01982589
09-03-1999
Donald R. Boothe, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency
Donald R. Boothe, )
Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 01982589
v. ) Agency No. 1D-241-1003-94
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 1998, appellant timely filed an appeal with this
Commission from the final decision of the agency dated January 15, 1998,
in which the agency determined that it had not breached a settlement
agreement entered into on April 26, 1995. The appeal is accepted by the
Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented is whether the agency properly determined that it
did not breach the settlement agreement entered into on April 26, 1995.
BACKGROUND
The settlement agreement (SA) provided, in pertinent part, that:
Complainant will be given an Officer in Charge detail assignment at the
Eggleston Post Office, effective May 12, 1995, not to exceed 90 days,
or until the present detail of the Postmaster has ended, whichever date
comes first. In addition, Complainant will be furnished a rolling cart
for use in handling heavy parcels. In the event of another Officer in
Charge assignment closer to Roanoke at a Level 15 or below coming open
during this assignment, Complainant will have an opportunity for that
assignment. Complainant will have an equal opportunity to be considered
for promotions based on his Form 991 qualifications and other skills,
within his medical limitations. If his medical limitations cause him
problems in the office, he will inform [a management official] and he
will be taken out of the office as soon as possible.
By letter to the agency dated October 3, 1997, appellant alleged that
the agency was in breach of the SA. Specifically, the appellant alleged
that as of the date of his letter, the agency had failed to grant him
the opportunity to serve as an Officer in Charge in his geographical
area, and that the agency had not provided him with any information on
available assignments.
In its January 15, 1998 final agency decision (FAD), the agency concluded
that it had not breached the SA, and that in fact the appellant had
been the party who sought to change the terms of the agreement after
its signing. During the agency's inquiry into appellant's claim that the
agency had breached the agreement, it was revealed that after signing the
settlement agreement on April 26, 1995, but before starting his Officer
in Charge assignment at the Eggleston Post Office, the appellant notified
the agency on May 1, 1995 that he would not be accepting the Eggleston
assignment. He stated during the investigation that it was because
the driving distance from his home to the Eggleston Post office, 75-90
miles each way, would have been detrimental to his medical condition,
and that at the time of signing the agreement he was unaware of the
distance involved. The FAD argued that appellant was well aware of the
distance before the SA was signed. The management official who signed the
SA on behalf of the agency indicated that appellant had requested that the
sentence, "[i]n the event of another Officer in Charge assignment closer
to Roanoke at a Level 15 or below coming open during this assignment,
Complainant will have an opportunity for that assignment," be inserted
in the SA specifically for this reason. The agency concluded that
it had not breached the SA because the relevant language guaranteed
an Officer in Charge assignment to appellant at the Eggleston Post
Office beginning on May 12, 1995, not to exceed 90 days, and that only
"during this assignment" would appellant have the opportunity to obtain
an assignment closer to his home.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. Section 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties shall be
binding on both parties. That section further provides that if the
complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with the terms
of a settlement agreement, the complainant shall notify the Director
of Equal Employment Opportunity of the alleged noncompliance with the
settlement agreement within 30 days of when the complainant knew or
should have known of the alleged noncompliance. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a).
The complainant may request that the terms of the settlement agreement
be specifically implemented or request that the complaint be reinstated
for further processing from the point processing ceased. Id.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract
between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of contract
construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request
No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that
it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, and not
some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990); In re Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 94 F.2d 296 (7th
Cir. 1938). In reviewing settlement agreements to determine if there
is a breach, the Commission is often required to ascertain the intent
of the parties and will generally rely on the plain meaning rule.
Wong v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05931097 (April 29, 1994)
(citing Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December
2, 1991)). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and
unambiguous on its face, then its meaning must be determined from the
four corners of the instrument without any resort to extrinsic evidence
of any nature. Id. (citing Montgomery Elevator v. Building Engineering
Service, 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984)).
In the instant case, we agree with the agency's interpretation of the
relevant language. Appellant agreed to an assignment at the Eggleston
Post Office which would begin on May 12, 1995 and last no more than 90
days, or until August 10, 1995 (whether it was 90 working days or calendar
days was not specified in the SA). The sentence, "[i]n the event of
another Officer in Charge assignment closer to Roanoke at a Level 15
or below coming open during this assignment, Complainant will have an
opportunity for that assignment," is strong evidence that the appellant
was aware that the Eggleston Post Office was a substantial distance
from his home and that he would prefer an assignment that was closer.
The key language is "during that assignment." Once the 90 days had
expired, appellant no longer had the opportunity under the SA to obtain
another Officer in Charge position. If the appellant had a different
understanding of what the agreement was to mean upon implementation,
he should have ensured that the language of the SA reflected that
understanding. Therefore, the agency correctly concluded that it had
not breached the SA.
Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
___09-03-99___ ______________________________
DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations