Dex Media, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 28, 2018

27-CA-196726 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 28, 2018)

JD(SF)–05–18
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES – SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
DEX MEDIA, INC.
and Case 27–CA–196726
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1269
Julia M. Durkin, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David L. Zwisler, Esq. (Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart P.C.), for the Respondent.
Lorrie E. Bradley, Esq. (Beeson, Tayer & Bodine), for the Charging Party.
DECISION
DICKIE MONTEMAYOR, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me on
November 30, 2017, in Denver, Colorado. The case involves an allegation that Dex Media, Inc.,
(the Respondent) failed to provide the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
1269 (the Union) certain information requested by the union. The Respondent, for its part,
denied that it had any obligation under the Act to provide the requested information. I find that
Respondent violated the Act essentially as alleged.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint alleged that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
failing to provide the Union certain relevant requested information. Respondent filed a timely
answer to the complaint denying all violations of the Act. Counsel for the General Counsel, the
Union, and the Respondent filed briefs in support of their positions on January 5, 2018. On the
entire record, I make the following findings, conclusions of law, and recommendations.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at all material times,
since at least January 1, 2016, Respondent, a corporation with offices and places of business
throughout the United States, including an office and place of business in Greenwood Village,
Colorado (Respondent’s Greenwood Village facility), has been engaged in the business of
providing digital and non-digital marketing and advertising services.
JD(SF)–05–18
2
The complaint further alleges, and I find that at all material times Respondent, in
conducting these operations, performed services valued in excess of $50,000 in states other than
the state of Colorado.
5
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that Respondent is and has been an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and
further, the Union, is, and has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
10
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the Board has
jurisdiction of this case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
15
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at all times material
herein, the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The following employees of Respondent (Unit) constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:20
All Senior Telephone Marketing Consultants, Telephone Marketing Consultants
— Win-Back, Telephone Marketing Consultants, and Telephone Sales Associates
working in Respondent’s Greenwood Village facility, as well as all Senior
Marketing Consultants and Premise Marketing Consultants working in the Rocky 25
Mountain area and Southwest area described in Appendix A of the collective-
bargaining agreement effective from June 12, 2015 to May 11, 2018; excluding
all managers, professional employees, office clerical employees, guards and
supervisors as defined by the Act.
30
At all material times since at least June 2015, Respondent has recognized the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all employees in the Unit. This recognition
has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of which is
effective from June 12, 2015 to May 11, 2018 (CBA). At all material times since at least June
2015, the Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Unit pursuant 35
to Section 9(a) of the Act.
III.THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background40
The Respondent is a company that sells print media, including a telephone directory and
digital media which also includes online advertising and other digital products. Respondent
employs about 200 employees in the unit and divides them into two groups: (1) telephone
representatives, and (2) premise employees. The group of persons identified as “telephone 45
representatives” hold the job titles of senior telephone marketing consultants, telephone
JD(SF)–05–18
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marketing consultants, and telephone sales associates. This group is physically located at
Respondent’s facility in Greenwood Village, Colorado at a location referred to as the “telephone
hub.” The group identified as the “premise employees” hold job titles of senior marketing
consultant or premise marketing consultants. Unlike the telephone representatives, they are not
housed in the Greenwood Village office and instead are spread out in various locations in 5
Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, Montana, Oregon, Idaho, Utah, and Arizona.
IV. THE INFORMATION REQUESTS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE10
Dex Media and IBEW Local 1269 are signatories to a collective-bargaining agreement
(CBA) which contains various provisions pertinent to the allegations in this case. The first is
Section 1.4 which prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of their race, national
origin, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, union activities, disabilities, or 15
military/veteran status. (Jt. Exh. 2 p. 8.) The second Section 2.3 which provides that “a
grievance shall be put in writing and formally presented to the manager within 28 calendar days
after the date the employee reasonably had first-hand knowledge of the circumstance that led to
the grievance. If the first step grievance is not filed within twenty-eight calendar days after the
aggrieved action occurred, it is untimely, and closed. It shall be a mutual responsibility to meet 20
to consider the grievance within fourteen days (14) after it is presented. After the grievance has
been presented, the Company will have no more than fourteen (14) calendar days to respond in
writing to the Union.” (Jt. Exh. 2 p. 10.) The third is Article 9.5 which provides that “an
employee may, upon reasonable notice, inspect records contained in the employee’s personnel
file. For the purposes of this Article personnel filed is defined as those records normally in the 25
custody of the employee’s supervisor retained at the work location.” (Jt. Exh. 2 p. 8.)
The background facts surrounding this case begin with an email sent to union officials on
June 9, 2016 regarding a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) that Respondent was on the verge
of implementing. The email contained copies of a group of slides that outlined the various 30
aspects of the new performance and disciplinary plan. (Jt. Exh. 3.) In particular, the plan set
forth specific guidelines for placing employees on a performance improvement plan when
“performance is unsatisfactory or falls short of company expectations.” (Jt. Exh. 3 p. 3.) The
plan also provided that, “while consistent adherence to the guidelines presented herein is
expected, some management discretion may be applied to unusual individual situations as 35
business circumstances warrant.” (Jt. Exh. 3 p. 3.) The plan generally described the use of a
Performance Rank Report (PRR) which in essence is a spreadsheet that rates and ranks
employees’ performance for a particular time frame. (Jt. Exh. 4.) The plan also set forth the
various steps which could lead to employee warnings and termination, dependent upon their
ranking in the PRR. (Jt. Exh. 3 p. 5–7.)40
On November 2, 2016, after the new PIP was instituted, the Union Vice President and
Director of Operations, Harry Esquivel sent an email with the subject “PRR Report Request-third
request” which asked that Respondent provide “the PRR report.” (Jt. Exh. 4.) The following day
Maria T. Celona, Senior Staff Consultant-Labor Relations provided the PRR for pay period 45
2016-01 through 2016-22. After receiving the PRR Esquivel again emailed Celona, this time
JD(SF)–05–18
4
requesting, “the PIP Notification of Action Steps for everyone in the entire IBEW area, from
initiation of the PRR/PIP to present.” (Jt. Exh. 5.) On November 9, 2016, Celona responded to
the request. Her response in pertinent part set forth the following:
Section 9.5 of the CBA sets forth Dex’s obligations related to providing 5
individual discipline to the union. Employees can and do reach out to the
appropriate union representative when they want to do so. The Company accepts
and supports the employee’s rights and decisions on this matter. It is their
prerogative. Your request does not fall within the negotiated parameters. Requests
for information related to “everyone in the entire IBEW area” is extremely broad 10
and likely to be unduly burdensome. I have provided you with the PRR which
should give you the information necessary to assess whatever your issues are.
What is the relevance of the requested information? (Jt. Exh. 6.)
After receiving this response, Esquivel called Celona to explain to her the union’s position 15
regarding the information sought and in an apparent attempt to convince her to provide the
information requested. (Tr. 54–56.) The requested information was not provided and on
November 30, 2016, Esquivel sent another email. This email stated:
The Union is requesting a copy of the report(s) “Notification of20
Action Steps” sent out to the local offices for administering
the progressive steps under the PIP. These reports are already generated so we do
not see the [sic] any undue burden, additionally the request is relevant to all
our represented members, the Union intends to be available to
represent our members and it has become clear that many of25
the employees/members are not fully aware to what level of
progressive steps they might be in. The RFI stands
please provide as soon as possible. (Jt. Exh. 7.)
30
On December 2, 2016, Celona responded by email which stated:
As I stated previously, employees can and do reach out to the
appropriate union representative when they want to do so. The
Company accepts and supports the employee’s rights and decisions on35
this matter. To that point, we will not provide detailed reports of PIP
activity for every employee in the bargaining unit. Attached please find the
Performance Ranking Reports for pay period 24. (Jt. Exh. 8.)
After receiving this email, Esquivel spoke to Celona and again in this conversation 40
requested the information. (Tr. 61–62.) Celona denied the request and thereafter she left her
employment with Respondent.
On or about December 12, 2016, Respondent decided to make “Strategic Changes” which
included changes to the PRR and PIP policies and emailed another group of power point slides 45
outlining the new changes to union officials including Mr. Esquivel. (R. Exh. 2.) Subsequently,
JD(SF)–05–18
5
the Union requested information regarding persons who were at some stage of the PIP. On
February 15, 2017, Beth Dickson, the Director of Labor Relations responded with a list of names
and work locations along with an explanation of how the persons would be affected by the PIP
transition. She indicated:
5
PIP action will resume next week. As we previously described, these employees
will be reviewed based on their performance/standings under the metrics in place
for 2016. During the transition through March, new PIPS will be based on bottom
quintile ranking on both the 2016 and 2017 metric evaluations as previously
discussed. As soon as I receive the stacked-ranking report for IBEW-represented 10
employees, I will send it to you as promised. (R. Exh. 3.)
Sometime after receiving this information, Esquivel called Dickson and renewed his
request for the Notification of Action Steps. Dickson noted that “providing the information may
lead to many grievances,” and took the position that the Notification of Action steps was a 15
“management document.” (Tr. 65.)

On March 21, 2017, Esquivel again requested the information. His request contained the
following language: “The Union is requesting a copy of the report(s) “Notification of Action
Steps” sent out to the local offices for administering the progressive steps under the PIP. (Jt. Exh. 20
9.) The following day Dickson responded by indicating, “I’ve answered that question before.”
(Jt. Exh. 9.) Esquivel responded with the following:
If the issue is copy of the actual report “Notification of
Action Steps” then the Union is requesting Dex provide the25
data for all IBEW represented employees who are on a
step of discipline or entering steps of discipline per the
PIP. On what step of discipline our members are currently on
and what the next steps are going to be moved to or
retreated in consideration of the latest findings from the30
PRR report(s) This information is essential for the Union to properly
represent its members. (Jt. Exh. 10.)
On April 6, 2017, Esquivel emailed Dickson noting that, “he [sic] Union has not received
the information requested, Please advise ASAP.” (Jt. Exh. 11.) Dickson responded with the 35
following:
I have to ask: what is different about your request? I have already
responded on this issue. Either Marie or I have provided the actionable
PRR reports which give you the information that the Union needs.40
Section 9.5 of our Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth the
Company’s obligation related to this matter. This request does not fall
within those negotiated parameters. As you will recall, I stated that the
document you referenced is a management document that contains
recommendations, and it is not the final authority on what disciplinary45
action actually occurs(ed). [You do not provide us with Union
JD(SF)–05–18
6
documents that you consider confidential to your needs. I see our
document to be in a similar vein.] If you have individual employee grievances for
which you need additional information, please let me know who they are. (Jt.
Exh. 12.)
5
During the time that the Union’s requests were outstanding, the Employer disciplined
employees pursuant to its PIP policies. The Union filed a number of grievances regarding the
disciplinary actions. (GC Exhs. 2, 5, 8.) One of these grievances filed September 2, 2016,
proceeded to arbitration after Respondent issued its Step 3 denial on February 13, 2017, and the
Union referred the grievance to arbitration on February 28, 2017. (GC Exh. 2.) 10
It is undisputed that despite the repeated union requests and pending grievances,
Respondent did not provide the Union with any PIP Notification of Action Steps documents for
employees in general or any individual employees.
15
A. The Duty to Provide Information
I f an emplo yer fails to provide the union with requested information that is
relevant to the union’s proper performance of its collective-bargaining obligations, it
violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Leland Stanford Junior University & Service20
Employees Local No. 715, SEIU, 262 NLRB 136, 138 (1982) (citing Detroit Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979)). An employer is obligated under the Act to
provide requested information that is relevant to the union’s responsibilities regarding both
administration and enforcement of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–153 (1956). 25
The relevance of any request is ascertained by analyzing the information request against a
liberal “discovery” standard of relevance as distinguished from the standard of relevance in trial
proceedings. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 f n . 6 (1967). The discovery
standard for relevance is construed “broadly to encompass any matter that bears on or that
reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue…” Oppenheimer Fund, 30
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
The information doesn’t have to be dispositive of the issues between the parties; it
o n l y h a s t o have some bearing on it. Thus, an employer must furnish information that
is of even probable or potential relevance to the union’s duties. Pfizer Inc., 268 NLRB 916
(1984); Conrock Co., 263 NLRB 1293, 1294 (1982).35
B. Relevance
1. The information request was presumptively relevant
The evidence of record establishes, and I find, that the information requested by the union 40
was presumptively relevant. More specifically, I find that the information requests set forth
herein dated November 3, 2016, November 30, 2016, February 2017, March 22, 2017, and April
6, 2017 were presumptively relevant because on their face the requests sought information which
directly related to disciplinary actions. It is well settled that information concerning wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for unit employees is presumptively 45
JD(SF)–05–18
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relevant to the union’s role as exclusive collective-bargaining representative. See Southern
California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235 (2005). The Board has repeatedly specifically held that
information related to the discipline of employees is presumptively relevant. Grand Rapids
Press, 331 NLRB 296 (2000), In re Dish Network Service Corp., 339 NLRB 1126 (2003),
Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union, 355 NLRB 1345 (2010) Security Walls, LLC, 361 5
NLRB 348 (2014).
C. Respondent’s Contentions
The Respondent contended that it had no duty to provide the information to the union and 10
that not providing the information was permissible under the act. Respondent also asserted that
(1) Internal communications between managers are not presumptively relevant and are not
required to be produced; (2) The Union waived its right to directly access information in
bargaining unit files; (3) The Union is not entitled to pre-arbitration discovery and the Company
had no obligation to produce the requested information; and (4) The Company’s response to the 15
Union’s requests for information was a good faith effort to comply with its obligations under the
Act.
1. The information was presumptively relevant because it related directly to
matters contained within the CBA and disciplinary processes20
Despite Respondent’s assertion to the contrary, I find the PIP Notification of Action steps
to be presumptively relevant because they are directly related to the disciplinary process. It
cannot be argued (given Respondent’s own outline which clearly set forth that “the failure to
complete the PIP will result in further discipline, up to and including termination”) involves the 25
disciplinary process. ( Exh. 1.) It is also undisputed that the PIP Notification of Action Steps is a
document which directly relates to the PIP disciplinary process. The relevance of the
information is further borne out in the direct language of the CBA. Section 1.4 of the CBA is in
essence an anti-discrimination provision. The information contained within the PIP Notification
of Action Steps provides direct and relevant information regarding whether some employees are 30
treated differently and if so whether such difference in treatment may have been motivated by a
factor prohibited by Section 1.4. Thus, the comparison of employee discipline is directly relevant
to the Union’s representational obligations that arise as a consequence of Section 1.4. It is well
within the statutory responsibility of the Union to closely scrutinize all facets relating to potential
discriminatory treatment and/or discipline of employees. This includes under the “discovery 35
type standard” securing information contained in the PIP Notification of Action steps. The Board
need only decide whether the information sought has some bearing on the issues or if it would be
of use to the Union. Dodger Theatricals Holdings, Inc., 347 NLRB 953 (2006). The information
sought clearly meets this standard. Moreover, this is the very type of information that the Union
might need to process and/or evaluate a grievance or to determine whether to proceed to 40
arbitration. See NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), holding that an employer
has a duty to furnish information which is necessary to enable the Union to evaluate intelligently
grievances filed.
Nor am I persuaded that since Respondent itself characterized the PIP Notification Action 45
Steps as “internal communication between managers” or a “management document that contains
recommendations, and is not the final authority on what disciplinary action actually occurs(ed)”
JD(SF)–05–18
8
it was not under a duty to provide the information. (Jt. Exh. 12.) In the first instance, I am
skeptical that a document entitled “Notification of Action Steps” contained merely
“recommendations.” The title of the document itself indicates a more direct purpose and the
actual function of the document, which is to notify the recipient of what actions will be taken.
Assuming for the sake of argument that it does contain merely recommendations, the5
“Notification of Action Steps” nevertheless can form the basis for discipline and therefore is
presumptively relevant. See Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union, 355 NLRB 1345
(2010).
Respondent bears the burden of establishing confidentiality. National Broadcasting Co., 10
352 NLRB 90 (2008). There was simply no showing sufficient to meet Respondent’s burden
that the information sought was of a confidential nature such that would justify nondisclosure.
A claim of confidentiality is an insufficient defense to a request for relevant information where
there is no evidence presented to support such a claim. Engineers Local 12, 237 NLRB 1556,
1559 fn.9 (1978). Not only did Respondent not carry its burden, but when Dickson testified, her15
testimony revealed that she was “not sure” about basic processes surrounding the Notification of
Action steps despite it being a core part of the Employer’s disciplinary processes. For example,
when asked if HR business managers relied on other information or documents in preparing the
Notification of Action Steps she testified that “she didn’t know for sure.” (Tr. 151.) When
asked if the Notification of Action Steps included other information to identify employees she 20
testified, “I am not sure”. (Tr. 151.) When asked if the Notification of Action Steps were
implemented “without feedback” she testified that she “didn’t know.”1 (Tr. 150.)
I am similarly not persuaded by Respondent’s assertions that the Union did not
sufficiently specify the relevance of the documents thus justifying Respondent’s withholding of 25
the information. As noted by General Counsel, a union is not required to make a specific
showing of relevance unless the employer has submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption. Living and Learning Centers, Inc., 251 NLRB 284, 288 fn. 3 (1980) enfd. 652
F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1981). Respondent failed to rebut the presumption of relevance. Assuming
for the sake of argument that it had, the Union without question on various occasions in its phone 30
calls and in writing adequately specified the relevance of the documents which was clearly
known to Respondent. The relevance of the information is on its face clear given its direct
relationship to the disciplinary process. Moreover, on numerous occasions Esquivel explained
various aspects of relevance. For example, in his request he explained that the information was
relevant because employees/members are not fully aware to what level of progressive steps they 35
might be in.” (Jt. Exh. 7.) He later mentioned that he needed to know “on what step of
discipline our members are currently on and what the next steps are going to be moved to or
retreated in consideration of the latest findings from the PRR reports(s).” (Jt. Exh. 10.) Indeed,
Dickson understood the relevance to the extent that she noted that if Respondent were to provide
the information, it “may lead to many, many grievances.” (Tr. 65.) 40

1 It bears noting that her professed uncertainty did not appear genuine and was likely utilization of the testimonial
artifice of “selective memory.”
JD(SF)–05–18
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2. The Union did not waive its right to receive information
Respondent asserted that Section 9.5 of the CBA (which set forth an employee’s ability
to inspect personnel records) constituted a “clear and unmistakable waiver of its right to receive
the information it requested.” I disagree. The duty to furnish information is a statutory 5
obligation which exists independent of any agreement by the parties. American Standard, Inc.,
203 NLRB 1132 (1973). Thus, the Union’s right to information can be waived only in express
terms and not by implication and/or contractual silence. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460
U.S. 693 (1983); NLRB v. Perkins Machine Co., 326 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1964); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F. 2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963). Nowhere in Section 9.5 of the CBA is there 10
any mention of the waiver of any union statutory right to receive information. In fact, Section
9.5 merely addresses an employee’s right to access its personnel records; it contains no reference
whatsoever to a Union’s right to seek and/or receive information. Respondent argues that waiver
should be found based upon the absence of any reference to the Union’s statutory rights asserting
that the principle of “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius” should apply. As noted above, the 15
Board and the courts have uniformly rejected the type of waiver by implication that Respondent
suggests should apply in this case. See for example, Register-Guard, 301NLRB 494,496 (1991).
3. Pre Arbitration Discovery
20
Despite Respondent’s well established duty to provide the information in its possession,
make a reasonable effort to secure any unavailable information, and, if any information remained
unavailable, explain and document the reasons for its continued unavailability, the record is
devoid of any evidence to establish that Respondent made any genuine effort to provide the
Union with the actual information it requested. Respondent’s characterization of the information 25
requests as “pre-arbitration discovery” is misplaced. This is necessarily so because the various
requests for information predated the February 28, 2017, referral of the grievance to arbitration.
The board made clear in Ormet Alluminum Mill Products, 335 NLRB 788 (2001), that it will
require information sought but not produced during the processing of a grievance to be produced
notwithstanding the fact that an arbitration may be pending at the time the Board considers the 30
unfair labor practice. To hold otherwise the Board reasoned would allow parties who refuse
valid information requests to use arbitration as a “safe harbor.” The Board’s reasoning and
rationale in Ormet is directly applicable to the facts presented.
4. The Company’s alleged good faith in responding to the Union’s request 35
The duty to furnish information requires “a reasonable good-faith effort to respond to the
request as promptly as circumstances allow.” Goodlife Beverage Co., 312 NLRB 1060, 1062
fn.9 (1993). The duty to act in good faith requires “an honest effort to provide whatever
information is required.” Decker Coal Co., 301 NLRB 729, 740 (1991). Despite Respondent’s 40
assertions that it was acting in “good faith” it made no real effort to produce the requested
information. The information sought was simple, readily available and close at hand yet after
repeated requests, Respondent failed to produce the clearly identified information. “The refusal
of an employer to provide a bargaining agent with information relevant to the union’s task of
representing its constituency is a per se violation of the act without regard to the employer’s 45
subjective good or bad faith.” Piggly Wiggly Midwest, LLC, 357 NLRB 2344 (2012), Brooklyn
JD(SF)–05–18
10
Union Gas Co., 220 NLRB 189, 191 (1975); Procter & Gamble Mfg., 237 NLRB 747, 751
(1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1979). It is undisputed that Respondent failed to provide
the requested information and in doing so its actions were in direct contravention of and in
violation of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Dex Media, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
10
2. The Charging Party the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1269
(Union) is a labor organization with the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all material times the Union has been the designated exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the following bargaining units of Respondent’s employees:15
a) All Senior Telephone Marketing Consultants, Telephone Marketing Consultants
— Win-Back, Telephone Marketing Consultants, and Telephone Sales Associates
working in Respondent’s Greenwood Village facility, as well as all Senior Marketing
Consultants and Premise Marketing Consultants working in the Rocky Mountain area and 20
Southwest area described in Appendix A of the collective- bargaining agreement
effective from June 12, 2015 to May 11, 2018; excluding all managers, professional
employees, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined by the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to 25
provide information requested by the Union and relevant to the Union’s representational
duties.
4. The unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.30
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to 35
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall provide the Union with the PIP Notification of Action Steps
information requested on the November 3, 2016, November 30, 2016, February 2017, March 22,
2017 and April 6, 2017. 40
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended
45
JD(SF)–05–18
11
ORDER
The Respondent, Dex Media, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from5
(a) Failing and/or refusing to provide information requested by the Union
that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s representational status.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the 10
Act.
(a) In a timely manner, furnish the Union with the PIP Notification of
Action Steps information requested on November 3, 2016, November
30, 2016, February 2017, March 22, 2017, and April 6, 2017. 15
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in
Greenwood Village, Colorado, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”28 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 27, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized 20
representative shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. In addition to the physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email,
posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if the 25
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional 30
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided
by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.2
35
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 28, 2018
__________________________
Dickie Montemayor40
Administrative Law Judge

2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading, “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
Notice to Employees
Mailed by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to
post, mail, and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
• Form, join, or assist a union
• Choose a representative to bargain with us on your behalf
• Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
• Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the above rights.
WE WILL NOT refuse and/or fail to provide the Union with requested information that is relevant
and necessary to the performance of its duties as the collective-bargaining representative of our
unit employees.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information it requested in its information requests of
November 3 and 30, 2016, February 2017, and March 21 and 22, 2017, April 6, 2017.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
DEX MEDIA, INC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. We conduct secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and we investigate and remedy unfair labor practices by employers
and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election
petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below
or you may call the Board’s toll-free number 1–866–667–NLRB (1–866–667–6572). Hearing impaired
persons may contact the Agency’s TTY service at 1–866–315–NLRB. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
Byron Rodgers Federal Office Building
1961 Stout Street, Suite 13-103
Denver, CO 80294
(303)844–3551
Hours of Operation: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/27-CA-196726 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (720) 598-7398.