Dixie Lee Anders, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 10, 2000
01970893 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 10, 2000)

01970893

08-10-2000

Dixie Lee Anders, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Dixie Lee Anders v. United States Postal Service

01970893

08-10-00

.

Dixie Lee Anders,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01970893

Agency No. 2-G-1306-1

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 1996, Dixie Lee Anders (hereinafter referred to as

complainant) filed a timely appeal from the October 7, 1996, final

decision of the United States Postal Service (hereinafter referred to as

the agency) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Accordingly, the appeal is timely filed

(see 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(a))), and is accepted in accordance

with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.<1> For the reasons that follow,

the agency's decision is reversed.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the complainant has proven,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency discriminated against

her on the basis of sex (sexual harassment) on July 2, 1991 (July 2).

BACKGROUND

Complainant filed her formal complaint on September 20, 1991.<2>

Following an investigation, complainant requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). A hearing was held in December 1992,

and, on August 6, 1996, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD),

finding that the agency discriminated against complainant. In its final

agency decision (FAD), the agency rejected the RD and found that it did

not discriminate against complainant.

Complainant began working as a casual employee in July 1988, and, at

the time of the events herein, was a Rural Carrier Associate (RCA) in

Carmel (North Carolina), working auxiliary routes and as a substitute.

In the summer of 1989, a new manager came to the Carmel station (S1).

Shortly thereafter, complainant and S1 commenced a consensual sexual

relationship. The relationship ended around February 1, 1991, although

complainant and S1 had social contact of a non-sexual nature on at least

one occasion thereafter. Complainant sought transfer to another facility

on July 1 and left the Carmel station in mid-July 1991.<3>

In late June 1991, complainant sought a review of the delivery sequence

for Route 72, for which she was the substitute carrier.<4> On July 2,

1991, complainant and S1 traveled in S1's car to review the established

delivery sequence of the mail route. Near the end of the trip, S1

drove into an uninhabited cul-de-sac and parked the car. He began to

kiss and touch complainant and, according to complainant, engaged in

a sexual act on himself. At that point, complainant's boyfriend (E1),

also a RCA, arrived, and complainant completed the route review with E1.

In his investigative affidavit, S1 acknowledged that he kissed and touched

complainant, but denied that he engaged in a sexual act. In her initial

statement, complainant stated that she allowed S1 to kiss and touch her

because she "still liked him" but when "he got all worked up [she] was

not going to help him." (Statement, August 27, 1991). At the hearing,

complainant further described S1's actions as "pawing all over me" and

stated that she asked him to stop and pushed him away. (Tr. pp. 30-31).

E1 stated that, standing approximately 30 feet away on a hillside, he

saw S1 engaging in motions with his right hand indicative of the sexual

act in question.

Following complainant's administrative complaint, the agency initiated

an investigation that resulted in a settlement agreement between S1

and the agency, whereby S1 was charged with improper personal conduct

on duty and issued a 14-day suspension on September 24, 1991.<5> The

agency's report found that S1 engaged in a consensual intimate sexual

relationship with a subordinate employee and was reprimanded for his

habit of touching subordinate employees. The incident of July 2, 1991,

was not mentioned in the agency's report.

The AJ found that, on July 2, 1991, S1 engaged in the sexual act as

alleged by complainant, that it was unwelcome to complainant, and that

it, in conjunction with S1's other behavior toward female employees,

constituted hostile environment sexual harassment. He further found that

complainant's testimony was credible and that she had a legitimate and

justifiable fear concerning her job status, as seen by her voluntarily

transferring to another site, although the record shows that she did

not suffer any diminution in pay or benefits. The AJ stated that his

finding of sexual harassment was founded on his view of the record as

a whole and that S1's conduct was part of a pattern wherein he touched

and fondled complainant and other subordinate female employees.

The AJ rejected the agency's theory of a conspiracy between complainant

and E1 against S1 and its argument that S1's conduct, to the extent

it occurred, was not unwelcome by complainant. He also found that the

agency failed to take swift or sufficient action to correct the unlawful

sexual harassment. As relief, the AJ directed that the agency acknowledge

to complainant that she was the victim of sexual harassment, that any

adverse documents as a result of this matter be removed from her file,

that the agency post a notice, and that complainant be awarded reasonable

attorney's fees. The AJ noted that complainant did not show entitlement

to back pay and, as the events herein occurred prior to November 21,

1991, was not entitled to compensatory damages.

In its FAD, the agency found that the AJ's reasoning was flawed and

rejected his recommended decision. The agency criticized the evidence

relied on by the AJ, finding it incomplete or unreliable. The agency

contended that complainant had not clearly withdrawn from her relationship

with S1, that S1 did not engage in a sexual act on July 2, 1991, and

that, if such conduct occurred, it was not unwelcome by complainant.

With regard to its actions after complainant's administrative complaint,

the agency asserted that it took prompt and appropriate action and that

it was not liable for S1's actions under principles of agency law since

it has a strong policy against sexual harassment.

On appeal, complainant contended that the agency was negligent in its

handling of her administrative complaint and asserts her disagreement

with the restriction on compensatory damages to her case. The agency

submitted comments in support of its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

decision of the AJ accurately states the facts and correctly applies the

pertinent principles of law. Based on our review of the record, we find

that the credibility findings and the decision of the AJ were correct.

Following two recent Supreme Court decisions, the Commission issued

guidance concerning an agency's liability for harassment by supervisors.

See Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful

Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999)

(Guidance).<6> Flowing from the Court's decisions, the Commission's

guidance, as applied to federal agencies, is premised on the principles

that an agency is liable for the acts of its supervisors and that

agencies should be encouraged to prevent harassment in the workplace and

employees encouraged to avoid or limit the harm caused by the harassment.

Guidance, at1. Based on these two axioms, the guidance holds that,

where harassment is found and culminates in a tangible employment action,

the agency is strictly liable, and no defense is available.<7> Ibid.

Conversely, where the proven harassment does not result in a formal

personnel action, an agency may avoid or limit damages by utilizing an

affirmative defense that demonstrates that: (a) the agency exercised

reasonable care to prevent and correct unlawful harassment<8> and (b)

the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the agency's

preventive or corrective processes or to otherwise avoid harm. Ibid.

A determination that unlawful harassment has occurred must be predicated

on events that are sufficiently severe and pervasive such that the

conditions of the workplace are altered, that is, the harassment has

culminated in a tangible employment action or created a hostile work

environment. Guidance, at 2, citing, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore

Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, (1998). In analyzing allegations of

harassment, the Commission will continue to examine factors such as the

frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether

it is physically threatening or humiliating and if it unreasonably

interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Usually, unless the conduct is severe,

a single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded

as discriminatory harassment. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355,

1358 (11th Cir. 1982); see Guidance, at 2.

It is well-settled that sexual harassment in the workplace constitutes an

actionable form of sex discrimination under Title VII. Meritor Savings

Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In order to establish a claim

of harassment, the complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to the

statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct

related to her membership in the class; (3) the harassment complained

of was based on sex; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of

unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is

a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City

of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct

should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable

person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris

v. Forklift Systems Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994).

If the complainant satisfies the five elements, then the agency is

subject to vicarious liability insofar as the harassment would have

been �created by a supervisor with immediate...authority over the

[complainant].� Guidance, at 4

Initially, in considering complainant's claim, we find, as did the

AJ, that the weight of evidence shows that the incident did occur,

that is, on July 2, 1991, S1 engaged in a sexual act on himself in

front of complainant and that the action taken by S1 was unwelcome

to her. Further, we find that the conduct was sufficiently severe to

constitute discriminatory harassment. As is set forth in the EEOC's

Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, "a single,

unusually severe incident of harassment may be sufficient to constitute

a Title VII violation." N-915-050, No. 137 (March 19, 1990),at104.

See Walker v. Ford Motor Company, supra ; Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,

646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir. 1981).

Finally, we find that the agency is liable for S1's actions and that

the agency, through S1, failed to take appropriate action that provided

an adequate resolution of the matter. See Guidance, supra. In order to

avoid liability for complainant's charges of sexual harassment, an agency

must demonstrate that complainant failed take advantage of any preventive

or corrective opportunities and that the employer exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct such behavior. Guidance, at 1. Here,

complainant filed an administrative complaint, and, although the agency

conducted a review, its resolution rendered no relief to complainant and

limited discipline to S1. Most tellingly, the agency's report failed

to mention complainant's allegations concerning S1's actions of July 2.

The agency argued that the incident did not occur and that, if it

occurred, it was not unwelcome to complainant. In making this argument,

the agency disregarded the AJ's determination that complainant's testimony

regarding the incident was credible. In considering the agency's

position, we note that, in an administrative hearing, where the motivation

and credibility of witnesses are critical, the credibility findings of

an AJ are entitled to great weight unless there is substantial evidence

in the record to support a contrary assessment. See Universal Camera

Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951); Esquer

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960096 (September 6,

1996); Willis v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05900589

(July 26, 1990). In addition, we note that no witness substantially

undermined complainant's claim regarding her relationship with S1 or her

and E1's descriptions of the events of July 2. Based on our review of

the record, we find that the credibility findings and the decision of

the AJ were correct.

In relief, we find that, in addition to the relief set out by the AJ,

it is appropriate to require the agency to provide training to all

management personnel involved in this matter with regard the agency's

obligations regarding sexual harassment. Complainant also made a claim

for compensatory damages. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA),

42 U.S.C. � 1981a, authorizes an award of compensatory damages for

intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII, the Supreme Court

has held that the compensatory damages provision of the CRA is not to

be retroactively applied to conduct that occurred prior to the Act, or

November 21, 1991. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).

Thus, the holding in Landgraf precludes an award of compensatory damages

for the acts of discrimination herein because they occurred prior to

November 21, 1991, and complainant is not entitled to compensatory

damages. Laverdure v. Interior, EEOC Request No. 05931186 (June 17,

1994).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision is REVERSED. The agency is directed

to comply with the Order, below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

A. The agency shall take whatever actions it deems necessary, including

but not limited to the actions set forth below, to ensure that complainant

or any other employee is not subjected to sexual harassment in the

future. The agency shall notify complainant and the Commission by

letter of its specific plans to insure a work environment free of sexual

harassment.

B. The agency shall conduct training for all supervisory and management

personnel who were in S1's chain of command in the North Carolina region

and those personnel involved in review of complainant's administrative

complaint, specifically addressing these employees' responsibilities

under equal employment opportunity law. The training shall place special

emphasis on the prevention and elimination of sexual harassment.

C. The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post, at its Carmel, North Carolina, facility,

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to

an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the

complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall

be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of

fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__08-10-00________________

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dated

which found that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. has occurred at this

facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE or PHYSICAL or MENTAL DISABILITY with respect

to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions

or privilege of employment.

The Carmel, North Carolina, facility supports and will comply with

such federal law and will not take action against individuals because

they have exercised their rights under the law. It has remedied the

employee affected by the Commission's finding by, inter alia, providing

training for supervisory personnel and posting this notice. The Carmel,

North Carolina, facility will ensure that officials responsible for

personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide

by the requirements of all federal equal employment laws and will not

subject employees to discrimination based on sex (sexual harassment).

The Carmel, North Carolina, facility will not in any manner restrain,

interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who exercises his

or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participated

in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.

Date Posted:

Posting Expires:

29 C.F.R. Part 1614.

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2Initially the agency dismissed complainant's complaint for untimely EEO

contact, but the complaint was remanded by the Commission. EEOC Appeal

No. 01920438 (March 4, 1992).

3Complainant continued to work at Carmel on Saturdays but had no official

contact with S1, who did not work on that day.

4A review requires a manager and the carrier to drive the route, measuring

the distance between every turn and counting the mailboxes.

5The record indicates that S1 retired in early 1992. He did not testify

at the hearing.

6Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher

v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). Although these decisions

addressed sexual harassment, the Court's legal analysis reached into

cases involving harassment on other bases, and therefore the Commission's

guidance sets forth a standard of liability applicable to all forms of

unlawful harassment. Guidance, at1.

7Tangible employment actions are, e.g., discharge, demotion, or

reassignment. Guidance, at 7.

8An agency may show that it exercised reasonable care through creation

of, inter alia, a complaint procedure that provides for the dissemination

and enforcement of policies prohibiting unlawful harassment. Guidance,

at15.