Doron M. Elliott et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 9, 2019

13672121 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/672,121 11/08/2012 Doron M. Elliott 83231510 5173
28395 7590 08/09/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
AHSAN, UMAIR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2645
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DORON M. ELLIOTT and YIPING XIA
____________

Appeal 2018-006255
Application 13/672,1211
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 3–5, 8–11, 13, 15–17, and 19, which constitute
all the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to passing voice communication
between a mobile device and a vehicle. Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 1, 29. Claim 1,

1 The real party in interest is identified as Ford Global Technologies, LLC.
App. Br. 1.
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set forth below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis
added):
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator
application from a vehicle computer to launch a voice-input
responsive application on a mobile device;
responsive to the voice-input responsive application launch,
send, from the arbitrator application, an incoming call
indicator to a vehicle computing system (VCS);
receive access to an open voice channel originating at the
VCS as part of a VCS handsfree call handling for a virtual
phone call established by sending the indicator;
receive, via the arbitrator application, voice input over the
hands-free call channel; and
pass the voice input to the voice-input responsive
application.

App. Br. 1 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 3, 8–10, 13, 15, 16, and 19 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tuerk et al. (US
2012/0015696 A1; pub. Jan, 19, 2012) (“Tuerk”) in view of Santori et al.
(US 2010/0311345 Al; pub. Dec. 9, 2010) (“Santori”). Final Act. 4–10.
Claim 5 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tuerk, Santori, and Mozer (US 2009/0204410 A1; pub.
Aug. 13, 2009) (“Mozer”). Final Act. 10–11.
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Claims 4, 11, and 17 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Tuerk, Santori, and Harada (US 2007/0232335
A1; pub. Oct. 4, 2007) (“Harada”). Final Act. 11–12.
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding that the combination of
Tuerk and Santori teaches the following claim 1 limitations (also referred to
as “disputed limitations”):
receive an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator
application from a vehicle computer to launch a voice-input
responsive application on a mobile device; and
responsive to the voice-input responsive application launch,
send, from the arbitrator application, an incoming call
indicator to a vehicle computing system (VCS).

App. Br. 5–7; Reply Br. 2–6.
Appellants argue that the Examiner provides inadequate evidence to
support an obviousness rejection because the evidence to support the
combination is lacking. Id.
In the Final Action, the Examiner finds Tuerk teaches the claim 1
limitations, except that “Tuerk does not explicitly disclose receiv[ing] an
instruction at a mobile device arbitrator application from a vehicle
computer.” Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 4–6 (citing Tuerk ¶¶
42, 44, 47, 57, 69, 70, and 76; Figs. 2B, 3, 7A, 8, and 9). The Examiner
finds “Santori teaches receiv[ing] an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator
application from a vehicle computer to launch a voice-input responsive
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application on a mobile device.” Id. at 6–7 (citing Santori ¶ 47, Figs. 1, 2)
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner concludes
[i]t would have been obvious, to one with ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention, to modify the instruction of
Tuerk, to include receiving an instruction to launch a voice-input
responsive application on a mobile device from a vehicle
computer, as taught by Santori, in order to operate one or more
applications from a portable device using hands-free access in
order to enable safe driving for the user (Santori [0004]).
Id. at 7.
Appellants argue that
[a]ccording to paragraph [0057] of Tuerk, “audio
gateway 110 is configured to, upon request of the mobile
device, perform a sequence of steps that are the substantial
equivalent of an indication to I/0 device 410 that a voice
recognition command is requested, with the I/0 device as the
input/output.” The Examiner equates the I/0 device as the
vehicle (including a mic) and the first flaw in this analysis is
revealed in the fact that in Tuerk, this whole section is done
upon request of the mobile device. That is not remotely what is
claimed.
App. Br. 5.
Appellants argue the claims recite that the instruction to launch the
application came from the vehicle computer, and that the arbitrator
application sends an incoming call indicator responsive to the application
launch. Id.
Regarding Santori, Appellants argue that, although Santori may
suggest a user controlled application launch on a mobile device, “the
Examiner fails to explain, in any way, why this request would be passed to
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the audio gateway of Tuerk as opposed to simply being sent directly to the
OS of the mobile device.” Id. at 6.
In the Answer, the Examiner refers to Tuerk teaching:
Receiv[ing] an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator
application to launch a voice input responsive application on a
mobile device (See Tuerk Fig. 48 [0057] " ... In this approach,
audio gateway 110 uses an “initiate voice recognition"
approach to establish an audio channel with I/0 device 410. In
an embodiment of this approach, audio gateway 110 is
configured to, upon the request of a mobile device, perform a
sequence of steps that are the substantial equivalent of an
indication to I/0 device 410 that a voice recognition command
is requested, with I/0 device 410 as the input/output mechanism
for the command ...”; Fig. 7A, [0044], [0070] “... audio gateway
110 is configured to, upon the request of announcer module
130, perform a sequence of steps that are the substantial
equivalent of the initiation of a telephone call, with I/0 device
410 as the input/output mechanism for the call. .. " Fig. 9,
[0076] " ... as shown in stage 910, an application operating on a
first device is enabled to receive the NTVC ...”");
responsive to the voice-input responsive application
launch, send, from the arbitrator application, an incoming call
indicator to a vehicle computing system (VCS) (See Tuerk Fig
7A, [0044] “... audio gateway 110 is configured to, upon the
request of announcer module 130, perform a sequence of steps
that are the substantial equivalent of the initiation of a telephone
call, with I/0 device 410 as the input/output mechanism for the
call...” Fig. 9, [0076] “...as shown in stage 910, an application
operating on a first device is enabled to receive the NTVC ... At
stage 920, a voice recognition initiation command signal is sent
from the first device to a second device using a wireless
protocol module ...”).
In further explanation, the voice-input responsive
application launch is equivalent of the teaching “the operating
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on a first device is enabled to receive the NTVC" (See Tuerk
step 910 Fig. 9, [0076]), wherein the step of "send, from the
arbitrator application, an incoming call indicator to a vehicle
computing system (VCS)” (See Tuerk step 920, fig 9, [0076])
follows and is responsive to step 910.
Ans. 6–7.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants reiterate arguments and argue that there
is no evidence to support the Examiner’s finding that the request of Santori
would be passed through the arbitrator application of Tuerk. Reply Br. 2–6.
Appellants contend the Examiner does not show how the application of
Tuerk would be capable of receiving the vehicle-side application activation
of Santori and does not explain what the Santori arbitrator is doing with
respect to the claims. Id. at 2. According to Appellants
In the aggregate, the prior art fails to teach passing the
request for launching a voice responsive application (Santori)
from a vehicle (Santori) to the audio gateway of Tuerk. The
Examiner even admits that the vehicle of Santori can establish
direct communication with the mobile device prior to sending
an application launch request, and the vehicle of Santori can
talk to and instruct applications on the mobile device, so there
is literally no viable reason to pass all of this communication
through the audio gateway of Tuerk.
Id. at 4.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and agree, instead,
with the findings and conclusions of the Examiner.
Tuerk and Santori each teaches communication between a mobile
device and a vehicle computer system. Tuerk, Abstract, Figs. 3, 4B; Santori,
Abstract, Figs. 1, 2. Similar to the Application disclosure, each teaches the
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creation of a “fake” telephone call between the mobile device and the
vehicle computer system to establish a communication path. Spec. ¶ 31;
Tuerk ¶ 44; Santori ¶ 47. Each teaches the advantage of using a mobile
device application through the vehicle computer system. Tuerk ¶¶ 2, 3;
Santori ¶¶ 4, 5.
Tuerk teaches the claim 1 limitations, except that Tuerk’s express
disclosure refers to the vehicle computer receiving the instruction from the
mobile device, rather than the mobile device receiving the instruction from
the vehicle computer, as claim 1 requires. Tuerk ¶¶ 42, 44, 47, 57, 69, 70,
and 76, Figs. 2B, 3, 7A, 8, and 9).
Santori teaches triggering activation of an internet radio application in
a mobile device (ND 53) from the vehicle. Santori ¶ 47, Figs. 1–3. Santori
teaches an arbitrator application (management and arbitration application
219) that manages the applications. Answer. 5–7; Santori ¶¶ 78–81, Fig. 4.
We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that one of ordinary skill in
the art would have modified Tuerk to include receiving an instruction to
launch a voice-input responsive application on a mobile device from a
vehicle computer, as taught by Santori, in order to operate one or more
applications from a portable device using hands-free access in order to
enable safe driving for the user. See Final Act. 7 (citing Santori ¶ 4).
We note much of Appellants’ arguments are unsupported by factual
evidence. Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are
unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. See In
re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d
699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte Belinne, Appeal 2009-004693, 2009 WL
2477843, at *3–4 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative).
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Appellants also argue an unreasonably narrow teaching of the cited
references and an overly demanding standard of obviousness.
The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Here, the Examiner provides sufficient evidence as required for
obviousness. As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection must be based on:
[S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever,
the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person
of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
The Examiner’s findings are reasonable because the skilled artisan
would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of
a puzzle” because the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21.
Based upon the teachings of the references and the fact that each
claimed element was well known in the art, we agree with the Examiner
because the combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.
Id. at 415–16. We note Appellants present no persuasive arguments that the
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results are unpredictable. Moreover, as discussed supra, the Examiner
additionally provided reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would
combine the references in the manner suggested.
On this record, Appellants do not present sufficient or persuasive
evidence that the combination of the cited references was “uniquely
challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an
unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price,
Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–21).
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and
independent claims 9 and 15 which recite the disputed limitations and are
argued together with claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of dependent
claims 3–5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, and 19 as these claims are not argued
separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–5, 8–11, 13,
15–17, and 19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED