Dong F.,1 Complainant,v.Sally Jewell, Secretary, Department of the Interior (National Park Service), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jun 3, 2016

0120140109 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 3, 2016)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Dong F.,1
Complainant,

v.

Sally Jewell,
Secretary,
Department of the Interior
(National Park Service),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120140109
Agency No. NPS110471

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s August 29, 2013, final decision concerning his
equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 791 et seq. and Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq. (GINA). The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission) deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the Agency’s final
decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the Agency violated GINA and/or the Rehabilitation Act when
it denied Complainant a waiver of its medical standards for the position of Law Enforcement
Park Ranger.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a as a Seasonal
Park Ranger (Protection) (also known as Law Enforcement Park Ranger), GS-002S-S, at
Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore (INDU), National Park Service (NPS), U.S. Department of
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

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the Interior (DOI) in Porter, Indiana. On October 11, 2011, Complainant filed an EEO
complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of disability (color
blindness and genetic disability), when he was denied a medical waiver for his disability,
which resulted in his termination on July 27, 2011.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a
final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant
failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Complainant has worked as seasonal Park Ranger for the NPS at various locations since 2008
which include Perry's Victory and International Peace Memorial in 2008 and 2009 and Kings
Mountain National Military Park in 2010. According to all accounts from former co-workers
and supervisors, Complainant was a highly qualified and effective Law Enforcement Ranger.
Complainant’s most recent seasonal employment (with INDU) began sometime in the spring of
2011.

After being hired for the 2011 season, it was discovered that Complainant had never taken a
pre-entry baseline medical examination which should have taken place in 2008 prior to his first
commission as a Law Enforcement Park Ranger. Accordingly, Complainant was required to
take a medical examination on April 27, 2011. Complainant failed the visual examination.
Specifically, he failed the Ishihara color vision test. Moreover, according to the examination
results Complainant was “(1) unable to identify green on a functional color vision test; and (2)
failed the Farnsworth D15 color vision test (8 crossings).” Based upon the findings of the
visual medical examination, the NPS Medical Standards Program (NMSP) determined that
Complainant was not medically qualified to safely and effectively perform arduous duties as a
NPS Law Enforcement Officer.

On June 21, 2011, Complainant submitted a request for a waiver of the NPS medical standard
for color vision and provided additional medical information and numerous professional
references attesting to his superior performance as a Law Enforcement Park Ranger despite his
color vision deficiency. He also presented a written statement from his optometrist (OD)
explaining that he had this condition his entire life and has “adapted” to it. OD also stated that
the condition “has little if any affect to his life.” OD further stated that “since [Complainant]
has excellent visual acuity with corrective lenses in each eye, it would be appropriate to apply
a waiver on excluding him from his job as a law enforcement National Park Service Ranger
based on color deficiency alone. …” Complainant also presented a second optometrist’s (OD2)
written opinion. Specifically, OD2 stated the following:

[Complainant] has a deficiency in his green cones called deuteranomaly, which
six percent of all males have congenitally. This condition will not get worse,

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and the ability to develop excellent coping mechanisms and alternative ways of
identifying colors is amazing. [Complainant] can see colors of green, and the
shades of green are the only difficulties for him. He can see the green in the
stop light, the leaves and the grass, and only the subtle differences in hue cause
him difficulty. There is not a loss in brightness of colors as you would see with
a protanomalous (red) defect, which is of great benefit. [Complainant] and I
have talked at length about his job duties, and his performance over the last
three years, without any negative feedback. This is a positive factor for
[Complainant] in his waiver request. My research shows that the color vision
requirement is rarely absolute, except in a screening of new appointees. Past
history of successful performance despite an otherwise disqualifying medical
condition is very strong evidence predicting continued success in future
performance. I am confident that the medical professional for the National Park
Service will find that [Complainant’s] color vision has not affected his job
performance. …

The Medical Review Board (MRB) met to review the matter on July 27, 2011, and denied the
waiver request. The MRB consisted of three individuals. The first voting member (MRB1)
declined to either vote for or against the waiver but wrote in a third option. Specifically,
MRB1 checked a third handwritten option, “I want more info” and below that wrote: “would
like to see if [sic] can pass a functional color test which would have allowed for a waiver in
2007 if he had passed. If he could pass, I would vote: yes, grant waiver.” The second voting
member (MRB2) voted to deny the waiver and wrote in the following comment: “The standard
is set for a valid reason, and for the safety of all.” The third voting member (MRB3) voted to
deny the waiver and wrote in the following comment: “Does not meet the standard.”

The record contains what appears to be a draft copy of the Medical Standard Program’s (MSP)
policy regarding waivers. According to the policy, the Medical Standard Program Manager
(MSPM) should follow the following criteria for initial waivers: (1) the employee has the
ability to perform arduous duties safely and efficiently; (2) the employee's medical condition is
stable and static; (3) employee provides direct evidence of ability to mitigate their medical
issue; (4) the employee's condition is not likely to be aggravated by engaging in normal
required duties; and (5) the employee demonstrates a pattern of compliance with medical
treatment and use of prescribed medications. See RM 57 Medical Standards Program, Ch.
4.1.2, Medical Reconsiderations, Initial Waiver & Waiver Renewal Requests, Report of
Investigation (ROI) pg. 264-269.

In addition, the MSP policy states: (1) the MSPM may renew initial waivers for color vision
deficiency which are static and stable, but the standard is not met based on the following tests:
(a) Ishihara plate-14 plates; (b) Farnsworth D-15; (c) Titmus Vision Tester; (d) the ability to
see red/green/yellow; (2) the MSPM may renew initial waivers for uncorrected distance vision
corrected with the accommodation/restriction of correcting with eyeglasses for uncorrected
vision which is static and stable; (3) the MSPM may renew initial waivers for corrected

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distance vision with/without the accommodation/restriction of correcting with eyeglasses or
contacts which is static and stable; and (4) the MSPM may renew initial waivers for depth
perception which is static and stable. See Id.

Complainant’s job duties were to perform vehicular patrol, engage in traffic stops, issue traffic
citations and interact with Park visitors. He states that his color blindness had no effect on his
ability to perform these functions because he has completely adapted to his condition. He had
received good evaluations in his prior federal law enforcement positions and was the top
ranked firearms qualifier at INDU.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant asserts on appeal that he is able to discern the difference between the red and
green. His only deficiency is the ability to discern the difference between greens that are very
close in color. Complainant also argues that the waiver process was not consistently applied.

AGENCY’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Agency asserts that Complainant is an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation
Act. However, the Agency argues that Complainant fails to demonstrate that he is qualified
for the position at issue because he does not meet the established minimum qualification for all
commissioned Law Enforcement Officers to be able to distinguish between colors, as required
for safety of the Law Enforcement Park Ranger and the public.

The Agency also concludes that management officials articulated legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its actions (i.e., he did not pass the required medical examination)
as it pertains to the aforementioned claims. Moreover, the Agency notes that management
officials and the MRB denied the medical waiver because Complainant’s color deficiency is not
correctable and the condition prevents Complainant from performing several essential functions
(e.g., the ability to identify suspects by their clothing, vehicles, license plates, etc. in the field
and in court). The Agency further asserts that such color deficiency impacts an officer’s
ability to apprehend suspects or testify reliably at trial, which are all essential functions of the
Law Enforcement Park Ranger position. The Agency further argues that Complainant fails to
demonstrate that the Agency's explanation for its employment decision was pretext or
otherwise motivated by discriminatory reasons.

The Agency also concludes that Complainant does not demonstrate a prima facie violation of
GINA. Specifically, the Agency notes that although Complainant's submission of additional
documentation disclosed the fact that the condition is congenital, this does not indicate that
Complainant was screened-out because the condition was inherited. At no time did the Agency
make an inquiry into (1) Complainant’s genetic tests; (2) the genetic tests of Complainant’s
family members; (3) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in Complainant’s family
members; (4) Complainant’s request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or the participation in
clinical research that includes genetic services by Complainant of Complainant’s family

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member; or (5) the genetic information of Complainant’s fetus. Thus, Complainant did not
demonstrate a prima facie violation of GINA.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29
C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard
of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and
legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the
parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record
and its interpretation of the law”).

In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act, a complainant must demonstrate that: (1) he is an “individual with a disability;” (2) he is
“qualified” for the position held or desired, i.e., can perform the essential functions of the
position with or without an accommodation; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment
action because of his disability; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the adverse action give
rise to an inference of discrimination. See Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental
Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68 (2nd. Cir. 1999); Swanks v.
WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d
916 (7th Cir. 2001).

The Agency does not dispute that Complainant is an individual with a disability. Therefore,
the next inquiry is whether Complainant is a “qualified individual with a disability.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(m). A “qualified individual with a disability” is one who satisfies the requisite skill,
experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position and who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such
position. Id. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits a covered entity from engaging in discrimination
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in, among other things, hiring. 42
U.S.C. §12112(a). Such discrimination includes “using qualification standards, employment
tests, or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability ... unless the standard, test, or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity,
is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.
Id. § 12112(b)(6); see also 29 C.F.R. § 130.10 (making unlawful a covered entity's use of
qualification standards that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability
unless such standard is job related and consistent with business necessity). The regulations
define “qualification standard” as “the personal and professional attributes, including the skill,
experience, education, physical, medical, safety, and other requirements established by a
covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the
position held or desired.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q).

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With regard to safety requirements that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities, an employer must demonstrate that the
requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity. The regulations provide that
an agency can meet this standard by showing that the requirement, as applied to the individual,
satisfies the “direct threat” analysis set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); 29 C.F.R. 1630 App.
1630.15(b) and (c); Nathan v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070014 (July 19,
2013). A person is a “direct threat” if he or she poses a significant risk of substantial harm to
the health or safety of him or herself or others which cannot be eliminated or reduced to an
acceptable level by reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The “direct threat”
evaluation must be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to
perform the essential functions of the job. Id. If no such accommodation exists, the agency
may refuse to hire an applicant. Id.

Here is where the dispute lies: Complainant asserts he can safely perform the duties of the Law
Enforcement Park Ranger, and the Agency finds that he cannot because of the fact that he
failed a visual examination. In order to exclude an individual on the basis of future possible
injury, the Agency must show there is a significant risk, i.e., a high probability of substantial
harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient. The Agency must show more than that an
individual with a disability seeking employment stands some slightly increased risk of harm.
The burden of showing a significant risk is on the Agency. Selix v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC
Appeal No. 01970153 (Mar. 16, 2000).

Moreover, such a finding must be based on an individualized assessment of the individual that
takes into account: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential
harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and 4) the imminence of the
potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002);
Cook v. State of Rhode Is., Dep’t of Mental Health Retardation and Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17 (1st
Cir. 1993). A determination of significant risk cannot be based merely on an employer's
subjective evaluation, or, except in cases of a most apparent nature, merely on medical reports.
Rather, the agency must gather information and base its decision on substantial information
regarding the individual's work and medical history. Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, supra;
Harrison v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 01A03948 (July 30, 2003); Nathan v. Dep’t
of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070014 (July 19, 2013) (finding that as part of its
individualized assessment, the agency should examine adaptive behaviors and prior work
experience).

After a review of the record, we find insufficient evidence to establish that an adequate
individualized assessment was accomplished. We find that the results of the visual examination
alone are insufficient to establish that there would be a high probability of substantial harm to
Complainant or others. The evaluation of an applicant’s unique abilities and disabilities is the
crux of an individual assessment. At minimum, such an assessment should take into account
any special qualifications that might allow an applicant to successfully perform the essential
functions of a position without posing a direct threat to himself or others. The preponderance
of the evidence establishes that Complainant has adapted to his color deficiencies and can

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distinguish between red and green during real world settings. The record contains
Complainant’s testimony along with two experts (i.e., treating optometrists) who support
Complainant’s view that his eye deficiency has no impact on his job performance. While the
Agency refutes this conclusion, they have failed to perform an individualized assessment to
determine how Complainant’s eye deficiency actually affects his job performance. The record
shows that the Agency was capable of performing an individualized assessment in the form of a
“functional color test” but failed to do so against MRB1’s recommendation. We also note that
the undisputed record establishes that Complainant had been performing his job duties in an
exemplary fashion for more than three years and the Agency failed to take this into
consideration during the waiver process. Since the Agency failed to meet its burden under the
direct threat standard as required by the Rehabilitation Act, we find that the evidence supports
the finding that the Agency violated the Rehabilitation Act.

With respect to Complainant’s GINA claim, we find that Complainant is not covered by GINA
since an individual who has a current impairment is not protected from discrimination on the
basis of that impairment by GINA, even if the condition has a genetic basis, but rather would
be protected by the Rehabilitation Act. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1635.12(a)(1) and (2).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we REVERSE the
Agency’s final order and conclude that the Agency violated the Rehabilitation Act when it
failed to grant Complainant a waiver of the color vision requirements. We REMAND the
matter back to the Agency to take corrective action in accordance with this decision and the
order herein.

ORDER (D0610)

Within ninety (90) days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall take the
following actions:

1. The Agency shall offer Complainant reinstatement into the position of Seasonal Park
Ranger, GS-002S-S. The Agency shall afford Complainant fifteen (15) days to
determine whether to accept reinstatement. Should Complainant reject the offer of
reinstatement, Complainant's entitlement to back pay shall terminate as of the date of
his rejection.

2. The Agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay, with interest, and
other benefits due to Complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 114.501. Complainant
shall cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits
due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency. If there is a
dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits, the Agency shall issue
a check to Complainant for the undisputed amount within ninety (90) calendar days of
the date the Agency determines the amount it believes to be due. Complainant may

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petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute. The petition for
clarification or enforcement must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address
referenced in the statement entitled, “Implementation of the Commission's Decision.”

3. The Agency shall also pay compensation for the adverse tax consequences of receiving
back pay as a lump sum. Complainant has the burden of establishing the amount of
increased tax liability, if any. Once the Agency has calculated the proper amount of
back pay, Complainant shall be given the opportunity to present the Agency with
evidence regarding the adverse tax consequences, if any, for which Complainant shall
then be compensated.

4. The Agency shall give Complainant a notice of his right to submit objective evidence
(pursuant to the guidance given in Carle v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No.
01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993) in support of his claim for compensatory damages. The
Agency shall complete the investigation on the claim for compensatory damages within
forty-five (45) calendar days of the date the Agency receives Complainant's claim for
compensatory damages. Thereafter, the Agency shall process the claim in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f).

5. The Agency shall provide eight (8) hours of EEO training for S1, S2, and all members
of the MSP, including the MRB on the Rehabilitation Act. The training shall
emphasize the Rehabilitation’s Act’s requirements with respect to the Agency’s
medical/physical standards and medical waiver programs to ensure that similar
violations do not occur.

6. The Agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against the Agency officials found
to have discriminated against Complainant. The Agency shall report its decision. If
the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the
Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its
decision not to impose discipline.

7. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the
statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission's Decision.” The report shall
include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been
implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0914)

The Agency is ordered to post at its Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore (INDU), Porter,
Indiana, copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the
Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic
format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall
remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure

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that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original
signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph
entitled “Implementation of the Commission's Decision,” within 10 calendar days of the
expiration of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610)

If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the
processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be
paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within
thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The Agency shall then process the
claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission’s corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit
its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered
corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013. The Agency’s report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must
send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the
Commission’s order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the
order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to
enforce compliance with the Commission’s order prior to or following an administrative
petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the
underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil
Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil
action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing
of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0416)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant
or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tends to
establish that:

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1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material
fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices,
or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R.
Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments
must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In
the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is
received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other
party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your
complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in
an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that
you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and
eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your
appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that
person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of
your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may

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request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court
has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File
a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

June 3, 2016
Date