Dianna Serio

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 26, 2019

14472660 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/472,660 08/29/2014 Dianna Serio CORLOG.028US 7177
125224 7590 09/26/2019
Muncy, Geissler, Olds & Lowe, P.C._CoreLogic
4000 Legato Road
Suite 310
Fairfax, VA 22033
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, TAN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
meo.docket@mg-ip.com
meo@mg-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DIANNA SERIO
____________

Appeal 2018-006200
Application 14/472,660
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY, III, JOHN A. EVANS, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of Claims 1–20 which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. App. Br. 23–26 (Claims Appx.). We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 Appellant states CoreLogic Solutions LLC, is the real party in interest.
App. Br. 3.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed December 11, 2017, “App. Br.”), the Reply
Brief (filed May 29, 2018, “Reply. Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed
March 27, 2018, “Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed August 11, 2017, “Final
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to systems and methods for performing building
permit analytics for real estate properties. See Abstract.
Invention
Claims 1, 8, and 14 are independent. An understanding of the
invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1, which is reproduced
below.
1. A system comprising:
physical data storage configured to store building permits
data; and
a computer system in communication with the physical
data storage, the computer system comprising computer
hardware, the computer system programed to:
receive, by the computer system over a network
communication channel, identification information associated
with a subject property;
identify, by the computer system, one or more building
permits associated with the subject property from the physical
data storage;
determine, by the computer system, an automated
valuation for the subject property based at least in part on the
one or more identified building permits; and
store the determined automated valuation in the physical
data storage.

Act.”), and the Specification (filed August 29, 2014, “Spec.”) for their
respective details.
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References and Rejections3
Leibowitz US 2005/0071174 A1 Mar. 31, 2005
Moudy US 2008/0306982 A1 Dec. 15, 2008
Hutchinson US 2013/0036031 A1 Feb. 7, 2013

1. Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
an abstract idea without significantly more. Final Act. 3–12.
2. Claims 1–3, 6–13, and 14–20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Hutchinson and Moudy. Final Act. 12–
22.
3. Claims 4 and 5 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over Hutchinson, Moudy, and Leibowitz. Final Act. 22–
23.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1–20 in light of
Appellant’s arguments. We consider Appellant’s arguments as they are
presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 6–32 and the Reply Br., pages 1–16.
For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred.

3 The present Application is being examined under the pre-AIA first to
invent provisions. Final Act. 2.
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CLAIMS 1–20: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER.
Appellant argues Claims 1–20 as a group in view of the limitations of
the independent claims. Therefore, we decide the appeal of the § 101
rejections with reference to Claim 1 and refer to the rejected claims
collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also
In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.4 The
Examiner finds the claims are directed to statutory categories. Final Act. 6.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)

4 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the patent-eligibility
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at
611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and
chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at
191); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber,
smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at
69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme
Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula
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in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing
Benson and Flook), 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one
inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77 (alteration in original)).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. United States Patent and Trademark Office Revised Guidance5
The USPTO recently published revised guidance in the Federal
Register concerning the application of § 101.
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes);6 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual for
Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h)).7
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,

5 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(January 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Revised Guidance,” or “Rev. Guid.”)
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf).
6 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
7 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
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specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.8
See Revised Guidance.
Step 2A(i) — Abstract Idea
The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited
as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical
relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity —
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales
activities or behaviors; business relations); managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people (including social activities, teaching, and following
rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent-
eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,

8 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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except in rare situations identified in the Revised Guidance.9 However, if
the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea enumerated
above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim requires further
analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception in Step 2A(ii).
Step 2A(ii) — Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A(i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and
in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
The seven identified “practical application” sections of the MPEP,10
cited in the Revised Guidance under Step 2A(ii), are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical
Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine

9 In the rare circumstance in which an Examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
of the Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See Guidance,
Section III.C.
10 See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer
to revision [R-08.2017].
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(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception
(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment
If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application as
determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited above, then the
claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-eligibility
inquiry ends. If not, then analysis proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
It is possible that a claim that does not “integrate” a recited judicial
exception under Step 2A(ii) is nonetheless patent eligible. For example, the
claim may recite additional elements that render the claim patent eligible
even though a judicial exception is recited in a separate claim element.11
The Federal Circuit has held claims eligible at the second step of the
Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B) because the additional elements recited in
the claims provided “significantly more” than the recited judicial exception
(e.g., because the additional elements were unconventional in
combination).12 Therefore, if a claim has been determined to be directed to

11 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
12 See, e.g., Amdocs (Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288,
1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings,
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a judicial exception under Revised Step 2A, we must evaluate the additional
elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to determine
whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional
elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).13
Under the Revised Guidance, we must consider in Step 2B whether an
additional element or combination of elements: (1) “Adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present;” or (2) “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance, III.B.
In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of
elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional unless the
examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in
writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the
specification or to a statement made by an applicant during
prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . .

LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
13 The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325.
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions
discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s)
. . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official
notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of
the additional element(s)
See Berkheimer Memo.
If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the
element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the
exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility
analysis.
However, if a determination is made that the element and combination
of elements does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself,
the claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for
lack of subject matter eligibility.
ANALYSIS
Step 1
The Examiner finds the system of Claims 1–7 falls within the machine
statutory category and thus recites one of the enumerated categories of
eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Final Act. 6. The Examiner finds
Claims 8–20 falls within the article of manufacture statutory category and
thus recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35
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U.S.C. § 101. Id. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the claims are
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Based upon our
review of the record in light of the Revised Guidance with respect to patent-
eligible subject matter rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we affirm the
rejection of Claims 1–20.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner finds the claims are directed to the abstract idea of
automated evaluation of a property based on identification of a building
permit. Final Act. 6. The Examiner analogizes the claims to those of
Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A, 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
finding they relate to collecting, analyzing, and displaying information
without more. Id. 8.
Appellant contends the Examiner has not sufficiently explained why
“the alleged abstract ideas of ‘automated evaluation of a property based on
identified building permit’ and ‘analyzing a building permit’ are similar to
the abstract ideas found in any of Electric Power Group (“collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis”), Alice (“intermediate settlement”), Bilski (“risk hedging”), Fort
Properties (“tax-free investing”), or SmartGene (“comparing new and stored
information and using rules to identify a list of options.”). App. Br. 6.
The preamble of Claim 1 recites: “[a] system comprising.” Table I
compares the remaining limitations of Claim 1 to the categories of abstract
ideas set forth in the Revised Guidance.

Claim 1 Revised Guidance
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[a]14 physical data storage
configured to store building
permits data; and
“Physical data storage” is a hardware
limitation to which the Guidance is
not applicable.
[b] a computer system in
communication with the physical
data storage, the computer system
comprising computer hardware, the
computer system programed to:
The “computer system” is a
hardware limitation to which the
Guidance is not applicable.
[c] receive, by the computer system
over a network communication
channel, identification information
associated with a subject property;
Mere data-gathering, insignificant
extra-solution activity step. Rev.
Guid. 55, n. 31.
[d] identify, by the computer
system, one or more building
permits associated with the subject
property from the physical data
storage;
Mental process, i.e., concept
performed in human mind. Rev.
Guid. 52.
[e] determine, by the computer
system, an automated valuation for
the subject property based at least in
part on the one or more identified
building permits; and
Mental process, i.e., concept
performed in human mind. Rev.
Guid. 52.
[f] store the determined automated
valuation in the physical data
storage.
Data storage is merely insignificant
extra-solution activity. Rev. Guid.
55, n. 31.

Thus, under Step 2A(i), we find limitations [c]– [e] recites steps
which may fit within the Revised Guidance category of “mental processes.”

14 Step designators, e.g., “[a]” were added to facilitate discussion.
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Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above,
we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) wherein we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer
or To Any Other Technology or Technical Field.”
“In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether
the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’” or
“any other technology or technical field.” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
With respect to technological improvements, Appellant contends the
features of independent Claims 1, 8, and 14 improve another technology or
technical field. App. Br. 8. Appellant argues investors and governments
may need building permit data to verify that a property is in compliance with
city codes, but because there are many sources of building permit data, it
may be difficult to locate information for a particular property without
consulting several data sources. Id. 9 (citing Spec. ¶ 3). Appellant argues
the claims permit the aggregation of building permit data across multiple
jurisdictions. Id.
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The Enfish Court found the claims provided an improvement in
computer function because “the claims are not simply directed to any form
of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically directed to a self-
referential table for a computer database.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (2016). Although Appellant argues “independent claim
1 recites a ‘physical data storage configured to store building permits data’”
(App. Br. 10), the claims do not specify, nor does Appellant point to
Specification disclosure, to suggest that either building permit data requires,
or benefits from, any special form of data storage.
We find that such generic recitations of computing elements fail to
transform a patent ineligible concept into an eligible one. See Mortgage
Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25 (generic computer components, such as an
“interface,” “network,” and “database,” fail to satisfy the inventive concept
requirement); Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a
‘communications controller’ and a ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing
the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the
method claims.”).
MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine.
This section is not relevant because the Bilski machine-or-
transformation test is only applicable to method (process) claims of which
there are none on appeal in the present application.
MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation.
This section of the MPEP guides: “Another consideration when
determining whether a claim recites significantly more is whether the claim
effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state
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or thing.” “‘Transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or
thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at
70).
The claims select and analyze certain electronic data, i.e., building
permit data. Spec. ¶ 2 (“The present disclosure relates to computer
processes for aggregating and analyzing building permits associated with a
real estate property.”). The selection of electronic data is not a
“transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing
constituting patent-eligible subject matter[.]” See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The mere
manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the
transformation prong.”). Applying this guidance here, we conclude
Appellant’s method claims fail to satisfy the transformation prong of the
Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations.

This section of the MPEP guides:
Diamond v. Diehr provides an example of a claim that recited
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
450 U.S. 175 . . . (1981). In Diehr, the claim was directed to
the use of the Arrhenius equation (an abstract idea or law of
nature) in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding
press. 450 U.S. at 177-78 . . . . The Court evaluated additional
elements such as the steps of installing rubber in a press,
closing the mold, constantly measuring the temperature in the
mold, and automatically opening the press at the proper time,
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and found them to be meaningful because they sufficiently
limited the use of the mathematical equation to the practical
application of molding rubber products. 450 U.S. at 184, 187 . .
. . In contrast, the claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea of
mitigating settlement risk. 573 U.S. . . . . In particular, the
Court concluded that the additional elements such as the data
processing system and communications controllers recited in
the system claims did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea
because they merely linked the use of the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment (i.e., “implementation via
computers”) or were well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.
MPEP § 2106.05(e).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Similarly as for Alice, we find
that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Id. “In
short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform
generic computer functions.” Id.
We find that Appellant’s claims do not add meaningful limitations
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment.
MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception.
Appellant does not persuasively argue that their claims do any more
than to merely invoke generic computer components merely as a tool in
which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception.

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MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity.
The claims store data. We find storing information to be a classic
example of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at
963 (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological Environment.

[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited
meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or
post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience,
a category of use, field of use, or technological environment.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2013). We find the “physical data storage configured to store building
permits data; and a computer system in communication with the physical
data storage, the computer system comprising computer hardware,”
limitations to be simply a field of use that attempts to limit the abstract idea
to a particular technological environment.
We do not find Appellant’s arguments to be persuasive because “[t]he
courts have also identified examples in which a judicial exception has not
been integrated into a practical application.” Rev. Guid. 55. The claims fail
to recite a practical application where the additional element does more than
generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological
environment or field of use. Id. The mere application of an abstract idea in
a particular field is not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See id. at n.32. In view of the foregoing, we conclude
the claims are “directed to” a judicial exception.

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1. Well-understood, routine, conventional.
Because the claims recite a judicial exception and do not integrate that
exception into a practical application, we must then reach the issue of
whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The written description describes the claimed computer system
consistent with its being “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional”:
“[c]ode modules or any type of data may be stored on any type of non-
transitory computer-readable medium, such as physical computer storage
including hard drives, solid state memory, random access memory (RAM),
read only memory (ROM), optical disc, volatile or non-volatile storage,
combinations of the same and/or the like.” Spec. ¶ 125.
2. Specified at a high level of generality.
It is indicative of the absence of an inventive concept where the
claims simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Rev. Guid., 56.
The claims fail to recite any specific steps of an algorithm, nor
doesAppellant cite Specification disclosure for the required specificity.
We find the limitations are specified at such a high level of generality
consistent with the absence of an inventive concept. Therefore, we conclude
that none of the claim limitations, viewed “both individually and as an
ordered combination,” amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception in order to sufficiently transform the nature of the claims into
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patent-eligible subject matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
CLAIMS 1–7: OBVIOUSNESS OVER
OVER HUTCHINSON, MOUDY, AND LEIBOWITZ.
Appellant presents various contentions asserting no combination of
the prior art teaches “determine, by the computer system, an automated
valuation for the subject property based at least in part on the one or more
identified building permits; and store the determined automated valuation in
the physical data storage,” as recited in independent Claim 1. App. Br. 13.
The Examiner finds “Mouldy” [sic] discloses the generation of a
report containing automated valuation of property based on economic indicia
and other parameters such as crime and foreclosure. Ans. 6. (citing Moudy,
¶ 4). The Examiner further finds Moudy discloses building permit data is
considered as among “property valuation parameters.” Id. The Examiner
finds Moudy teaches “various types of automated valuation models have
been developed in an attempt to automate the process of property value
estimation.” Ans. 7. (citing Moudy, ¶ 4).
Appellant’s Reply Brief responds solely with respect to dependent
Claim 2: “[t]he Examiner continues to allege that the ‘automated valuation
models’ in paragraph [0004] of Moudy discloses the ‘automated valuation
model’ recited in claim 2. The Appellant respectfully disagrees for the
reasons provided in the Appeal Brief.” Reply Brief (unpaginated) (page 12
of the Electronic Record, “R. 12”).
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Claim 2 recites: “[t]he system of claim 1, wherein the automated
valuation is determined using an automated valuation model.” Claim 2
requires “an” automated valuation model, but is not limited to any specific
automated valuation model.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting Claims 1–7 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
CLAIMS 8–13: OBVIOUSNESS OVER
OVER HUTCHINSON, MOUDY, AND LEIBOWITZ.
Appellant contends: none of Hutchinson, Moudy, or Leibowitz, either
alone or in combination, discloses or suggests at least the features of “(d)
determining, by the data processor of the computer system, a product or
service associated with the identified building permits [i.e., associated with
incomplete projects]; and (e) storing, by the data processor of the computer
system through the communication channel, the determined product or
service as a potential sales lead in the at least one data repository,” as recited
in independent Claim 8. App. Br. 17.
The Examiner fails to find the prior art teaches products associated
with incomplete building projects. See Ans. 7. We therefore, decline to
sustain the rejection of Claims 8–13.
CLAIMS 14–20: OBVIOUSNESS OVER
OVER HUTCHINSON, MOUDY, AND LEIBOWITZ.
Appellant contends none of Hutchinson, Moudy, or Leibowitz, either
alone or in combination, discloses or suggests at least the features of “(d)
identifying, by the computer system, one or more discrepancies between the
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identified property information and the accessed building permits data,” as
recited in independent Claim 14. App. Br. 19.
The Examiner finds Hutchinson teaches a “variance” which indicates
“errors,” “discrepancies,” and “differences” between the identified property
information and “permit” data. Final Act. 28 (citing Hutchinson, ¶ 84).
The Examiner finds Hutchinson teaches that if the file was created earlier,
the authorized user can search for the “correct files” stored in the jurisdiction
database by permit number search for any associated files, wherein
additional information should be uploaded or monitored. Id. In the Answer,
the Examiner finds any discrepancies between the identified property
information and the accessed building permits data, as claimed is to be
considered “non-functional descriptive material,” and thus, is not entitled to
patentable weight. Ans. 7.
We disagree that whether a database contains specified information
may be dismissed as non-functional descriptive material. We find the prior
art fails to teach at least one claimed limitation. We decline to sustain the
rejection of Claims 14–20

DECISION
The rejection of Claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
The rejection of Claims 1–7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is AFFIRMED.
The rejection of Claims 8–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is REVERSED.
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED