14542044 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2019)

Donatus Andreas Josephine. Kees et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 24, 2019

14542044 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/542,044 11/14/2014 Donatus Andreas Josephine KEES 83479053 9167 28395 7590 10/24/2019 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL 1000 TOWN CENTER 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 EXAMINER MARTINEZ BORRERO, LUIS A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3665 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/24/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte DONATUS ANDREAS JOSEPHINE KEES and CAYETANO DAVID FUENTE SAN JUAN ____________________ Appeal 2018-005440 Application 14/542,044 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before: MICHAEL L. HOELTER, GEORGE R. HOSKINS, and BRENT M. DOUGAL, Administrative Patent Judges. DOUGAL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2018-005440 Application 14/542,044 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of claims 1–4, 6–8, and 10–14 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Choi (US 2011/0025127 A1, pub. Feb. 3, 2011) and Haggerty (US 2012/ 0306457 A1, pub. Dec. 6, 2012).2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a method of controlling a mild hybrid electric vehicle. Claims 1, 8, and 14 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of controlling a vehicle comprising: causing by a controller a low voltage (LV) battery to exclusively provide power to one or more LV loads for an entire duration of an automatic engine stop responsive to a state of charge of the LV battery remaining above a threshold, and charging the LV battery with a high voltage (HV) battery responsive to an automatic engine restart. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2. 2 The Examiner withdrew all other rejections. See Ans. 3. Appeal 2018-005440 Application 14/542,044 3 OPINION Independent claim 1 includes “causing by a controller a low voltage (LV) battery to exclusively provide power to one or more LV loads.” Independent claim 8 includes a controller operable to “exclusively use the low voltage battery to power the at least one low voltage load.” Independent claim 14 includes “a controller operable to . . . exclusively use the auxiliary battery to power an auxiliary load.” Claim 1 also requires that this exclusive activity occur “for an entire duration of an automatic engine stop responsive to a state of charge of the LV battery remaining above a threshold,” and claims 8 and 14 include similar limitations. The Examiner and Appellant dispute the meaning of “exclusive” in the claims. See Appeal Br. 3–4; Ans. 4–6. The Examiner takes the position that “exclusive” limits the actions of the LV battery, without limitation on the actions of the high voltage (HV) battery. Final Act. 5, 9; Ans. 4–5. Thus, under the Examiner’s position, the LV battery only powers the LV loads, not any other loads, while the HV battery can also power the LV loads (as taught in Choi). Final Act. 5, 9; Ans. 4–5. In contrast, Appellant argues that “exclusive” limits how the LV loads are powered. Appeal Br. 3–4. In other words, Appellant’s position is that the LV loads are only powered by the LV battery, which is not taught by the cited prior art. Id. As noted by the Examiner, the claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation. See Ans. 4. “[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We look to the Specification to see if the Examiner’s position is consistent with the Appeal 2018-005440 Application 14/542,044 4 specification, and for the reasons discussed below, we determine that it is not. Appellant’s Specification states that: “during an E-stop all of the electrical requirements of the low voltage loads 17 are met from the LV battery 16 irrespective of the SOC [state of charge] of the HV battery 13 which is isolated from the LV battery 16.” Spec. ¶ 39 (emphasis added). An excerpt of Figure 1 is reproduced below, showing a similar teaching. Excerpt from Figure 1, above, showing that “only” the LV battery is used to power loads. As will be understood from the above, the teachings of the Specification are consistent with Appellant’s understanding of “exclusive,” that the LV loads are only powered by the LV battery. The Specification does allow for instances where the HV battery can be used to power the LV loads, but these exceptions to the rule are incorporated into the independent claims. See id. at ¶¶ 40–42. For example, claim 1 states that the controller acts on the LV battery “responsive to a state of charge of the LV battery remaining above a threshold.” Dependent claim Appeal 2018-005440 Application 14/542,044 5 23 further requires: “responsive to a state of charge of the LV battery dropping to a predefined minimum allowable limit while an engine remains stopped, connecting the HV battery to the LV battery via a DC to DC converter and using the HV battery to power the LV loads.” These claim limitations are consistent with the Specification’s disclosure of when the HV battery can be used to power the LV loads. See id. Thus, based on our review of the Specification, we do not find support for the Examiner’s conclusion that “exclusive” can be read to mean that other power sources, besides the LV battery, can be used to “provide power to one or more LV loads for an entire duration of an automatic engine stop responsive to a state of charge of the LV battery remaining above a threshold” as required by claim 1. We similarly find error in the Examiner’s interpretation of the related claim limitations of claims 8 and 14. For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–4, 6–8, 10–14 103 Choi, Haggerty 1–4, 6–8, 10–14 REVERSED 3 Though we understand the “threshold” in claim 1 to relate to the “predefined minimum allowable limit” in claim 2 to advance prosecution, we note that the relationship is not clearly defined in the claims.