DISH Network L.L.C.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 1, 2021

2019006256 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/875,581 10/05/2015 Alistair Chatwin P00015.US.02 3357
143292 7590 04/01/2021
Wash Park IP Ltd. -- DISH
387 Corona Street, Suite 540
Denver, CO 80218
EXAMINER
WILCOX, JAMES J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2439
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/01/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
jkennedy@washparkip.com
jtkennedy.jk@gmail.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALISTAIR CHATWIN and VIVEK KHEMKA
___________

Appeal 2019-006256
Application 14/875,581
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JAMES B. ARPIN, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE,
Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–13 and 21–27, all of the pending claims. Final
Act. 2.2 Claims 14–20 are cancelled. Id. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as DISH Network L.L.C.
Appeal Br. 2.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
February 22, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 24, 2019);
the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed October 30, 2018) and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 26, 2019); and the Specification
(“Spec.,” filed October 5, 2015). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings
and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claimed methods and systems relate to “managing requests for
access to a networked media device.” Spec. ¶ 2.
As noted above, claims 1–13 and 21–27 are pending. Claims 1, 9, and
21 are independent. Appeal Br. 26 (claim 1), 27–28 (claim 9), 29–30
(claim 21) (Claims App.). Claims 2–8 depend directly or indirectly from
claim 1; claims 10–13 depend directly or indirectly from claim 9; and
claims 22–27 depend directly or indirectly from claim 21. Id. at 26–31.
Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized and
limitation labels added, is illustrative.
1. A method of managing network connections, comprising:
[1A] receiving a communication from a media device that
requests permission to allow a direct connection between the
media device and a client device;
[1A1] wherein a prior direct connection between the
media device and the client device has not been previously
authorized;
[1B] processing the communication by querying at least
one database with identifying information for the client device;
[1C] if a unique identifier for the client device is received
from the database, comparing the unique identifier for the client
device with a unique identifier for the media device;
[1D] in the event that the unique identifier for the client
device matches the unique identifier for the media device,
returning a result to the media device that allows the direct
connection between the media device and the client device; and
[1D1] during the direct connection, restricting the media
device from establishing a connection with one or more second
client devices; and
[1E] in the event that the unique identifier for the client
device does not match the unique identifier for the media device,
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returning a result to the media device that does not allow the
direct connection between the media device and the client device.
Id. at 26 (emphases added); see Final Act. 4–6 (applying limitation labels).
Independent claim 21 recites limitations corresponding to the disputed
limitations of claim 1, but independent claim 9 recites limitations
corresponding to disputed limitations 1A1 and 1D1. Appeal Br. 27–28, 29–
30 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES AND REJECTION
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name3 Reference Issued/Published Filed
Stewart US 6,571,221 B1 May 27, 2003 Nov. 3, 1999
Liu US 2012/0210011 A1 Aug. 16, 2012 Feb. 15, 2011
Warrick US 2013/0346564 A1 Dec. 26, 2013 June 21, 2013
The Examiner rejects claims 1–13 and 21–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over the combined teachings of Warrick, Stewart, and Liu. Final
Act. 8–29.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). The Examiner and Appellant focus their findings and
contentions on claim 1; so do we. See Appeal Br. 24; Ans. 20; Reply Br. 10.
Arguments not made are forfeited.4 Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
4 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(“We interpret the Patent Office to be arguing that Google’s failure to raise
its lexicography arguments, inadvertent or not, compels a finding of
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the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our
own and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. We address the
rejection below.
ANALYSIS
A. Claim Interpretation
Claim 1 recites, “receiving a communication from a media device that
requests permission to allow a direct connection between the media device
and a client device.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The
Examiner interprets the term “direct connection” to mean “[a] direct
connection connects two computers together. The actual method of
connection can vary.” Final Act. 3. Appellant disagrees and contends the
Examiner “conflates a ‘direct communication’ with a ‘direct connection.’”
Appeal Br. 22 (citing Warrick ¶ 18).
The Examiner and this Board have an independent obligation to
determine the meaning of an application’s claims, notwithstanding any
views asserted by Appellant. See, e.g., Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v.
Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he trial judge has
an independent obligation to determine the meaning of the claims,
notwithstanding the views asserted by the adversary parties.”). Claim
interpretation is a question of law, and we review the Examiner’s
interpretations de novo.

forfeiture.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“Except as provided for in
§§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the
appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the
present appeal.”).
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[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims
the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written
description contained in the applicant’s specification.
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Examiner finds,
“In networking, it is well known that a direct connection is a situation in
which one computer is directly linked to another computer by a cable instead
of a network. This might be using a crossover cable instead of going
through an Ethernet switch.” Final Act. 3. Appellant contends, however,
“[a] ‘direct connection’ as recited in [limitation 1A] and as taught by
Appellant, does not require the use of network segments” (e.g., the
Examiner’s example of a network cable). Appeal Br. 22 (emphasis added).
Appellant contends a connection via a “network” does not teach or suggest
the recited “direct” connection. Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 3 n.5. We are not
persuaded that Appellant’s interpretation of “direct connection” is entirely
applicable here. Thus, although use of a network segment may not be
required, Appellant does not persuade us that use of a network segment
(e.g., a cable) is prohibited as a direct connection.
The Examiner further finds that the Specification does not clearly
limit what constitutes a “direct connection.” See Ans. 6–7; see also Final
Act. 3 (“The Examiner respectfully submits that applicant’s specification is
vague as to what a direct connection refers to.”). The Specification
discloses:
In accordance with embodiments disclosed herein, a private
communication may occur between the media device and the
user’s (guest’s) device through a third party network, namely the
hotel’s network. In various implementations, media may be
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streamed from a streaming media source or directly from the
user’s laptop or handheld device to the television screen through
a media device associated with that particular TV. The
connection between the client device and the media device may
[be] configured such that other hotel guests do not have access to
the media device owned or used by a particular guest.
Spec. ¶ 33 (emphasis added); see id. ¶ 79. Although this disclosure suggests
that the client device may be connected to the media device by means other
than the hotel’s network, neither the Examiner nor Appellant identifies
where the Specification discloses such other means. Further, the
Specification discloses:
A display device 242, e.g., a monitor, a television, or a
projector, or other type of presentation device may also be
connected, directly or indirectly, to the system bus 204 via an
interface, such as a video adapter/interface 240. Similarly, audio
devices, for example, external speakers or a microphone (not
shown), may be connected directly or indirectly to the system bus
204 through an audio interface (not shown).
Id. ¶ 52 (emphases added). Thus, we understand “direct connection,” as
used in the Specification, encompasses a connection either with or without a
component, including an “interface” or external cable, intervening between
the client device and the media device. Therefore, on this record, we are not
persuaded the Examiner errs in interpreting “direct connection” as
connecting two computers together, where the actual method of connection
can vary. Final Act. 3; see Ans. 7 (citing Warrick ¶¶ 18 (“For example, a
guest device on a first network segment is dynamically enabled by the
network component to share media content with only certain in-room media
devices on another network segment.”), 241 (describing use of the AirPlay®
protocol for direct wireless connection between compatible devices); Fig. 1
(depicting laptop 118 connected directly to TV 121 or 122 or set top box
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123)). For purposes of evaluating Appellant’s assertion of error in the
obviousness rejection, we need not decide the precise boundary between a
connection that is “direct” versus “indirect”; what matters here is that two
computers connected via a network segment (e.g., a cable) falls within the
scope of what the Specification describes in a “direct” connection.
B. Obviousness of Claim 1 over Warrick, Stewart, and Liu
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Warrick, Stewart, and Liu. Final Act. 4–6, 8–12. For
the reasons given below, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
1. Reasons to Combine
Appellant contends that the Examiner fails to show that a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine (a) the
teachings of Warrick and Stewart to teach or suggest “wherein a prior direct
connection between the media device and the client device has not been
previously authorized,” i.e., limitation 1A1; and (b) the teachings of Warrick
and Liu to teach or suggest “in the event that the unique identifier for the
client device does not match the unique identifier for the media device,
returning a result to the media device that does not allow the direct
connection between the media device and the client device,” i.e.,
limitation 1E. Appeal Br. 19–20; see Reply Br. 2–3. We disagree.
a. Combination of Warrick and Stewart
With regard to the combination of Warrick and Stewart, the Examiner
finds,
it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to
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combine the teachings of Liu with the method/system of Warrick
to include wherein a prior connection between the media device
and the client device has not been previously authorized to
provide users with a means for providing a network system that
includes an improved subscriber model which may allow mobile
users convenient access to a network (Stewart, Col. 4, lines 18-
21).
Final Act. 11 (emphasis added). In particular, Stewart discloses, “in various
embodiments, the network system includes an improved subscriber model
which may allow mobile users convenient access to a network.” Stewart,
4:18–21 (emphasis added).
Appellant contends the Examiner errs for three reasons. Appeal
Br. 19. First, the Examiner relies on conclusory statements to support the
asserted reason to combine. Id. Second, the Examiner fails to consider the
conflicting teachings of the references when considered in their entirety. Id.
Third, the Examiner disregards the references’ teachings away from
Appellant’s claimed method. Id. We disagree with Appellant.
Specifically, Appellant contends,
Warrick does not teach, mention, suggest or otherwise motivate
a [person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)] to use “an
improved subscriber model.” Warrick does not seek to solve
issues of signing-up users on its network, nor does Warrick
suggest or teach that this is an unsolved needed. Instead, Warrick
addresses user access, or lack thereof, to the network by use of a
central login portal and the process steps of Fig. 7 (specifically
operation {708}). A PHOSITA in possession of Warrick would
not have perceived of any need to search further for references
teaching “an improved subscriber model” or other approach for
signing a user into Warrick’s DHCP server.
Id. at 19.
First, we are not persuaded the Examiner improperly relies on
conclusory statements to support the combination of these references’
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teachings. As the Examiner finds, Stewart solves a problem or need by
disclosing a technique that allows mobile users convenient access to a
network. Stewart, 3:30–40, 4:18–21, 6:41–59; see Final Act. 11; Ans. 5.
Stewart’s technique solves a problem or need also addressed by Appellant’s
claimed methods. See Spec. ¶¶ 3, 37. As the U.S. Supreme Court explains,
“Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of
endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a
reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007) (emphasis added). Thus, the
Examiner provides more than a conclusory reason, e.g., allowing mobile
user’s convenient access, to combine the teachings of these references.
Second, Stewart’s teaching regarding “an improved subscriber model”
is entwined with Stewart’s goal of allowing mobile users convenient access
to a network. Stewart, 4:18–21; see id., Abstract (“In one embodiment, a
mobile user (MU), also referred to as a subscriber, may access the network
service through a portable computing device (PCD) using a wireless (or
wired) network interface card.” (emphasis added)). Because the Examiner
relies on Warrick to teach or suggest access through “direct connection” (see
Warrick ¶ 18, Fig. 1), we are not persuaded the teachings of these references
conflict, and we are persuaded the Examiner sufficiently considers the
entirety of Stewart’s and Warrick’s teachings in making this combination.
See Ans. 5 (discussing Stewart, 8:53–64, 16:43–61; Figs. 4, 5).
Third, we are not persuaded Appellant shows that Warrick and
Stewart teach away from their combination to achieve Appellant’s claimed
methods, as recited in claim 1. In particular, Appellant contends, “Warrick’s
simple approach teaches away from Stewart’s undue complexity.” Reply
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Br. 2. Specifically, Appellant contends the Examiner fails to show why a
person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to replace
“Warrick’s teaching of use of a central login portal by which a user gains
access to Warrick’s network” with Stewart’s “allegedly improved approach
[that] adds undue complexity - it requires storage of a digital certificate on a
mobile device.” Id. (citing Appeal Br. 17). However,
“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of
ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged
from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led
in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the
applicant.” A reference does not teach away, however, if it
merely expresses a general preference for an alternative
invention but does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise
discourage” investigation into the invention claimed.
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Here, we are not persuaded Appellant
shows that Warrick or Stewart criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages
the other’s approach, such that the references teach away from their
combination.
For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded the Examiner has shown
sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Warrick and Stewart in the
manner proposed.
b. Combination of Warrick and Liu
With regard to the combination of Warrick and Liu, the Examiner
finds,
it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to
combine the teachings of Liu and Stewart with the
method/system of Warrick to include and in the event that the
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unique identifier for the client device does not match the unique
identifier for the media device, returning a result to the media
device that does not allow the direct connection between the
media device and the client device to provide users with a means
for comparing a client ID with an ID of the Wi-Fi system and
denying access when there is a mismatch for the purpose of
defaulting gracefully to the standard connection experience
configured for the host controller for users that are not being
targeted, and thus the ID does not match, or when the third party
server becomes unreachable (Liu, [0020]).
Final Act. 12 (emphasis added). In particular, Liu discloses,
the embeddable portion of module is scripted to allow the Wi-Fi
connection experience to be turned on or off remotely for 1) a
particular user, 2) a given venue location, and 3) both based on,
for example, a client device’s ID or user’s ID past session
information while defaulting gracefully to the standard
connection experience configured for the host controller 1) for
users that are not being targeted, and thus the ID does not match,
or 2) when the third party server becomes unreachable.
Liu ¶ 20.
Appellant contends the Examiner errs for two reasons. Appeal
Br. 19–20. First, Appellant contends, “Warrick already teaches what occurs
when a user is not signed in - the user’s network access proceeds no further.”
Id. at 20 (citing Warrick, Fig. 14). Thus, Appellant contends, “Liu’s
teachings are cumulative at best.”5 Id. Second, Appellant contends the
Examiner’s combination of the teachings of these references is based on

5 Even if we agreed that Liu is cumulative, that alone would not be reason
enough to reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. The Board may
sustain a multi-reference, obviousness rejection by relying on less than the
total amount of evidence without having to designate the reliance a new
ground of rejection. In re Boyer, 363 F.2d 455, 458 n.2 (CCPA 1966); In re
Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 496 (CCPA 1961).
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impermissible hindsight. Id. at 20 (“a [person of ordinary skill in the art] not
in possession of the road map provided by the present claims would not be
motivated to look beyond Warrick . . . ”). We disagree with Appellant.
First, the Examiner finds the reason to combine the teachings of
Warrick and Liu
was to provide a means for comparing a client ID with an ID of
the Wi-Fi system and denying access when there is a mismatch
for the purpose of defaulting gracefully to the standard
connection experience[, e.g., the non-direct connection,]
configured for the host controller for users that are not being
targeted, and thus the ID does not match . . . .
Ans. 6. Thus, although Warrick teaches that access is not granted if the
identifiers do not match and, in that event, an alternative method of granting
access is sought (Warrick, Fig. 14 (step 1410)), Liu teaches that Wi-Fi
access is denied if the client ID does not match a known ID access. The
combination teaches access to a “direct connection” may be denied. See
Warrick ¶ 18, Fig. 1 (teaching a “direct connection”). Thus, we are
persuaded a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had
reason to combine the teachings of these references to teach or suggest
limitation 1E. Further, Appellant cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
the references’ teachings. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
Second, we note:
Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a
reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it
takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of
ordinary skill [in the art] at the time the claimed invention was
made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from
applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.
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In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Here, the Examiner
adequately explains what each reference is relied upon to teach and how and
why the references’ teachings are combined. See Final Act. 8–12. On this
record, we are not persuaded Appellant shows the Examiner relies on
impermissible hindsight.
2. Teaching Disputed Limitations
Appellant contends the Examiner fails to show that Warrick, Stewart,
and/or Liu teach(es) or suggest(s) limitations 1A, 1A1, 1B, 1D1, and 1E.
Appeal Br. 20–24; Reply Br. 3–10. For the following reasons, we disagree
with Appellant.
a. Limitation 1A
Claim 1’s limitation 1A recites, “receiving a communication from a
media device that requests permission to allow a direct connection between
the media device and a client device.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.)
(emphasis added). The Examiner finds Warrick teaches or suggests this
limitation. Final Act. 8–9 (citing Warrick ¶¶ 18, 95, 97, 121, 205, 241).
Referring to Warrick’s Figures 3 and 5, Appellant contends Warrick
instead teaches or suggests that guest (e.g., client) device 118, not a media
device, sends the communication requesting permission to allow a direct
connection between the media device and a client device. Appeal Br. 20–21.
In particular, Appellant contends that the cited portions of Warrick teach or
suggest that communications from the media device “occur[] after the
networked connection between the guest device and the media device has
already been established. This teaching of Warrick is simply irrelevant to
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limitation [1A].”6 Id. at 21; see, e.g., Warrick, Fig. 1 (depicting laptop 118
connected directly to TV 121 or 122 or set top box 123).
The Examiner responds that, in light of the Specification, the
application of Warrick’s teachings is consistent with the Examiner’s
interpretation of limitation 1A. The Specification explains,
a media device 108 a,b may receive a connection request from a
client device 116 a,b. Prior to granting the request, the media
device 108 a,b may send a communication to the connection
management module 120 that includes identifying information
for itself and for the client device 116 a,b that is requesting
connection.
Ans. 7 (quoting Spec. ¶ 40 (emphasis added)). The Specification further
explains,
the connection management module 120 may compare the
identifying information for the media device 108 a,b and the
client device 116 a,b to determine if the client device 116 a,b is
permitted to connect to the media device 108 a,b. The
connection management module 120 may then return the result
of this determination and the media device 108 a,b will then
allow or not allow the connection, as appropriate.
Spec. ¶ 40 (emphasis added).
Although claim 1 recites a communication received “from the media
device,” independent claim 9 recites, “directly receiving a direct connection
request from a client device at a media device.” Appeal Br. 27 (Claims

6 Appellant also contends that Warrick does not teach or suggest “a direct
connection” as recited in limitation 1A of claim 1. Appeal Br. 22; see Reply
Br. 4. For the reasons discussed above, this contention is unpersuasive. See
supra Section A.
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App.) (emphasis added).7 Thus, the language of claim 1, as understood in
view of the Specification’s disclosure and the differing language of other
claims, does not require that the first or only communication prior to
allowing a direct connection between the media device and the client device
is from the media device.
Warrick discloses:
In addition to rerouting a streaming connection from guest
device 120 to TV 124, the media proxy 212 may also reroute
another type of connection made from TV 124 back to guest
device 120. This secondary connection may be useful in some
applications such as desktop mirroring as it can be utilized to
keep clocks of the two devices 120, 124 in sync, for example.
The media server 500 listens for this reverse connection request
from TV 124 and looks up guest device 120 associated with TV
124 based on the source IP of TV 124 and the prior open
connections on port 7000 already made.
Warrick ¶ 95 (emphases added); see id. ¶ 97 (describing determining guest
device identifier in response to secondary connection request). Thus, as the
Examiner finds, Warrick discloses a communication from a media device
requesting allowance of a direct connection between the media device and
the client device. Consequently, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in
the application of Warrick’s teachings or in finding Warrick teaches or
suggests limitation 1A.

7 Appellant does not address the differences between the language of
claims 1 and 21 and that of claim 9 in its challenge to the Examiner’s
rejection. Appeal Br. 24; Reply Br. 10.
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b. Limitation 1A1
Claim 1’s limitation 1A1 recites, “wherein a prior direct connection
between the media device and the client device has not been previously
authorized.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.) (emphases added). The
Examiner finds that Warrick does not teach or suggest this limitation, but
Stewart does. Final Act. 9–11 (citing Stewart, 8:53–64, 16:43–61, Figs. 4,
5). In particular, referring to Stewart’s Figure 4, the Examiner finds Stewart
discloses checking for a “Known MAC ID?” at step 212. Id. at 5, 10. Thus,
the Examiner finds, “Stewart discloses wherein a prior direct connection
between the media device and the client has not been previously authorized
because if a known ID such as a MAC ID is not known then access is
denied.” Ans. 13.
Appellant contends that neither Warrick nor Stewart teaches or
suggests a direct connection, as recited in limitation 1A1. Appeal Br. 22–23.
Specifically, Appellant contends,
if Warrick does not teach use of direct connections between a
media device and client device, and Stewart also does not teach,
the Examiner has failed to establish obviousness. That is,
whether Stewart does or does not teach prior authorization of
networked communications is immaterial to showing whether
Warrick in view of Stewart teaches prior authorization of “prior
direct connection between the media device and the client
device.”
Reply Br. 7.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the Examiner finds Warrick, not
Stewart, teaches or suggests the “direct connection.” Final Act. 4, 9; Ans. 7,
12, 17; see supra Section A; Warrick ¶ 18, Fig. 1. We agree with that
finding. Appellant does not persuasively contest the Examiner’s findings
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regarding Stewart’s teachings of a previously authorized connection. Thus,
we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the application of Warrick’s and
Stewart’s teachings or in finding Stewart teaches or suggests limitation 1A1.
c. Limitation 1B
Claim 1’s limitation 1B recites, “processing the communication by
querying at least one database with identifying information for the client
device.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). “[T]he
communication” in limitation 1B draws antecedent basis from “a
communication from a media device,” as recited in limitation 1A. Id. at 23;
see Reply Br. 8 n.10. The Examiner finds Warrick teaches or suggests this
limitation. Final Act. 4, 9 (citing Warrick ¶¶ 159–160, Fig. 14). Appellant
contends the Examiner errs in finding Warrick teaches or suggests this
limitation. Appeal Br. 23. For the reasons given below, we disagree with
Appellant.
Appellant contends although Warrick discloses databases and
different queries that may be performed, Warrick does not teach or suggest
the specific queries performed in limitation 1B. Id. (citing Warrick ¶¶ 159–
160). Appellant contends that, unlike claim 1, Warrick discloses querying
on a “per operation” basis. Reply Br. 8 (“Instead, it teaches, per operation
{1402} a query to determine whether a MAC address is associated with a
reservation, per operation {1406} a query to determine whether a MAC
address is associated with a user ID, and per operation {1412} a query to
determine if a user ID is associated with a current hotel guest.” (emphases
added)).
Nevertheless, in Figure 14, Warrick discloses, “Query[ing] user
profile server to determine whether MAC address is associated with a user
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ID.” Warrick, Fig. 14 (step. 1406); see id. ¶ 159 (“The user profile database
172 associates each of a plurality of different user identifiers (IDs) in
column 1512 with one or more device identifiers (e.g., MAC addresses in
this embodiment) in column 1504.”); see also id. ¶ 156 (discussing Fig. 14’s
step 1406). Further, even if Appellant were correct that Warrick discloses
only per operation queries, Appellant does not identify language of
limitation 1B of claim 1 excluding such queries from its scope. Thus, we are
not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding Warrick teaches or suggests this
limitation.8
d. Limitation 1D1
Claim 1’s limitation 1D1 recites, “during the direct connection,
restricting the media device from establishing a connection with one or more
second client devices.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
The Examiner finds that Stewart in combination with Warrick teaches or
suggests this limitation. Final Act. 9–11 (citing Stewart, 8:53–64, 16:43–61,
Figs. 4, 5). In particular, Stewart’s Figures 4 and 5 show embodiments in
which access is granted only to devices with properly authenticated
certificates. See Stewart, 16:16–61 (describing Fig. 5’s steps 322, 326, 332,
340, and 350).

8 Appellant also contends “since the Examiner has not established that
Warrick teaches the limitation [1A] request ‘to allow a direct connection’,
the resulting operation per limitation [1B] of ‘processing the [request]’ is
also not taught by Warrick.” Reply Br. 8 (emphasis omitted). For the
reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by this contention. See supra
Sections A, B.2.a.; see also Ans. 13 (citing Warrick, Fig. 1 (guest device
118)).
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Appellant contends Stewart does not teach or suggest this limitation
because Stewart discloses what happens “when access to a network occurs,”
rather than when “direct connection” occurs. Appeal Br. 23–24. Appellant
further contends, given this network access,
Stewart does not teach precluding access because a subscribed
user’s first device is already connected to a second device. Last,
at 8:53-64, Stewart does not teach precluding access. Instead,
Stewart teaches a network access point may be a “hybrid” wired
and wireless port - notably, this passage further teaches away
from any “direct connection” as, per Stewart, any
communications arise as networked traffic - direct connections
are not taught.
Reply Br. 9.
Nevertheless, the Examiner relies on Warrick, not Stewart, to teach or
suggest such a direct connection, and that connection via a network segment
does not preclude “direct connection.” Ans. 18; see supra Sections A, B.2.a.
Further, the Examiner relies on the combination of the teachings of Warrick
and Stewart to teach or suggest this limitation. Ans. 19. As noted above,
Appellant cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually
where the rejections are based on combinations of the references’ teachings.
See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097; Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Thus, we are not
persuaded the Examiner errs in finding Warrick and Stewart together teach
or suggest this limitation.
e. Limitation 1E
Claim 1’s limitation 1E recites, “in the event that the unique identifier
for the client device does not match the unique identifier for the media
device, returning a result to the media device that does not allow the direct
connection between the media device and the client device.” Appeal Br. 26
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(Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Examiner finds that the combination
of Warrick and Stewart does not teach or suggest this limitation, but Liu
does. Final Act. 11 (citing Liu ¶ 20). In particular, Liu discloses “the
embeddable portion of [the] module is scripted to allow the Wi-Fi
connection experience to be turned on or off remotely for 1) a particular
user, 2) a given venue location, and 3) both based on, for example, a client
device’s ID or user’s ID past session information.” Liu ¶ 20 (emphases
added).
Appellant contends:
Thus, even if one adopts (for sake of argument only) the
Examiner’s position that Warrick in view of Stewart and in
further view of Liu teach a direct connection, such combined
references still do not teach limitation [1E] because, per Liu
when the client device is not authorized (because the recited
“match” does not occur), the devices are nonetheless connected,
albeit at the “standard connection experience.”
Reply Br. 10 (emphasis added). Appellant, however, contests a distinction
of Liu that is beyond the scope of claim 1. The Examiner merely relies on
Liu’s teachings, in combination with the teachings of Warrick and Stewart,
to teach or suggest that access may be denied based on the client device’s
identifier’s failure to match a stored identifier. Final Act. 6, 12. Claim 1
does not recite what happens if the unique identifiers for the client device
and the media device do not match beyond that direct connection between
the media device and the client device is not allowed. Thus, Liu’s teachings
regarding the “standard connection experience” are not relevant to the
Examiner’s findings regarding this limitation. Therefore, we are not
persuaded the Examiner errs in finding Liu in view of Warrick and Stewart
teaches or suggests this limitation.
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On this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting
claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Warrick, Stewart, and
Liu; and we sustain that rejection. Further, Appellant does not challenge the
obviousness rejection of independent claims 9 and 21, separately, or of
dependent claims 2–8, 10–13, and 22–27, separately from its challenge to
their base claims, independent claims 1, 9, and 21; and, therefore, we sustain
the rejection of those claims. See Appeal Br. 24.9
DECISIONS
1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 1–13 and 21–27 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Warrick, Stewart, and Liu.
2. Thus, on this record, claims 1–13 and 21–27 are not patentable.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–13 and 21–27.
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–13, 21–27 103 Warrick, Stewart, Liu 1–13, 21–27
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

9 Appellant misidentifies claim 13 as independent. Appeal Br. 24; Reply
Br. 10. As noted above, claims 1, 9, and 21 are independent.