01A14877_r
03-05-2002
Dorothy L. Roberson, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Dorothy L. Roberson v. United States Postal Service
01A14877
March 5, 2002
.
Dorothy L. Roberson,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A14877
Agency No. 1-H-331-0044-00
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency
decision, issued on July 19, 2001, finding that it was in compliance
with the terms of the September 21, 2000 settlement agreement into which
the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b);
and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
(1) [Complainant] requests one week family leave unless her medical
needs require additional time.
(2) [The Plant Manager] agrees to grant [complainant] one week of
family leave contingent upon her physician's statement of additional
leave needed.
(3) [The Plant Manager] agrees that when [complainant] returns from her
family leave that she will be assigned to Tour 2, 9:00 a.m. until 5:30
p.m., until [complainant] makes regular or until a regular job falls
on her.
(4) [The Plant Manager] agrees that [complainant] shall have Saturday
and Sunday off until she makes regular.
[The Plant Manager] agrees to this work schedule after a careful review
of medical documentation provided by [complainant's] physician and at
her request.
By letter to the agency dated May 2, 2001, complainant alleged that
the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement. Specifically,
complainant alleged that the agency placed a PTF ahead of her on the
seniority roster. Complainant also alleged that a �verbal agreement that
was reached between both parties during the mediation was not written
as stated.� Complainant explains that she wrote to the Plant Manager
and his response �changed what was verbally agreed upon.�
In its decision, the agency concluded that it had not breached the
agreement. According to the agency, complainant alleged that claims (3)
and (4) of the settlement agreement were breached when she was moved
from Tour 2 to Tour 3 after becoming regular. The agency determined
that complainant believed that she would remain on Tour 2 even after
being made a regular employee. The agency concluded, however, that the
settlement agreement only provided that complainant would be assigned
to Tour 2 �until she makes regular.� Regarding complainant's claim that
the agreement was breached when she was not made senior to another PTF,
the agency found that the matter was not part of the agreement.
On appeal, complainant notes that �[w]hat I understood to be during the
verbal agreement from [the Plant Manager] did not manifest itself in
the written agreement.� Complainant states that it was not until a week
later that she understood the agreement, and wrote to the Plant Manager.
In the letter, complainant stated that she outlined her understanding of
the terms of the settlement agreement. According to complainant, the
Plant Manager responded in writing, stating that complainant �was right.�
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
Complainant claims that the settlement agreement was breached when a
PTF was placed ahead of her on the seniority roster. The Commission,
however, agrees with the agency's determination that seniority placement
was not a matter included in the agreement. A review of the agreement
does not reveal any language referring to complainant's seniority status
or placement on the seniority roster. Therefore, we do not find that
the September 21, 2000 agreement was breached when a PTF was placed
ahead of complainant.
The agency also addressed complainant's belief that she would remain on
Tour 2 even after being made regular, finding that the settlement language
specifically provided that she would be assigned to Tour 2 �until she
makes regular.� Therefore, the agency found that when it moved her to
Tour 3 after she made regular, it was in compliance with the settlement
agreement. We note that the record contains a letter from complainant,
dated September 27, 2000, wherein she explains to the Plant Manager:
�You agreed that after I made regular I would remain on tour 2 with
Saturday and Sunday off.� Complainant notes that �[t]his part is not
in the agreement....� While the Plant Manager may have responded to
complainant's letter, we find that the September 21, 2000 agreement
did not require the agency to keep complainant on Tour 2 after she
became regular. If complainant intended this term to be included in
the agreement, she should have required that the necessary language was
part of the settlement prior to its execution. We are not persuaded
by complainant's contention that �[a]fter she got home and had time to
review the settlement� she noticed that it did not reflect her intentions.
Accordingly, the agency's decision finding that it was in compliance
with the agreement was proper and is hereby AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 5, 2002
__________________
Date