Doron M. Elliott et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 9, 201913672121 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/672,121 11/08/2012 Doron M. Elliott 83231510 5173 28395 7590 08/09/2019 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL 1000 TOWN CENTER 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 EXAMINER AHSAN, UMAIR ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2645 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/09/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DORON M. ELLIOTT and YIPING XIA ____________ Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,1211 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 3–5, 8–11, 13, 15–17, and 19, which constitute all the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates to passing voice communication between a mobile device and a vehicle. Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 1, 29. Claim 1, 1 The real party in interest is identified as Ford Global Technologies, LLC. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 2 set forth below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added): 1. A system comprising: a processor configured to: receive an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator application from a vehicle computer to launch a voice-input responsive application on a mobile device; responsive to the voice-input responsive application launch, send, from the arbitrator application, an incoming call indicator to a vehicle computing system (VCS); receive access to an open voice channel originating at the VCS as part of a VCS handsfree call handling for a virtual phone call established by sending the indicator; receive, via the arbitrator application, voice input over the hands-free call channel; and pass the voice input to the voice-input responsive application. App. Br. 1 (Claims Appendix). REJECTIONS Claims 1, 3, 8–10, 13, 15, 16, and 19 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tuerk et al. (US 2012/0015696 A1; pub. Jan, 19, 2012) (“Tuerk”) in view of Santori et al. (US 2010/0311345 Al; pub. Dec. 9, 2010) (“Santori”). Final Act. 4–10. Claim 5 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tuerk, Santori, and Mozer (US 2009/0204410 A1; pub. Aug. 13, 2009) (“Mozer”). Final Act. 10–11. Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 3 Claims 4, 11, and 17 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tuerk, Santori, and Harada (US 2007/0232335 A1; pub. Oct. 4, 2007) (“Harada”). Final Act. 11–12. ANALYSIS Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding that the combination of Tuerk and Santori teaches the following claim 1 limitations (also referred to as “disputed limitations”): receive an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator application from a vehicle computer to launch a voice-input responsive application on a mobile device; and responsive to the voice-input responsive application launch, send, from the arbitrator application, an incoming call indicator to a vehicle computing system (VCS). App. Br. 5–7; Reply Br. 2–6. Appellants argue that the Examiner provides inadequate evidence to support an obviousness rejection because the evidence to support the combination is lacking. Id. In the Final Action, the Examiner finds Tuerk teaches the claim 1 limitations, except that “Tuerk does not explicitly disclose receiv[ing] an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator application from a vehicle computer.” Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 4–6 (citing Tuerk ¶¶ 42, 44, 47, 57, 69, 70, and 76; Figs. 2B, 3, 7A, 8, and 9). The Examiner finds “Santori teaches receiv[ing] an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator application from a vehicle computer to launch a voice-input responsive Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 4 application on a mobile device.” Id. at 6–7 (citing Santori ¶ 47, Figs. 1, 2) (emphasis omitted). The Examiner concludes [i]t would have been obvious, to one with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, to modify the instruction of Tuerk, to include receiving an instruction to launch a voice-input responsive application on a mobile device from a vehicle computer, as taught by Santori, in order to operate one or more applications from a portable device using hands-free access in order to enable safe driving for the user (Santori [0004]). Id. at 7. Appellants argue that [a]ccording to paragraph [0057] of Tuerk, “audio gateway 110 is configured to, upon request of the mobile device, perform a sequence of steps that are the substantial equivalent of an indication to I/0 device 410 that a voice recognition command is requested, with the I/0 device as the input/output.” The Examiner equates the I/0 device as the vehicle (including a mic) and the first flaw in this analysis is revealed in the fact that in Tuerk, this whole section is done upon request of the mobile device. That is not remotely what is claimed. App. Br. 5. Appellants argue the claims recite that the instruction to launch the application came from the vehicle computer, and that the arbitrator application sends an incoming call indicator responsive to the application launch. Id. Regarding Santori, Appellants argue that, although Santori may suggest a user controlled application launch on a mobile device, “the Examiner fails to explain, in any way, why this request would be passed to Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 5 the audio gateway of Tuerk as opposed to simply being sent directly to the OS of the mobile device.” Id. at 6. In the Answer, the Examiner refers to Tuerk teaching: Receiv[ing] an instruction at a mobile device arbitrator application to launch a voice input responsive application on a mobile device (See Tuerk Fig. 48 [0057] " ... In this approach, audio gateway 110 uses an “initiate voice recognition" approach to establish an audio channel with I/0 device 410. In an embodiment of this approach, audio gateway 110 is configured to, upon the request of a mobile device, perform a sequence of steps that are the substantial equivalent of an indication to I/0 device 410 that a voice recognition command is requested, with I/0 device 410 as the input/output mechanism for the command ...”; Fig. 7A, [0044], [0070] “... audio gateway 110 is configured to, upon the request of announcer module 130, perform a sequence of steps that are the substantial equivalent of the initiation of a telephone call, with I/0 device 410 as the input/output mechanism for the call. .. " Fig. 9, [0076] " ... as shown in stage 910, an application operating on a first device is enabled to receive the NTVC ...”"); responsive to the voice-input responsive application launch, send, from the arbitrator application, an incoming call indicator to a vehicle computing system (VCS) (See Tuerk Fig 7A, [0044] “... audio gateway 110 is configured to, upon the request of announcer module 130, perform a sequence of steps that are the substantial equivalent of the initiation of a telephone call, with I/0 device 410 as the input/output mechanism for the call...” Fig. 9, [0076] “...as shown in stage 910, an application operating on a first device is enabled to receive the NTVC ... At stage 920, a voice recognition initiation command signal is sent from the first device to a second device using a wireless protocol module ...”). In further explanation, the voice-input responsive application launch is equivalent of the teaching “the operating Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 6 on a first device is enabled to receive the NTVC" (See Tuerk step 910 Fig. 9, [0076]), wherein the step of "send, from the arbitrator application, an incoming call indicator to a vehicle computing system (VCS)” (See Tuerk step 920, fig 9, [0076]) follows and is responsive to step 910. Ans. 6–7. In the Reply Brief, Appellants reiterate arguments and argue that there is no evidence to support the Examiner’s finding that the request of Santori would be passed through the arbitrator application of Tuerk. Reply Br. 2–6. Appellants contend the Examiner does not show how the application of Tuerk would be capable of receiving the vehicle-side application activation of Santori and does not explain what the Santori arbitrator is doing with respect to the claims. Id. at 2. According to Appellants In the aggregate, the prior art fails to teach passing the request for launching a voice responsive application (Santori) from a vehicle (Santori) to the audio gateway of Tuerk. The Examiner even admits that the vehicle of Santori can establish direct communication with the mobile device prior to sending an application launch request, and the vehicle of Santori can talk to and instruct applications on the mobile device, so there is literally no viable reason to pass all of this communication through the audio gateway of Tuerk. Id. at 4. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and agree, instead, with the findings and conclusions of the Examiner. Tuerk and Santori each teaches communication between a mobile device and a vehicle computer system. Tuerk, Abstract, Figs. 3, 4B; Santori, Abstract, Figs. 1, 2. Similar to the Application disclosure, each teaches the Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 7 creation of a “fake” telephone call between the mobile device and the vehicle computer system to establish a communication path. Spec. ¶ 31; Tuerk ¶ 44; Santori ¶ 47. Each teaches the advantage of using a mobile device application through the vehicle computer system. Tuerk ¶¶ 2, 3; Santori ¶¶ 4, 5. Tuerk teaches the claim 1 limitations, except that Tuerk’s express disclosure refers to the vehicle computer receiving the instruction from the mobile device, rather than the mobile device receiving the instruction from the vehicle computer, as claim 1 requires. Tuerk ¶¶ 42, 44, 47, 57, 69, 70, and 76, Figs. 2B, 3, 7A, 8, and 9). Santori teaches triggering activation of an internet radio application in a mobile device (ND 53) from the vehicle. Santori ¶ 47, Figs. 1–3. Santori teaches an arbitrator application (management and arbitration application 219) that manages the applications. Answer. 5–7; Santori ¶¶ 78–81, Fig. 4. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Tuerk to include receiving an instruction to launch a voice-input responsive application on a mobile device from a vehicle computer, as taught by Santori, in order to operate one or more applications from a portable device using hands-free access in order to enable safe driving for the user. See Final Act. 7 (citing Santori ¶ 4). We note much of Appellants’ arguments are unsupported by factual evidence. Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte Belinne, Appeal 2009-004693, 2009 WL 2477843, at *3–4 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative). Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 8 Appellants also argue an unreasonably narrow teaching of the cited references and an overly demanding standard of obviousness. The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Here, the Examiner provides sufficient evidence as required for obviousness. As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection must be based on: [S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). The Examiner’s findings are reasonable because the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle” because the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21. Based upon the teachings of the references and the fact that each claimed element was well known in the art, we agree with the Examiner because the combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. Id. at 415–16. We note Appellants present no persuasive arguments that the Appeal 2018-006255 Application 13/672,121 9 results are unpredictable. Moreover, as discussed supra, the Examiner additionally provided reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the references in the manner suggested. On this record, Appellants do not present sufficient or persuasive evidence that the combination of the cited references was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–21). In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and independent claims 9 and 15 which recite the disputed limitations and are argued together with claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 3–5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, and 19 as these claims are not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–5, 8–11, 13, 15–17, and 19. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation