District 65, Wholesale Union

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 6, 1971

187 N.L.R.B. 716 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

716 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
District 65, Wholesale , Retail , Office & Processing
Union and Melville Shoe Corporation. Case
2-CB-4766
January 6, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On August 10, 1970, Trial Examiner Sidney Sher-
man issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recomme ding that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certin affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Exam-
iner also found that Respondent had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices.' Thereafter,
Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a supporting brief and the Charging
Party filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the Respondent, District 65, Wholesale, Retail, Office
& Processing Union, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.2
1 In the absence of exceptions to the Trial Examiner's failure to find
these unfair labor practices , we adopt pro forma his conclusions
8 In footnote 15 of the Trial Examiner's Decision , substitute "20" for
"10" days
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SIDNEY SHERMAN, Trial Examiner: The charge herein was
served on Respondent on September 30, 1969,1 the
complaint issued on April 16, 1970, and the case was heard
on May 25 and June 10, 1970. The issues litigated related to
alleged violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(3) of the
Act. A brief was filed by the Charging Party.2
Upon the entire record,3 including observation of the
witnesses' demeanor, the following findings and recom-
mendations are adopted:
1. JURISDICTION
Melville Shoe Corporation, hereinafter called Melville, is
a corporation under the laws of the State of New York, with
a principal office in New York City, and is engaged at
various locations throughout the United States in the
manufacture and sale of shoes. Through its Miles Shoes
Division, hereinafter referred to as Miles, Melville has
maintained a warehouse and office in New York City,
which services Melville's various retail outlets. The
employees assigned to such division are the only ones here
involved.4 Melville annually ships products valued in excess
of $50,000 in interstate commerce. Melville is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
District 65, Wholesale, Retail, Office & Processing
Union, herein called Respondent, is a labor organization
under the Act. Since it is alleged to have engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting Melville and its employees, it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The pleadings raise the following issues:
1. Whether on or about September 30, Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(3) by calling a strike of Miles' 5
employees in support of its demand for contract modifica-
tion, and without complying with the provisions of Section
8(d) of the Act?
2. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) and
8(b)(I)(A) by soliciting two employees of Miles not to work
for it because their rate of pay was less than that demanded
by Respondent?
A. Sequence of Events
Respondent has contracts with about 2,000 employers in
the New York City area. It has for many years had
contractual relations with Miles, the most recent contract
having been executed in February 1968 for a term of 3
years. The weekly pay rates under that contract ranged
from $75 to $115. However, early in 1969, Respondent
began to publicize a demand for a minimum weekly rate of
$100 for all the employees represented by it, including those
i All dates are in 1969 , unless otherwise indicated
2 The Charging Party's name has here been amended to conform to the
facts developed at the hearing as to its legal identity
3 For corrections of the transcript and a ruling on evidence , see the
order of July 21, 1970
4 For reasons of convenience , and to conform to the nomenclature used
by the witnesses at the hearing , the employer of such employees will for the
most part be referred to hereinafter as Miles rather than Melville.
8 See In 4, above
187 NLRB No. 107
DISTRICT 65, WHOLESALE UNION
working for Miles In April, Respondent wrote Miles to
request that it institute at once a minimum weekly rate of
$100 In a letter of August 19, Respondent's president,
Livingston, repeated this request, suggesting that before
October 1 the parties meet and negotiate appropriate
modifications of their contract to incorporate a $100
weekly minimum Livingston also served notice that, on
and after October 1, Respondent would no longer dispatch
any worker to a job paying less than $100 per week, and
would "take all measures within the law to guarantee that
no worker in a '65' shop is obligated to accept a wage"
below $100 a week On September 24, Maddux, a shop
steward at Miles' establishment, informed its personnel
director, Braun , that all Respondent's members would
attend a rally from 11 30 a in to 1 30 p in on September
30, to be held at Respondent's headquarters, and that the
rally would pertain to the matter of amending the contract
with Miles and other employers to raise the minimum
weekly wage to $100 The normal lunch period for Miles'
employees was from 11 45 to 12 45 On September 29,
Braun handed Maddux a copy of a letter, the original of
which was delivered that day to Respondent's headquar-
ters, in which he advised it that the proposed 2-hour
absence of the employees from work would be
"unauthorized" and would be treated as a violation of the
no-strike clause in the parties' contract Nevertheless, at the
appointed time the next day all of the approximately 150
members of Respondent among Miles' employees simulta-
neously left the premises, and most did not return until
some time between 1 45 and 2 30 p in During that period,
at Respondent's headquarters, its president, Livingston,
flanked by Mayor Lindsey and other notables, addressed a
large turnout of its members, making a vigorous plea for a
$100 minimum weekly wage for its constituents, and urging
resort, if necessary, to work stoppages to achieve that goal
This speech was rebroadcast on television the same
evening, when it was heard by Braun
Under its contract with Respondent, Miles was required
to hire new employees through Respondent, and, only if it
was unable to furnish satisfactory applicants within 48
hours, was Miles free to hire in the "open market " The
contract required further that any employee hired in the
open market promptly be registered with Respondent On
October 7, Braun interviewed a job applicant, Scott, and
offered to hire her at the applicable contract rate of $90 a
week When she accepted, Braun referred her to Respon-
dent for registration pursuant to the contract At Respon-
dent's office, its dispatcher, Hunter, told Scott that Miles
could not hire her for less than $100 per week and called
Braun to tell him that Scott could not be "dispatched"
below that rate When Braun asked that Scott be sent back
to his office, Hunter did not comply, telling Scott, instead,
that Respondent and Miles could not agree on her rate and
that Respondent would attempt to find her other work
After a few unproductive telephone calls by Hunter to
other employers, he asked Scott what she wished to do
When she inquired whether she could work for Miles,
Hunter answered, "No, not until we come to an agree-
ment " Scott then went home, where, later that day, she was
6 Respondent denies that Maddux who gave Miles advance notice of
the September 30 demonstration was Respondents agent citing the fact
717
reached by Braun, who summoned her to his office
Although, after reporting what had happened at Respon-
dent's headquarters , she indicated that she was still willing
to work for Miles , Braun expressed regret that he could not
retain her because of fear of a work stoppage She was paid
by Miles for the 7th and has not since worked for it
On October 9, Bosch applied to Miles and was hired at
$90 per week She was referred to Respondent for
registration When , on October 14, she returned with a
"dispatch slip" prepared by Respondent, which listed her
salary as $ 100 per week , Miles ignored this notation and put
her to work at $90 per week Later the same day, when Shop
Steward Maddux learned her actual rate, he demanded that
Braun raise her pay or discharge her, and , when Braun
refused , Maddux stated that he would have to tell Bosch to
leave the shop Fearing this might lead to a disturbance
among the employees , Braun capitulated and discharged
Bosch
Hunter admitted that he had been instructed by his
superiors that after October 1, he was not to dispatch
anyone to a job that paid less than $ 100 per week and that
he was not to register any employee who had been hired
below that rate , and that he complied with this instruction
with respect to all employers under contract with Respon-
dent , including Miles He added that this instruction was
rescinded about December 1
B Discussion
I Respondent's status
It was agreed at the hearing, and it is found, that
Respondent has been at all times the statutory bargaining
agent of Miles' employees in an appropriate unit consisting
of all warehouse and office clerical employees of Miles at
459 West 59th Street, New York City, excluding the
comptroller, assistant comptrollers, merchandise manager,
his male assistant, private secretaries, confidential employ-
ees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act
2 The 8(d) violation
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by causing the work stoppage of
September 30, and "inducing and encouraging" Scott and
Bosch not to work for Miles at less than $90 per week,
without complying with the provisions of Section 8(d) of
the Act The effect of those provisions is, inter a/a, that a
union violates 8(b)(3), by calling a strike to compel
modification of a contract, sinless it has first observed a 60-
day "cooling-off" period, during which the other party has
been afforded an opportunity to bargain about the
proposed modification and the various Federal and state
mediation services have had an opportunity to intervene It
was stipulated that none of those conditions was met here
It is clear also that Miles' union employees left work on
September 30 without permission, 15 minutes before their
regular lunch period, and did not return until about an hour
after the expiration thereof, and under the circumstances
there can be no doubt that they acted pursuant to
instructions from Respondent 6 It is accordingly found that
on September 30, Respondent caused a work stoppage by
that he was not appointed by it but was elected by Miles employees
However it is clear from the instant record particularly G C Exh 6 and
(Continued)
718 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about 150 of Miles' employees. While it was of relatively
brief duration, Section 8(d) does not distinguish between
short strikes and long ones. Although one might under
other circumstances think that a stoppage of little more
than an hour approached de minimis, here the impact on
Miles was heightened by the threats of further stoppages
contained in Livingston's well-publicized address at the
"rally." It is, accordingly, found that, by causing such
walkout, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
In the case of Scott, it seems proper to find that, when she
reported to Hunter for registration, she was already an
employee of Miles, having accepted Braun's job offer, and
being considered by him to be entitled to pay for that day.
There is nothing in the contract which conditions her
employment on approval by Respondent. On this score, the
contract states only that the requirement that employees
hired in the open market register with Respondent is "for
the purpose of assisting the Union in administering this
contract and in observing and maintaining the standards
desired by the Employers in filling vacancies." While the
latter purpose suggests that Respondent was reserving the
right to veto the hiring of "sub-standard" employees, there
was no evidence that Respondent had ever in the past
refused to register an employee hired directly by Miles or
any other employer, except where such hinng was in
violation of the "48-hour" clause cited above. There was no
evidence nor contention that the hiring of Scott (or Bosch)
was in violation of that clause 7 or any other contract
provision.
It follows that, being already an employee of Miles,
Hunter's inducement of Scott was an inducement of an
employee to cease work, and, since, as the record shows, she
was not told to resign her job but merely to abstain from
Charging Party's Exh. 6, that such elections are conducted pursuant to
authority granted by Respondent 's constitution and that it has delegated to
the shop stewards certain of its functions , including the enforcement of
union rules , regulations and "decisions " That the summoning of the
employees to the September 30 rally was such a decision is clear from the
fact that the rally was announced at a union meeting, was attended by all
Respondent's members, was addressed by Respondent's president, and was
designed to promote its campaign to obtain a $100 minimum weekly wage
See Capital Paper Co, 117 NLRB 635 (fn 1), 644, enfd 267 F 2d 879 (C A.
7), cert denied 361 U S 914, Mach Lumber Co, 126 NLRB 297, 304, enfd.
281 F 2d 952 (C.A. 3)
r It is proper to infer therefore that Scott and Bosch were hired by Miles
after giving Respondent due opportunity to refer applicants and that none
was referred because none was available or, as is more likely, because of
Respondent's announced policy of refusing to make any referrals to
positions paying less than $ 100 per week , which Hunter claimed to have
rigidly enforced
8 As found below, the Bosch incident did not involve a refusal to work
but a discharge
9 In this respect, Scott's case is distinguishable from that of a single
employee , who takes some action because of a grievance personal to him
Such action is not deemed to be concerted, but only because it is solely for
the benefit of the employee and not, as here, pursuant to a program
designed to benefit all other employees similarly situated
is While it would seem at least arguable that such discharge violated
Section 8 (b)(2), the General Counsel did not see fit to amend the complaint
to allege such a violation nor to take any affirmative position on the issue,
even after the Trial Examiner stated that, absent such affirmative position
by the General Counsel, no finding would be made as to any such
violation
ii Broward Builders' Exchange, Inc, 122 NLRB 1008-09; Cream Top
Creamery, Inc, 147 NLRB 264, 265
12 Any such finding as to Bosch would be cumulative, in any case, and
would not affect the remedy
work until agreement could be reached between Respon-
dent and Miles about her pay rate, and since she did fail to
return to work for several hours, until summoned by Braun,
there are present here all the elements of a strike. While
there is no evidence that any other employees of Miles
absented themselves from work at the same time as Scott8
and under comparable circumstances, it suffices that Scott
acted at the instance of Respondent, and in furtherance of
the policy adopted by it as the representative of Miles'
employees to secure modification of the contractual pay
scale .9 It is therefore found that, in causing Scott to refrain
from work until Miles met Respondent's pay demand,
Respondent additionally violated Section 8(b)(3).
However, in the case of Bosch, it is clear from Braun's
own testimony that Bosch did not leave work but was
discharged by him, albeit in response to pressure exerted by
Maddux.iO It is nevertheless contended that a violation of
8(b)(3) may be found in her case on the basis of evidence
that she was urged by Respondent not to work for less than
$100 per week. On that score, Maddux testified that in the
morning of the 14th, he succeeded in convincing Bosch that
she should not work for less than $100 per week. While
Bosch did not act on this conviction but remained at work
until discharged by Braun, it is contended that Maddux's
foregoing solicitation of Bosch, in itself, violated Section
8(b)(3), citing Board cases holding that the mere induce-
ment of employees to strike, apart from the strike, itself,
may violate Section 8(d).ii However, here, unlike the case
of Scott, it is not clear whether Maddux was urging Bosch
to strike or quit. Accordingly, I do not deem the evidence to
preponderate in favor of a finding of an 8(b)(3) violation
with respect to Bosch.12
in its brief, the Charging Party contends that Respondent should, in
addition, be found to have violated Section 8(b)(3) by unilaterally
modifying the terms of its contract with Miles , contrary to the prohibitions
in Section 8(d) against any modification of a contract by a party thereto
without complying with various conditions, which admittedly were not met
here The complaint , however, does not allege any such modification of the
contract by Respondent, but only that its various activities discussed above
were "in furtherance of its desire to modify" the contract , and, at the
hearing the General Counsel did not profess to rely on the theory advanced
by the Charging Party. Moreover, this contention raises the rather novel
question whether a union , as distinguished from an employer , may exercise
sufficient control over the terms of employment that it can effectively
change them Here, it is contended that the effect of Respondent's refusal
to register or dispatch new employees for below minimum rate jobs was to
establish unilaterally a $100 weekly minimum, at least for new hires
However, the question of the total impact of Respondent's registration
policy on Miles' hiring rates was not adequately litigated . Thus, there was
no evidence that Scott and Bosch were the only new hires at less than $100
per week during the period under consideration , so that, so far as appears
from the record, theirs may have been isolated cases, and Miles may have
continued to hire others below that rate despite Respondent 's refusal to
register them at that rate In any event, what little Board authority there is
in point does not seem to support the Charging Party's position The only
Board authority cited is Associated Musicians, Local 802, 164 NLRB 23, 27,
affd 395 F.2d 287 (C A. 2), where it was found that there was no violation
of Sec 8(b)(3) by a union in refusing to furnish musicians at pay rates
below those demanded by it in bargaining for a new contract. In rejecting
the contention that, by refusing to supply men at rates below its new wage
scale, the union unilaterally changed such rates , the Board said'
the Respondent's revised wage scales . realistically could not
become terms and conditions of employment in Cutler 's business until
accepted or adopted by him. Nor, by the same token , did they
automatically become working conditions simply because the
Respondent offered its members ' services on those terms
DISTRICT 65, WHOLESALE UNION 719
3. The 8(b)(1)(A) Issue III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The General Counsel contends that, by refusing to
register Scott and Bosch for jobs paying $90 per week and
by inducing and encouraging them not to work at that rate,
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act.
It is clear that, at least in the case of Scott, the totality of
Respondent's conduct exceeded permissible limits. Hunter
not only refused to register her, although the contract on its
face gave him no discretion in the matter, but he also told
her that she "could not" work for Miles, thereby implying
that there was some insuperable legal obstacle to such
employment or that she would be prevented from working
for Miles by force or other improper means. Thus, there
was implicit in Hunter's remarks either a deliberate
misrepresentation as to Scott's section I, above, have a
substantial relation to commerce among the legal rights or a
coercive threat. In either case , such remarks, coupled with
the refusal to register Scott, must be deemed to constitute
unlawful restraint of Scott from exercising her right to
refuse to cooperate in Respondent's campaign to secure a
$100 minimum wage. By such restraint of Scott, Respon-
dent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
With regard to Bosch, the complaint's allegation of a
violation of 8(b)(1)(A) is based on the fact (a) that, although
she had been hired at $90 per week, Respondent insisted on
listing her salary on her registration slip as $100 per week,
and (b) that Shop Steward Maddux told her she could not
work at less than $100 per week and otherwise induced her
not to do so. As to (a), all that was involved here was, in
effect, a demand that her rate of pay be increased, which
demand, in itself, could not have exerted improper pressure
on Bosch not to work for Miles or otherwise to cooperate
with Respondent's minimum wage campaign. As for (b),
there was no evidence that Maddux made any such
statement to Bosch. On this point the record contains only
Maddux' testimony that, in speaking to her on the 14th, he
merely attempted to convince her of the inequity of the
existing wage scale, and there is no evidence that, in so
doing, he made any remarks that exceeded the limits of free
speech. Accordingly, no 8(b)(1)(A) violation is found as to
Bosch.13
And, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, in affirming this reasoning
After all , Cutler held the purse strings , and, insofar as he was
concerned , the bylaws in question were no more than demands by the
union
The Charging Party's main reliance appears to be on the court decision
in Associated Home Builders v N L R B, 352 F 2d 745, 751-755 (C A 9),
where it was held that a union violated Sec 8 (b)(3) by forbidding its
members to exceed production ceilings fixed by it (The Board had there
refrained from passing on that issue .) However, in dealing with an
analogous question in Scofield v N LR B, 394 U S 423, 433, 436, the
Court found no breach of contract or impairment of the collective-
bargaining process in a union's imposing a production ceiling during the
term of a contract In any event, it is clear that a stronger case may be
made for finding unilateral imposition of terms of employment by a union
with respect to matters within the physical control of its members , such as
their production effort or their reporting and departure times , than with
respect to such a matter as the price to be paid for their services (This
would seem to be a sounder basis for distinguishing the court 's holding in
the Associated Home Builders case , supra, than the dictum of the Trial
The activities of Respondent set forth in section II,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Melville described in section 1, above, have a substantial
relation to commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce.
IV. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(3), it will be recommended that it be
required to cease and desist therefrom and take appropri-
ate, affirmative action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Charging Party is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization under the Act.
3. The following unit has been at all material times, and
still is, appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act:
All warehouse and office clerical employees of Mel-
ville's Miles shoe division at 459 West 59th St., New
York City, excluding the comptroller, assistant comp-
troller , merchandise manager , his male assistant , private
secretaries, confidential employees, and all supervisors
as defined in the Act.
4. At all times here material, Respondent has been, and
still is, the statutory representative of the employees in the
aforedescnbed unit.
5. By coercing and restraining employees in the exercise
of their right to refrain from engaging in concerted activity
and from otherwise assisting it, Respondent has violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
6. By causing employees to engage in a concerted
refusal to work in support of a demand for modification of
the terms of an existing collective-bargaining contract,
without complying with the requirements of Section 8(d) of
the Act, Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
Examiner in the Associated Musicians case , supra, that the former case was
distinguishable because the union's setting of production ceilings occurred
during the term of a contract, in violation of Sec 8(d) It is not clear how
the fact that there is or is not a current contract can have any relevance to
the crucial factor of the extent of a union's effective control over working
conditions )
13 In its brief, the Charging Party contends that an 8(b)(1)(A) violation
should be found as to Bosch on the basis of the undisputed evidence that
Respondent caused her to be discharged because of her failure to
cooperate in its minimum wage campaign However, this particular basis
for an 8 (b)(1)(A) finding was not alleged in the complaint , and, for reasons
already stated, the General Counsel must be deemed to have expressly
waived any reliance on Respondent's role with regard to the discharge of
Bosch , whether in connection with a violation of Sec 8 (b)(2) or a
derivative violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) (The Charging Party makes a like
contention as to Scott , apparently relying on Braun's refusal to take Scott
back after she indicated her willingness to return This contention is subject
to the same procedural infirmity as that relating to Bosch.)
720 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Respondent, District 65, Wholesale, Retail, Office &
Processing Union, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Restraining and coercing employees of Melville Shoe
Corporation in the exercise of their right to refrain from
engaging in concerted activities and from otherwise
assisting said Respondent.
(b) Causing employees of Melville Shoe Corporation to
engage in a concerted stoppage or interruption of work in
support of a demand for modification of the terms of an
existing contract, without complying with the requirements
of Section 8(d) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at Respondent's business office and meeting
places copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 2, shall, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for
a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.is
14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
,s In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of
Melville Shoe Corporation in the exercise of their right
not to engage in concerted activities and not to assist us
in our program to raise wage rates.
WE WILL NOT cause employees of Melville to strike or
engage in other interruptions of work in support of a
demand for changing existing wage rates or other terms
of employment fixed by contract, without complying
with the requirements of Section 8(d) of the Act.
DISTRICT 65, WHOLESALE,
RETAIL, OFFICE AND
PROCESSING UNION
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 36th
Floor, Federal Building, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New
York 10007, Telephone 212-264-0340.