Dock Workers Local 1 (Trans Ocean Maitime)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 27, 2000

330 N.L.R.B. 1348 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1348
Independent Dock Workers Union, Local No. 1
(Trans Ocean Maritime Services, Inc.) and Wil-
liam J. Morgan. Case 4–CB–8000
April 27, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS HURTGEN
AND BRAME
On June 4, 1999, Administrative Law Judge David L.
Evans issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed a brief in support of the judge’s decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Independent Dock Workers
Union, Local No. 1, Gloucester, New Jersey, its officers,
agents, and representatives shall take the action set forth
in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(f) and reletter
the subsequent paragraph.
(f) Forward a sufficient number of signed copies of
the notice to the Regional Director for Region 4, for
posting by the Employer at its place of business, in
Gloucester, New Jersey, in places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted, if the Employer is will-
ing to do so, and ask the Employer to remove reference
to Morgan’s unlawful discharge from the Employer’s
files and notify Morgan that it has asked the Employer to
do this.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 The judge inadvertently omitted a required provision from his Or-
der. We correct this omission here.
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT cause, or attempt to cause, Trans Ocean
Maritime Services, Inc. to discharge or otherwise dis-
criminate against you for reasons other than your failure
to pay periodic dues and initiation fees that are required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in
Independent Dock Workers Union, Local No. 1.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make William J. Morgan whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits resulting from his dis-
charge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the
unlawful discharge of William J. Morgan, and WE WILL
notify Morgan in writing that this has been done and that
his discharge will not be used against him in any way.
WE WILL ask the Employer to remove any reference to
Morgan’s unlawful discharge from its files and will no-
tify Morgan that we have asked the Employer to do this.

INDEPENDENT DOCK WORKERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 1

Carmen P. Cialio Jr. and Andrew Brenner, Esqs., for the
General Counsel.
Bernard N. Katz, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the
Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID L. EVANS, Administrative Law Judge. This case, un-
der the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), was tried before
me in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on February 4–5, 1999. On
November 20, 1997,1 William J. Morgan, an individual, filed
the charge in Case 6–CB–8000 against Independent Dock
Workers Union, Local No. 1 (the Respondent or the Union).
On July 16, 1998, the General Counsel issued a complaint and
notice of hearing (the complaint) alleging that the Respondent
has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by causing,
or attempting to cause, Trans Ocean Maritime Services, Inc.
(the Employer) to discriminate against the Charging Party in
violation of Section 8(a)(3). The Respondent denies the com-
mission of any unfair labor practices.
1 All dates are in 1997, unless otherwise indicated.
330 NLRB No. 194
INDEPENDENT DOCK WORKERS LOCAL 1 (TRANS OCEAN MARITIME SERVICES) 1349
On the testimony and exhibits entered at trial,2 and on my
observations of the demeanor of the witnesses,3 and after con-
sideration of the briefs that have been filed, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
As the Respondent admits, the Employer is a Delaware cor-
poration that has a pier and warehouse in Gloucester, New Jer-
sey, where it is engaged in the warehousing and stevedoring
business. During the year preceding the issuance of the com-
plaint, in conducting those business operations, the Employer
performed services valued in excess of $50,000 outside Dela-
ware. Therefore, at all relevant times the Employer has been an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. As the Respondent further admits,
it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Factual Issues
Morgan is a laborer who works as a casual employee on the
docks in the Philadelphia area; he is a member of the Union.
The gravamen of the General Counsel’s complaint is that, for a
time, the Union unlawfully caused the Employer not to employ
Morgan as a casual employee because he had concertedly
voiced to agents of the Union complaints about the operation of
its hiring hall. More specifically, the General Counsel contends
that Morgan objected to the fact that union membership, or
length of union membership, was not considered in the Union’s
making of job referrals and that, after Morgan voiced those
objections, the Respondent caused the Employer to discharge
Morgan and thereafter refused to refer Morgan to jobs with the
Employer. (There is no allegation that the Employer unlaw-
fully did so; at trial, counsel for the General Counsel stated that
a charge had been filed against the Employer, but the Region
did not issue a complaint because there was no evidence that
the Employer knew of the Union’s alleged actions regarding the
Charging Party.)
The Employer’s operation consists of five warehouses, two
ship docks, and several truck docks. The Employer has a regu-
lar work force of stevedores and other dock workers, and it
hires casual employees as the needs arise. The Employer and
the Union are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that
provides, inter alia, that: “The Company agrees to use casual
labor supplied by the Union by means of their hiring hall.”
Although this is not an express exclusive hiring hall agreement,
the General Counsel called Jeffrey Gillespie, president of the
Employer, who testified that the Employer has historically
hired casual employees only by calling the Union and asking it
to refer casual employees on a day-to-day basis. Gillespie fur-
ther testified that the Employer hires all casual employees who
are referred to it by the Union. Gillespie also testified that if
any individual applies directly to the Employer for work as a
casual employee that individual is referred to the Union.
The Union’s only officers are Samuel Schofield, its presi-
dent, and Barbara Palmer, its secretary-treasurer. Schofield and

2 Certain passages of the transcript have been electronically repro-
duced. Some corrections to punctuation have been entered.
3 Credibility resolutions are based on the demeanor of the witnesses
and any other factors that I may mention.
Palmer are also paid employees of the Employer. Palmer is a
warehouse foreman and regularly works on the docks and in the
warehouses. According to Jeffrey Gillespie, Schofield’s “pri-
mary responsibilities are to provide labor for us and help us
organize our labor on a daily basis.” That is, Schofield does not
work on the docks, and he gets paid by the Employer only for
operating the Union’s hiring hall. Schofield operates the hiring
hall for every week of the year except 2 weeks; during those 2
weeks Palmer operates it. The Union’s office, which is the
locus of its hiring hall, is located in one of the Employer’s
warehouses.
The Union has no written referral rules. Schofield testified
that the Employer will tell him when casual employees are
needed for the next day, and he, alone, decides which casual
employees will work. If a casual employee is working when
the Employer notifies Schofield that casual employees will be
needed the next day also, Schofield will tell those already
working to come back the next day, if they have the skills that
the Employer needs for the next day’s work. If the Employer
needs additional casual employees for the next day, Schofield
will consult a list that he keeps; the list is made up of names of
applicants who have previously received work from, or who
have sought work with, the Employer. Schofield telephones
additional casual employees and tells them when to report.
Some casual employees who are seeking work will call
Schofield, and Schofield will tell them if work will be available
the next day; if it is, Schofield may make a commitment to
them over the telephone that they will be assigned the work.
Individuals who are seeking work as casual employees, but
who have not been previously called by Schofield, or who have
not called Schofield themselves, may nevertheless come to the
hiring hall during the mornings and sign a daily list that
Schofield maintains. If some of the previously scheduled cas-
ual employees do not appear for work, Schofield gives the re-
ferrals to those who have appeared and signed the day’s list.
Schofield acknowledged that no casual employee can work
for the Employer without coming through the Union’s hiring
hall and receiving clearance by him (or by Palmer during the 2
weeks of the year that she operates the hiring hall). Schofield
testified that he makes his referrals according to abilities and
availabilities; union membership is not a factor. (Nor is senior-
ity with the Employer a factor in making assignments; under
the collective-bargaining agreement, casual employees do not
accumulate seniority rights with the Employer.)
Morgan testified that on Friday, October 24, he went to the
Union’s office and met with Schofield. The initial purpose of
the visit was to get Schofield to sign some papers that would
entitle Morgan to continue his unemployment compensation.
During the visit Morgan told Schofield that he had heard ru-
mors that “new faces” were working that week. Schofield de-
nied it. Morgan asked about work for the next week; Schofield
told Morgan to call him on Sunday. Morgan did so, and
Schofield then told Morgan to report for work the next day.
Morgan testified that on Monday, October 27, when he re-
ported for work he “saw new faces that I’d never seen there
before.” Morgan approached one of the new casual employees
and discovered that that employee had never been a member of
the Union, or paid any dues, and that he had worked 2 days
during the week before. Lunchtime for the employees of the
Employer is from noon until 1 p.m. About 12:30, Morgan went
to the Union’s office where he met with Schofield; Palmer was
also present. According to Morgan, he confronted Schofield:

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1350
[A]nd I said “Yeah . . . you didn’t tell me the truth. . . .
Last Friday you said there were no new faces and I’m
working with one of the new faces. . . . Why am I paying
my Union dues? Why did I pay for a Union book? Where
is my seniority?”
He says, “Your seniority don’t mean nothing.”
I said, “Mean nothing? Then why am I paying all this
money if it means nothing?”
He says, “If you continue bitching, you’re going fur-
ther down the list.”
. . . .
I said, “Are you threatening me?”
He said, “Take it as you want.”
And my response to him was: “Who the fuck do you
think you are?”
. . . .
And he said, “I’m the president of this Local.”
. . . .
I said, “What? The president of your own ass.”
. . . .
He stood up, jumped up, threw his hands up in the air,
and he said, “That’s the end of the conversation. That’s it.”

Morgan testified that he then went back to work. A few minutes
later he was approached by Palmer. According to Morgan:

She said, “Bill, I hate4 to tell you this, but you’re
fired.”
I said, “Fired?” I said, “For what?”
[She said,] “For gross insubordination to a Union offi-
cer.”
. . . .
I said, “I don’t believe this. I don’t believe this.”
She just went like this, rolled her eyes back and . . .
said [that] Sam [Schofield] had instructed her, for her to
do this, to fire me.

Morgan further testified that he then left the premises.
Morgan testified that about 2 weeks later he called Schofield
and asked for a copy of the Union’s constitution and bylaws
and a copy of the collective-bargaining agreement between the
Union and the Employer. Morgan further told Schofield that he
wished to file a grievance. Schofield replied that he did not
have the copies that Morgan had requested, but he also told
Morgan to come to the Union’s office to file the grievance.
When Morgan got to the Union’s office, he told Schofield that
he had consulted a lawyer and the lawyer had told him that he
and Schofield should “kiss and make up.” Morgan testified
further that:

[I said,] “Look, we can put this thing to bed, let’s kiss
and make up and just forget it, and let me go back to work
and I’ll forget the whole incident, the last two and a-half
weeks.”
. . . .
[Schofield replied,] “I don’t know what you got in
mind, but do what you got to do. If you’ve got any ques-
tions, see my lawyer. . . . [A]s far as the constitution and
by-laws, if you want them, see my lawyer.”
I said, “What about the grievance?”

4 Certain errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected.
He says, “You’re no longer a member of Independent
Dock Workers Local No. 1.” He says, “I’m not filing a
grievance in your behalf.”
I said, “Is that your stand?”
He said, “I don’t know what you’re up to, but . . . do
what you got to do and I’ll do what I got to do.”

Morgan left the Union’s office, and he later filed the charge
here.
Morgan testified that he received no calls from, or referrals
by, the Union from October 27 until some point after December
17, 1998. On that date, pursuant to a partial settlement agree-
ment that was suggested by a Board settlement judge,5 the Un-
ion notified the Employer that it had never had objections to the
Employer’s employment of Morgan and that Morgan would be
immediately referred to work that was available if he presented
himself to the hiring hall. Morgan thereafter received referrals
from the Union, and the General Counsel makes no complaint
beyond the date of the Union’s letter.
The management-rights clause of the contract between the
Employer and the Union specifically states that the right to
discipline and discharge employees is “vested exclusively in
the Company.” To corroborate Morgan’s testimony that despite
this contractual language the Union disciplines and discharges
employees, the General Counsel introduced the testimony of
another casual employee, David Baldus. Baldus testified that in
May 1998 he got into an altercation with Palmer. During the
following week, when Baldus called Schofield to ask when he
could next expect to work, Schofield told Baldus that he was
“suspended” from working for the Employer because of the
incident with Palmer. A few days later, Baldus called Schofield
again. Baldus told Schofield that he had complained to one of
the Employer’s managers that a guard had told Baldus that he
had been “banned from the terminal” by the Union. Baldus
further told Schofield that the manager had replied to him that
only management could ban someone from the terminal. Fur-
ther according to Baldus’ testimony, “his [Schofield’s] reply
was [that] I was suspended; I wasn’t banned from the terminal,
he says. But I’m suspended from work, I could not work.” The
suspension continued until September 16, 1998, when a union
review board met to hear intraunion charges that Baldus and
Palmer filed against each other over their altercation. The Un-
ion’s review board reinstated Baldus, but without backpay.
Both Schofield and Palmer were present at the Union’s hearing;
neither denied any part of this testimony by Baldus when they
testified before me.
Schofield testified that on October 27 Morgan approached
him and, in a loud voice, asked why he was paying his “fucking
dues.” Schofield asked what Morgan was talking about, and
Morgan replied that there were casual employees working who
had been working when he was not, and Morgan asked, “why
wasn’t I called in.” Schofield replied that the casual employees
who had been working had been at the hiring hall when other
scheduled casual employees had not shown up, and he had put
them to work. In louder tones, Morgan called Schofield a “fuck-
ing ass-hole” and a “fucking jerk-off.” (Morgan denied using
these last curses, but I credit Schofield.) Schofield testified that
he then told Morgan to go back to work.
Schofield further testified that later in the afternoon Palmer
came to the Union’s office and reported to him that a dock
foreman had reported to her that Morgan had left work before
5 See the Board’s Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.35(b).
INDEPENDENT DOCK WORKERS LOCAL 1 (TRANS OCEAN MARITIME SERVICES) 1351
the end of the shift. Schofield testified that, on receiving that
report (of a report), he assumed that Morgan “[d]idn’t like what
I said and he quit.” Schofield further testified that the only rea-
son that he did not thereafter call Morgan to work was because
he thought that Morgan had quit. Schofield also testified that
when Morgan later told him that he wished to file a grievance
Schofield told Morgan that the situation was not a grievance
matter and that he had to file intraunion charges instead.
Schofield did not deny other parts of Morgan’s testimony about
their exchanges after October 27.
On cross-examination, Schofield admitted that Morgan’s Oc-
tober 27 remarks made him angry. Schofield further admitted
that the Employer sends “Work Rules Violation” reports to the
Union when an employee engages in misconduct such as not
reporting for work as scheduled. Schofield admitted that the
Union’s records contain no such report for Morgan’s leaving
work early on October 27 (or any other disciplinary record for
Morgan).
Palmer testified consistently with Schofield about what was
said between Schofield and Morgan on October 27 when she
was in the Union’s office; specifically, Palmer testified that
Morgan did use the profanity that Schofield attributed to him.
Palmer denied that she thereafter had any conversations with
Morgan, and she flatly denied that she told Morgan that he was
“fired.” Palmer further testified that she did not know that Mor-
gan had left the job early on October 27 until a dock foreman
told her.
B. Credibility Resolutions and Conclusions
I found Morgan credible in his testimony that Palmer told
him on October 27 that Schofield had “fired” him for “gross
insubordination to a Union officer.” The complaint alleges
Palmer to be an agent of the Respondent within Section 2(13)
of the Act. The answer admits that Palmer is the secretary-
treasurer of the Union, but it denies that she is an agent. The
Respondent’s constitution names three officers of the Union, to
wit: the president, the vice president, and the secretary-treasurer.
The Respondent has no vice president, however, Schofield and
Palmer are its only officers. The constitution further states that
the duties of the secretary-treasurer include, inter alia,

(1) The Secretary-treasurer shall assist the President in
the administration of the Union.
(2) He shall be the chief financial officer of the Union
and shall make such payment from funds with the ap-
proval of the President.
. . . .
(6) He shall be responsible for the proper performance
of [the foregoing ] duties to the President and the member-
ship.

In view of these listed duties, in view of the fact that the Union
has no officer other than the president and the secretary-
treasurer, and in view of the fact that Palmer operates the Un-
ion’s hiring hall regularly (2 weeks per year), I find and con-
clude that Palmer is an agent of the Union within Section 2(13).
Therefore, the Union is bound by her conduct, including spe-
cifically her statement to Morgan that Schofield had “fired”
him.6

6 The Respondent did not object to the receipt of Morgan’s testi-
mony of what Palmer told him that Schofield had said to her. Were
Palmer not an agent, Morgan’s testimony of what Palmer said that
Schofield had said would have been inadmissible hearsay. The failure
Schofield testified that he did not have the authority to dis-
charge the Employer’s employees. Schofield, however, denied
none of the testimony of Baldus that in March 1998 he twice
told Baldus that he was “suspended” from working for the Em-
ployer. Schofield further did not deny Baldus’ testimony that
he (and Palmer) did not refer Baldus out for jobs thereafter,
until September when the Union’s review board ordered Baldus
to be reinstated (albeit without backpay). Baldus’ case proves
that Schofield had the authority to effectively suspend casual
employees; therefore, he had the authority to effectively dis-
charge them. Additionally, the order by the Union’s review
board that Baldus be reinstated without backpay from his sus-
pension by Schofield shows that the Union approved of
Schofield’s disciplining casual employees by affecting their
terms and conditions of employment with the Employer.
Schofield did not deny Morgan’s testimony that after Octo-
ber 27, he came to the Union’s office and asked Schofield, inter
alia, “let me go back to work.” Schofield further did not deny
Morgan’s testimony that he refused, stating, “See my lawyer.”
Nor did Schofield deny telling Morgan at the time that he was
no longer a member of the Union. Nor did Schofield deny that
he refused to accept a grievance over the matter from Morgan.7
There can be no clearer evidence that Schofield had disrupted
Morgan’s employment with the Employer.
I do not believe Schofield’s testimony that Palmer’s report of
a warehouse foreman’s report that Morgan had left work early
was the only reason that he no longer referred Morgan to jobs
with the Employer. Aside from the fact that Schofield subse-
quently rejected Morgan’s appeal to “let me go back to work,”
the Respondent offers evidence of nothing that would reasona-
bly have caused Schofield to accept the report (of a report)
without inquiry. After all, Morgan was seeking more work
from the Employer, not less, as Schofield well knew.
In summary, on October 27, Morgan complained that union
membership should be considered in the Union’s operation of
its hiring hall, and he called Schofield a liar in the process. This
conduct made Schofield angry and, thereafter until December
1998, Morgan received no referrals from the Union. In making
his complaint to the Union, Morgan used very bad language;
however, such language most probably is not unheard of on the
Philadelphia docks.8 At any rate, the Respondent does not con-
tend that it refused to refer Morgan because of his profanity (or
his calling Schofield a liar) on October 27. The Respondent
contends that it did not refuse to refer Morgan at all. I have,
however, rejected this defense.
Although Schofield admitted that he did not call Morgan af-
ter October 27, the Respondent contends that Morgan should
have returned to the hiring hall and sought work like any other
casual employee who has not been called in by Schofield.

of the Respondent to object fortifies my conclusion that Palmer was its
agent.
7 Schofield testified that he refused to accept a grievance from Mor-
gan because his complaint was an intraunion matter over which only
internal charges were appropriate. This testimony was false; Schofield
admitted later in his testimony that it was not until the Baldus incident
of 1998 that he learned from the Union’s lawyer that intraunion charges
are appropriate in such situations. Moreover, the fact that intraunion
charges may also have been appropriate did not mean that a simultane-
ous grievance would have been inappropriate.
8 For example, Palmer acknowledged that during her confrontation
with Baldus she leaned out of a door of the Union’s office and yelled at
Baldus, “You better get a good fucking lawyer.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1352
Other such casual employees, of course, have not been told that
they had been “fired.” The Respondent’s telling Morgan that he
was fired would have given Morgan reason to believe that fu-
ture appearances at the hiring hall would have been futile. In-
deed, and again, Morgan did return to the hiring hall 2 weeks
after he was “fired,” and he asked Schofield to put him back to
work, but Schofield then told him to “see my lawyer.”
Relying on the language of the contract between the Em-
ployer and the Union, the Respondent contends that Schofield
had no authority to discharge Morgan. Despite what the con-
tract between the Employer and the Union says, however, Gil-
lespie (again, the Employer’s president) testified that the Union
does the hiring of casual employees. Moreover, Schofield con-
firmed that no casual employee can secure employment with
the Employer without coming through him (or Palmer). All the
casual employees assuredly knew this, and any casual em-
ployee, such as Morgan, would reasonably have concluded
from that knowledge that if Schofield had the authority to
“hire” Schofield had the authority to “fire.” Schofield used this
understanding, I find, to terminate the employment status of
Morgan on October 27. Of course, when Schofield told Palmer
to “fire” Morgan, he did not “fire” Morgan in the sense that an
employer might discharge an employee. The plain meaning of
the word “fire” in the context that it was used, however, was
that Morgan should leave the Employer’s premises immediately
and that Schofield (and Palmer) were not going to give Morgan
any more referrals from the hiring hall.
I find that Schofield’s anger at Morgan’s protected concerted
complaints about the operation of the Union’s hiring hall
caused Schofield to effectuate the discharge of Morgan. By
such conduct, I find and conclude, the Respondent caused the
Employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of
Section 8(a)(3), and the Respondent thereby violated Section
8(b)(1) (A) and (2).9
THE REMEDY
Having found that by engaging in the above-described con-
duct the Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1) (A) and (2), I
shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist from
such conduct and to take certain affirmative action in order to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
It is recommended that the Union be ordered to make Wil-
liam J. Morgan whole for any loss of pay that he may have
suffered by reason of the discrimination against him by pay-
ment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount he would
normally have earned as wages and any other benefits as a cas-
ual employee of the Employer from the date of his effective
termination on October 27, 1997, to the date of the first job
referral that he received after the Union’s December 17, 1998
letter to the Employer. The loss of earnings shall be computed
in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the
Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). The Union shall also be
ordered to expunge from its files any reference to Morgan’s
unlawful termination, and it shall be required to notify Morgan,
in writing, of its actions as well as inform him that his unlawful
termination shall not be used as a basis for future action against
him. Furthermore, the Union shall be required to ask the Em-
ployer to remove from its files any reference to Morgan’s

9 See Ogden Allied Eastern States Maintenance Corp., 306 NLRB
545 (1992).
unlawful termination, and it shall notify Morgan that it has
asked his employer to do so. Sterling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472
(1982).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, Independent Dock Workers Union, Local
No. 1, Gloucester, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Trans Ocean Maritime
Services, Inc. to terminate or otherwise discriminate against
William J. Morgan or any other employee for reasons other
than failures of such employees to pay periodic dues and initia-
tion fees that are required as a condition of acquiring or retain-
ing membership in the Union.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7
of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make William J. Morgan whole for any loss of pay he
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him
in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of William J.
Morgan, and within 3 days thereafter notify Morgan in writing
that this has been done and that his discharge will not be used
against him in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its of-
fice in Gloucester, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

INDEPENDENT DOCK WORKERS LOCAL 1 (TRANS OCEAN MARITIME SERVICES) 1353
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification by a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.