Doris M. Randleman, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 4, 2011
0120093815 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 4, 2011)

0120093815

08-04-2011

Doris M. Randleman, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.




Doris M. Randleman,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120093815

Hearing No. 470-2008-00141X

Agency No. 200J-0552-2007104073

DECISION

On September 18, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s

August 25, 2011, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether substantial evidence in the record supports

the EEOC Administrative Judge’s decision that Complainant failed to

demonstrate that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of

race and reprisal in connection with a non-selection.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a GS-06 Health Technician at the VA Medical Center’s Mental Health

Service in Dayton, Ohio.

In June 2007, Complainant applied for the position of Prosthetics

Representative, GS-0672-7/9/11, advertised under Vacancy Announcement

No. 07-049. Under “Grade Determination,” the announcement stated

the following criteria for determining the grade of candidates:

(a) GS-9: one year of GS-7 experience or a master’s degree in a

business or medical field; (b) GS-11: one year of GS-9 experience or a

PhD in a business or medical field. Under “Basis of Rating,” the

announcement indicated that candidates would be rated on the degree to

which they possess the required knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs).

Specifically the announcement requested that the candidates address in a

separate narrative statement each of the following KSAs: (1) Knowledge of

methods to identify trends and causation factors sufficient to analyze

prepared data and gather information to inform and advise management;

(2) Ability to advise clinicians on the selection, prescription and

acquisition of a full range of prosthetic devices; (3) Ability to

maintain liaison with prosthetic supply manufacturers and dealers by

inspecting their facilities and services, and participating in the award

of prosthetic appliance contracts by providing advisory services to

contract specialists; (4) Ability to initiate new ideas and approaches

and demonstrate resourcefulness; and (5) Ability to manage resources,

e.g. space, equipment, supplies, etc., and personnel at the local level.

On July 6, 2007, after reviewing each candidate’s application, a

Human Resources Specialist (HRS – Caucasian) qualified Complainant

at the GS-7 level and the Selectee (Caucasian) at the GS-11 level.

On July 9, 2007, HRS sent the Selecting Official (SO – Caucasian)

the certificates of eligibles for the position, along with each

candidate’s application. There were a total of 20 candidates on six

different certificates (internal GS-7, GS-9, GS-11 and external GS-7,

GS-9, GS-11). Complainant was on the internal GS-7 certificate and the

Selectee was on the internal GS-11 certificate.

On August 3, 2007, SO selected the Selectee for the position.

SO indicated on the GS-7 and GS-9 certificates that he did not conduct

interviews with those candidates because candidates on other certificates

scored higher. SO indicated on the GS-11 certificates that he conducted

performance-based interviews with those candidates. On August 23, 2007,

HRS1 informed Complainant that she was qualified for the position and

referred for consideration, but not selected.

On October 3, 2007, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the

Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American),

sex (female), color (Black), and reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity when:

1. On August 30, 2007, she was notified that she was not selected

for the position of Prosthetics Representative, GS-0672-7/9/11, advertised

under Vacancy Announcement No. 07-409; and

2. On or about August 7, 2007, she was asked if she spent 100%

of her time on union matters.

On November 20, 2007, the Agency accepted claim 1 for investigation

but dismissed claim 2 pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(4), due

to having raised the matter in a negotiated grievance procedure that

permits allegations of discrimination. Specifically, the Agency noted

that Complainant had filed an October 12, 2007 grievance on the same

matter and that a decision was issued on October 25, 2007.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

timely requested a hearing. On May 9, 2009, at a prehearing conference,

Complainant withdrew her claims of sex and color discrimination. The AJ

held a hearing on July 7, 2009 and issued a decision on August 12,

2009.1 The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s

finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her

to discrimination as alleged.

The AJ affirmed the Agency’s dismissal of claim 2. The AJ found the

following facts regarding claim 1: Complainant previously worked as a

Purchasing Agent in Prosthetics from 1992 to 1997. Complainant has

represented several employees in EEO cases in the past and has also

filed other prior EEO complaints. SO rated the candidates’ KSAs from

their applications. Based on the scoring of the KSAs, SO determined

that the highest scoring candidates were from the GS-11 certificates.

Each of the GS-11 certificates contained two candidates. One of

the candidates on the GS-11 certificates (C1 – African-American)

did not submit any KSAs. However, SO believed that if he interviewed

one person from that certificate, he was obligated to interview all

persons from that certificate. SO believed that the four candidates

from the two GS-11 certificates were sufficient for the purposes of

making the selection; therefore, he decided to conduct interviews only

of the candidates from the GS-11 certificates. None of the scores from

the candidates on the GS-7 certificates were high enough to warrant

interviewing those individuals. Complainant was on the GS-7 certificate

and did not score high enough on the application to warrant an interview.

Interviews were conducted by SO and two panel members (P1 – Caucasian,

P2 – Asian). P1 and P2 took no part in the scoring of the KSAs or in

the decision to interview only those persons from the GS-11 certificates.

Individuals interviewed for the position included the Selectee, C1, and

two other individuals (one Caucasian, one an unknown race). The position

required that the successful candidate be evaluated by the Professional

Standards Board (Board) before starting in the position. Although the

Selectee was selected at the GS-11 level, the Board rated her at the

GS-9 level. The Selectee accepted the position at the GS-9 level.

Initially, the AJ found that the Agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for Complainant’s non-selection. Specifically,

the AJ found that SO testified credibly that, based on his scoring of

the KSAs, he determined that the highest scoring candidates were from

the GS-11 certificates and therefore interviewed only those candidates.

Next, the AJ found that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency’s

articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination. First, the AJ found

that Complainant failed to establish that she was treated less favorably

than similarly situated persons outside of her protected classes.

Specifically, the AJ determined that Complainant was not similarly

situated to the GS-11 candidates that received interviews and that she

was similarly situated to, but not treated differently than, the GS-7

candidates that did not receive interviews.

Second, the AJ found that Complainant failed to establish that her

qualifications for the position were plainly superior to those of

the Selectee. The AJ found that the evidence did not establish that

the difference in qualifications between Complainant and the Selectee

were of such significance that a reasonable employer would have found

Complainant to be significantly better qualified for the job.

Finally, the AJ addressed several arguments presented by Complainant.

Regarding Complainant’s argument that the Selectee was not qualified for

the position at the GS-11 level because the Board reduced the Selectee’s

level from GS-11 to GS-9, the AJ found that the Board’s actions occurred

after the selection and that SO acted solely on information available to

him at the time of the selection. Regarding Complainant’s argument

that HRS resigned two weeks prior to the hearing to avoid testifying

about his part in the selection, the AJ found that her contention was

unsupported speculation and irrelevant. Regarding Complainant’s

argument that HRS should have rated her at a higher level, the AJ found

that Complainant offered no proof that her rating at the GS-7 level was

discriminatory or even in error. In addition, the AJ noted that GS-9

candidates fared no better than GS-7 candidates in the selection process.

Regarding Complainant’s argument that the fact that C1 received

an interview shows she was discriminated against, the AJ found that

her argument failed for several reasons. Specifically, the AJ found

that Complainant could not show that her treatment was based on race

when C1, an individual of the same race, was treated more favorably.

In addition, the AJ found that Complainant and C1 were not similarly

situated because C1 appeared on the GS-11 certificate. Further, the

AJ found that C1’s failure to submit his KSAs was excused when SO

decided to interview another candidate from the same certificate on

which C1’s name appeared. The AJ noted SO’s belief that he had to

interview everyone from a certificate once he decided to interview one

candidate from that certificate.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal,2 Complainant contended3 that the AJ ignored relevant material

facts presented at the hearing and admitted as hearing exhibits.

First, Complainant argued that SO erred in scoring the Selectee’s

KSAs higher than her KSAs. Specifically, Complainant asserted that KSAs

must be job-related and that the Selectee’s KSAs were not job-related

because they were limited to cardiology, not prosthetics. In addition,

Complainant asserted that the Selectee’s KSAs reflected that she had

no prior prosthetics experience.

Second, Complainant argued that her qualifications were far more

superior to the Selectee’s. Specifically, Complainant presented the

following comparison of qualifications: (a) she had an associate degree,

a bachelor’s degree, and a master’s degree, whereas the Selectee

only had a bachelor’s degree; (b) she had four and a half years of

prior prosthetic experience as a Prosthetics Clerk/Purchasing Agent

and 11 years experience working with the prosthetic needs of elderly

patients, whereas the Selectee had no prior prosthetics experience;

(c) she had 11 years of experience supervising 15 staff employees and

11 years of experience as a union official (which was not considered),

whereas the Selectee’s outside experience was considered.

Third, Complainant argued that the Selectee was given preferential

treatment when HRS rated the Selectee higher than her qualifications

indicated and rated Complainant lower than her qualifications indicated.

Regarding the Selectee’s GS-11 level rating by HRS, Complainant noted

that the Board subsequently rated her at the GS-9 level. Regarding her

own GS-7 level rating by HRS, Complainant referenced arbitration testimony

by HRS that his failure to consider her master’s degree was an oversight

and that he should have rated her at a GS-11 level.

Fourth, Complainant argued that management did not provide a legitimate

reason for interviewing C1 when he did not submit any KSAs. Specifically,

Complainant asserted that Agency policy states that KSAs were required to

receive an interview. In addition, Complainant asserted, “A reasonable

person viewing the evidence and testimony could clearly see all the

major players in the game are Caucasian and that an African-American

was thrown into the effort to cover their tracks.”

In response, the Agency contended that Complainant essentially made two

arguments on appeal: (1) the Selectee’s KSAs could not and should not

have scored higher than her KSAs, because the Selectee’s KSAs were

not job-related due to the Selectee’s lack of prosthetics experience;

and (2) she should have been found to be eligible at the GS-11 level,

and thus should have been interviewed. Regarding Complainant’s first

argument, the Agency asserted that the vacancy announcement reflects

that a majority of the KSAs were general and did not require prosthetics

experience. In addition, even if prosthetics experience was required

for some of the KSAs, the Agency asserted that the Selectee indicated

in her KSAs that she had experience with some types of prosthetics, such

as 24-hour and 48-hour holter monitors, pacemakers, and defibrillators.

Regarding Complainant’s second argument, the Agency asserted that

Complainant would not have been qualified at the GS-11 level and thus

still would not have received an interview. Specifically, the Agency

asserted that, because she had a master’s degree and was a GS-6 at

the time of her non-selection, Complainant would not have been graded

at higher than a GS-9 based on either her education or her experience.

In addition, the Agency asserted that, even if Complainant had been

found to be eligible at the GS-9 level, it would have made no difference

in the outcome. The Agency noted that, as the AJ pointed out in his

decision, the GS-9 candidates fared no better than the GS-7 candidates

in terms of receiving interviews. Further, the Agency asserted that,

although the Board eventually graded the Selectee at a GS-9 level, HRS

properly graded the Selectee at the GS-11 level because she was working

as a GS-10 Medical Instrument Technologist at the time of her selection.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Standard of Review

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual

findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.,

340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding

whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's

conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether

or not a hearing was held. An AJ’s credibility determination based

on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will

be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts

the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable

fact finder would not credit it. See EEO MD-110, Ch. 9, at § VI.B.

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was

subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would

support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804

n.14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant

must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s

explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

519 (1993). At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion,

and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See Hicks, supra.

Upon review, we find that substantial evidence in the record supports the

AJ’s decision. Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima

facie case of discrimination on the bases of race and reprisal, we agree

with the AJ that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for her non-selection. The AJ found that SO testified credibly

that he based his selection on two criteria: the scores he gave to the

candidates’ KSAs and the scores from the interviews. At the hearing,

SO testified that “[t]he decision as far as who we interviewed was based

on the KSA’s scores.” In addition, with respect to the candidates

on the GS-7 and GS-9 certificates, SO testified that “none of them

scored high enough on KSA’s to warrant an interview.” Further, in

his affidavit, SO attested to the following regarding his scoring of the

KSAs: “There were 5 questions in the KSA’s, each scored on a scale

of zero to five, with five being superior and zero being unacceptable.

[Complainant] scored 1, 1, 3, 1, and 1 on those five questions, for

a total of 7 points … The [S]electee scored 3, 1, 5, 5, and 3 for a

total of 17 points.”

We also agree with the AJ that Complainant failed to prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s proffered reason

was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. In doing so, we note that

the AJ had already addressed many of the arguments Complainant made

on appeal. Regarding Complainant’s argument that C1 was given an

interview in order to hide management’s discrimination against her,

we agree with the AJ’s finding that SO’s decision to interview C1

was not indicative of discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found that

SO believed that, if he interviewed one person from C1’s certificate,

he was obligated to interview C1. SO testified at the hearing, “Because

when one person on a certificate is interviewed it’s my understanding

that everyone on the certificate would then need to be interviewed.

So one person on the certificate [C1] was listed on scored high enough on

the KSA’s to warrant an interview, thus everybody on that certificate

was interviewed.” Aside from her bare assertions, Complainant has

provided no evidence that SO’s decision to interview C1 was based on

discriminatory animus.

Regarding Complainant’s argument that SO erred in scoring the

Selectee’s KSAs higher than her KSAs because the Selectee’s KSAs

were unrelated to prosthetics, we find that the record does not support

such an argument. The vacancy announcement reflects that KSAs 1, 4,

and 5 dealt with other qualifications and only KSAs 2 and 3 specifically

mentioned prosthetics. In addition, the record reflects that the Selectee

did have prosthetics experience and did discuss that experience in

addressing KSAs 2 and 3. For KSA 2, the Selectee wrote, “The cardiology

department performs several different procedures on a daily basis this

involves prosthetic devises such as 24 hour and 48 hour holter monitors,

pacemakers, defibrillators. As manager, I was responsible for ensuring

all clinicians were informed and trained on selection and application [of]

the various prosthetic devices used within the section.” For KSA 3,

the Selectee described her experience working with stent manufacturers as

the point of contact within the cardiology department. We note SO’s

testimony at the hearing that the Selectee “worked in cardiology and

pacemakers and st[e]nts in cardiology are considered prosthetic items.”

Regarding Complainant’s argument that her qualifications are far

more superior to those of the Selectee, the record supports the AJ’s

finding that the difference in qualifications between Complainant and the

Selectee were not of such significance that a reasonable employer would

have found Complainant to be significantly better qualified for the job.

Complainant’s argument focused on the following: (1) although HRS

rated the Selectee at a GS-11, the Selectee’s qualifications warranted

only a GS-9 rating, as evidenced by the Board’s decision; and (2)

although HRS rated her at a GS-7, her qualifications warranted a GS-11

rating, as evidenced by her master’s degree and HRS’ testimony

in the arbitration hearing that he should have rated her at a GS-11.

The record reflects that, at the time of her non-selection, Complainant

was a GS-6 and had a master’s degree in Legal and Ethical Studies.

Thus, according to the grade determination criteria listed in the vacancy

announcement and assuming that Complainant’s master’s degree was

in a business or medical field, Complainant would have qualified as

a GS-9 because of her master’s degree. Complainant, however, would

not have qualified as a GS-11 because she did not have one year of GS-9

experience or a Ph.D. In contrast, the record reflects that, at the time

of her selection, the Selectee was a GS-10. Thus, according to the grade

determination criteria listed in the vacancy announcement, the Selectee

would have qualified as a GS-11 because she had one year of experience

as a GS-9. In non-selection cases, a complainant may establish pretext

by showing that her qualifications are “plainly superior” to those

of the selectee. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981).

Based on the above, we agree with the AJ that Complainant has failed to

make such a showing.

Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence in the record supports

the AJ’s decision that Complainant has not proven that, more likely

than not, the Agency’s articulated reason for her non-selection was

a pretext for race and reprisal discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

Agency’s final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____8/4/11______________

Date

1 The record reflects that Complainant filed a grievance regarding her

non-selection. The AJ admitted as a hearing exhibit an arbitrator’s

April 10, 2009 decision and award in favor of Complainant. Complainant

was promoted retroactively to the position.

2 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(d) provides that any statement or brief filed

on behalf of a complainant in support of the appeal must be submitted

to the Office of Federal Operations within 30 days of filing the notice

of appeal. The record reveals that, in addition to her statement filed

with her September 18, 2009 notice of appeal, Complainant submitted

additional statements on October 22 and November 6, 2009. The Commission

declines to consider Complainant’s additional statements, as they were

untimely pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(d).

3 Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part

1614 (EEO MD-110), Ch. 9, at § IV.A. (Nov. 9, 1999) provides that the

Commission has the discretion to only review those issues specifically

raised on appeal. We note that Complainant did not raise the dismissal

of claim 2 on appeal. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion and will

not address the dismissal of claim 2 in this decision.

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0120093815

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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