiver
unlawful does not conflict with the FAA, because the
waiver interferes with substantive statutory rights under
the NLRA, and the intent of the FAA was to leave sub-
stantive rights undisturbed. Stated another way, under
Gilmer, there is an inherent conflict between the NLRA
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2287
and the MAA’s waiver of the right to proceed collective-
ly in any forum.
Third, nothing in the text of the FAA suggests that an
arbitration agreement that is inconsistent with the NLRA
is nevertheless enforceable. To the contrary, Section 2 of
the FAA, quoted above, provides that arbitration agree-
ments may be invalidated in whole or in part upon any
“grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” This clause is fully consistent with the
FAA’s general intent to place arbitration agreements on
the same footing as other contracts. Entirely apart from
the Supreme Court’s teachings in National Licorice and
J. I. Case, supra—cases invalidating private agreements
that restricted NLRA rights—it is a defense to contract
enforcement that a term of the contract is against public
policy. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S.
386, 392 (1987). In fact, this principle has been specifi-
cally followed in relation to contract provisions violating
the NLRA.

It is . . . well established . . . that a federal court has a
duty to determine whether a contract violates federal
law before enforcing it. ”The power of the federal
courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at
all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limi-
tations of the public policy of the United States as man-
ifested in . . . federal statutes. . . . Where the enforce-
ment of private agreements would be violative of that
policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such
exertions of judicial power.” Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24, 34–35 (1948) (footnotes omitted).

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83–84 (1982).
Courts presented with such a defense apply a balanc-
ing test: where the interest in favor of enforcing a con-
tract term is outweighed by a public policy against en-
forcement, the term is unenforceable. Restatement (2d)
of Contracts §178(1). In assessing the weight to be given
to the respective interests, one must consider “the
strength of the public policy as manifested by legisla-
tion” and “the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the
term will further that policy.” Id. § 178(3). As explained
above, Section 7 of the NLRA manifests a strong federal
policy protecting employees’ right to engage in protected
concerted action, including collective pursuit of litigation
or arbitration. Moreover, Section 8(a)(1) and other pro-
visions of the NLRA derived from the earlier Norris-
LaGuardia Act manifest a strong federal policy against
agreements in the nature of yellow-dog contracts, in
which individual employees are required, as a condition
of employment, to cede their right to engage in such col-
lective action. A refusal to enforce the MAA’s class-
action waiver would directly further these core policies
underlying the NLRA.
A policy associated with the FAA and arguably in ten-
sion with the policies of the NLRA was explained by the
Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, supra
at 1748: The “overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to
ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements accord-
ing to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceed-
ings.” The “switch from bilateral to class arbitration,”
the Court stated, “sacrifices the principal advantage of
arbitration—its informality.” Id. at 1750. But the weight
of this countervailing consideration was considerably
greater in the context of AT&T Mobility than it is here for
several reasons. AT&T Mobility involved the claim that
a class-action waiver in an arbitration clause of any con-
tract of adhesion in the State of California was uncon-
scionable. Here, in contrast, only agreements between
employers and their own employees are at stake. As the
Court pointed out in AT&T Mobility, such contracts of
adhesion in the retail and services industries might cover
“tens of thousands of potential claimants.” Id. at 1752.
The average number of employees employed by a single
employer, in contrast, is 20,25 and most class-wide em-
ployment litigation, like the case at issue here, involves
only a specific subset of an employer’s employees. A
class-wide arbitration is thus far less cumbersome and
more akin to an individual arbitration proceeding along
each of the dimensions considered by the Court in AT&T
Mobility—speed, cost, informality, and risk—when the
class is so limited in size. 131 S.Ct. at 1751–1752.
Moreover, the holding in this case covers only one type
of contract, that between an employer and its covered
employees, in contrast to the broad rule adopted by the
California Supreme Court at issue in AT&T Mobility.
Accordingly, any intrusion on the policies underlying the
FAA is similarly limited.
Thus, whether we consider the policies underlying the
two statutes as part of the balancing test required to de-
termine if a term of a contract is against public policy
and thus properly considered invalid under Section 2 of

25 The U.S. Census Bureau reports that in 2008 there were
5,930,132 employers (with employees), and those employers employed
120,903,551 employees. See
http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html. Accord: See U.S. Census
Bureau, Sector 00: Survey of Business Owners (SBO): Company Sta-
tistics Series: Statistics for All U.S. Firms by Geographic Area, Indus-
try, Gender, Ethnicity, and Race: 2007, available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=D&-
ds_name=SB0700CSA01&-_lang=en. Employers covered by the Act
may, on average, employ slightly more employees because only em-
ployers engaged in interstate commerce are covered, but that exclusion
may be balanced by the exclusion of employers covered by the Railway
Labor Act, which on average employ more employees than those cov-
ered by the NLRA.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2288
the FAA, or as part of the accommodation analysis re-
quired by Southern Steamship, Morton, and other Su-
preme Court precedent, our conclusion is the same:
holding that an employer violates the NLRA by requiring
employees, as a condition of employment, to waive their
right to pursue collective legal redress in both judicial
and arbitral forums accommodates the policies underly-
ing both the NLRA and the FAA to the greatest extent
possible.
Finally, even if there were a direct conflict between the
NLRA and the FAA, there are strong indications that the
FAA would have to yield under the terms of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. As explained above, under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, a private agreement that seeks to prohibit
a “lawful means [of] aiding any person participating or
interested in” a lawsuit arising out of a labor dispute (as
broadly defined) is unenforceable, as contrary to the pub-
lic policy protecting employees’ “concerted activities for
. . . mutual aid or protection.” To the extent that the
FAA requires giving effect to such an agreement, it
would conflict with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act, in turn—passed 7 years after the
FAA,—repealed “[a]ll acts and parts of act in conflict”
with the later statute (Section 15).26
C. The Supreme Court’s Restriction on Compelling
Class Arbitration Is Not Implicated Here
The Respondent and some amici further argue that
holding that the MAA violates the NLRA would be in-
consistent with two recent Supreme Court decisions stat-
ing that a party cannot be required, without his consent,
to submit to arbitration on a classwide basis. See Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758,
1775–1776 (2010) (arbitration panel exceeded its author-
ity by permitting class antitrust claim when commercial
shipping charter agreement’s arbitration clause was silent
on class arbitration); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131
S.Ct. 1740, 1751–1753 (2011) (claim that class-action
waiver in consumer arbitration agreement was uncon-
scionable under state law was preempted by FAA). Nei-
ther case is controlling here. Neither involved the waiver
of rights protected by the NLRA or even employment
agreements. Furthermore, AT&T Mobility involved a

26 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that when two federal
statutes conflict, the later enacted statute, here the NLRA, must be
understood to have impliedly repealed inconsistent provisions in the
earlier enacted statute. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S.
148, 154 (1976); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union.
402 U.S. 570, 582 fn. 18 (1971); Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S.
497, 503 (1936); see also Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.3d
936, 948 (11th Cir. 2001); Sutherland Stat Const § 51.02 (5th ed.)
(“Where two statutes are involved each of which by its terms applies to
the facts before the court, the statute which is the more recent of the
two irreconcilably conflicting statutes prevails.”).
conflict between the FAA and state law, which is gov-
erned by the Supremacy Clause, whereas the present case
involves the argument that two federal statutes conflict.
Finally, nothing in our holding here requires the Re-
spondent or any other employer to permit, participate in,
or be bound by a class-wide or collective arbitration pro-
ceeding.
We need not and do not mandate class arbitration in
order to protect employees’ rights under the NLRA. Ra-
ther, we hold only that employers may not compel em-
ployees to waive their NLRA right to collectively pursue
litigation of employment claims in all forums, arbitral
and judicial. So long as the employer leaves open a judi-
cial forum for class and collective claims, employees’
NLRA rights are preserved without requiring the availa-
bility of classwide arbitration. Employers remain free to
insist that arbitral proceedings be conducted on an indi-
vidual basis.
III.
We emphasize the limits of our holding and its basis.
Only a small percentage of arbitration agreements are
potentially implicated by the holding in this case. First,
only agreements applicable to “employees” as defined in
the NLRA even potentially implicate Section 7 rights.27
Second, the employment-related contracts of those trans-
portation workers covered by the Act (e.g., interstate
truck drivers) appear already to be exempted from the
FAA, by section 1 of that statute. See fn. 20, supra. Fi-
nally, only those agreements that would be reasonably
read to bar protected, concerted activity are vulnerable.
For example, an agreement requiring arbitration of any
individual employment-related claims, but not precluding
a judicial forum for class or collective claims, would not
violate the NLRA, because it would not bar concerted
activity. Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the Re-
spondent and supporting amici, finding the MAA’s class-

27 Sec. 2(3) of the Act provides that the term “employee” excludes
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual em-
ployed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of
an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervi-
sor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Rail-
way Labor Act . . . or by any other person who is not an employer as
herein defined.
Sec. 2(2) of the Act, in turn, defines “employer” to exclude, inter
alia, employees of the federal government or any state or political sub-
division. Thus, significant numbers of workers typically considered to
be “employees” in lay terms—supervisors, government employees, and
independent contractors being perhaps the largest groups—are not
covered by Sec. 7, and therefore any class or collective action waiver to
which they are subject cannot be challenged on Sec. 7 grounds.
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2289
action waiver unlawful will not result in any large-scale
or sweeping invalidation of arbitration agreements.28
Nor does our holding rest on any form of hostility or
suspicion of arbitration. Indeed, arbitration has become a
central pillar of Federal labor relations policy and in
many different contexts the Board defers to the arbitra-
tion process both before and after the arbitrator issues an
award. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (“The
present federal policy is to promote industrial stabiliza-
tion through the collective bargaining agreement. . . . A
major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion
of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.”); Collyer Insulated Wire,
291 NLRB 837, 839–843 (1971) (pre-award deferral);
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 1081 (1955) (post-
award deferral). Rather, our holding rests not on any
conflict between an agreement to arbitrate and the
NLRA, but rather solely on the conflict between the
compelled waiver of the right to act collectively in any
forum, judicial or arbitral, in an effort to vindicate work-
place rights and the NLRA.
We thus hold, for the reasons explained above, that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by requiring em-
ployees to waive their right to collectively pursue em-
ployment-related claims in all forums, arbitral and judi-
cial.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for the judge’s Conclusion of
Law 2.
“2. By maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
provision that waives the right to maintain class or col-
lective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial,
and that employees reasonably could believe bars or re-
stricts their right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.”
AMENDED REMEDY
Because the Respondent utilized the MAA on a corpo-
rate-wide basis, we shall order, in addition to the relief
ordered by the administrative law judge, that the Re-

28 Moreover, we do not reach the more difficult questions of (1)
whether an employer can require employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to waive their right to pursue class or collective action in
court so long as the employees retain the right to pursue class claims in
arbitration and (2) whether, if arbitration is a mutually beneficial means
of dispute resolution, an employer can enter into an agreement that is
not a condition of employment with an individual employee to resolve
either a particular dispute or all potential employment disputes through
non-class arbitration rather than litigation in court.
spondent post a notice at all locations where the MAA
was in effect. See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of California, 347
NLRB 375 fn. 2 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, D. R. Horton, Inc., Deerfield Beach, Flori-
da, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that
employees reasonably could believe bars or restricts their
right to file charges with the National Labor Relations
Board.
(b) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that
waives the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind or revise the Mutual Arbitration Agree-
ment to make it clear to employees that the agreement
does not constitute a waiver in all forums of their right to
maintain employment-related class or collective actions
and does not restrict employees’ right to file charges with
the National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Notify the employees of the rescinded or revised
agreement to include providing them a copy of the re-
vised agreement or specific notification that the agree-
ment has been rescinded.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility at Deerfield Beach, Florida, and any other
facility where the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement has
been in effect, copies of the attached notice marked “Ap-
pendix.”29 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 12 after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consec-
utive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post-
ing on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notic-

29 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2290
es are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since August 3, 2010.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 12 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that waives the right to maintain class or collective
actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that employees reasonably could believe bars or
restricts their right to file charges with the National La-
bor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Federal labor law.
WE WILL rescind or revise the Mutual Arbitration
Agreement to make it clear to employees that the agree-
ment does not constitute a waiver of their right in all fo-
rums to maintain class or collective actions and does not
restrict employees’ right to file charges with the National
Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify employees of the rescinded or revised
agreement, including providing them with a copy of the
revised agreement or specific notification that the agree-
ment has been rescinded.

D. R. HORTON, INC.

John F. King, Esq., the General Counsel.
Mark Stubley, Esq. and Bernard P. Jeweler, Esq., (Ogletree
Deakins), for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This matter
arises out of a consolidated complaint and notice of hearing
issued on November 26, 2008, against D.R. Horton, Inc. (the
Respondent), stemming from unfair labor practice (ULP)
charges filed by Michael Cuda, an individual. The complaint,
as amended, alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by
maintaining and enforcing individual arbitration agreements
that employees have been required to execute as a condition of
employment.1
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Miami, Florida, on
November 8, 2010, at which I afforded the parties full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to introduce evidence.
Issues
1) Has the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintain-
ing and enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement with its
employees that unlawfully prohibits them from engaging in
protected concerted activities, including joint arbitration
claims or class action lawsuits?

2) Do such agreements lead employees reasonably to believe
that they are barred or restricted from filing charges with the
NLRB, thereby violating Section 8(a)(4) and (1)?
Facts

Based on the entire record, including testimony, documents,
and stipulations, as well as the thoughtful posttrial briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I find the follow-
ing.
The salient facts are undisputed. The Respondent, a Dela-
ware corporation with an office and place of business located in
Deerfield Beach, Florida (the facility), is engaged in the busi-
ness of building and selling homes. The Respondent has admit-
ted Board jurisdiction as alleged in the complaint, and I so find.
In January 2006, Respondent, on a corporate-wide basis, im-
plemented a policy of requiring each current and new employee
to sign a mutual arbitration agreement as a condition of em-
ployment.2 The agreement provides, inter alia, that all em-
ployment disputes and claims shall be determined exclusively
by final and binding arbitration before a single, neutral arbitra-
tor. Specifically included are claims for discrimination or har-
assment; wages, benefits, or other compensation; breach of
contract; violations of public policy; personal injury; and tort

1 On April 20, 2009, the Regional Director issued an order severing
cases, approving withdrawal of certain allegations of complaint, and
approving withdrawal of charge in Case 12–CA–025766. As a result,
co-respondent DHI Mortgage Co. LTD, a subsidiary of the Respondent,
was removed from the complaint. Accordingly, I will not address
evidence that pertained to it as distinct from the Respondent per se.
2 Jt. Exh. 2.
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2291
claims. In reference to employees’ statutory rights, the only
express exclusions are employee claims for workers’ compen-
sation or unemployment benefits.
Paragraph six of the agreement states:

[T]he arbitrator will not have the authority to consolidate the
claims of other employees into a proceeding originally filed
by either the Company or the Employee. The arbitrator may
hear only Employee’s individual claims and does not have the
authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective ac-
tion or to award relief to a group or class of employees in one
arbitration proceeding.

At around the time of the distribution of the arbitration
agreement to employees, the Respondent provided facility su-
pervisors with a list of employees’ frequently asked questions
and the appropriate responses.3 One of the instructions was to
tell employees who expressed concern about the scope of the
agreement that the agreement applied to relief sought through
the courts and that they would still be able to go to the EEOC
or similar agency with a complaint. However, the Respondent
did not provide these questions and answers to employees at the
time, and there is no evidence it ever communicated to them the
above clarification of the scope of the agreement to its employ-
ees.
By letter dated February 13, 2008,4 Cuda’s attorney, Richard
Celler, notified the Respondent that his law firm had been re-
tained to represent Cuda and a class of similarly situated cur-
rent and former “Superintendents” the Respondent employed
on a national basis, to contest the Respondent’s “misclassifica-
tion” of them as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act.5 The letter went on to state it constituted formal no-
tice of a request to commence the arbitration process under
paragraph 3 of the arbitration agreement. By letter of the same
date, Celler advised Respondent his firm was also representing
five other named employees.6 By letter of February 21, Celler
notified Respondent he was similarly representing employee
Mario Cabrera and a class of similarly situated current and
former “Superintendents” Respondent employed on a national
basis.7
By letter of March 14, Michael Tricarloo, Respondent’s
counsel, replied to Celler’s February 13 letter concerning the
five-named employees.8 Citing the language in paragraph 6
barring arbitration of collective claims, he denied the February
13 letter constituted effective notice of intent to initiate arbitra-
tion. For the same reason, Ticarloo, by letter of March 20,
denied the validity of Cabrera’s notice of intent.9
Analysis and Conclusions
Preliminarily, in reaching my conclusions about the legality
of the provisions in question, I do not rely on the Region’s ini-
tial determination or the contrary result of the General Coun-

3 E. Exh. 1.
4 All dates hereafter occurred in 2008, unless otherwise stated.
5 Jt. Exh. 4.
6 Jt. Exh. 5.
7 Jt. Exh. 6.
8 Jt. Exh. 8.
9 Jt. Exh. 10.
sel’s Office of Appeals.10 Further, I will not consider as dispos-
itive Memorandum GC-10-06, cited in the Respondent’s brief
(at 5). The Board has repeatedly held that policies set out in the
General Counsel’s Casehandling Manual are not binding on the
Board (or the General Counsel, for that matter). Hempstead
Lincoln Mercury Motors Corp., 349 NLRB 552, 553 fn. 4
(2007); see also Children’s National Medical Center, 322
NLRB 205, 205 fn. 1 (1996). The same logic applies to other
internal pronouncements the General Counsel issues.
I. DOES THE MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT VIOLATE
SECTION 8(A)(1) BY UNLAWFULLY PROHIBITING EMPLOYEES
FROM ENGAGING IN PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITIES?
Section 7 of the Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157, provides
in relevant part that employees have the right to engage in con-
certed activities for their “mutual aid or protection.” The Su-
preme Court has held that this “mutual aid or protection” clause
encompasses employees acting together to better their working
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums.
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–567 (1978). In Rock-
well International Corp. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 1530, 1536 (11th
Cir. 1987), the Circuit Court cited Eastex for the proposition
that Section 7 is liberally construed to protect a broad range of
employees concerns. Filing a class action lawsuit constitutes
protected activity unless done with malice or in bad faith. Har-
co Trucking, LLC, 344 NLRB 478 (2005); U Ocean Palace
Pavilion, Inc., 345 NLRB 1162 (2005).
The crux of the matter here is the efficacy of a mandatory ar-
bitration provision that restricts employees’ from joining arbi-
tration claims or collectively seeking recourse outside of arbi-
tration. The General Counsel does not contend arbitration
agreements are per se unlawful (GC br. at 12).
Indeed, decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years re-
flect a strong sentiment favoring arbitration as a means of dis-
pute resolution. A leading case in the employment area is
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Therein, the Court held an Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) claim can be subject to compulsory arbitration.
The Court reviewed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), origi-
nally enacted in 1925, 43 Stat. 883, and then reenacted and
codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code, conclud-
ing its provisions manifest a “‘liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements.’ Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).” Id. at 25
(fn. omitted).
The Court went on to state (Id. at 26) (citations omitted):

Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbi-
tration, ‘[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an in-
tention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statu-
tory rights at issue.” . . . [T]he burden is on Gilmer to show
that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial fo-
rum for ADEA claims. . . . “[Q]uestions of arbitrability must
be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy fa-
voring arbitration.”

10 See E. Exhs. 3 & 2, respectively.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

2292
The Court noted an individual ADEA claimant subject to an
arbitration agreement was still free to file a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, even though
barred from instituting private judicial action.
In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465
(2009), the Court held the Gilmer Court’s interpretation of the
ADEA fully applied in the collective-bargaining context so that
a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement requiring un-
ion members to arbitrate ADEA claims was enforceable as a
matter of federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also expressed
judicial support for the use of arbitration in the employment
arena. See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d
1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[C]ompulsory arbitration agree-
ments are now common in the workplace, and it is not an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to require an em-
ployee to arbitrate, rather than litigate, rights under various
federal statues, including employment-discrimination stat-
utes”); Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2002) (“[A]rbitration agreements encompassing claims
brought under federal employment discrimination statutes have
also received near universal approval”).
I am not aware of any Board decision holding that an arbitra-
tion clause cannot lawfully prevent class action lawsuits or
joinder of arbitration claims. On the other hand, in Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1773–1775
(2010), the Supreme Court emphasized the consensual nature of
private dispute resolution and held “a party may not be com-
pelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there
is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so” (emphasis in original).
In light of the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the absence it
appears of direct Board precedent, I decline to conclude that the
provision in question violates Section 8(a)(1) by unlawfully
prohibiting employees from engaging in protected concerted
activities.
DOES THE MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT VIOLATE
SECTION 8(A)(4) AND (1) BY LEADING EMPLOYEES REASONABLY
TO BELIEVE THEY CANNOT FILE CHARGES WITH THE NLRB?
In at least two cases, the Board has dealt with the issue of
mandatory arbitration policies in unorganized work forces. In
U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375 (2006), enforcement
granted 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rehearing en banc
denied (2008), the Board addressed a mandatory arbitration
policy that enumerated various types of disputes and claims and
included “any other legal or equitable claims and causes of
action recognized by local, state or federal law or regulations.”
The Board held this language unlawful under Section 8(a)(4)
and (1) because employees reasonably could conclude they
were precluded from filing NLRB charges. Id. at 377–378.
The Board specifically rejected the respondent’s argument the
arbitration policy was not unlawful because the memo an-
nouncing it included the statement the “arbitration process is
limited to disputes, claims or controversies that a court of law
would be authorized to entertain or would have jurisdiction
over to grant relief.” As the Board explained (id.):

The reference to a “court of law” in this part of the
memo does not by its terms specifically exclude an
action governed by an administrative proceeding such
as one conducted by the National Labor Relations
Board. . . . Further, inasmuch as decisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board can be appealed to a
United States court of appeals, the reference to a
“court of law” does nothing to clarify that the arbitra-
tion policy does not extend to the filing of unfair la-
bor practice charges. While . . . it is the NLRB, and
not the individual, who presents the case to court, we
believe that most nonlawyer employees would not be
familiar with such intricacies of Federal court juris-
diction, and thus the language is insufficient to cure
the defects in the policy.

Similarly, in Bills Electric, Inc., 350 NLRB 292, 296 (2007),
the Board found unlawful a mandatory arbitration provision
providing that arbitration be “the exclusive method of resolu-
tion of all disputes,” although it expressly stated that “this shall
not be a waiver of any requirement for the Employee to timely
file any charge with the NLRB, EEOC, or any State Agency.”
As the Board stated, after analyzing all of the factors present,
“At the very least, the mandatory grievance and arbitration
policy would reasonably be read by affected applicants and
employees as substantially restricting, if not totally prohibiting,
their access to the Board’s processes.” Id.
The ultimate test it appears, then, is determining whether
nonlawyer employees would reasonably conclude they are
barred or restricted from filing NLRB charges. Although the
Respondent’s instructions to its supervisors clarified the right
of employees to access the Board’s processes, such was never
communicated to employees and therefore is of no operative
effect. I conclude the language of the mandatory arbitration
agreement, on its face, would lead employees reasonably to
believe they could not file charges with the Board.
Even if I deemed the language to be ambiguous, it is well
settled, as a general precept, ambiguous policies or rules that
reasonably could be interpreted as violative of employee rights
will be construed against the maker of the policy or rule and,
even if not followed, will be found to violate the Act. St. Fran-
cis Hotel, 260 NLRB 1259, 1260 (1982); see also Nor-
ris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992).
Accordingly, I conclude Respondent’s maintenance of the
mandatory arbitration agreement violates Section 8(a)(4) and
(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By maintaining a mandatory arbitration provision that
employees reasonably could believe bars or restricts their right
to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board, the
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act and violates Section 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act.
D. R. HORTON, INC.

2293
REMEDY
Because I have found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]