Doubletree Guest Suites Santa Monica

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 2006

347 N.L.R.B. 782 (N.L.R.B. 2006)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
347 NLRB No. 72
782
Doubletree Guest Suites Santa Monica and Hotel
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union Lo-
cal 11, Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employ-
ees International Union.1 Case 31–CA–26242
July 31, 2006
DECISION AND ORDER REMANDING
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, SCHAUMBER, AND KIRSANOW
On September 19, 2003, Administrative Law Judge
Jay R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and
supporting briefs; the Respondent filed an answering
brief; and the General Counsel and the Charging Party
filed reply briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
remand this proceeding to the judge for further findings,
analysis, and conclusions consistent with this Decision.
At issue here is whether the judge erred in finding that
a settlement agreement in an earlier proceeding2 bars the
finding of the violation alleged in the instant complaint.
For the reasons set forth below, we find that the settle-
ment agreement must be set aside because there was no
“meeting of the minds” between the Respondent and the
General Counsel. Thus, solely with respect to certain
allegations, explained below, in the earlier consolidated
complaint, we will set aside the settlement in the earlier
proceeding, reinstate those allegations, and remand those
allegations together with those in the instant complaint to
the judge for further consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Cases 31–CA–25696 and 31–CA–25891
On November 25, 2002, the Regional Director issued a
consolidated complaint alleging, inter alia, that around
May 2002 the Respondent promulgated in its employee
handbook the following overly broad rule (which we will
hereinafter call the “jewelry rule” or “jewelry policy”):
Jewelry should be professional and conservative. The
only pins or decorations that may be worn on uniforms
are nametags, language pins, service awards, and other
pins approved by Hotel management for special pro-
motions or activities. Union team members may
wear one official union button to show union mem-
bership. The maximum number of pins permitted be-
yond the nametag is two. Non-uniformed female team

1 We have amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of UNITE
HERE from the AFL–CIO effective September 14, 2005.
2 The consolidated complaint in the earlier proceeding included
Cases 31–CA–25696 and 31–CA–25891.
members may wear one conservative pin or broach.
[Emphasis added.]
The complaint also alleged that about September 2002,
the Respondent modified the jewelry rule by deleting the
sentence providing that “[u]nion team members may
wear one official union button to show union member-
ship.” The complaint alleged that the modified jewelry
rule was overbroad in that it unlawfully restricted em-
ployees from wearing union buttons or insignia.
B. The Settlement Agreement
On January 28, 2003,3 the Respondent participated in a
settlement conference at the Region 31 office and signed
an informal settlement agreement providing, among
other things, for the posting of a notice by the Respon-
dent and compliance with its terms. The agreement pro-
vided that the notice was to state, inter alia:
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce any
rule or dress code provision that discriminatorily pro-
hibits our employees from wearing union insignia or
buttons, or that requires our approval before doing so. .
. [Emphasis added].
WE WILL rescind and/or modify the rules and provi-
sions of our Team Member handbook to conform to the
foregoing undertakings AND WE WILL notify our em-
ployees that we have done so.
The Union did not participate in the settlement confer-
ence. Although the Union was informed that it could
join in or object to the settlement agreement, it did nei-
ther. The agreement was approved by the Regional Di-
rector on February 7. By letter dated February 10, the
Regional Director informed the Union that, in view of
the settlement agreement, he had withdrawn the com-
plaint and that any appeal of his decision was to be filed
by the close of business February 24. No appeal was
filed.
By letter to Region 31 dated March 4, the Respondent
sought clarification regarding the required alterations to
various provisions of its employee handbook, including
the jewelry rule. In that letter the Respondent stated its
understanding that the jewelry rule, “as previously re-
vised [i.e., as revised in September 2002 to delete the
sentence concerning “[u]nion team members”], complies
with the Settlement Agreement. Hotel will not discrimi-
natorily enforce this provision.” By letter dated March
10, the Region stated to the Respondent that the settle-
ment agreement “provides that the Employer will rescind
and/or modify the rules and provisions of its Team
Member handbook to conform to the Notice provisions
and notify its employees that it has done so.”

3 All dates hereafter are 2003 unless otherwise indicated.
DOUBLETREE GUEST SUITES SANTA MONICA 783
II. CASE 31–CA–26242
On June 30, the Region issued a complaint alleging
that the Respondent, about February 6, “orally promul-
gated an ad hoc rule prohibiting employees from wearing
union buttons and/or insignia” in violation of Section
8(a)(1). The complaint further alleged that about April 1,
the Respondent repeated “the oral ad hoc rule cited
above. . . . [The rule] is overbroad in that it unlawfully
restricts employees from wearing union buttons and/or
insignia.”
At the hearing on the instant complaint, the General
Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege as vio-
lative of Section 8(a)(1) the “revised written rule” – that
is, the jewelry rule as modified in September 2002. In so
moving, the General Counsel stated: “It is the Region’s
decision that based on Respondent’s admission they did
not rescind their modified rule which we thought to be a
violation.” The amendment was granted.
At the hearing, the Respondent’s attorney, Adam
Abrahms, testified that, at the January 28 settlement con-
ference, he had stated that the Respondent had special
circumstances justifying its jewelry rule and had ex-
plained what those special circumstances were.4 He also
testified that at the settlement conference, he suggested
that the proposed notice be amended to add the word
“discriminatorily” because the initial jewelry rule al-
lowed union-represented employees to wear a button and
did not allow nonrepresented employees to wear a but-
ton.5 The judge asked Abrahms whether there was any
discussion about rescinding the jewelry rule, and
Abrahms replied:
[Y]es, to the extent that we made it clear that that was a
sticking point for the Hotel, that it felt that it had a valid
business need, and wanted to maintain that policy, and
would not agree to settle without—without an ac-
knowledgement that that policy was able to go forward,
and that they could continue to enforce it as long as

4 An employer may lawfully restrict employees from wearing union
insignia during working time only if it demonstrates “special circum-
stances” justifying the prohibition. Special circumstances include
circumstances in which the wearing of union insignia “may jeopardize
employee safety, damage machinery or products, exacerbate employee
dissension, or unreasonably interfere with a public image that the em-
ployer has established,” or where a ban on union insignia is “necessary
to maintain decorum and discipline among employees.” Smithfield
Packing Co., 344 NLRB 1 fn. 20 (2004) (internal quotations omitted),
enfd. sub nom. Food Commercial Workers Local 204 v. NLRB, Nos.
05–1004, –1131, –1229, 2006 WL 1192736 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 2006).
5 The paragraph in the proposed notice had read:
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce any rule or dress code
provision that prohibits our employees from wearing union insignia or
buttons, or that requires our approval before doing
so. . . .
they enforced it non-discriminatorily, which is why the
“discriminatorily” is added in there.
Abrahms was then asked, “Was that what was ultimately
agreed to, by the parties?” He replied, “Yeah, after some
discussion, that is what was brought back to us.”
III. THE JUDGE’S DECISION
The judge found that the Regional Director approved
the settlement agreement on March 10, and that “[o]n
March 4, prior to the Regional Director’s approval of
the settlement agreement, the Respondent’s attorney
wrote [to the Region] that the Jewelry Policy was lawful
and did not need to be modified or rescinded” (emphasis
added).6 The judge then found that,
[n]otwithstanding this clear language, the Regional Di-
rector approved the settlement agreement. Thus, the
General Counsel permitted the language of the Jewelry
Policy to remain while other provisions of the em-
ployee handbook were modified or rescinded. There is
no evidence that Respondent did not comply with the
settlement agreement and the General Counsel did not
seek to set aside the settlement agreement.
The judge observed that, under well-established law, a set-
tlement agreement, complied with, bars litigation of pre-
settlement conduct. The judge then cited, inter alia, Ratliff
Trucking Corp., 310 NLRB 1224 (1993), for the proposi-
tion that, under limited circumstances, a settlement agree-
ment may also bar litigation of postsettlement conduct
grounded in pre-settlement conduct that would itself be
settlement-barred from litigation. Applying that principle
here, the judge found that, because the Regional Director
approved the settlement agreement after having received the
March 4 letter stating the Respondent’s belief that the jew-
elry rule complies with that agreement, the jewelry rule
constitutes presettlement conduct that cannot be relied upon
as evidence to support allegations of unlawful postsettle-
ment maintenance and enforcement of the jewelry rule.
Accordingly, the judge dismissed the complaint. The Gen-
eral Counsel and the Charging Party except.
IV. ANALYSIS
We may quickly dispose of the judge’s stated basis for
dismissing the complaint. As noted above, the Regional
Director approved the settlement agreement on February
7, not March 10. Thus, contrary to the judge’s finding,
when the Regional Director approved the settlement, he
did not have before him the Respondent’s March 4 letter
setting forth its understanding of the agreement. Because
the judge’s settlement-bar finding rests on this factual

6 As noted earlier, and contrary to the judge’s statement, the dates on
the settlement agreement show that the Regional Director approved the
agreement on February 7.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD784
error, that finding must be reversed, the instant complaint
reinstated, and the case remanded to the judge. To do
only that would, however, leave unresolved the larger
issue of the viability of the settlement agreement itself,
and thus of whether the allegations in the Consolidated
Complaint in Cases 31–CA–25696 and –25891 pertain-
ing to the jewelry rule should also be reinstated. We
could include that issue within the scope of the remand
and leave it for the judge to decide in the first instance.
We are mindful, however, of the age of this case, and the
parties’ briefs have fully apprised us of the relevant ar-
guments. Accordingly, we shall address that issue here.
As the Supreme Court has observed, the Board’s pol-
icy from its earliest days has been to encourage voluntary
settlement of labor disputes. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248, 253–254 (1944). We strongly reaffirm
that policy here. Where, however, the parties’ different
understandings of the language of a settlement agreement
warrant the conclusion that there was no meeting of the
minds, the agreement must be set aside. Howard Elec-
trical & Mechanical, 293 NLRB 472, 472 fn. 2, 490
(1989), enfd. mem. 931 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1991). That is
the case here.
To begin with, the notice provision at issue is ambigu-
ous, and neither of the interpretations advanced by the
parties resolves the ambiguity. Again, the revised provi-
sion reads:
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce any
rule or dress code provision that discriminatorily pro-
hibits our employees from wearing union insignia or
buttons, or that requires our approval before doing so.
The General Counsel and Charging Party contend that,
in addition to precluding a “prior approval” rule, the re-
vised provision unambiguously prohibits banning the
wearing of union insignia or buttons. In the General
Counsel’s words, the provision simply means that em-
ployees “were free to wear Union buttons.” That inter-
pretation fails, however, to give any effect to the word
“discriminatorily,” which the Region agreed to add to a
provision that already meant exactly what the General
Counsel says the revised provision means. Thus, the
General Counsel’s and Charging Party’s reading of the
provision makes the word “discriminatorily” mere sur-
plusage.
The Respondent, on the other hand, interprets the re-
vised provision to permit it to maintain and enforce its
jewelry rule as modified in September 2002, provided
that it does not discriminate in the application of the rule
by permitting only represented employees to wear a un-
ion button. This reading, too, fails to give effect to a
portion of the notice provision, namely, the clause “or
that requires our approval before doing so.” For if the
provision means that the Respondent may prohibit union
buttons (provided it does so across the board), the prohi-
bition of any prior approval requirement becomes mean-
ingless.
Additionally, extrinsic evidence in the form of
Abrahms’ testimony does not resolve the provision’s
ambiguity.7 With respect to his own statements at the
settlement conference, Abrahms’ testimony was rea-
sonably specific; but regarding the discussion at that con-
ference between himself and the Region’s representa-
tives, Abrahms testified in a vague, conclusory fashion.
Thus, after Abrahms testified that he told the Region that
the Respondent would not agree to settle “without an
acknowledgement that that policy [the jewelry rule] was
able to go forward, and that they [Respondent] could
continue to enforce it as long as they enforced it nondis-
criminatorily, which is why the ‘discriminatorily’ is
added in there,” the judge asked Abrahms, “Was that
what was ultimately agreed to, by the parties?” and he
replied, “Yeah, after some discussion, that is what was
brought back to us.” Abrahms’ response to the judge’s
question—”after some discussion, that is what was
brought back to us”—did not include any specific con-
tent of the parties’ exchange after his proposal to add the
word “discriminatorily” to the notice provision. More-
over, although it is uncertain what “that” refers to in
“that is what was brought back to us,” in context the
most likely referent seems to be the modified notice pro-
vision itself. In other words, Abrahms’ parol evidence
purportedly offered to clarify that ambiguous provision
appears to circle back to the ambiguous provision itself.
Thus, we cannot conclude from his testimony that the
Regional representatives’ understanding of the revised
provision was the same as Abrahms’.
Next, as explained above, the judge’s finding of a set-
tlement bar relied on his inadvertently mistaken belief
that the Regional Director had received the Respondent’s
March 4 letter before approving the settlement agree-
ment. Setting that mistake aside, however, some residual
concern may linger from the fact that the Regional Direc-
tor did not expressly reject the Respondent’s March 4

7 The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that the pa-
rol evidence rule should have barred receipt of Abrahms’ testimony.
We disagree. Under the parol evidence rule, evidence of prior or con-
temporaneous statements is inadmissible if offered for the purpose of
varying or contradicting the terms of a contract. When a contract’s
meaning is ambiguous, however, parol evidence is admissible for the
purpose of resolving that ambiguity. See, e.g., Sansla, Inc., 323 NLRB
107, 109 (1997). Here, Abrahms’ testimony was offered in order to
ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous term in the settlement agree-
ment, and not to vary its terms. Therefore, the parol evidence rule does
not bar Abrahms’ testimony.
DOUBLETREE GUEST SUITES SANTA MONICA 785
assertion “that the Jewelry Policy was lawful and did not
need to be modified or rescinded.” We would not accord
significance to the lack of a specific response. In a letter
to the Respondent dated March 10, the Regional Director
did not acquiesce in the Respondent’s understanding of
the notice provision regarding the jewelry policy. In-
stead, the Region’s March 10 letter simply reiterated the
relevant language of the settlement agreement, stating
that it “provides that the Employer will rescind and/or
modify the rules and provisions of its team member
handbook to conform to the notice provisions and notify
its employees that it has done so.” The Regional Direc-
tor reasonably could have decided that his nonacquies-
cence in the Respondent’s interpretation would suffice to
put the Respondent on notice that it ought not to rely on
that interpretation.
Finally, as there can be many reasons why the Re-
gional Director chose not to set the settlement agreement
aside, we do not construe his failure to have done so as
evidence that he agreed with the Respondent’s under-
standing that the settlement agreement allowed the Re-
spondent to retain the September 2002 jewelry policy.
Thus, as we have found that this is a case where no set-
tlement agreement was reached—rather than a case
where one was reached and further unfair labor practices
committed—the situation here does not fall within the
Board’s principle (stated in cases such as Ratliff Truck-
ing, cited by the judge),8 that a settlement can have the
effect of barring litigation of post-settlement conduct
grounded in pre-settlement contract language or action.9
Accordingly, we reverse the judge’s dismissal of the
complaint in this case, set aside the settlement agreement
in Cases 31–CA–25696 and 31–CA–25891 (but only to
the extent that it pertains to the paragraphs in the Con-
solidated Complaint in those cases regarding the Re-
spondent’s jewelry policy), reinstate the paragraphs in
the Consolidated Complaint in Cases 31–CA–25696 and
31–CA–25891 regarding the Respondent’s jewelry pol-
icy, and remand this proceeding to the administrative law
judge for further consideration of both the reinstated al-
legations and those in the instant complaint and to make
the necessary findings, analysis, and conclusions of law.
ORDER
This proceeding is remanded to Administrative Law
Judge Jay R. Pollack for further consideration. Accord-
ingly, the judge’s dismissal of the complaint in this case
is reversed. The settlement agreement in Cases 31–CA–
25696 and 31–CA–25891 is set aside only to the extent

8 310 NLRB 1224 (1993).
9 See Stage Employees IATSE Local 659 (MPO-TV), 197 NLRB
1187, 1188 (1972), enfd. mem. 477 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
that it pertains to the allegations in the Consolidated
Complaint in those cases regarding the Respondent’s
jewelry policy. The allegations in the Consolidated
Complaint in Cases 31–CA–25696 and 31–CA–25891
pertaining to the Respondent’s jewelry policy are rein-
stated. Further, the hearing shall be reopened to take
evidence regarding the allegations in the Consolidated
Complaint in Cases 31–CA–25696 and 31–CA–25891
pertaining to the Respondent’s jewelry policy, including
evidence regarding the Respondent’s asserted defense of
“special circumstances” in Cases 31–CA–25696 and 31–
CA–25891, as well as in the present case.10 Thereafter,
pursuant to the applicable provisions of Section
102.45(a) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
judge shall prepare and issue a supplemental decision
containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
recommended supplemental Order, as appropriate on
remand. Following service of this Supplemental Deci-
sion and Order on the parties, the provisions of Section
102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations shall be
applicable.

Yaneth Palencia, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Mark Theodore, Esq. and Adam C. Abrahms, Esq. (Proskauer
Rose LLP), of Los Angeles, California, for the Respondent.
Kristin L. Martin, Esq. (Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP), of San
Francisco, California, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in trial at Los Angeles, California, on August 11, 2003.
On April 22, 2003, Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
Union Local 11, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
International Union, AFL–CIO (the Union) filed the charge in
Case 31–CA–26242 alleging that Doubletree Guest Suites
Santa Monica (Respondent or the Employer) committed certain
violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Section 151 et seq., herein called
the Act). The Union filed an amended charge on June 27,
2003. On June 30, 2003, the Regional Director for Region 31
of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and
notice of hearing against Respondent alleging that Respondent
violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The complaint was
amended at the hearing. Respondent filed a timely answer to
the complaint, denying all wrongdoing.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to file briefs. Upon the entire record, from my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses,1 and having considered

10 However, nothing in this Decision and Order shall preclude the
parties from entering into a settlement agreement regarding any of the
allegations at issue.
1 The credibility resolutions herein have been derived from a review
of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard for the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD786
the post-hearing briefs of the parties, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is engaged in the operation of a hotel located in
Santa Monica, California. During the 12 months prior to the
issuance of the complaint, Respondent derived gross revenues in
excess of $500,000. During the same time period, Respondent
purchased and received products valued in excess of $5,000 di-
rectly from suppliers located outside the State of California.
Accordingly, Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Issues
At its Santa Monica, California facility, Respondent is en-
gaged in the operation of a hotel. The Union has been engaged
in an organizing campaign at Respondent’s hotel for approxi-
mately 2 years. In May 2002, the Union filed a charge in Case
31–CA–25696 alleging, inter alia, that Respondent maintained an
overly broad no-solicitation rule and a rule requiring that em-
ployees remove union buttons. On September 27, 2002, the Re-
gional Director issued a complaint against Respondent alleging
various violations of the Act including an allegation that Respon-
dent maintained an overly broad rule restricting employees from
wearing union insignia and/or buttons; and the promulgation,
maintenance, and enforcement of a written jewelry policy in
Respondent’s employee handbook.
On August 28, 2002, the Union filed the charge in Case 31–
CA–25891, alleging, inter alia, that Respondent maintained vari-
ous rules restricting employee Section 7 rights, including a ban
against wearing union buttons. In September 2002, Respondent
amended its jewelry policy. Thereafter, in October 2002, the
Union filed an amended charge challenging Respondent’s
amended jewelry policy. On November 25, 2002, the Regional
Director issued a consolidated complaint against Respondent
alleging, inter alia, that Respondent promulgated and maintained
an overly broad rule prohibiting employees from wearing union
insignia and/or union buttons and that Respondent’s Jewelry
Policy unlawfully restricted employees’ rights to wear union
buttons and/or insignia.
On January 28, 2003, Respondent entered into an informal set-
tlement agreement whereby it agreed, inter alia, to post a notice,
which included the following:
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce any rule that
discriminatorily prohibits our employees from wearing union
insignia or buttons, or that requires our approval before doing
so.

logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the teachings of
NLRB v. Walton Manufacturing Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). As to
those witnesses testifying in contradiction to the findings herein, their
testimony has been discredited, either as having been in conflict with
credited documentary or testimonial evidence or because it was in and
of itself incredible and unworthy of belief.
WE WILL rescind and/or modify the rules and provisions of
our Team Member handbook to conform to the foregoing un-
dertakings AND WE WILL notify our employees that we have
done so.
The Union did not join in the settlement agreement. While
Respondent modified certain of its rules in the employee hand-
book it did not modify or rescind the jewelry policy at issue in
the settled case and which is at issue in the instant case.
The jewelry policy attacked by the instant complaint was
promulgated in September 2002 and has been enforced both
before and after the Section 10(b) period involved in the instant
case. The jewelry policy provides:
Jewelry should be professional and conservative. The only
pins or decorations that may be worn on uniforms are name-
tags, language pins, service awards, and other pins approved
by hotel management for special promotions or activities.
The maximum number of pins permitted beyond the nametag
is two. Non-uniformed female team members may wear one
conservative pin or broach.
Respondent contends that when it settled Cases 31–CA–25696
and 31–CA–25891 it agreed not to discriminatorily enforce its
jewelry policy but did not agree to rescind or modify that rule.
Respondent contends that the settlement agreement permits it to
continue the rule in effect and to enforce the rule in a lawful
manner. Respondent argues that the settlement agreement in
Cases 31–CA–25696 and 31–CA–25891 bars the General Coun-
sel from litigating the jewelry policy in the instant case.
General Counsel and Union argue that the Jewelry Policy is
unlawful under Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945). They further argue that the prior settlement agreement
cannot be construed to abrogate the employees’ rights to wear
union buttons and/or insignia.
The facts are not in dispute. Respondent only allows its em-
ployees to wear pins and buttons approved by the Employer. The
ban on union buttons applies to all of the employees at the Hotel.
Employees at the Hotel wear three types of pins. Employees are
required to wear a promotional white and blue button containing
the phrase “Catch Me At My Best.” Employees are also required
to wear nametags and service recognition pins.
B. The Settlement Negotiations
As indicated earlier, on November 25, 2002, the Regional Di-
rector issued a consolidated complaint against Respondent alleg-
ing, inter alia, that Respondent promulgated and maintained an
overly broad rule prohibiting employees from wearing union
insignia and/or union buttons and that Respondent’s Jewelry
Policy unlawfully restricted employees’ rights to wear union
buttons and/or insignia. On January 28, 2003, representatives of
the Respondent met with representatives of the Region to discuss
settlement of the outstanding complaint. Respondent stated that
it would not agree to language prohibiting the Employer from
maintaining a no buttons rule or dress code. The Respondent did
agree to the following language:
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce any rule that
discriminatorily prohibits our employees from wearing union
insignia or buttons, or that requires our approval before doing
DOUBLETREE GUEST SUITES SANTA MONICA 787
so.
WE WILL rescind and/or modify the rules and provisions of
our Team Member handbook to conform to the foregoing un-
dertakings AND WE WILL notify our employees that we have
done so.
On February 19, 2003, Respondent’s general manager in-
formed the press that Respondent was going to enforce its Jew-
elry Policy in a nondiscriminatory manner.2 On March 4, 2003,
Respondent’s counsel wrote the Region stating that the jewelry
rule “complied with the Settlement Agreement” and that “Re-
spondent [would] not discriminatorily enforce the provision.”
Other employee rules were to be modified or deleted. The Union
did not join in the settlement agreement. On March 10, the Re-
gional director approved the settlement agreement unilaterally.
On April 3, 2003, the Union filed a charge alleging that Re-
spondent had forbidden employees from wearing union insignia
of the Act and the prior settlement. The charge was withdrawn
by the Union. However, on April 22, 2003, the Union filed the
instant charge alleging that Respondent had unlawfully forbidden
employees from wearing union insignia. The Respondent then
wrote the Region stating that Respondent was merely enforcing
its Jewelry Rule in a nondiscriminatory manner. The Region
found that the settlement agreement had not been breached but
issued a complaint based upon an ad hoc oral rule prohibiting the
wearing of union insignia. At the instant hearing, the General
Counsel amended the complaint and challenged the written jew-
elry rule. The evidence, at the hearing, indicated that Respondent
has enforced the jewelry rule as written since September 2002.
Even at the hearing, when it became clear that Respondent had
never rescinded or modified its jewelry rule, the Regional Direc-
tor did not set aside or revoke the settlement agreement.
C. The Settlement Bar Issue
It is well established that “a settlement agreement with which
the parties have complied bars subsequent litigation of pre-
settlement conduct alleged to constitute unfair labor practices.”
Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel Co., 235 NLRB 1397 (1978). Under
Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel the settlement agreement disposes
of all issues involving pre-settlement conduct. The settlement
disposes of all presettlement matters “unless prior violations
were unknown to the General Counsel, not readily discoverable
by investigation, or specifically reserved from the settlement by
the mutual understanding of the parties.” 235 NLRB at 1397.
In Ratliff Trucking Corp., 310 NLRB 1224 (1993), the Board
held that a settlement agreement barred the General Counsel from
attacking language in a union-security clause which had been the
subject of a settlement agreement. The Board held that the
entire union-security clause of the collective-bargaining
agreement was before the General Counsel in the cases dis-
posed of by the settlement, and the language that the Gen-
eral Counsel alleged as unlawful even appeared in the same
sentence as other language modified by the settlement
agreement. The Board reasoned that the respondents could
therefore reasonably believe that the settlement disposed of

2 The parties stipulated that the Union was aware of this statement
by the Hotel’s general manager.
the legality of the entire clause, at least during the term of
the contract in which it was contained. According to the
Board, in order for the General Counsel to relitigate, the
union-security clause and call it a new, or “other” case, the
General Counsel had to show a specific reservation of the
right to proceed on “the union-security clause’s unaltered
provisions.” Thus, the Board held that the unfair labor
practices alleged in Ratliff Trucking, could not be properly
described as constituting either an “other” case or one in-
volving different presettlement “events.” The settlement,
therefore, had the effect of barring litigation of not only pre-
settlement conduct but also barring litigation of post-
settlement conduct which was grounded in the pre-
settlement contract language.
In Leeward Nursing Home, 278 NLRB 1058, 1083
(1986), the administrative law judge noted with Board ap-
proval:
Finally, it deserves mention that a settlement agreement
may, in a limited class of circumstances, have a certain
“prospective” reach in that it will bar efforts to litigate al-
leged post settlement violations which are themselves in-
escapably grounded in pre-settlement actions which would
be barred by a settlement from litigation. Ventura Coastal,
Corp., 264 NLRB at 298, 301 (1983).
Thus, in the cited case, the settlement was held to bar not
only litigation of a certain pre-settlement demotion of the
charging party, but also the post settlement layoff of the
same individual. The latter layoff action, it was held, was a
natural consequence of the former settlement-barred demo-
tion since the demotion placed the alleged discriminatee in a
position of vulnerability to layoff at such future point as the
employer might be required to engage in work force cut-
backs. Since the eventual layoff of the alleged discriminatee
had no independently unlawful character, but depended for
its violative character solely on the allegedly unlawful pre-
settlement demotion, the settlement was held to bar litiga-
tion of both the initial demotion and the eventual post set-
tlement layoff. Ibid.
I find the instant case controlled by the holding in Ratliff
Trucking. In January 2003, at the time of the settlement
agreement, the Regional Director, had before him the jew-
elry policy in existence since September 2002. Apparently,
the General Counsel contends that the policy was to be re-
scinded or modified. However, the uncontradicted evidence
establishes that Respondent never agreed to modify the jew-
elry policy. On March 4, prior to the Regional Director’s
approval of the settlement agreement, Respondent’s attor-
ney wrote that the jewelry policy was lawful and did not
need to be modified or rescinded. Notwithstanding this
clear language, the Regional Director approved the settle-
ment agreement. Thus, the General Counsel permitted the
language of the jewelry policy to remain while other provi-
sions of the employee handbook were modified or re-
scinded. There is no evidence that Respondent did not
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD788
comply with the settlement agreement and the general
Counsel did not seek to set aside the settlement agreement.
Thus, under Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel, and Ratliff Truck-
ing, I find that the instant complaint must be dismissed. The
jewelry policy, on which the unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint rests, is pre-settlement conduct, which may
not be considered as evidence to support the General Coun-
sel’s complaint. Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal
of the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Doubletree Guest Suites Santa Monica is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. The Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 11
and Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International
Union, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The instant complaint is barred by the Board’s settlement
bar doctrine.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended
ORDER3
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

3 All motions inconsistent with this recommended order are hereby de-
nied. If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section l02.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived
for all purposes.