Disney Enterprises, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 20, 2022

2021002722 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 20, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/282,977 05/20/2014 Edward C. Drake 0260392 7726 63649 7590 01/20/2022 DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC. C/O FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP 26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360 MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691 EXAMINER KIM, STEVEN S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/20/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@farjami.com farjamidocketing@yahoo.com ffarjami@farjami.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte EDWARD C. DRAKE and MARK ARANA ____________ Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-3, 6-13, and 16-22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed December 17, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed March 18, 2021), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed January 21 2021) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed September 10, 2020). Appellant identifies Disney Enterprises, Inc. as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2). Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The Specification states, “[t]he present disclosure is directed to methods and systems for determining consumer entitlements for playback interoperability” (Spec. 2). Claims 1 and 11 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of obtaining entitlements of a first consumer from a device having a processor, a communication interface and a database, the database including a plurality of data structures each associated with a single title owner of a plurality of title owners including a first title owner and a second title owner, the plurality of data structures including a first data structure associated with the first title owner and with a first plurality of providers including a first provider and a second provider, a second data structure associated with the second title owner and with a second plurality of providers including the first provider and a third provider, and a third data structure associated with the first title owner and with a third plurality of providers including the second provider and the third provider and not the first provider, wherein the first data structure associates a first entitlement provided by the second provider with the first consumer, the second data structure associates a second entitlement provided by the third provider with the first consumer, and the third data structure associates a third entitlement provided by the second provider with the first consumer, the method comprising: [(a)] receiving, via the communication interface from an electronic device of the first provider, a query for a list of the entitlements of the first consumer, the query including a first consumer identification of the first consumer and a first provider identification of the first provider; [(b)] searching, in response to receiving the query, the plurality of data structures to determine data structures associated with the first provider identification; Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 3 [(c)] determining, based on the searching, that the data structures associated with the first provider identification include the first data structure and the second data structure, and exclude the third data structure; [(d)] identifying each of the entitlements associated with the first consumer identification, only in each of the data structures determined to be associated with the first provider identification, wherein the identified entitlements of the first consumer include at least the first entitlement provided by the second provider from the first data structure and the second entitlement provided by the third provider from the second data structure, and exclude the third entitlement provided by the second provider from the third data structure; [(e)] generating the list to include the identified entitlements of the first consumer; and [(f)] transmitting, via the communication interface to the electronic device of the first provider, the list of the identified entitlements of the first consumer. REJECTIONS2 Claims 1-3, 6-13, and 16-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that the inventors regard as the invention. Claims 1-3, 6-13, and 16-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. ANALYSIS Indefiniteness In rejecting claims 1-3, 6-13, and 16-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite, the Examiner observed that the term “entitlement,” as recited in 2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1-3, 6-13, and 16-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 4 the claims, is ordinarily understood to mean permissions, e.g., rights, to something (Final Act. 14 (citing a Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of “entitlement”)). The Examiner noted, “[t]he Specification also suggests this definition in describing . . . entitlement in the background section” (id.). However, the Examiner found that the “claims in light of the Specification . . . describe[ ] the entitlement as an object of the entitlement, e.g.[,] media works or projects, and/or [a] description of the object of the entitlement[,] rather than the entitlement, e.g.[, the] right, itself” (id. at 15 (citing Spec. ¶ 11, Fig. 2, claims 3 and 13)). The Examiner concluded, the scope of the claims is, therefore, “unclear as to . . . what the term ‘entitlement’ . . . is to one of ordinary skill in the art[,] rendering the claims . . . indefinite” (id.). Appellant asserts that it is entitled to act as its own lexicographer; that the “written specification defines an ‘entitlement’ as ‘creative media works or projects, such as movies, games, apps, digital books and music,’ to which a consumer has a right” (Appeal Br. 9 (citing Spec. 6, ll. 12-17)); and that “the pending claims use the term ‘entitlement’ consistent with the written specification” (id.). Appellant, thus, maintains, “Appellant’s use of the term . . . ‘entitlement’ does not render the scope of the claims unclear” (id. at 11 (“For example, if the ‘entitlement’ were a ‘movie’ (which is one of the examples of ‘entitlement’ used in the written [specification]) that a consumer has a right to watch, the last two steps of independent claim 1 would provide generating a list of movies of that consumer, and transmitting the list of such movies.”)). Appellant also charges that the Examiner failed to apply the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the written Specification because Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 5 “the specification provides clear examples of an ‘entitlement’ as being any of ‘creative media works or projects, such as movie, games, apps, digital books and music’” and that the Examiner relied on the Merriam-Webster definition but ignored Cambridge Dictionary’s definition - a definition that Appellant asserts is consistent with “Appellant’s use of the term ‘entitlement’ and provides ‘something that you have a right to do or have, or the right to do or have something’” (Appeal Br. 10). Responding to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner disagrees that “entitlement” is a lexicographic term, noting that “the Specification describes the term ‘entitlement’ in an open ended form, e.g.[,] ‘entitlement 140 may include . . .’ rather clearly setting forth the special definition that differs from the plain and ordinary meaning it would otherwise possess” (Ans. 4). The Examiner also opines that if, as Appellant proposes, “entitlement” is interpreted as “the something (e.g.[,] an object) that you have a right to do or have, or the right to do or have something as in movie[s], games, apps, digital books and music,” the claimed limitation (i.e., “generating the list to include [ ] the identified entitlements [e.g.[,] the movie[s], games, apps, digital books, and [music]] of the first consumer”) would be “unclear to one of ordinary skill in the art as it is unclear as to how a list would include the object, in this case movie[s], games, apps, digital books, and [music], itself” (id. at 5 (reasoning that “[o]ne of ordinary skill would appreciate that the list may include the titles or any identification description but not . . . the object itself”)). Further responding to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner takes the position that a person of ordinary skill in the art, in light of the Specification, would understand that “the entitlement is for interoperability” (Ans. 5 Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 6 (noting that the background section of the Specification describes interoperability in terms of digital rights management)), and in light of the Meriam-Webster dictionary definition of “entitlement,” would understand “‘entitlement’ to be rights” (id.). The Examiner concludes, “[a]s such, the term is not consistently use[d] in the Specification, rendering the claim(s) in light of the specification . . . indefinite” (id.). We agree with the Examiner that Appellant, acting as its own lexicographer, has not set forth a special definition of “entitlement,” different from the plain, ordinary meaning of that term. Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the Cambridge Dictionary definition of “entitlement” is consistent with Appellant’s use of the term, and that a person skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claims are read in light of the Specification. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 6-13, and 16-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, now § 112(b), is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.”). Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 11-21). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C. Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 7 § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ - i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 8 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).3 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54-55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. 3 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the 2019 Revised Guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 9 If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that independent claim 1 describes “ a process for providing entitlement information, specifically which provider provides what entitlement, for a specific consumer from an information warehouse, e.g.[,] database” and observed, “[t]he claim achieves this by receiving a request from a first provider wherein the request includes the first provider ID and a consumer ID”; searching the database “based on the first provider ID to identify domain(s) (data structure[(s)]) that includes the first provider ID”; and using the identified domains “along with the consumer ID to identify the entitlement information of the first consumer” (Final Act. 10). The Examiner reasoned that this process is similar to “retrieving information from [an] organized collection of information, generat[ing] a list of the retrieve[d] information, and transmitting . . . the generated list to the requestor of the information”; and the Examiner concluded, as such, the claim recites subject matter that falls with the “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” category of abstract ideas (id. at 10-11). The Examiner also concluded that “the claimed subject matter is something that can be performed [in the] human mind [or] with pen and paper” (id. at 4; see also Ans. 7), i.e., a mental process and, therefore, an abstract idea. Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 10 Continuing the analysis, the Examiner determined that the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application; that claim 1 does not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself; and that the remaining claims are patent ineligible for substantially the same reasons (Final Act. 11-13). Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335-36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR DETERMINING CONSUMER ENTITLEMENTS FOR PLAYBACK INTEROPERABILITY,” and describes, in the Background section, that when a consumer purchases a digital video disc (a “DVD”) from a retailer, the consumer is assured that the DVD can be used on any DVD player; however, “that is not the case with current digital products that are protected with digital rights management (DRM) algorithms or some other type of Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 11 security and playback control” (Spec. 1). For example, “if a user purchases Movie A from Retailer 1 and would like to watch it on Retailer 2’s system, the user will be required to re-purchase Movie A from Retailer 2” (id.). “As such, there is a fundamental lack of interoperability between digital retail stores” (id.). The Specification states that “[t]he present disclosure is directed to methods and systems for determining consumer entitlements for playback interoperability” (Spec. 2), and discloses that the system includes a database having a plurality of domains (id. at 4). The domains record entitlements (i.e., creative media, such as movies, games, apps, digital books and music) purchased by consumers from providers (i.e., distributors of entitlements). And each domain includes a title owner, e.g., the producer, broadcaster, author, assignee of the entitlements, and is associated with business rules for that title owner (id. at 6). The Specification describes, for example, with reference to Figure 1, reproduced below, that title owners 125a-c of domains 120a-c may each be Disney, and title owners 125d-e of domains 120d-e may each be Sony Pictures, where Disney and Sony Pictures are producers of entitlements 140 (Spec. 7-8); in this example, domain 120a may be a premier domain and lists Disney premier providers 130a, i.e., providers that have access to new releases of entitlements 140a as opposed to providers that only have access to existing entitlements (id.), while domain 120c may be a media type domain that lists Disney providers, i.e., providers 130c, streaming entitlements on the web (id. at 8). Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 12 Figure 1 is block diagram of a system used for determining consumer entitlements for playback interoperability, and shows a database device storing five domains in a memory. The Specification describes that, in one implementation, the domains record providers and consumers using provider and consumer identifications (Spec. 6-7); thus, as illustrated in Figure 1, when a provider 150 queries database device 110 for a specific consumer’s entitlements, the request 160 includes provider ID 161 and consumer ID 162 (id. at 9). Database Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 13 device 110, on receiving request 160, searches domains 120, using provider ID 161 and consumer ID 162, and generates a response 170, which lists the entitlements purchased by the consumer having consumer ID 162 (id. at 10-11). This search process is described in more detail, with reference to Figure 2, reproduced below. Figure 2 is a block diagram of a system used for determining consumer entitlements for playback interoperability, and shows a database device storing domains for Title Owner #1 and Title Owner #2; the figure also shows a list of John Doe’s entitlement purchases. Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 14 Referencing Figure 2, the Specification describes that in response to a request for a consumer’s entitlements, database device 210 first uses the identity of the requesting provider to identify authorized domains for that provider; the database device then uses the consumer identification (included in the request) to identify the consumer’s entitlements from the identified authorized domains (Spec. 14). The Specification, thus, describes that where a request for John Doe’s entitlements is received from Provider #5, the authorized domains for Provider #5, i.e., domains 220b, 220c, and 220d, are first identified (id.). The database device then determines John Doe’s entitlements from the authorized domains (id. at 15). In this example, John Doe’s entitlements include Movie #2 from Provider #2, Movie #4 from Provider #4, Movie #5 from Provider #5, Movie #6 from Provider #6, Movie #7 from Provider # 1, Movie #8 from Provider #4, and Movie# 9 from Provider #5 (id.).4 After determining the consumer’s (here, John Doe’s) entitlements, the database device generates a response, i.e., a list of the entitlements, and transmits the response to the requesting provider, e.g., Provider #5 (id.). Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites a method of obtaining entitlements of a first consumer comprising: (1) receiving, from a first provider, a request for a list of entitlements of the first consumer, i.e., “receiving, via the communication interface from an electronic device of the first provider, a query for a list of the entitlements of the first consumer, the 4 Because the authorized domains for Provider #5 are domain 220b, domain 220c, and domain 220d, but not domain 220a and domain 220e, the authorized domains for Provider #5 do not include Title Owner #1’s entitlements provided by Provider #1 and Provider #3, and Title Owner #2’s entitlements provided by Provider #6 (Spec. 15). Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 15 query including a first consumer identification of the first consumer and a first provider identification of the first provider” (step (a)); (2) searching a plurality of data structures to identify data structures for which the first provider is authorized, i.e., “searching, in response to receiving the query, the plurality of data structures to determine data structures associated with the first provider identification” and “determining, based on the searching, that the data structures associated with the first provider identification include the first data structure and the second data structure, and exclude the third data structure” (steps (b) and (c)); (3) identifying the entitlements associated with the first consumer, only in the authorized data structures, and generating a list of the identified entitlements, i.e., identifying each of the entitlements associated with the first consumer identification, only in each of the data structures determined to be associated with the first provider identification, wherein the identified entitlements of the first consumer include at least the first entitlement provided by the second provider from the first data structure and the second entitlement provided by the third provider from the second data structure, and exclude the third entitlement provided by the second provider from the third data structure; [and] generating the list to include the identified entitlements of the first consumer (steps (d) and (e)); and (4) “transmitting . . . to . . . the first provider, the list of the identified entitlements of the first consumer” (step (f)). We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite “retrieving information from [an] organized collection of information, generat[ing] a list of the retrieve[d] information, and transmitting . . . the generated list to the requestor of the information,” i.e., a mental process, and, therefore, an abstract idea (Final Act. 4). See also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Versata Dev. Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 16 Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that method steps that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable mental processes). Reproducing the claim language, Appellant argues that claim 1 does not recite subject matter that falls within any of the three enumerated groupings of abstract ideas (Appeal Br. 12-15). Appellant summarily asserts, “independent claim 1 does not recite any concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion.)” (id. at 15). Yet, the underlying processes recited in the claim (i.e., receiving a query for a list of entitlements of a first consumer, searching a plurality of data structures to identify entitlements associated with the first consumer, generating a list of the identified entitlements, and transmitting the list to the party submitting the query) are all acts that could be performed by a human mentally or manually, using pen and paper, without the use of a computer or any other machine (Final Act. 4; see also id. at 10-11 (observing that the claimed process is similar to “searching/identifying for specific file folders labeled with specific provider[s] in a filing cabinet, generating a list of the entitlements (e.g.[,] stored information) of the [first] consumer based on the information found in the identified folders, and transmitting the generated list of the entitlements”)). Indeed, with the exception of the “device having a processor,” recited in the preamble, we find nothing in claim 1 that precludes these steps from being performed by a human. Cf. Intellectual Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 17 Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (where the claims were directed to a post office for receiving and redistributing email messages on a computer network, the court observed that “with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose[s] them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper”). Appellant attempts to draw an analogy between the pending claims and those held patent eligible in Enfish, arguing that “just as in Enfish, the claims of the present application are not directed to a patent ineligible concept, because the claims are directed to a specific data storage structure and a method of using the same” (Appeal Br. 17). Yet, we can find no parallel between claim 1 and the claims at issue in Enfish. There, the Federal Circuit held that claims reciting a self-referential table for a computer database were not directed to an abstract idea under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework, and were patent eligible, because the claims were directed to an improvement in computer functionality. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. The specification described the benefits of using a self- referential table - faster searching and more effective data storage - and highlighted the differences between the claimed self-referential table and a conventional database structure. Id. at 1333, 1337. The Federal Circuit, thus, rejected the district court’s characterization of the claims as directed to the abstract idea of “storing, organizing, and retrieving memory in a logical table,” id. at 1337, emphasizing that the key question is whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an abstract idea for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. Id. at 1335-36. Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 18 Appellant asserts that “just as in Enfish, [the] independent claims of the present application recite a specific type of data structure, which improves the efficiency of identifying entitlements of consumers, and generating a list of such entitlements to the providers” (Appeal Br. 17). Yet, we find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the claimed data structure, as in Enfish, improves the way a computer stores or retrieves data in memory or that the data structure otherwise improves the way a computer operates. Instead, that assertion appears to be no more than unsupported attorney argument. Cf. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (attorney argument cannot take the place of evidence in the record). Appellant’s reliance on Intellectual Ventures II LLC, v. FedEx Corp., Civil Action No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2018 WL 7823098 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2018) (Appeal Br. 18-19) is similarly misplaced. There, the district court found that claim 7, there at issue,5 is not abstract and is patent eligible because the claim “is directed towards a technological solution to a technological problem, namely, the elimination of a previously necessary 5 Claim 7 reads as follows: 7. A computer-readable storage device storing computer executable instructions that are executable by a computer system to cause the computer system to perform operations for data interchange, the operations comprising: creating an electronic document having a plurality of bar codes, wherein the plurality of bar codes encode respective data tags and data items, and wherein at least one of the data tags includes an identifier identifying one of the data items; and sending the electronic document for decoding of a first one of the plurality of bar codes to recover a first data tag and a first data item. Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 19 third party in ‘transferring bar code data between businesses and consumers using different hardware and software applications.’” Intellectual Ventures II, 2018 WL 7823098 at *4. The district court stated, “[a]t a high level, [c]laim 7 achieves this by creating an electronic document that can store tagged bar coded information, which can then be sent to a counterparty in order to decode a bar code”; and the court explained, “[t]his solution improves upon the previously existing technological structure that required sophisticated software developed by third parties by allowing users to easily transfer bar code data between parties that may be using different operating systems or software applications.” Id. Appellant summarily asserts here that “[j]ust as in Intellectual Ventures, independent claims 1 and 11 recite [a] specific data structure that enhances data interchange” (Appeal Br. 19). Appellant charges that the Office Action “remained completely silent about the specific type of data structure recited by independent claims 1 and 11, and erroneously failed to consider the recited specific type of data structure in its Section 101 eligibility analysis” (id.). But, Appellant does not identify any technological improvement that is attributable to the claimed data structure. Nor does Appellant otherwise adequately explain how Intellectual Ventures II impacts the patent eligibility of the claims at issue here. Appellant’s further argument, i.e., that claim 1 includes additional elements that integrate any recited abstract idea into a “practical application” (Appeal Br. 19-20), is also unpersuasive. The Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)-(c) and (e) in Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 20 non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if, inter alia, the additional element (1) reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appellant argues here that “independent claim 1 integrates any allegedly recited judicial exception with the specific data structures recited by independent claim 1 providing a practical application for searching, determining and identifying, and providing a list of the entitlements of a consumer to a provider” (Appeal Br. 20). But, that argument is not persuasive of Examiner error at least because the relevant question under Step 2A, Prong 2 is not whether the claimed invention itself (i.e., “searching, determining and identifying, and providing a list of the entitlements of a consumer to a provider”) is a practical application; instead, the question is whether the claim includes additional elements beyond the judicial exception that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Here, the only additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea are “a processor”; “a communication interface”; and “a database,” i.e., generic Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 21 computer components (see, e.g., Spec. 5 (describing that “[p]rocessor 111 may be a processing device, such as a microprocessor or similar hardware processing device, or a plurality of hardware devices”; that “communication interface 112 includes any device that is capable [of] both transmitting data with a transmitter and receiving data with a receiver”; and that memory 113, which stores the recited database, “may be instituted as ROM, RAM, flash memory, or any sufficient memory capable of storing a set of commands”)). “And after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223-24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 22 whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner determined here that claim 1 does not include additional elements or a combination of elements that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (Final Act. 7, 12). And, aside from quoting the claim language, and summarily asserting that claim 1 “recites significantly more limitations directed to facilitating interoperability between providers” (Appeal Br. 20-21), Appellant offers no persuasive argument or technical reasoning to demonstrate that the Examiner’s determination is unreasonable or unsupported. We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 6-13, and 16-22, which fall with claim 1. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 6-13, 16-22 112(b) Indefiniteness 1-3, 6-13, 16-22 Appeal 2021-002722 Application 14/282,977 23 Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 6-13, 16-22 101 Eligibility 1-3, 6-13, 16-22 Overall Outcome 1-3, 6-13, 16-22 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED