Ditch Witch of Central Illinois, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 14, 1980

248 N.L.R.B. 452 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ditch Witch of Central Illinois, Inc. and James L.
Weatherwax and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local
Union 627. Cases 33-CA-3734 and 33-CA-
3819
March 14, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On September 21, 1979, Administrative Law
Judge Karl H. Buschmann issued the attached De-
cision in this proceeding, and, on the same date,
the case was transferred to and continued before
the National Labor Relations Board in Washington,
D.C. In his Decision, the Administrative Law
Judge found that Respondent had engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, had not engaged in
other alleged unfair labor practices, and recom-
mended that Respondent take specific action to
remedy those unfair labor practices found.
On October 17, 1979, Respondent filed "excep-
tions" with the Board in Washington, D.C., which
consist solely of its brief previously submitted to
the Administrative Law Judge along with a cover
letter to the Board which states:
Enclosed please find eight copies of the Brief
of Respondent Ditch Witch of Central Illinois,
Inc. in the subject cases, setting forth said Re-
spondent's exceptions to the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision.
On October 23, 1979, the General Counsel filed
with the Board a motion to strike exceptions, and,
on October 31, 1979, Respondent filed a motion to
strike the General Counsel's motion to strike ex-
ceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
In its motion, the General Counsel contends that
Respondent's exceptions fail to meet the require-
ments for exceptions set forth in the Board's Rules
and Regulations, Series 8, as amended. For the fol-
lowing reasons, we agree.
Section 102.46(b) of the Board's Rules and Regu-
lations sets forth the minimum requirements with
which exceptions to an administrative law judge's
decision must comply in order to merit consider-
ation by the Board.' In accord with that section,
Sec. 102.46(b) of the Board's Rules and Regulations states:
(b) Each exception (1) shall set forth specifically the questions of
procedure, fact, law, or policy to which exceptions are taken; (2)
shall identify that part of the administrative law judge's decision to
which objection is made; (3) shall designate by precise citation of
248 NLRB No. 52
parties objecting to findings of an administrative
law judge must set forth with specificity, inter alia,
the questions of procedure, fact, law, or policy to
which exceptions are taken, and identify that part
of the administrative law judge's decision to which
objection is made.
In its order of September 21, 1979, transferring
this proceeding to the Board, the Board served Re-
spondent with copies of the order, the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision and recommended
Order, and excerpts from the Board's current Rules
and Regulations, including the relevant Sections
102.46 and 102.48.2 The order of transfer expressly
directed Respondent's attention to the excerpts.
Thus, Respondent has been duly notified of the
pertinent Board Rules applicable to the filing of ex-
ceptions. At no time has Respondent requested an
extension of time in which to comply with these
Rules.
Nowhere in Respondent's brief submitted to the
Board are there stated specific exceptions to any
part of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
Nor is it alleged with any degree of particularity
what error, mistake, or oversight Respondent con-
tends the Administrative Law Judge committed.
By merely resubmitting its brief to the Administra-
tive Law Judge, Respondent has failed to narrow
the issues for review, and would have the Board
engage in a fishing expedition to determine what, if
any, problems or irregularities might be found in
the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. The
Board is not obliged to embark on such expedi-
tions,3 nor does it have the resources or inclination
to do so. Moreover, the Board's minimal require-
ments for the filing of exceptions are not so bur-
densome that they are an inappropriate prerequisite
to the Board's complete examination of the record
in this proceeding. Accordingly, as Respondent's
"exceptions" are insufficient to place in issue any
finding of the Administrative Law Judge, we reject
them.4 Thus, in the absence of exceptions thereto,
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Administrative Law Judge as contained in his
page the portions of the record relied on; and (4) shall state the
grounds for the exceptions and shall include the citation of authori-
ties unless set forth in a supporting brief. Any exception to a ruling,
finding, conclusion, or recommendation which is not specifically
urged shall be deemed to have been waived. Any exception which
fails to comply with the foregoing requirements may be disregarded.
2 Sec. 102.48(a) of the Board's Rules and Regulations states:
(a) In the event no timely or proper exceptions are filed as herein
provided. the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the ad-
ministrative law judge as contained in his decision shall, pursuant to
section 10(c) of the act, automatically become the decision and order
of the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all
objections and exceptions thereto shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
3 Aitoo Painting Corporation. 238 NLRB No. 51 (1978).
See, eg, Kings Electronics Co.. Inc., 109 NLRB 1324 (1954)
DITCH WITCH OF CENTRAL ILLINOIS 453
Decision shall automatically become the Decision
and Order of the Board. 5
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and Section 102.48 of
the National Labor Relations Board Rules and
Regulations, Series 8, as amended, the Board
hereby adopts the rulings, findings, conclusions,
and recommended Order of the Administrative
Law Judge and orders that the Respondent, Ditch
Witch of Central Illinois, Inc., Peoria, Illinois, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order.
5 Consistent with our decision herein, Respondent's motion to strike
the General Counsel's motion is denied
DECISION
KARI. H. BUSHMANN, Administrative Law Judge: This
case arose upon the filing of a charge on May 18, 1978,
by James Weatherwax, an individual, and the filing of a
charge on July 12, 1978, by the Union. The complaints,
dated June 29 and August 10, 1978, were consolidated
and alleged in substance that Respondent committed sev-
eral acts of independent 8(a)(1) violations, including in-
terrogation of employees and threats to close the plant or
of loss of benefits. The complaint further charged that
Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act,
discharged two employees because of their union activity
and, further, that Respondent refused to recognize the
Union or bargain with it, in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act.
Respondent's answers filed July 13 and August 28,
1978, admitted the jurisdictional allegations in the com-
plaint but denied all substantive charges of unlawful con-
duct.
A hearing on the allegations in the complaint was held
on October 17 and 18, 1978, in Peoria, Illinois. The Gen-
eral Counsel and Respondent were represented by coun-
sel and filed briefs on December 11 and 14, 1978, repsec-
tively. Upon the entire record in this case, including the
briefs, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Respondent Ditch Witch of Central Illinois, Inc., is an
Illinois corporation with its office and place of business
located at Peoria, Illinois. It is engaged in the sale and
service of trenching equipment to contractors and indi-
viduals. It is admittedly an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The Union, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union 627, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ditch Witch of Central Illinois, Inc., is one of three
related enterprises operated by Earl Harbaugh, who as
president and treasurer of Ditch Witch of Central Illi-
nois, Progressive Leasing Company, and of Ditch Witch
of Illinois, was actively involved in the management of
these three firms. The day-to-day management of Ditch
Witch of Central Illinois, Respondent herein, was per-
formed by James Broderick, its general manager. In No-
vember 1977, Respondent's work force reached an all-
time high of approximately eight employees in addition
to the manager. Among them was Aral Eaton, the parts
and service manager, Robert Prather, a lead mechanic,
and two mechanics, Robert Weaver and James Weather-
wax, the two alleged discriminatees.
On May 8, 1978, Eaton called a shop meeting which
the three mechanics, Prather, Weatherwax, and Weaver,
attended. Eaton informed the mechanics that their "ser-
vice training and recall work" was excessive and that
they had 2 weeks in which to improve. When Weather-
wax asked Eaton whether his warning was in effect a 2-
week notice, Eaton replied: "That's not what I meant."
Eaton then called on Broderick who similarly told the
mechanics that if after 2 weeks their work was not "up
to standards" they would be replaced.
On May 12, 1978, the three mechanics went to the of-
fices of Teamsters Local 627 to inquire about joining the
Union. When informed by the receptionist that the offi-
cial whom they wished to meet was not in the office, the
men left. On May 15, 1978, Weatherwax returned to the
Union's office, spoke to Business Agent Charles L.
Gauwitz, and signed a union card. He also took several
authorization cards with him. Both Prather and Weaver
signed cards on the following day, May 16, 1978, which
Weatherwax, accompanied by Prather, turned into the
Union's offices on the same day. In the afternoon of the
same day, Gauwitz called Respondent's offices and in-
formed Aral Eaton, Respondent's supervisor, that the
Union had been selected by Respondent's mechanics as
their bargaining representative. Eaton promptly called
James Broderick on his mobile telephone and informed
him that they were now a union shop. Broderick re-
sponded: "Do we have a union shop or did they sign
cards?" And Eaton said they had signed cards.
On still the same day, May 16, Eaton spoke to Weath-
erwax and asked why the mechanics had gone to the
Union. Weatherwax replied that he had wanted to be
sure that he had a job in the morning when he came in.
Eaton then said, "You'll always have a job here as long
as you keep doing the work the way you have been."
Weatherwax stated that this way he would be sure.
Eaton then accused him of lying and going home sick
when in fact they had been going to the Union. Weath-
erwax denied having gone to the Union on company
time. Eaton then said: "I thought we had an agreement
.... Well, this way I feel like you guys have stabbed
me in the back."
Shortly after this conversation, Broderick asked
Weatherwax whether all mechanics had signed a card.
Weatherwax declined to answer the question and Bro-
derick said. "Well, I know one person that didn't fill out
a card. I called Weaver and Weaver told me he didn't
fill out a card." Weatherwax replied: "Well, all I can do
is tell you what I saw."
In the afternoon of May 16, Broderick and Eaton also
talked with Bob Prather and inquired whether he had
signed a card. He admitted that he had. They then in-
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
formed him that Weaver had denied signing a card, to
which Prather responded: "I must be going blind be-
cause I saw another card." During this conversation,
Broderick and Eaton stated that the Union could be a
determining factor as to whether they would sell the
business. They mentioned possible changes within the
Company in the event of unionization, as for example a
requirement that the employees had to pay for their own
insurance. They predicted that, in the event of an elec-
tion, Weatherwax would vote for the Union and Weaver
would vote against the Union. In response to this,
Prather indicated to his supervisors that his vote would
depend on their treatment of him.
On the following day, May 17, 1978, Respondent laid
off two of its three mechanics. This episode occurred at
4 p.m., when the mechanics were called to a meeting in
the parts room. Jim Broderick told them that he had
been going over the Company's records which showed
that they did not have sufficient work to continue em-
ploying three people. As a result they were going to lay
off two mechanics in order of seniority. Affected were
Weatherwax, with the least seniority, and Weaver. It
was made clear that if work increased Weaver would be
recalled before Weatherwax. The following conversation
ensued as related by Weatherwax:
A. I asked Mr. Broderick if this was our two
weeks notice. And he said no. And I said, "Well,
you told us the other day that you would give us
two weeks notice." And he said, "Well, this is your
notice now." And I said, "In other words, we've
got two weeks to look for another job before we
are fired or laid off?" And he said, "No. Today is
your last day." . .. Then Bob Weaver said that if
he knew a layoff was coming that he had a chance
to get in overtime. And Mr. Broderick said, "Well,
I didn't know nothing about the layoff until just a
few minutes ago." And then I said, "In other
words, all this is happening on account of the
union." And he said, "What union?" And I said,
"The Teamsters. The one we called to try to get to
represent us." He said he didn't know nothing about
no union.
Analysis
It is the General Counsel's position, as alleged in the
complaint, that Respondent has committed independent
8(a)(l) violations because (1) James Broderick threatened
an employee on May 16, 1978, that the Company would
close if the Union became the bargaining agent of the
employees, (2) Broderick and Aral Eaton coercively in-
terrogated employees Weatherwax and Prather on May
16, 1978, and (3) Earl Harbaugh informed its employees
that they would lose their profit-sharing benefits if they
went union. The General Counsel further argues that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharg-
ing Weaver and Weatherwax because of union consider-
ations, and that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act because the discharge of two employees under-
mined and destroyed the Union's majority status.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the two
employees were laid off for economic reasons, without
any union animus, and that certain statements attributed
to Harbaugh, Broderick, and Eaton were either not made
or did not amount to violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the
Act.
Threats. With respect to the alleged 8(a)(1) statements,
the record shows initially that Harbaugh in early 1978
addressed the employees about their insurance and
profit-sharing programs. In this connection he stated that
if the employees decided to be represented by a union
they would lose the profit-sharing plan and possibly have
to pay for their own insurance.' Weatherwax corrobo-
rated Harbaugh's testimony that his statements made ref-
erence to the written profit-sharing plan which by its
terms apparently excluded coverage of the employees if
they were represented by a union. Under these circum-
stances, Harbaugh made a prediction as to the effects
which unionization would have on the existing profit-
sharing plan and hypothesized about insurance payments.
Since it conveyed the "employer's belief as to demon-
strably probable consequences beyond his control" and
not the implication that he may take action "solely as his
own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessi-
ties," I cannot find that Harbaugh's statements were vio-
lative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co. Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 618-619 (1969). Similarly,
Broderick's or Eaton's comment to Prather on May 16
that the Union could be a factor as to whether they
would sell the business does not amount to a violation of
Section 8(a)(l). Not only was this statement vague and
uncertain, but it also fell short of creating an atmosphere
of fear or of portraying as inevitable certain economic
hazards if the employees selected the Union.
Interrogation. However, the record supports Respon-
dent's coercive interrogation. As summarized above,
both Broderick and Eaton interrogated Weatherwax and
Prather on May 16. First, Eaton questioned Weatherwax
why the mechanics had gone to the Union, and then
Eaton accused him of lying and backstabbing. Subse-
quently, both Broderick and Eaton questioned all three
mechanics as to whether they signed a union authoriza-
tion card. They also interrogated Prather and Weather-
wax concerning their own sympathies and that of
Weaver in the event of a union election. In the light of
all surrounding circumstances, it is my conclusion that
the interrogations were coercive and therefore violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Blue Flash Express, Inc.,
109 NLRB 591 (1954).
Discharges. The allegation that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by the discharge of the two
mechanics is also well documented by the record. Al-
though Respondent has attempted to prove that the lay-
offs were the result of Broderick's overly optimistic an-
ticipation of an upsurge in business in the spring of 1978,
the record shows that the true reasons for the discharges
were the employees' union activity and their attempt to
seek protection by the Union.
Respondent, of course, is correct in arguing that the
"Act does not suspend the right of an employer to oper-
I Weaver did not remember any other statements by Harbaugh about
the Union and Prather's recollection differs with that of Weatherwax.
Accordingly, I cannot credit their testimony that any antiunion remarks
were made at that meeting.
DITCH WITCH OF CENTRAL ILLINOIS 455
ate his business in a productive and profitable manner,"
and that business changes solely effected for economic
reasons are not proscribed by the Act. However, it is
also true that certain business changes-although eco-
nomically justifiable-are violative of Section 8(a)(3),
where they are actually undertaken because of union
considerations.
In this regard, the record shows that Respondent had
financial problems and that the service department was
unprofitable. In an apparent effort to cure this problem,
the mechanics were called to a meeting on May 8, 1978,
at which time Eaton informed the men that they had 2
weeks in which to correct their performance. However,
before the 2 weeks had expired and I day after the
Union notified Respondent that it represented a majority
of the mechanics at the facility,2 the men were laid off.
The timing of this action clearly suggests that the Union,
not the economic situation of the Company, was the
motive behind the layoff of the two employees, because
Respondent's financial position had not changed within
the -week interval between May 8 and May 17, to war-
rant such a dramatic turnabout in its announced decision
to provide a 2-week grace period.
Moreover, Respondent's argument is inconsistent in
several respects. According to Harbaugh, the layoff had
no connection with the performance of the mechanics
and their efficiency. However, Respondent went to a
considerable effort in attempting to establish an excessive
amount of service warranty work and service training
time by Weatherwax and Weaver to show their perfor-
mance record.
Respondent's position is further weakened by record
evidence showing that when Prather left the employ of
the Company on September 1, 1978, instead of recalling
one of the men on layoff, Respondent hired Gary Price,
a new mechanic. 3 This indicates that Respondent had
not intended to recall Weatherwax or Weaver and that
the layoff actually amounted to a discharge of the two
men.
Furthermore, the economic evidence relied upon by
Respondent to show that the layoff was a result of the
Company's financial problems is ambiguous. If anything,
it shows that the poor economic position of the Compa-
ny deteriorated after the layoff, which suggests that the
layoff caused the adverse consequences rather than vice
versa.
Considering Respondent's unlawful interrogations of
the mechanics concerning their union sympathies and
Respondent's union animus reflected during these inter-
rogations, as well as the timing of the layoffs which co-
incided with the Union's notification of majority status
2 Respondent's argument that the decision for the layoff had been care-
fully made in the evening of May 15, between Harbaugh and Broderick is
not persuasive in the light of Eaton's testimony which-although
vague-indicated that a firm decision had not been made in the early
morning of May 16 Eaton initially testified that the reason for the deci-
sion to reduce manpower was made on the basis of his report late on
May 15 that there was "no work." Yet, during cross-examination, he con-
ceded that there was a certain, minimum amount of work scheduled for
the following day
3 Respondent argues that Price replaced Prather as lead mechanic, and
that neither Weaver nor Weatherwax qualified as lead mechanic Howev-
er, the record shows that there were no other mechanics working for Re-
spondent.
and Respondent's abrupt turnabout in laying off its me-
chanics prior to the expiration of the 2-week grace
period during which they were to demonstrate their im-
proved performance, I can only find that James Weath-
erwax and Robert Weaver were discriminatorily dis-
charged. Respondent's economic defense was not persua-
sive. While it generally showed that the Company was in
a difficult financial position from which it intended to ex-
tricate itself by encouraging its mechanics on to better
performance, it also showed that the layoff did not im-
prove the economic position of the Company. To the
contrary, it deteriorated further. In short, Respondent's
warning to the mechanics on May 8 prompted them to
go to the Union for protection. When Respondent was
informed that the Union had gained majority status, Re-
spondent retaliated, discharged two of the three, and
thereby destroyed the Union's majority status among the
mechanics in the service department.
The unit consisting of all mechanics in the service de-
partment had a sufficient community of interest to be
considered as an appropriate bargaining unit, and this
issue is not disputed by Respondent. It is also clear that
the signing of union authorization cards by all three me-
chanics sufficed to show majority status of the Union as
the bargaining representative of these employees. Be-
cause Respondent embarked upon a course of serious
unfair labor practices, including coercive interrogations
of its employees and the discriminatory discharges of
two mechanics which destroyed and directly interfered
with the Union's majority status, immediately after the
Union had made a demand for recognition, it is appropri-
ate for the Board to issue a bargaining order N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 614. The duty to
bargain arose on May 16, the day on which the Union
requested recognition. Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298,
301 (1974).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Ditch Witch of Central Illinois, Inc., is
and was at all times material, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Local Union 627, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating its employees about
their union activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
4. By discharging James Weatherwax and Robert
Weaver, on May 17, 1978, because of their union activi-
ties, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
5. By its failure and refusal to bargain with the Union,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. The unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Ditch Witch of Central Illinois,
Inc., engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the Act, I recommend that
456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from its un-
lawful practices. I further recommend that Respondent
be orderd to post an appropriate notice.
In addition, I recommend that James Weatherwax and
Robert Weaver be offered full and immediate reinstate-
ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without loss of benefits or seniority, and that they be
made whole for any loss of earnings sustained by them
by reason of the discrimination against them, together
with interest to be computed in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and
Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 657 (1977). 1 also
recommend that Respondent recognize and bargain with
the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit described as all me-
chanics in the service department.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I recommend the issuance of
the following recommended:
ORDER 4
The Respondent, Ditch Witch of Central Illinois, Inc.,
Peoria, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discriminatorily discharging employees because of
their union support.
(b) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union activities.
(c) Refusing or failing to recognize and bargain collec-
tively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of all mechanics in the service department con-
cerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, or coercing,
its employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organi-
zation, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the
above-named Union or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for
4 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all
such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer James Weatherwax and Robert Weaver im-
mediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
these jobs are not available, to substantially equivalent
employment, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights or privileges, and make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of the
discharges in the manner set forth in the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords relevant and necessary to a determination of com-
pliance with paragraph (a) above.
(c) Upon request, bargain collectively with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Help-
ers, Local Union 627, as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of all employees in the bargaining unit, de-
scribed as all mechanics in Respondent's service depart-
ment with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other conditions of employment, and, if
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a written signed agreement.
(d) Post at its Peoria, Illinois, place of business copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 33, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 33, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."