Douglas Raymond. Martin et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 21, 2020

14268000 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/268,000 05/02/2014 Douglas Raymond MARTIN 83384066 7896
28395 7590 02/21/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
BERHANU, SAMUEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DOUGLAS RAYMOND MARTIN and
ERICK MICHAEL LAVOIE
____________

Appeal 2019-000489
Application 14/268,000
Technology Center 2800
____________
Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, JEFFREY T. SMITH, and
DEBRA L. DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 In our Decision, we refer to the Specification (“Spec.”) of Application No.
14/268,000 filed May 19, 2016; the Final Office Action dated Feb. 15, 2018
(“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief filed July 16, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer dated Aug. 27, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed
Oct. 28, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
Appeal 2019-000489
Application 14/268,000

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–17 of Application 14/268,000, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.
The subject matter of the invention relates to recharging of vehicle
batteries and methods therefore. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1, reproduced below from
the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief, represents the claimed subject
matter:
1. A vehicle comprising:
a battery electrically connected to a charge plate; and
a controller programmed to wirelessly transmit an
association signal for a charge station prior to initiating
inductive charging such that charging the battery via the charge
plate is initiated and maintained by repeatedly wirelessly
transmitting the association signal, and responsive to an object
entering a vicinity of the charge plate, interrupt wireless
transmission of the association signal to stop the charging.
Appeal Br. (Claims App.) 1.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims
on appeal:

2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 14/268,000

3
Name Reference Date
Melocik et al.
(“Melocik”)
US 4,496,896 Jan. 29, 1985
Odachi et al.
(“Odachi”)
US 5,617,003 Apr. 1, 1997
Kamijo et al.
(“Kamijo”)
US 2009/0001932 A1 Jan. 1, 2009
Watanabe US 2010/0001687 A1 Jan. 7, 2010
Kondo et al.
(“Kondo”)
US 2010/0253153 A1 Oct. 7, 2010
Wechlin et al.
(“Wechlin”)
US 2012/0187757 A1 July 26, 2012
Obayashi et al.
(“Obayashi”)
US 2012/0200151 A1 Aug. 9, 2012
Dibben et al.
(“Dibben”)
WO 2009/081115 A1 July 2, 2009
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections of the claims under
35 U.S.C. § 1033:
A. Claims 1, 2, 10–12, 14, 15, and 17 over Melocik in view of
Watanabe, Obayashi, and Odachi.4
B. Claims 3, 4, 6–9, and 16 over Melocik in view of Watanabe,
Obayashi, Odachi, and Kamijo.
C. Claim 5 over Melocik, Watanabe, Obayashi, Odachi, Kamijo,
and Kondo.
D. Claim 13 over Melocik, Watanabe, Obayashi, Odachi, and
Dibben.

3 Because this application was filed after the March 16, 2013, effective date
of the America Invents Act, we refer to the AIA version of the statute.
4 We omit claim 13 because it is not discussed in the body of the rejection,
but is instead separately rejected in the fourth rejection over an additional
reference. The inclusion of claim 13 was harmless error given Appellant’s
treatment of claim 13 in the Brief. Appeal Br. 11.
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Application 14/268,000

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Final Act. 2–8.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential),
(cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011))
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”). After considering the
evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s arguments, we are
not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error in the rejection of
claims 1–13. We reverse the rejection of claims 14–16.
The Examiner rejects each of the independent claims—claims 1, 10,
and 14—over the combination of Melocik, Watanabe, Obayashi, and
Odachi. Final Act. 2–5. With regard to these claims, the Examiner finds
that Melocik discloses a vehicle comprising a battery (16) electrically
connected to a charge plate (ferromagnetic station bumper 18) and a
controller (modulator/demodulator 90). Final Act. 2–3 (citing Melocik Fig.
5; 2:55; 2:60–61, 3:5–7). Figure 5 of Melocik is reproduced below:
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Figure 5 is a block diagram of an embodiment of Melocik’s invention.
Melocik col. 2, ll. 39–40. The vehicle (right side of diagram) includes
battery (16) and vehicle bumper (18). Id. at col. 2, ll. 55–57. The charging
station (left side of diagram) has a ferromagnetic station bumper (20)
attached to a station surface. Id. at col. 2, ll. 60–62. Vehicle bumper (18)
includes second (28) and fourth (82) wire coils. Id. at col. 2, ll. 62–64; col.
3, ll. 5–6; col. 5, ll. 22–24. Vehicle bumper (18) and station bumper (20)
form respective magnetic flux path elements for the coils. Id. at col. 2, ll.
66–67; col. 3, ll. 8–10; col. 5, ll. 27–29. The various modulated signals
delivered to fourth coil (82) are, in response to the vehicle being positioned
at the predetermined location, inductively coupled to third coil (80) by
ferromagnetic bumpers (18, 20). Id. at col. 6, ll. 8–12.
The Examiner finds that Watanabe discloses a control module (battery
charge monitoring device with Power Line Communications (PLC) modem
141) programmed to transmit an association signal (vehicle ID signal) to a
charge station prior to initiating inductive charging. Final Act. 4 (citing
Watanabe Fig. 3). The Examiner finds that Watanabe teaches that the PLC
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modem of the control module activates, then transmits vehicle side ID
information before the charge switch turns on. Id. (citing steps S11–S16 of
Fig. 3). The Examiner finds that Watanabe teaches charging of the battery
via the charge plate is initiated and maintained by repeatedly transmitting the
association signal (vehicle ID). Id. (citing steps S20–S22 of Fig. 3).
The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (POSITA) to modify
Melocik’s charge control apparatus to send vehicle ID information
continuously during charging as taught by Watanabe in order to avoid
vehicle theft during charging and effectively extend vehicle battery life.
Final Act. 4.
The Examiner finds that Obayashi discloses foreign object detection
sensors and a control device. Final Act. 4 (citing Obayashi Fig. 2, ¶¶ 70,
92). The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to a
POSITA to use Obayashi’s foreign object sensors in Melocik’s apparatus as
modified by Watanabe because the resulting apparatus would be “capable of
reducing [an] effect from an electromagnetic field on a human body, an
animal, or the like at the time of performing a non-contact charging for a
vehicle.” Id.
The Examiner finds that Melocik’s two-way communication is
performed wirelessly. Ans. 5 (citing Melocik Abstract, Figs. 1–3). In
addition, the Examiner finds that Odachi discloses transmitting and
receiving vehicle ID wirelessly, thus disclosing wireless communication
means. Id. at 6 (citing Odachi 5:41–53; 10:36–43).
Appellant argues that independent claims 1, 10, and 14 are each
separately patentable based on each claim’s features. Appeal Br. 9–10.
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Appellant provides several arguments that apply to the claims as a group,
and we address those first, selecting claim 1 as representative. See id. at 3–
9.
First, Appellant argues that the combination of references “fails to
disclose or suggest the repeated transmission of an association signal from
the vehicle.” Appeal Br. 4.
Claim 1 recites “a controller programmed to wirelessly transmit an
association signal for a charge station prior to initiating inductive charging
such that charging the battery via the charge plate is initiated and maintained
by repeatedly wirelessly transmitting the association signal.” Appeal Br.
(Claims App. 1). The Specification does not define “association signal.”
See generally Spec. We give claims their broadest reasonable scope
consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367
F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The words used in a claim must be read
in light of the specification, as it would have been interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id.
The Specification describes an embodiment in which wireless
communication is used to complete an association procedure between a
vehicle and a vehicle charger. Spec. ¶ 19. The association procedure can
include a signal sent from the vehicle to the charger indicating a request for
authentication and a signal sent from the charger to the vehicle. Id.
A POSITA would have understood transmission of the vehicle side ID
of Watanabe to be equivalent to the claimed association signal. See Ans. 3.
Watanabe Figure 3 is reproduced below:
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Watanabe’s Figure 3 is a flow chart showing the content of the control
of a PLC unit, which is disposed on the plug-in hybrid vehicle side of a
plug-in vehicle/power source installation. Watanabe ¶¶ 37, 39. Of
significance to our decision, processing steps S20–S22 in Figure 3 are
repeatedly executed during battery charge. Watanabe ¶ 70. In step S20, the
control portion of the hybrid vehicle-side battery charge monitoring device
checks whether the battery charge is ended; in step S21, the control portion
checks whether the PLC modem is continuing the reception of the power
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source side ID sent by the power-source-side battery charge monitoring
device or detects the interruption of the reception; and in step S22, the
control portion transmits the identification information read from the vehicle
ID storing portion. Watanabe ¶¶ 70, 72. Thus, Watanabe discloses repeated
transmission of an association signal from the vehicle until the battery
charge is ended. Appellant’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive.
Appellant next argues that the combined references fail to disclose or
suggest “interrupting the transmission [of an association signal] in response
to a sensor detecting an object near the charge plate.” Appeal Br. 4. Claim
1 requires the controller to be programmed to interrupt wireless transmission
of the association signal to stop the charging in response to an object
entering a vicinity of the charge plate. Id. at Claims App. 1.
The Examiner relies on the combination of Melocik, Watanabe, and
Obayashi to teach interruption of transmission of an association signal in
response to a sensor detecting an object entering a vicinity of the charge
plate. See Final Act. 4.
Watanabe discloses that the power source side ID is sent repeatedly
over a predetermined time period X1, then pauses, then is sent repeatedly
over a predetermined time period X2, then pauses, and so on. Watanabe
¶ 71, Fig. 5. The control portion of the hybrid vehicle-side battery charge
monitoring device detects interruption of reception of the power source side
ID corresponding to the pauses, and does not proceed to the next step of
transmitting the vehicle side ID until it again detects the power source side
ID. Watanabe ¶ 72, Fig. 3. Therefore, the vehicle side ID is interrupted.
Obayashi teaches sensors 71–74 mounted on the periphery of a
vehicle that detect where a living body enters a predetermined detection
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range D2. Obayashi ¶ 70. Detection of a living body during the charging
process triggers limiting or restriction of the power supply to prevent the
effects of an electromagnetic field on the living body. Obayashi Abstract,
¶¶ 96, 97. As one example, Obayashi indicates that the power could be
restricted to an output of half of a normal value. See Obayashi ¶¶ 97, 106.
However, one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
reasonably would have read the reference to include restricting power such
that charging is stopped. Moreover, Obayashi also teaches that charging
may be stopped in a non-contact type power supply device using
electromagnetic induction if a foreign body is detected in the high-frequency
magnetic field. Obayashi ¶¶ 11, 13. A living body at the periphery of a
vehicle or a foreign body generating heat due to its presence within a high-
frequency magnetic field are both in the vicinity of the charge plate, which
the application shows as just behind the front bumper of a vehicle. See ’000
App., Fig. 1. A preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
finding that the combination of prior art suggesting interrupting the
transmission as required by claim 1.
Numerous arguments by Appellant fail because they are based on
attacking a reference individually where the rejection is based upon
teachings of a combination of references. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Each reference cited by the Examiner must be
read, not in isolation as Appellant does, but for what it fairly teaches in
combination with the prior art as a whole. See id. Because Appellant
attacks individual references, rather than the combined teachings of the
references, the following arguments do not persuade us that the Examiner
reversibly errs.
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Appellant contends that Melocik’s modulator/demodulator 90 “is not
a controller and does not meet the limitations of Appellant’s claimed
controller.” Appeal Br. 4–5. Appellant argues that Melocik’s modulator/de-
modulator is not the required controller and the Examiner’s finding to the
contrary is based on an unreasonable interpretation of the claim language,
i.e., a claim interpretation outside the bounds of the requirement of a
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the Specification. Id. at 5–
6.
The Examiner relies on a combination of Melocik, Watanabe,
Obayashi, and Odachi for disclosure of the controller and its functions. See
Final Act. 2–5. Melocik’s modulator/demodulator qualifies as a controller
(without the specific functionality claimed) at least for the reasons explained
in the Answer. See Ans. 3–4. For the controller functions in the claims, the
Examiner relies on Watanabe, Obayashi, and Odachi, not on Melocik’s
modulator/demodulator. See Final Act. 2–5; Ans. 3–4. Therefore, in
arguing that Melocik does not disclose the claimed controller, Appellant
improperly attacks Melocik individually, ignoring the Examiner’s findings
regarding Watanabe, Obayashi, and Odachi. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
Appellant’s argument regarding the broadest reasonable construction of the
claimed controller also is based on limiting the controller to that disclosed in
Melocik, ignoring the controller functions that the Examiner identifies in
Watanabe, Obayashi, and Odachi. See Appeal Br. 4–5.
Appellant argues the rejection relies (1) “on Watanabe as disclosing
repeated transmission of an association signal ‘and responsive to an object
entering a vicinity of the charge plate, interrupt wireless transmission of the
association signal to stop the charging,’” and (2) on Obayashi for disclosure
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of foreign object detection sensors and a control device that detects the
presence of a foreign object. Appeal Br. 6. Therefore, Appellant argues, the
references cited in the rejection do not disclose or suggest the claim
limitation for which they are relied upon. Id. Specifically, regarding (1),
Appellant contends that “Watanabe step S22 is performed in response to
reception of the power source side ID as determined in step S21,” and there
is no disclosure of any signal provided from a sensor detecting an object that
results in step S22 not being performed. Id. at 7. Appellant further argues
that step S22 is not performed when step S21 results in a “NO”
determination even though battery charging continues based on a “NO”
determination from step S20. Id.
These arguments ignore the result of the combination of Melocik,
Watanabe, and Obayashi. As discussed above at pages 8–9, Watanabe
discloses that the control portion of the hybrid vehicle-side battery charge
monitoring device detects interruption of reception of the power source side
ID corresponding to pauses, and does not proceed to the next step of
transmitting the vehicle side ID until it again detects the power source side
ID, resulting in interruption of the vehicle side ID. Watanabe ¶ 72, Fig. 3.
Obayashi teaches that detection of a living body during the charging process
triggers limiting or restriction of the power supply to prevent the effects of
an electromagnetic field on the living body. Obayashi Abstract, ¶¶ 96, 97.
In addition, Obayashi teaches that charging may be stopped (interrupted) in
a non-contact type power supply device using electromagnetic induction if a
foreign body is detected in the high-frequency magnetic field. Obayashi
¶¶ 11, 13. Thus, the Examiner relies on the combined disclosures of
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Melocik, Watanabe, and Obayashi—and not only Melocik and Watanabe—
to teach the disputed claim limitation.
Appellant argues that Watanabe does not disclose wirelessly
transmitting an association signal. Appeal Br. 7. It need not. The Examiner
relies on Odachi and Melocik for disclosing wireless two-way
communication. Ans. 5–6.
Appellant contends that Obayashi discloses corner sensors that detect
whether a living body is within range D2 of the corners of a vehicle, but fails
to disclose that the sensors are configured to output a detection signal while
an object is near the charge plate. Appeal Br. 8.
This argument is unpersuasive of error. Figure 7 of Obayashi
indicates that the detection range D2 of the sensors may extend to cover the
entirety of the front and back of a vehicle and a substantial portion of the
sides. See Obayashi Fig. 7. Both Melocik and the ’489 Application show a
charge plate located at or near the front bumper. See Melocik Fig. 1; ’000
App., Fig. 1. Thus, a POSITA would recognize that Obayashi’s sensors
would detect a living body “entering a vicinity of the charge plate.”
Appellant argues that Obayashi does not disclose stopping charging of
the vehicle when the sensors detect a living body, but rather discloses merely
reducing the charging current. Appeal Br. 8. As discussed above at page 9,
a POSITA would reasonably have read Obayashi to restrict power supply
sufficiently to stop charging of the vehicle. In addition, Obayashi teaches
that charging may be stopped in a non-contact type power supply device
using electromagnetic induction if a foreign body is detected in the high-
frequency magnetic field. Obayashi ¶¶ 11, 13. Therefore, Appellant’s
argument is unpersuasive.
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Finally, Appellant contends that Melocik discloses wired
communication and the rejection does not provide a proper motivation or
rationale for substituting Odachi’s wireless communications. Appeal Br. 8–
9. We disagree.
The Examiner finds that Melocik discloses wireless two-way
communication. Ans. 5–6 (citing Melocik Abstract, 5:21–24, 5:39–43,
5:48–50). In addition, the Examiner relies on Odachi for teaching wireless
transmission of a vehicle ID to the ground wireless receiver in an apparatus
for charging a battery of an electric vehicle. Final Act. 5. The Examiner’s
rationale for relying on Odachi (i.e., “for the benefit of flexibility, quickly
and easily transmit of the information” which we read as referring to easy
installation of communication between a vehicle and a charging station) is
sufficient “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” to
combine Odachi with Melocik, Watanabe, and Obayashi. See In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.”). Substituting Odachi’s wireless communications into
Melocik’s apparatus is merely substituting one known element for another to
yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
401 (2007). “Express suggestion to substitute one equivalent for another
need not be present to render such substitution obvious.” In re Fout, 675
F.2d 297, 301 (CCPA 1982). The Examiner’s explanation of the reasons a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have had to combine the teachings
of Melocik and Odachi is sufficient when an allowance is made for “the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
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Based on the reasoning above, Appellant’s arguments for patentability
of the claims in general is not persuasive of reversible error.

Whether claim 1 is separately patentable
Appellant argues that claim 1 is separately patentable because the
combined references taken as a whole fails to disclose or suggest “a
controller programmed to repeatedly wirelessly transmit an association
signal that is interrupted in response to an object entering a vicinity of the
charge plate.” Appeal Br. 9.
Our discussion above focuses on the specific claim language in claim
1. Therefore, for the reasons given, claim 1 is not patentable over the
combined cited prior art.
Whether claim 10 is separately patentable
Appellant argues that claim 10 is separately patentable because the
combined references fail to disclose that “the charge system provides energy
via the charge plate only in response to receiving the association signal and
only for a predetermined time period after receiving the association signal,
and to transmit a halt signal in response to an object entering a vicinity of the
charge plate.” Appeal Br. 9–10. In relation to claim 10, Appellant contends
that Obayashi does not teach stopping charging of the vehicle, but only
teaches reducing the charging current when a living body is detected. Id.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of reversible error for the
reasons given with respect to claim 1’s limitation of “interrupt[ing] wireless
transmission of the association signal to stop the charging” in response to an
object entering a vicinity of the charge plate above at pages 8 and 11.
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Whether claim 14 is separately patentable
Appellant argues that claim 14 is separately patentable because the
combined references fail to teach “transmitting an association signal from
the vehicle to a charge system and providing energy via a charge plate only
while receiving the association signal.” Appeal Br. 10 (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner makes findings regarding independent claims 1, 10,
and 14 collectively. See Final Act. 2–5. In relation to the disputed language
in claim 14, the Examiner identifies Watanabe as disclosing sending vehicle
ID information continuously during charging. Id. at 4. However, such
finding does not address the claim language “providing energy via a charge
plate only while receiving the association signal.”
Watanabe’s Figure 3 and related text teach transmitting vehicle side
ID (step S22) (identified by the Examiner as the association signal) until the
battery charge is ended, then turning the charge switch off (step S25).
Watanabe Fig. 3. Watanabe suggests that, unlike claim 14, battery charging
continues, once initiated, whether the vehicle side ID is transmitted or not.
See id. Therefore, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not made
a prima facie case of obviousness of claim 14 over the combined disclosures
of Melocik, Watanabe, Obayashi, and Odachi.
We do no sustain the rejection of claim 14. We, likewise, do not
sustain the rejection of claims 15–17 that depend from claim 14.
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CONCLUSION
WE AFFIRM IN PART THE EXAMINER’S DECISION TO REJECT
CLAIMS 1–17.DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§ 
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 10–
12, 14, 15,
17
§ 103(a)
Melocik, Watanabe,
Obayashi, Odachi 1, 2, 10–12 14, 15, 17
3, 4, 6–9,
16 § 103(a)
Melocik, Watanabe,
Odachi, Obayashi,
Kamijo
3, 4, 6–9 16
5 § 103(a)
Melocik, Watanabe,
Odachi, Obayashi,
Kamijo, Kondo
5
13 § 103(a)
Melocik, Watanabe,
Odachi, Obayashi,
Dibben
13
Overall
Outcome
1–13 14–17
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART