Dorothy D. Hatchett, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 19, 2000
01a01117 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 19, 2000)

01a01117

04-19-2000

Dorothy D. Hatchett, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Dorothy D. Hatchett, )

Complainant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01A01117

William J. Henderson, ) Agency No. 4-D-230-0092-99

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

agency decision (FAD) pertaining to her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The

Commission accepts the appeal in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �1614.405).

On February 3, 1999, complainant contacted the EEO office regarding claims

of discrimination based on race, retaliation, physical disability, and

mental disability. Informal efforts to resolve complainant's concerns

were unsuccessful. Accordingly, complainant filed a complaint dated

June 4, 1999. Therein, complainant stated that on January 6, 1999,

she was made aware that agency actions were taken against her that

culminated in her constructive discharge from agency employment.

On October 18, 1999, the agency issued a FAD dismissing the complaint for

untimely counselor contact. The agency determined that complainant's

complaint was comprised of eighteen claims relating to a hostile work

environment, culminating in her separation from agency employment.

The first claim identified by the agency addressed the Postmaster's

plan to constructively discharge complainant, which resulted in her

resignation. The additional claims included, but were not limited to,

purported reprimands; humiliation by being forced to sit in the middle

of the floor; being forced to work in unsafe working conditions;

and being taunted by agency officials. The agency then determined that

complainant's EEO contact was approximately six years after the earliest

alleged incident and fourteen months after complainant resigned from

the agency on December 24, 1997. The FAD also dismissed the complaint

on the grounds that it raises the same claims that are pending before

or have been decided by the agency.

On appeal, complainant contends that the agency incorrectly framed her

complaint when it only referred to the dates of the alleged incidents.

Complainant argues that on January 6, 1999, she became aware that �the

hostile work environment evidenced by the 18 incidents, was deliberately

perpetrated by management, and resulted in [her] constructive discharge.�

According to complainant, her awareness was triggered by the �written

statement and testimony [by] one of the principals in this case.�

Complainant states that the written statement and testimony indicated

that agency management intentionally made her work situation intolerable

so as to force her out of her job.

Volume 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37656 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. 1614.105(a)(1)) requires that

complaints of discrimination should be brought to the attention of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of

the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of

a personnel action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date

of the action. The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion"

standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine

when the forty-five (45) day limitation period is triggered. See Howard

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999).

Thus, the time limitation is not triggered until a complainant reasonably

suspects discrimination, but before all the facts that support a charge

of discrimination have become apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that she was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that she did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence she was prevented

by circumstances beyond her control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

The Commission initially notes that despite complainant's argument on

appeal, the agency properly defined the matters raised in her formal

complaint, including the issue of constructive discharge from agency

employment. Based on a review of the record, the Commission finds that

complainant should have reasonably suspected discrimination more than

forty-five days prior to her February 3, 1999 EEO Counselor contact.

The record reflects that some of the alleged incidents occurred more

than five years before complainant's contact. We find that the alleged

incidents, such as those regarding reprimands and denial of leave,

should have triggered complainant's suspicions of unlawful employment

discrimination. On appeal, complainant argues that she was not aware of

the discrimination until January 6, 1999, over a year after her December

1997 separation from agency employment. Complainant contends that in

January 1999, she reviewed a �written statement and the testimony

from one of the principals in her case� that manifested the agency

intent to force her out of her job. The Commission is not persuaded

by complainant's argument on appeal. Complainant had, or should have

had, a reasonable suspicion of unlawful employment discrimination at the

time the alleged incidents occurred, and not as late as January 6, 1999.

The Commission has found that, since the limitation period for contacting

an EEO Counselor is triggered by the reasonable suspicion standard,

waiting until one has �supporting facts� or �proof� of discrimination

before initiating a complaint can result in untimely Counselor contact.

See Bracken v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900065 (March

29, 1990). Therefore, we find that the agency properly dismissed the

complaint for untimely counselor contact. Accordingly, the agency's

dismissal of the complaint was proper and is hereby AFFIRMED.

Because of our decision to affirm the dismissal of the complaint due to

untimely Counselor contact, we need not address the agency's alternative

grounds for dismissal.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 19, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_______________ __________________________

Date 1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where

applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended,

may also be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.