Dona W. Yunker, Appellant,v.Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 5, 1999
01991495 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 5, 1999)

01991495

11-05-1999

Dona W. Yunker, Appellant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.


Dona W. Yunker v. Department of Transportation

01991495

November 5, 1999

Dona W. Yunker, )

Appellant, )

)

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01991495

) Agency No. 3-97-3025

)

Rodney E. Slater, )

Secretary, )

Department of Transportation, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On August 21, 1998, appellant filed a timely appeal of a August 11,

1998 final agency decision, which was received by her on August 17,

1998, dismissing several allegations in her complaint, pursuant to 29

C.F.R. ��1614.107(a) and (b), for failure to state a claim and due to

untimely EEO Counselor contact.

The record indicates that the agency previously issued a final decision

dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. Upon appellant's

appeal, the Commission, in EEOC Appeal No. 01972712 (March 18, 1998),

vacated the final decision, and remanded the complaint back to the agency

for further clarification of the issues therein.

In accordance with the Commission's order, appellant's allegations were

further clarified through EEO counseling. In the instant final decision,

the agency identified the allegations of appellant's December 23, 1996

complaint as whether appellant was discriminated against based on age

(51), disability (asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and

fibromyalgia), and in reprisal for reporting alleged fraud when:

On September 5 and 10, 1996, her supervisor asked her to type

"presentations for him" that were not related to official duty;

On July 24, 1996, the supervisor accused her of sending a letter about

an extramarital affair to her coworker's husband;

On June 17, 1996, the supervisor removed her name from a training

schedule;

On June 14, 1996, the supervisor changed her award from 40 hours to 16

hours, and submitted her name for Employee of the Month then withdrew

her name;

On October 4, 1996, the supervisor transferred her to a position in the

warehouse causing her serious health problems;

In July 1996, her Division Chief put a bag of ice in the ice machine

and marked it "Everyone except [appellant] and [an identified coworker]";

In May 1996, the supervisor and other management officials asked her

about her entitlement to a disabled parking space;

While serving as a coffee fund keeper, her coworkers harassed her when

she decided not to support events without approval;

During 1993 to 1994, she was not selected during reclassification of

AR&SC jobs;

On August 23, 1996, the supervisor called her at home regarding time

and attendance records;

In October 1996, the supervisor harassed her about her time and attendance

record; and

On June 25, 1996, she was selected for a Microsoft course.

The agency accepted allegation (e) and dismissed allegation (i) due to

untimely EEO Counselor contact and the remaining allegations for failure

to state a claim. The agency also dismissed the basis of reprisal

since appellant failed to indicate that she was involved in any prior

EEO related activity.

Untimely EEO Counselor Contact:

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination be brought to the attention of the EEO Counselor within

45 days of the alleged discriminatory event, or the effective date of

an alleged discriminatory personnel action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the limitation period

is triggered under the EEOC Regulations. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(2);

Ball v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880247 (July 6,

1988). Thus, the limitations period is not triggered until a complainant

should reasonably suspect discrimination, but before all the facts that

would support a charge of discrimination have become apparent.

The record indicates that the incident raised in allegation (i) occurred

during 1993 and 1994. Appellant contacted an EEO Counselor regarding

the matter on November 15, 1996, which was beyond the 45-day time limit

set by the regulations. On appeal, appellant fails to present adequate

justification to warrant an extension of the applicable time limit for

contacting an EEO Counselor pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(2).

Failure to State a Claim

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides that an agency may dismiss

a complaint which fails to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.103.

In order to establish standing initially under 29 C.F.R. �1614.103, a

complainant must be either an employee or an applicant for employment of

the agency against which the allegations of discrimination are raised.

In addition, the allegations must concern an employment policy or

practice which affects the individual in his/her capacity as an employee

or applicant for employment. The agency shall accept a complaint from any

aggrieved employee or applicant for employment who believes that he/she

has been discriminated against by that agency because of race, color,

religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability. 29 C.F.R. ��1614.103

and .106(a). The Commission's Federal sector case precedent has long

defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss

with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

The record indicates that the incidents in allegations (a), (c), and (d)

involved appellant's duties, training, and an award. Since appellant

alleged that she sustained a personal harm or loss which affected a term,

condition, or privilege of her employment as a result of the alleged

incidents, we find that the subject allegations state a claim.

Furthermore, with regard to allegations (b), (f), (g), (j), and (k), we

find that the agency is improperly piecemealing appellant's complaint.

The Commission has previously held that an agency should not ignore the

"pattern aspect" of a complainant's allegations and define the issues

in a piecemeal manner where an analogous theme unites the matters

complained of. Meaney v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05940169 (November 3, 1994).

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme

court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's

employment. The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive

work environment" is created when "a reasonable person would find

[it] hostile or abusive" and the complainant subjectively perceives it

as such. Harris, supra at 21-22. Thus, not all claims of harassment

are actionable. Where a complaint does not challenge an agency action or

inaction regarding a specific term, condition, or privilege of employment,

a claim of harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment

to which the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment.

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless

it appears beyond doubt that the complainant cannot prove a set of facts

in support of the claim which would entitle the complainant to relief.

The trier of fact must consider all of the alleged harassing incidents

and remarks, and considering them together in the light most favorable to

the complainant, determine whether they are sufficient to state a claim.

Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13,

1997).

Considering that the identified actions were all perpetrated by

appellant's supervisor, including other managerial officials, and viewing

the identified remarks, comments, and accusations in the light most

favorable to appellant, we find that appellant has stated a cognizable

claim under the EEOC Regulations. See Cervantes v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05930303 (November 12, 1993). Thus, we find

that allegations (b), (f), (g), (j), and (k) stated a claim.

However, we find that allegations (h) and (l) fail to state a claim.

With regard to allegation (h), the responsible individuals were

appellant's coworkers, not appellant's supervisor or other managerial

official. Appellant indicated that she was subjected to derogatory

remarks/harassment from her coworkers when she and "the coffee committee"

decided not to use its excess funds for employees' social events.

There is no evidence in the record that appellant sustained any

personal harm or loss which affected a term, condition, or privilege

of her employment as a result of the remarks. See Henry v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940695 (February 9, 1995).

It appears that the alleged incident occurred in or around July 1996,

and appellant did not allege that she was subjected to further remarks

from those coworkers at any other time.

With regard to allegation (l), appellant indicated that management offered

her a Microsoft course in order to cover up for her supervisor's improper

action, as described in allegation (c). Appellant also indicated that

she subsequently asked management to delay her selection to the Microsoft

course, which was originally scheduled on September 6, 1996. There is

no evidence in the record that appellant sustained any personal harm or

loss which affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment

as a result of the alleged incident.

Retaliation

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.101(b) provides, in part, that no person

shall be subject to retaliation for opposing any practice made unlawful

by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII). 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq. Section 704(a) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. �2000e-3(a)) provides

that it shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of

his employees or applicants for employment because "he has opposed any

practice made unlawful by this title, or because he had made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this title." (Emphasis added.)

The EEO Counselor's Report indicates that appellant alleged discrimination

in reprisal for her reporting a prior fraud, waste and abuse matter to

the command. There is no evidence in the record that appellant filed

any previous EEO complaints, or engaged in any other protected activity

covered under the EEOC Regulations. Thus, we find that reprisal was

properly dismissed as a basis from appellant's complaint.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's final decision is hereby MODIFIED. Allegations

(a) through (d), (f), (g), (j), and (k) are REMANDED to the agency

for further processing in accordance with this decision and applicable

regulations. The dismissal of allegations (h), (i), and (l) is hereby

AFFIRMED.

ORDER (E1092)

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant

that it has received the remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to

appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant

of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days

of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise

resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision

without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty

(60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy

of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights

must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report

shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of

your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the

complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file

a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the

Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision

on your complaint. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

November 5, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations