Douglas James. Mcewan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 2, 2019

14448259 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 2, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/448,259 07/31/2014 Douglas James McEwan 83452606 2481
28395 7590 10/02/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
ISMAIL, MAHMOUD S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
__________

Ex parte DOUGLAS JAMES MCEWAN,
CHRISTOPHER PAUL GLUGLA, MICHAEL DAMIAN CZEKALA, and
GARLAN J. HUBERTS
______________
__________

Appeal 2017-010530
Application 14/448,259
Technology Center 3600
__________

Before LINDA E. HORNER, ANNETTE R. REIMERS, and
SUSAN L. C. MITCHELL, Administrative Patent Judges.

REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–3 and 12–20. Claims 4–11 have been withdrawn
from consideration. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) 1, filed Feb. 7, 2017.

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject relates to systems “for vehicle data gathering and
analysis.” Spec. ¶ 1, Fig. 1. Claims 1 and 12 are independent.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter and recites:
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive identification of a vehicle system-
usage parameter to be tracked and a vehicle model
in which to track the parameter;
wirelessly transmit the parameter to vehicles
of the identified model;
receive usage data, of a system defined by the
parameter, gathered following parameter receipt,
from the wirelessly connected vehicles; and
report the usage data responsive to a
determination that the usage data indicates usage
below a predefined threshold.

REJECTIONS
I. Claim 1–3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
II. Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Tamir (US 2007/0027583 A1, published
Feb. 1, 2007) and Cooper (US 2014/0136025 A1, published
May 15, 2014).
III. Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Tamir, Cooper, and Cox (US 2015/0228129
A1, published Aug. 13, 2015).
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IV. Claims 12–16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Tamir and Cox.
V. Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Tamir, Cox, and Rill (US 2015/0254052 A1,
published Sept. 10, 2015).
VI. Claims 18 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Tamir, Cox, and Rector (US 2011/0137520
A1, published June 9, 2011).
VII. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Tamir, Cox, Rector, and Ross
(US 2006/0099944 A1, published May 11, 2006).

ANALYSIS
Rejection I – Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Claims 1–3
Appellant argues claims 1–3 as a group, and does not present
arguments for dependent claims 2 and 3 apart from the arguments presented
for the independent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 4–6. We select claim 1 as
representative, and claims 2 and 3 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014) (“Alice”).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012) (“Mayo”)). In accordance with that
framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Bilski”) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic
concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)
(“Flook”)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972) (“Benson”)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include
physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products”
(Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) (“Diehr”)); “tanning, dyeing,
making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at
182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and
manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
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view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance,
we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
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human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes);2 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see Manual for Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018)).3
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.4
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54‒56.
Analysis under the Revised Guidance
Preemption
Appellant contends that the claims do not preempt an abstract idea.
See Appeal Br. 5–6 (“If ‘reporting usage data’ is the alleged abstract idea,
then the claims obviously do not tie up this abstract idea such that others
cannot practice it.”).

2 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(1)”).
3 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(2)”).
4 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does
not demonstrate patent eligibility. See Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys.,
Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-
ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made moot”
by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We conduct such an
analysis below.
Step 1 – Statutory Category

Claim 1 as a system claim recites a processor, which is one of the
enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a
machine. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the claims are directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Step 2A(1) – Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determines that claim 1 “is directed to the concept of
reporting usage data, which is merely the automation of human activity and
an idea of itself, which is merely an abstract idea.” Final Act. 2; Ans. 4.5 In
particular, the Examiner determines that “[t]he process could be done by a
human analog (by hand or merely thinking).” Final Act. 2 (emphasis
omitted); Ans. 4 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant contends that “there is no law, case holding or statute that
provides or states that if a process could be done by hand, in some manner,
then the process is patent ineligible,” that “[a]lgorithms that represent purely
mental processes may indeed be patent ineligible, but this does not mean that

5 Final Office Action (“Final Act.”), dated Nov. 15, 2016; Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.”), dated June 7, 2017.
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the concept is expanded to: ‘if a human can do the claimed process, then the
process is patent ineligible’” and that “since this is not purely a mental
algorithm, requiring such steps as, for example, reporting usage data below a
predetermined threshold . . . , the exception for mental algorithms does not
apply.” Appeal Br. 4.
As to Step 2A(1), which analyzes whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, we determine that the claims recite mental processes that could be
performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper. See
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (identifying mental processes as an
abstract idea subject matter grouping, wherein mental processes are
described as “concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion”)); id., n.14 (quoting Intellectual
Ventures 1 LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is
nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed
by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”)).
Here, for example, claim 1 recites “receive identification of a vehicle
system-usage parameter to be tracked and a vehicle model in which to track
the parameter.” The Specification describes examining actual vehicle usage
compared to expected vehicle usage to determine, for example, if design
changes or changes to demographic end-users is warranted. Spec. ¶ 34. The
Specification describes that “utilization of vehicle features can be tracked to
know what people want/use, and what people don’t want or may just don’t
know about.” Id. We understand this claim limitation to encompass a user
selecting, through evaluation and judgment, which vehicle system-usage
parameter for the vehicle model that the user wants to track and sending that
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selection to the processor as an input. Such an act of selecting the usage
parameter and model to be tracked can be performed by human judgment in
the human mind and by using pen and paper to receive identification of the
usage parameter and the vehicle model in which the usage parameter is to be
tracked.
Claim 1 also recites “receive usage data, of a system defined by the
parameter, gathered following parameter receipt, from the wirelessly
connected vehicles.” The Specification describes that “[t]he data gathered,
for example, in the process shown in Figure 2 is received by the process
301.” Spec. ¶ 35. Claim 1 does not recite that the claimed processor
actually gathers the data. In fact, the Specification describes, with reference
to Figure 2, a separate process running on a vehicle system that gathers the
vehicle data. Id. ¶ 29. The claimed processor merely receives the data
relevant to the selected usage parameter. This step could be performed
through human observation, wherein a human mind using pen and paper can
receive the gathered usage data from the vehicle of the identified model.
Claim 1 further recites “report the usage data responsive to a
determination that the usage data indicates usage below a predefined
threshold.” Claim 1 does not recite that the claimed processor actually
determines if the usage data falls below a predefined threshold. Rather,
claim 1 recites that the claimed processor merely reports such usage data
responsive to a determination, possibly performed elsewhere, that the usage
data falls below the threshold. The function of reporting data can be
performed by a human mind using pen and paper. Thus, these limitations,
under the broadest reasonable interpretation, are steps that can be performed
by a human mind, mentally or with pen and paper.
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Accordingly, under Step 2A(1), we conclude that claim 1 recites
mental processes, and thus, a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea.
Step 2A(2) – Is the Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical
Application?
Because the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, we proceed to
the “practical application” Step 2A, second prong, in which we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
The Revised Guidance is “designed to more accurately and consistently
identify claims that recite a practical application of a judicial exception []
and thus are not ‘directed to’ a judicial exception.” Revised Guidance 53.
In this case, claim 1 recites the additional limitation (b), “wirelessly transmit
the parameter to vehicles of the identified model.” The additional elements
of claim 1 include, “a processor configured to” perform each of the recited
steps, and the recited step of “wirelessly transmit[ting] the parameter to
vehicles of the identified model.”
Appellant contends that “the claims are not simply directed to any
form of gathering and reporting data, but instead are directed to gathering
specific data from specific vehicle models and reporting the data when usage
of the specific parameter is below a specified threshold” and that “the claims
actually do improve existing technology, by allowing an [original equipment
manufacturer] OEM to gather vehicle data on a specific model of vehicles
on the road, which data indicates systems that are being underutilized.”
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Appeal Br. 4–5; see also Reply Br. 26 (“[T]he claim solves the problem of
tracking a feature usage on a particular line of vehicles, by sending tracking
parameters to the specific models in that line, and receiving usage data,
which can then be used to determine and report if a certain feature is
underused in those vehicles.”).
As an initial matter, we note that several of the functions of claim 1
are not positively recited and thus are not required to be performed by the
recited processor. For example, claim 1 does not positively recite that the
processor gathers the usage data or determines whether the usage data is
below a threshold. Rather, the claim only requires the processor to receive
usage data that has been gathered and to report the data responsive to a
determination that the usage data is below a threshold. See Appeal Br. 12
(Claims App.). Additionally, Appellant does not adequately explain how an
original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM’s) gathering of vehicle data
indicative of underutilized systems on a specific vehicle model provides
improvements and enhancements to computer-related technology. See
Appeal Br. 4–5; see also Reply Br. 2.
The Specification describes that “[c]onnected vehicle services provide
a wide variety of customer benefits through wireless communication to and
from the vehicle” (Spec. ¶ 2) and that “[i]n one illustrative embodiment, the
system 1 uses the BLUETOOTH transceiver 15 to communicate 17 with a
user’s nomadic device 53 (e.g., cell phone, smart phone, PDA, or any other
device having wireless remote network connectivity)” (id. ¶ 16) (emphasis
added). The Specification further describes that in certain embodiments, the

6 Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed Aug. 7, 2017.
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processes “may be executed by a computing system in communication with
a vehicle computing system” and that “[s]uch a system may include, but is
not limited to, a wireless device (e.g., and without limitation, a mobile
phone) or a remote computing system (e.g., and without limitation, a server)
connected through the wireless device.” Id. ¶ 26 (emphases added).
The Specification also describes that “[t]he processor is . . . provided
with a number of different inputs allowing the user to interface with the
processor” (id. ¶ 14) (emphasis added), that “[o]utputs to the system can
include, but are not limited to, a visual display 4 and a speaker 13 or stereo
system output” (id. ¶ 15) (emphasis added), and that [n]umerous examples of
data analysis and generated results are considered to be within the scope of
this disclosure” (id. ¶ 66) (emphases added).
Upon review of Appellant’s Specification, a preponderance of the
evidence supports a determination that the “wireless transmission” of the
identified parameter to vehicles of the identified model to be tracked, and the
receipt of the tracked data is nothing more than generic computer
functionality. Similarly, receiving identification of the parameter and model
to be tracked is simply receiving inputs to the processor (generic computer
functionality) and reporting the data is simply outputs from the processor
(generic computer functionality). See MPEP 2106.05(f) (“As explained by
the Supreme Court, in order to transform a judicial exception into a patent-
eligible application, the additional element or combination of elements must
do ‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words
‘apply it’” (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 222–26) (alteration in original)).
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Although acknowledging that hardware and software can make non-
abstract improvements to computer technology,7 we determine that claim 1
as a whole (i.e., including wirelessly transmitting the parameter to the
vehicle of the identified model) is not a practical application of the abstract
idea identified in Step 2A(1) above.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
The 2019 Guidance further explains that “[i]t is possible that a claim
that does not ‘integrate’ a recited judicial exception into a practical
application is nonetheless patent eligible,” for example, because “the claim
may recite additional elements that render the claim patent eligible even
though a judicial exception is recited in a separate claim element.” See
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. In other words, a claim may still be
patent eligible if “the additional elements recited in the claims provided
‘significantly more’ than the recited judicial exception (e.g., because the
additional elements were unconventional in combination).” Id.
The Examiner determines that claim 1 “do[es] not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because they are merely an abstract idea with additional generic
computer elements.” Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 5. In particular, the
Examiner determines that the processor of the subject invention “is
generically recited and can merely be a general purpose computer that
performs basic computer functions of detecting, generating, and comparing
data, which are all well-understood, routine and conventional” (Ans. 5) and

7 See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, n.11 (citing Finjan Inc. v. Blue
Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) and Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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that “[t]he processor is generically recited and is merely used for receiving,
transmitting, and reporting in a well-understood, routine, and conventional
way” (Final Act. 3).
The Specification describes that:
[T]he processor is connected to both non-persistent 5 and
persistent storage 7. In this illustrative embodiment, the non-
persistent storage is random access memory (RAM) and the
persistent storage is a hard disk drive (HDD) or flash memory.
In general, persistent (non-transitory) memory can include all
forms of memory that maintain data when a computer or other
device is powered down. These include, but are not limited to,
HDDs, CDs, DVDs, magnetic tapes, solid state drives, portable
USB drives and any other suitable form of persistent memory.

Spec. ¶ 13 (emphases added).
The Specification further describes that “[i]n each of the illustrative
embodiments discussed herein, an exemplary, non-limiting example of a
process performable by a computing system is shown” (Spec. ¶ 27)
(emphasis added), that “[a]ll processes need not be performed in their
entirety, and are understood to be examples of types of processes that may be
performed to achieve elements of the invention” (id.) (emphases added), and
that “[t]his illustrative non-limiting process focuses on data gathering and
analysis related to vehicle and vehicle feature use” (id. ¶ 35) (emphasis
added).
Upon review of Appellant’s Specification, a preponderance of the
evidence supports a determination that the Specification describes the
processor performs conventional functions of receiving, transmitting, and
reporting data. As such, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not
provide meaningful limitations to transform the abstract idea into a patent
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eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claims amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Ans. 4–6; see also Final
Act. 2–4.
Therefore, based upon the findings and legal conclusions above, on
this record and in consideration of the Revised Guidance, we are not
persuaded that claim 1 is directed to patent-eligible subject matter, such that
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter.
Rejection II – Obviousness over Tamir and Cooper
Claims 1 and 2
The Examiner finds that Tamir discloses the system of claim 1
substantially as claimed except “Tamir does not explicitly mention receive
usage data, of a system defined by the parameter, gathered following
parameter receipt, from the wirelessly connected vehicles; and report the
usage data responsive to a determination that the usage data indicates usage
below a predefined threshold.” Final Act. 8–9. The Examiner looks to the
teachings of Cooper for these limitations. Final Act. 9–10. In particular, the
Examiner finds that the “monitored characteristics” disclosed in Cooper
constitute the recited “usage data.” See Final Act. 10; see also Ans. 9
(“Cooper will report the monitored characteristics (usage data) once it drops
below a threshold (an anomaly is indicated)” (citing Cooper ¶ 179)).
Appellant contends that “[n]othing in Cooper teaches that ‘a
monitored characteristic’ has anything to do with ‘usage data, of a system
defined by the parameter.’” Appeal Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 3 (“Reporting
characteristics of a vehicle, such as engine temperature, has literally nothing
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to do with ‘usage data of a system defined by a parameter’ and reporting
‘when that usage falls below a threshold.’”).
Appellant has the better position here. Cooper discloses that:
With respect to the vehicles 1908, one or more on-board sensors
2102 may be disposed on-board the vehicles 1908 to detect
anomalies related to the vehicles 1908 (e.g., mechanical failure
or characteristics of operation that indicate an impending
mechanical failure). The on-board sensors 2102 can monitor
operational characteristics of the vehicle 1908 to determine if an
anomaly related to the vehicle 1908 occurs.

Cooper ¶ 178, Fig. 21. Cooper also discloses that “the sensors 2102 may
report the characteristics to the control system 1918 when the characteristics
indicate an anomaly (e.g., exceed or fall below a threshold).” Id. ¶ 179.
Appellant’s Specification differentiates between what may constitute
a vehicle “parameter” and what may constitute “usage data” related to a
“vehicle system-usage parameter.” See Spec. ¶¶ 31 (discussing various
vehicle parameters), 36 (discussing examples of vehicle use parameters), 37
(discussing examples of vehicle feature use parameters). For example, the
Specification describes “traffic data” as a “vehicle system parameter” to be
tracked and further describes “types of driving (highway, city, offroad,
etc.))” as “usage data” to be gathered based on that system defined
parameter. See Spec. ¶¶ 31, 36.
A comparison between Appellant’s disclosure and Cooper’s
disclosure would appear to equate Cooper’s “monitored characteristics,”
which indicate “mechanical failure or characteristics of operation that
indicate an impending mechanical failure,” with Appellant’s vehicle
“parameters,” which are indicative of “relevant data that may be useful in
identifying vehicle problems.” See Spec. ¶ 31. In this case, the Examiner
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fails to provide sufficient evidence or technical reasoning to establish that
Cooper’s “monitored characteristics” constitute the claimed “usage data”
related to a vehicle system-usage parameter. Final Act. 9–10; see also Ans.
9.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 2 as unpatentable over Tamir and
Cooper.
Rejection III – Obviousness over Tamir, Cooper, and Cox
Claim 3
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 as unpatentable over Tamir,
Cooper, and Cox is based on the same unsupported findings and conclusions
in Cooper discussed above with respect to independent claim 1. See Final
Act. 11–12. The Examiner does not rely on the teachings of Cox to remedy
the deficiencies of Cooper. Accordingly, for reasons similar to those
discussed above for claim 1, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 3 as unpatentable over Tamir, Cooper, and Cox.
Rejection IV – Obviousness over Tamir and Cox
Claims 12–16
Appellant does not offer arguments in favor of dependent claims 13–
16 separate from those presented for independent claim 12. See Appeal
Br. 10. We select claim 12 as the representative claim, and claims 13–16
stand or fall with claim 12. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Tamir discloses the system of claim 12
substantially as claimed, including “determin[ing] the user-demographic for
vehicle occupants when the vehicle system is used.” Final Act. 12–13. The
Examiner finds that Tamir fails to disclose wirelessly receiving, from a
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remote system, a system-parameter and a user-demographic for tracking. Id.
at 13. The Examiner looks to the teachings of Cox for this limitation. In
particular, the Examiner finds that Cox discloses wirelessly receiving, from
a remote system, a “user-demographic for tracking.” Id. at 13–14.
Appellant contends Tamir fails to disclose “determine the user-
demographic for vehicle occupants when the vehicle system is used.”
Appeal Br. 9. In particular, Appellant contends that:
Detecting a number of passengers is: 1) not demographic
tracking; 2) not taught to be done when a particular system is
used (the teaching is that passenger count is detected in general,
not detected when a system is used); and 3) not a defined
demographic parameter wirelessly received by the vehicle from
a remote system.

Id.
As an initial matter, dependent claim 16 recites “[t]he system of
claim 12, wherein the user-demographic includes number of occupants.”
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Thus, Appellant fails to
apprise us as to how the Examiner’s reliance on Tamir’s disclosure of
“number of passengers” as constituting the claimed “user-demographic” for
tracking is in error. See Appeal Br. 9; see also Final Act. 12–13.
Tamir discloses that “[i]n some embodiments of the invention, the
warning thresholds are adjusted responsive to the number of passengers in
vehicle 150. The number of passengers may be determined according to
sensors under the passenger seats [and] based on acceleration readings.”
Tamir ¶ 184; see also Final Act. 12–13. Tamir also discloses that “[i]n one
embodiment, the warning system warns the driver when dangerous behavior
is identified, such as driving much faster or much slower than other vehicles
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currently on the road.” Tamir ¶ 5 (emphasis added). Tamir further
discloses that “[o]utput unit 118 optionally displays information on the road
segment on which vehicle 150 is currently driving, for example the speed
limit, the average vehicle speed and/or warnings on construction” and that
“[a]lternatively or additionally, to controlling vehicle 150 when a dangerous
situation is anticipated, safety measures are taken, so as to protect the
passengers, such as tightening seat belts, doubling braking system power
and/or cocking the airbag system.” Tamir ¶¶ 203 (emphasis added), 207
(emphasis added).
Upon review of the above cited disclosure from Tamir, we disagree
with Appellant’s contentions that detecting a number of passengers in Tamir
is “not demographic tracking” and is “not taught to be done when a
particular system is used.” See Appeal Br. 9. Thus, Appellant has not
apprised us of error in the Examiner’s finding that Tamir discloses
“determine the user-demographic for vehicle occupants when the vehicle
system is used,” as recited in claim 12. Final Act. 12–13; see also Appeal
Br. 14 (Claims App.). As to Appellant’s contention that Tamir fails to
disclose a “demographic parameter wirelessly received by the vehicle from a
remote system” (Appeal Br. 9), the Examiner relies on the teachings of Cox,
not Tamir, for this limitation. See Final Act. 13–14.
Appellant contends that although paragraph 57 of Cox discloses that
“a user profile can include user demographic information,” “the mere fact
that a user profile includes demographic information does not mean that:
a) the demographic information is wirelessly transmitted to the vehicle; or,
more importantly, b) that a demographic “for tracking” is wirelessly
transmitted to the vehicle.” Appeal Br. 10.
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Cox discloses that “[a]s an alternative or variation, the usage models
435 can reflect a driver type (aggressive or careful etc.) [or] driver
demographic (e.g., young, over 40, male/female etc.)” and that “[t]he usage
store 435 can be maintained to track use of a given vehicle for each user
model (i.e., driver) associated with that vehicle.” Cox ¶¶ 86, 87 (emphasis
added); see also Final Act. 14. Cox also discloses that “[t]he wireless
communication device 250 can enable wireless transmission and exchange
of data between the vehicle monitor device 20 and one or more network
services 201” and that “[i]n one implementation, the wireless
communication device 250 can transmit and receive data using a cellular
communication medium. In variation, the wireless communication device
250 can transmit and receive data using a local communication medium.”
Cox ¶¶ 39 (emphasis added), 40 (emphases added), Figs. 1, 2; see also Final
Act. 13–14.
Upon review of the above cited disclosure from Cox and under the
broadest reasonable interpretation, a preponderance of the evidence supports
the Examiner’s finding that Cox discloses a demographic “for tracking” that
is wirelessly transmitted to the vehicle. See Final Act. 13–14. Appellant
does not provide persuasive evidence or argument to the contrary. Appeal
Br. 10.
In summary, and based on the record presented, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 12 as unpatentable over
Tamir and Cox. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim
12. We further sustain the rejection of claims 13–16, which fall with claim
12.

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Rejections V through VII – Obviousness over Tamir, Cox, and either Rill or
Rector or Obviousness over Tamir, Cox, Rector, and Ross
Claims 17–20
Appellant contends that the teachings of Rill, Rector, or Ross do not
“cure the deficiencies of Tamir and Cox.” See Appeal Br. 10–11. As we
find no deficiencies in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12 as unpatentable
over Tamir and Cox for the reasons discussed above, we likewise sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 17–20.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–3 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
We REVERSE the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1 and 2
as unpatentable over Tamir and Cooper.
We REVERSE the decision of the Examiner to reject claim 3 as
unpatentable over Tamir, Cooper, and Cox.
We AFFIRM the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 12–16 as
unpatentable over Tamir and Cox.
We AFFIRM the decision of the Examiner to reject claim 17 as
unpatentable over Tamir, Cox, and Rill.
We AFFIRM the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 18 and 19
as unpatentable over Tamir, Cox, and Rector.
We AFFIRM the decision of the Examiner to reject claim 20 as
unpatentable over Tamir, Cox, Rector, and Ross.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED