District 50, United Mine Workers of America

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 27, 1959

122 N.L.R.B. 1627 (N.L.R.B. 1959)

DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA- 1627
illy colleagues also state that the Council "meets in negotiations
only every 3 years since those area contracts which it has negotiated
are 6-year contracts with 3-year reopenings for wage modifications."
This statement , even aside from the question of its germaneness,
ignores the realities of the collective-bargaining process. For the
fact is that bargaining negotiations do not begin and end simul-
taneously with their inception ; indeed, as the experience of this
Board demonstrates , they often continue over lengthy periods of
time.
In reaching their conclusion herein, my colleagues are overlooking
a well-established principle , followed by both this Board and the
courts, to the effect that anybody which has the attributes, and
exercises the functions , set forth in Section 2(5), is a labor or-
ganization even though it has no formal structure 22 I cannot ignore
this rule, and I cannot ignore the specific language of the statute.
Accordingly , I do not join in my colleagues ' ruling, and would dis-
miss the petitions.
MEMBER BEAN took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Direction of Elections.
2 " See, for example, N.L.R.B. v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F. 2d 817 (C.A. 3) ; United Shoe
Workers of America, C.I.O. (Perry Norvell Company), 80 NLRB 225, 244; Smith Victory
Corporation, 90 NLRB 2089 ; Metallic Building Company, 98 NLRB 386 , 387, 395, and
cases cited therein ; Gemsco , Inc., 111 NLRB 82; Building & Construction Trades Council
of Boston, AFL-CIO (J. J. Iteddington Electric Service Co.), 119 NLRB 1816; Endicott
Johnson Corporation, 117 NLRB 1886.
District 50, United Mine Workers of America [The Herbert
Chemical Company] and William L. Herman . Case No. 9-CB-
405. February 07, 1959
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 18, 1958, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding
that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain
unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Exam-
iner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended that these allegations of the complaint be dismissed. There-
after, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
122 NLRB No. 190.
1628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Dis-
trict 50, United Mine Workers of America, its officers, representatives,
and agents, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Causing or attempting to cause The Herbert Chemical Com-
pany, its officers, agents, successors, or assigns, to discriminate against
employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees of the said Employer in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized by Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Notify the above-named Employer, in writing, that it with-
draws its objection to full. reinstatement of William L. Herman to
his appropriate standing on the seniority list.
(b) Notify William L. Herman, in writing, that it has advised
said Employer that it withdraws its objections to his full reinstate-
ment to his appropriate standing on the seniority list.
(c) Post at its business offices and meeting halls in St. Bernard,
Ohio, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report
marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Ninth Region, shall, after being signed
by a representative of the said Union, be posted by it immediately
1 As no exceptions were filed to the Trial Examiner's findings that the Respondent
violated Sections 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act by causing the Company to effect a
change in the seniority of employee Herman, we adopt them pro forma. In adopting
the other findings of the Trial Examiner, we do not find it necessary to pass upon his
remarks defining the term "closed shop."
2 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of
a Trial Examiner" the words "A Decision and Order." In the event that this Order is
enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for
the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1629
upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Mail signed copies of said notice to the Regional Director for
the Ninth Region, for posting, the Employer willing, at the plant,
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has. taken
to comply herewith.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed, insofar as it alleges other violations of the Act not found
herein.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges having been duly filed and served, a complaint and notice of hearing
thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, and an answer having been filed by the above-named
Respondent a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation
of Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(61 Stat. 136), herein called the Act, was held in Cincinnati, Ohio, on October 7,
1958, before the duly designated Trial Examiner.
At the hearing' all parties were represented, were afforded full opportunity to
be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence pertinent
to the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. Argument was waived. A brief and proposed
conclusions of law have been received from General Counsel.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Herbert Chemical Company, the Employer involved in this matter, is an
Ohio corporation, having its principal office and manufacturing plant at St. Bernard,
Ohio, where it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of industrial
chemicals.
During the calendar year 1957 the Employer sold and shipped from its plant
industrial chemicals and related products manufactured by it and valued at more
than $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Ohio.
The Respondent Union does not deny, and it is found, that said Employer is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
District 50, United Mine Workers of America, is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues
The complaint alleges and the answer of the Union denies that: (1) on or about
November 10, 1957, the Union caused the Employer to discriminate in violation
I When the hearing opened, this case was consolidated with Case No. 9-CA-1255, the
named Respondent therein being The Herbert Chemical Company. After the hearing was
convened, and the consolidated complaint placed in evidence, General Counsel stated that
505395-59-vol. 122-104
1630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, against employee William L. Herman by assigning
to him a "false" seniority status; and (2) on or about October 14, 1957, the
Union entered into, and thereafter maintained and enforced, an "agreement, under-
standing and practice" which "required as a condition of employment member-
ship" in the Union on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment, although the Union has never received from the Board "a notice of
compliance with Section 9(f), (g) and (h) of the Act."
The brief of General Counsel, however, adds to these simple issues raised by
his complaint. For example, the brief contends that employee Herman suffered
the Employer's "discrimination" upon "the insistence and demand" of the Union
not only in reduction of seniority standing but also by having his wages "reduced."
And again, the brief not only urges that the Union and the Employer "violated the
Act by maintaining a union security practice at a time when the Union was not
in compliance" but it also claims that "in actual practice there was a closed shop
insofar as William L. Herman was concerned and a union shop insofar as Robert
Ward was concerned."
While some reference may later be made to the brief's tangential issues, ultimate
conclusions will be limited to those specified in the complaint.
B. Relevant facts and conclusions
On August 29, 1957, after receipt of the Union's claim of majority representa-
tion and demand for recognition, the Employer notified the Union in writing that
it would grant such recognition and would enter into a collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
Although in its request for recognition the Union claimed to represent only "all
of your production and maintenance employees," the Employer in its reply stated
that it "hereby recognizes" the Union "as the bargaining representative for all pro-
duction, maintenance and shipping employees employed by the Company." 2 [Em-
phasis supplied.]
Negotiations for a contract began. Attorney Hartsock and Vice President Miller
represented the Employer; Union Representative Joseph Frank and three employees
represented the Respondent. At the time of such negotiations all employees in the
unit claimed by the Union had "signed up in the Union." 3
The Employer proposed a contract with a "union-shop" clause in it .4 The union
representative rejected this proposal, and the final contract contained only the
familiar United Mine Workers' "Yes and No" "union-shop" provisions, which
General Counsel in his brief aptly says left "the parties where they were found."
That is to say that the customary union-shop clause is promptly and unambigu-
ously made ineffective by the following language:
It is understood that the provisions immediately above, relating to Union
Shop, shall not become effective but the operation of the same is hereby de-
ferred until such time as the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as
amended, or other applicable Federal Laws permit the enforcement of said
section, there being no intent in this Agreement to limit or abridge in any
manner the rights and privileges extended by applicable Federal Law.
During negotiations the question of classifications within the recognized unit
arose. Supervisors, of course, by requirement of the Act, were to be excluded.
Testimony of both Miller and Frank is in substantial agreement that in connection
with this classification the status of William Herman, the Charging Party, became
a subject of much discussion. Whatever might be the Board's determination, in
the event of a representation proceeding, as to Herman's actual status, the testi-
mony of the Employer's Representative Miller, of the Union's Representative
Frank, and even of Herman himself, establishes beyond question that at the time
of negotiations he was reasonably considered to be a supervisor by management,
by employees, and by the Union. At negotiations the Employer pointer out that
Herman did some work, as an employee, as well. The Union argued, not unrea-
sonably it appears to the Trial Examiner, that if he was a supervisor he should
because a settlement agreement had been reached between General Counsel and The
Herbert Chemical Company he moved that all allegations of unfair labor practices relat-
ing to said Employer be stricken. The Respondent Union voiced no objections to the
motion, which was thereupon granted by the Trial Examiner.
e Quotations are from documents in evidence.
3 General Counsel established this point through witness Elmer Rogers, a committee
member, and Vice President Miller.
I The fact is admitted by Vice President Miller.
DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1631
not do. the work of an employee, and if an employee he should be in the unit.
As Frank expressed it, "we felt that a man had to be either in the unit or out
of the unit. He couldn't be split down the middle."
Finally, according to Miller, the Employer made the decision that "Bill [Herman]
would have to be put on an hourly basis." Miller testified, "I told him [Herman]
that we could not continue three men in the plant supposedly as supervisory-in
.a supervisory capacity, and not doing any physical labor, and that we would have
.to put him on an hourly basis, and if he wished to continue he could do so." Also
.according to the vice president's testimony he made it clear to Herman that unless
he accepted the hourly paid status he would have to "find other employment."
In mid-October, before the contract between the Union and the Employer was
executed, Herman accepted the demotion and confined his work to that of an em-
ployee. From his testimony it appears that by this demotion he lost about 18
cents an hour.
To dispose of a point raised during the hearing and in his brief by General
Counsel but not in the complaint: the matter of this demotion and loss of pay.
Contrary to General Counsel's claim, Miller's testimony establishes, and the Trial
Examiner finds, that the Employer's choice of action as to Herman was voluntary
:and neither caused nor attempted to be caused by the Union. Whatever discrimi-
nation there may have been, if any, is not attributable to the Union, but to the
Employer and as noted heretofore at the opening of the hearing General Counsel
withdrew all allegations against the Employer.
This issue aside, there remain two others relating to Herman: (1) whether or
not the Union caused the Employer to discriminate against him by assigning him
a "false" position on the seniority list; and (2) whether or not "there was a closed
-shop insofar as William L. Herman was concerned."
The complaint claims that the discrimination against Herman in the matter of
his seniority consisted of his not being accorded his proper status as provided by
-the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Employer. The
relevant provision of the contract reads: (article V, sectionl)
The length of service of the employee in the Company shall determine the
seniority status of the employee.
Herman's actual hiring date, as shown by his employment record, was March 1,9,
1951. Upon insistence of the Union the Employer placed him on its seniority list
.as having seniority beginning on October 11, 1957. It is clear and is found that
Herman was not accorded his correct seniority status.
While there was no showing at the hearing that Herman has actually suffered
monetary loss because of his seniority standing, there can be no doubt that the
probability of such loss is inherent in the situation, and would be effected the first
time the Employer has occasion to lay off an employee. For instead of appear-
ing, as his real hiring date would require, second on the list of eight employees
in the bargaining unit, he actually has been placed last-and would be the first
-to be laid off in any reduction in force.
Since it appears that all other employees in the unit were placed on the same
list according to their actual hiring date, it seems obvious that Herman was indeed
discriminated against. Nor does the credible testimony permit any other conclu-
sion other than that it was the Union, through Frank, that caused the Employer
-thus to discriminate against Herman.
As to the date of October 11, listed by the Employer, neither the testimony of
Miller nor of Frank reveals why this precise date was chosen. Miller's testimony
-to the effect that the Union said Herman's seniority was to "be as of the date he
joined the union" is not only without the support of Frank's testimony but is
inconsistent with the actual date Herman joined the Union.5 Herman himself
established that he did- not join the Union until about the middle of November.
'Nor is Frank's testimony wholly convincing. From his testimony, however, con-
sidered in the light of company records as to Herman, the Trial Examiner infers
that the Union demanded that his seniority should begin with the day he ceased
to be a supervisor and came into the unit as an employee.6 Herman's employ-
5 In weighing credibility , the Trial Examiner cannot ignore the fact that Miller was an
officer of the Employer against whom General Counsel had just withdrawn allegations of
-violating the Act , that he was called-not as an adverse witness-by General Counsel,
and that as the record shows he gave willing answers to leading questions.
6 Frank testified as to the Union ' s position : ". . . If Herman came into the unit, he
-would come in as a new ' employee . . in the case of layoff and recall Mr. Herman would
:go at the bottom of the present seniority list at that time." , ,
1632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment record shows that on October 19 he first received pay at an hourly rate,
and in line with custom in many plants it is probable that October 19 marked the
end, not the beginning, of a new pay period.
Even if it be assumed, despite the clear contract language, that there was some
merit in the Union's claim that Herman's seniority should begin with the date he
became an employee, and ceased to be a supervisor, discrimination still occurred.
For it is undisputed that another employee, Ralph Hageman, had an employment
record similar in essential details to that of Herman. At some undisclosed date
before negotiations began, Hageman had been demoted and as Miller said, "re-
turned back to the plant as a worker." Hageman joined the Union before negotia-
tions began and on the seniority list was given a position according to the date of
his original hire by the Employer, not the date he returned as an "employee."
The foreseeable consequence of such discrimination against Herman was to en-
courage membership in the Union. Discrimination thus designed, as to terms of
employment, constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by the Employer.
It was caused by the Union's demand, and on the part of the Union was a viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
Turning to the other point concerning Herman, raised in General Counsel's brief:
It is the contention of General Counsel that although on its face the security
and check-off provisions (of the contract) are lawful, that in actual practice
there was a closed shop insofar as William L. Herman was concerned.
The contention may be quickly disposed of, by reason and by fact. A finding
of "practice" may not reasonably be inferred from a single incident-and General
Counsel claims but one.7 And Herman's own testimony establishes that he did
not join the Union, or seek to join it, until a month or more after he became a
working employee in the unit. A "closed shop," as presumably General Counsel
is aware, requires union membership as a condition of hiring, and had such a
condition been inflicted upon Herman, he would have had to join on or about
October 11. The Trial Examiner finds no merit in this contention.
As to the other major issue: whether or not there existed any "agreement, un-
derstanding and practice" requiring as a condition of employment membership in
the Union after 30 days.
The only "agreement" in evidence is the contract of October 31, and in his
brief, as noted above, General Counsel concedes that its "security and check-off
provisions" are lawful.
The only "understanding" of such union-shop requirement was voiced by Vice
President Miller, who admitted that he gained this "understanding" from the
Employer's own attorney. Miller also admitted that Union Representative North-
ern did not tell him so, and studiously evaded answering the question as to
whether or not Union Representative Frank told him so. Clearly Miller's testi-
mony will not support a finding of any clear "understanding"-between the two
parties-particularly in the light of his earlier admission that the Union refused to
accept the usual "union-shop" proposal by the Employer. Indeed, in his brief,
General Counsel makes no specific claim as to an "understanding."
Appraisal is now reduced to General Counsel's contention that the Union and
the Employer violated the Act by maintaining a "union-security" practice at a
time when the Union was not in compliance. The single act of this type of
"practice" cited by General Counsel relates to one employee, Robert Ward. Al-
though it has been suggested above that one incident does not make a "practice,"
and although the allegation of "practice" would have to be dismissed if considera-
tion were to be confined to the one claimed item in the brief, for purposes of
full appraisal the Trial Examiner will assume inclusion of the case of Herman,
as well.
First as to Herman: This employee's testimony is to the effect that Miller told
him before the contract was executed that "if the contract was approved, that I
would have to join the union or else look for another job," and that later Miller
called him in and "said the contract had been signed, and that it was all up to
me as to whether I wanted to stay and join the union, or leave." Herman's testi-
mony attributes to no union representative similarly coercive remarks. He said
only that "ten days to two weeks" after the contract had been signed Union Stew-
ard Brown "approached me with a union card and asked me if I was going to
sign it." A week or so later, Herman continued, he signed the card and later,
having been "asked" to do so by the Employer's treasurer, signed a checkoff au-
7 Webster defines "practice": "frequent or customary action ; a succession of acts of
a similar kind. ..."
DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1633
thorization. There can be no question but that the Employer did effectively coerce
Herman into joining the Union-but General Counsel has withdrawn the allega-
tions of the complaint against the Employer.
Testimony elicited by General Counsel designed to implicate the Union, and
show that it caused or attempted to cause the Employer thus to force Herman into
the Union is far from convincing. At one point General Counsel asked:
At those meetings did Mr. Frank-what did Mr. Frank say concerning the
method he expected the company to use to enforce the union shop provision?
and Miller replied:
I think that might be predicated partly upon the seniority status of William
Herman. In other words, it was my understanding if William Herman went
on an hourly basis that he would be required to join the Union. That would
more or less complete the picture as far as the union security clause was
concerned.
This equivocal answer plainly will not support a finding that the Union de-
manded or even asked the Employer to "enforce the union shop provision." In
short, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner credible evidence is insufficient to
support the claim that the Union caused or attempted to cause the Employer to
require Herman to join the Union, at any time.
As to Ward: He was hired in March 1958. So far as the record shows, he is
the only employee hired since the contract was executed October 31, 1957. Ward
was called by General Counsel, and testified that when he was hired by Manager
Howard Feller this official told him that if he worked there he would have to join
the Union within 30 days. Later, according to his testimony, he asked Steward
Brown for a card, and signed it. Brown did not ask him to sign, Ward said,
"I just asked if he had one I would take it with me and fill it in and sign it."
Here, as in the case of Herman, testimony warrants a finding that the Employer
told an employee membership in the Union was a condition of employment, but
not that the Union caused or attempted to cause the Employer to invoke this
requirement.
If it be urged that this situation is somewhat unusual, then also unusual is the
clear admission by Miller that the Employer early in negotiation proposed a union-
shop contract which the Union refused.
In conclusion, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that credible evidence
fails to sustain allegations of the complaint to the effect that an "agreement, un-
derstanding and practice" was entered into on October 14, 1957, by the Employer
and the Union, and that thereafter such understanding and practice was "main-
tained and enforced."
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
Certain of the activities of the Respondent Union, set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with the operations of the Employer described in section I,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Union has engaged in an unfair labor prac-
tice by causing discrimination as to employee William Herman, the Trial Examiner
will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
2. By causing and attempting to cause The Herbert Chemical Company to dis-
criminate against William Herman within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the
Act, thereby restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Union has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act.
1634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. The unfair labor practices found herein are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
Pursuant to the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause The Herbert Chemical Company,
its officers, agents, successors, or assigns to discharge, to lay off, to reduce
the seniority of, or otherwise to discriminate against its employees within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees:
of the above-named Employer, its successors or assigns, in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL notify the above-named Employer in writing and furnish a copy
to William Herman that we have withdrawn our objections to the full rein-
statement of Herman to his appropriate standing on the seniority list.
DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
H. R. McBride d/b/a H . R. McBride Construction Company and
International Hod Carriers ' and Common Laborers ' Union,.
Local No. 16, AFL-CIO. Case No. 33-CA-476. Feby- ary R731.
1959
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 25, 1958, Trial Examiner Howard Meyers issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair-
labor practices and recommending that he cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the.
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board' has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Exam-
iner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
I Pursuant to the provisions of section 8(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated Its
powers In connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and
Members Bean and Jenkins].
122 NLRB No. 184.