Dixie L. Tucker, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 25, 2000
01985638 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 25, 2000)

01985638

08-25-2000

Dixie L. Tucker, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Dixie L. Tucker v. United States Postal Service

01985638

08-25-00

.

Dixie L. Tucker,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01985638

Agency No. 1G-753-0089-97

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

On July 11, 1998, Dixie L. Tucker (the complainant) timely filed an

appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission)

from a final agency decision (FAD) dated May 15, 1998, concerning

her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of �

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et

seq.<1> The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405).<2>

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly determined that

complainant was not discriminated against based on disability when she

was put off the clock and denied light duty.

BACKGROUND

Complainant was employed by the agency as a Distribution Clerk in

the Dallas Processing and Distribution Center. She filed a formal

complaint on August 13, 1997, alleging discrimination on the basis of

disability (knee injury) when, on April 30, 1997, her supervisor put her

off the clock and she was denied light duty. The agency accepted the

complaint for investigation and processing. At the conclusion of the

investigation, the agency issued a copy of its investigative report and

notified complainant of her right to request an administrative hearing.

After complainant failed to request a hearing, the agency issued its

FAD on May 15, 1998.

In its FAD, the agency found that the complainant had failed to establish

a prima facie case of disability discrimination because she was unable to

demonstrate that she was an individual with a disability as defined by the

Rehabilitation Act, in that she had not shown that she was substantially

limited in a major life activity, or that she had a record of having

such a disability or that she was regarded as having such a disability.

The FAD further stated that, assuming complainant had met her prima facie

case, she failed to establish that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason articulated by the agency for its decision was a pretext for

discrimination. Complainant timely appealed, without comment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make

reasonable accommodation of the known physical and mental limitations

of a qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show

that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.9(a).

In order to claim the protections of the Rehabilitation Act, complainant

must first establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination by

showing that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined

by 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g);<3> (2) she is a qualified individual with

a disability pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m); and 3) a reasonable

accommodation existed that would have enabled her to perform the essential

functions of the job, but the employer refused to provide it. See Prewitt

v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).

An individual with a disability is one who: (1) has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;

(2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having

such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). The Commission has defined

"substantially limits" as "[u]nable to perform a major life activity

that the average person in the general population can perform" or

"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration

under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity

as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the

average person in the general population can perform that same major

life activity." 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j)(i) and (ii). Major life activities

include such functions as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. EEOC

Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

The medical documentation complainant submitted to support her claim that

her knee injury rose to the level of a "disability" under the definition

shows that she was substantially limited in a major life activity by her

knee injury. The documentation primarily consists of the light duty

forms submitted by complainant which detail the restrictions that her

physician felt that she should work under. According to her physician,

complainant had been diagnosed with �severe degenerative joint disease�

in both of her knees, with her left knee worse than her right knee.

She was restricted to intermittent lifting, pushing or pulling, and

standing or walking for no more than 2 hours per day for 10 minutes at

a time, and was to work under these restrictions until after the knee

replacement surgery she was scheduled to undergo at some point in the

future. The record also reveals that complainant used a cane to walk.

We find that complainant was substantially limited in the major life

activity of walking.

We also find that complainant is a qualified individual with a

disability. A qualified individual with a disability is an individual with

a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and

other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual

holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation,

can perform the essential functions of such position. See 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(m). Complainant indicated that she was able to perform her job

functions with an accommodation. In particular, we note that from a

reading of complainant's affidavit it appeared that she was able to

perform the tasks assigned to her by her supervisor with the aid of a

co-worker, and that she needed to rest or sit periodically as she was

performing the assigned tasks.

The agency presented evidence to show that complainant had been put off

the clock and denied light duty from April 30, 1997 until May 23, 1997,

because she had not, as of April 30, 1997, properly requested a reasonable

accommodation in the form of light duty by submitting a written request

form with supporting medical documentation. According to the Commission's

Enforcement Guidance, an employer is entitled to documentation from

an individual requesting a reasonable accommodation which would show

that the individual has a covered disability for which they require a

reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable

Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities

Act at 12-15 (March 1, 1999). Following complainant's submission of

a light duty request and the accompanying medical documentation of her

condition on May 21, 1997, she was provided with a light duty assignment

two days later, on May 23, 1997. We therefore find that complainant

was not discriminated against because of her disability because the

agency granted her a reasonable accommodation upon the receipt of her

documentation of her disability.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the agency is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

_08-25-00_________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 The agency did not supply a copy of a certified mail return receipt

or any other material capable of establishing the date complainant

received the agency's final decision. The copy of the FAD submitted by

the complainant with her appeal shows a notation that it was resent by

the agency on June 18, 1998. Accordingly, since the agency failed to

submit evidence of the date of receipt, the Commission presumes that

complainant's appeal was filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of

the agency's final decision. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(a)).

3 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination by

federal employees or applicants for employment. See 29 U.S.C. � 791(g).

Since that time, the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630

apply to complaints of disability discrimination. These regulations

can be found on EEOC's website: www.eeoc.gov.