01991821
04-26-2000
Dorothy D. Hatchett, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region), Agency.
Dorothy D. Hatchett, )
Complainant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01991821
) Agency No. 4D230122095
William J. Henderson, ) Hearing Nos.120-96-5376-X & 120-96-5672-X
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service )
(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region), )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination on the bases of race (Black), reprisal (prior
EEO activity), and physical disability (neck and shoulder impairment)
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq.<1> Complainant alleges she was discriminated
against when she was issued a letter of warning on May 22, 1995.
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following reasons, the
Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.
BACKGROUND
The record reveals that complainant, a Window Clerk at the agency's
Midlothian, Virginia Post Office, filed a formal EEO complaint with the
agency on July 18, 1995, alleging that the agency had discriminated
against her as referenced above. The agency accepted the complaint
for investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant
received a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing
before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ
issued a recommended decision (RD) finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of race-based discrimination because she failed to demonstrate
that similarly situated employees not in her protected class were
not disciplined under similar circumstances. The AJ concluded that
complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of disability-based
discrimination because she did not prove that her condition was
permanent. The AJ found that complainant had made out a prima facie
case of retaliation.
The AJ then concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that complainant had
been issued a letter of warning because she had violated her medical
restrictions by lifting a parcel weighing more than 10 pounds, thereby
injuring herself. The AJ further found that complainant had failed to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that the agency's articulated reasons
for its action were a pretext designed to conceal discriminatory animus.
The agency's final decision implemented the AJ's RD. From that decision,
complainant brings the instant appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an
Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence
in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding
whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding.
See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
The Commission finds that the AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and
referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note
that the agency's principal justification for its actions, i.e., that
complainant had violated her medical restrictions, and thereby injured
herself, was essentially uncontroverted by complainant. We discern no
basis to disturb the AJ's RD.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal,<2> and arguments and evidence not specifically
addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
April 26, 2000
Date
Carlton
M.
Hadden,
Acting
Director
Office of Federal Operations
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2We note also that in support of her appeal complainant has submitted
a letter signed by the manager who was the agency's principal witness
at the hearing in this matter. In the letter, which is unsworn, the
manager makes factual assertions that contradict certain aspects of his
earlier testimony. Although this recantation might initially appear
to necessitate a remand to permit the AJ to reconsider his findings of
fact, it does not. Nothing in the letter rebuts the agency's central
contention that complainant violated her medical restrictions. Had the
manager testified at the hearing to the facts set forth in the letter,
the AJ's conclusion with respect to complainant's claim of pretext
and his finding of no discrimination would have remained unchanged.
Accordingly, a remand is not required.