Devrim Varoglu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2019

13597894 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/597,894 08/29/2012 Devrim Varoglu P15124US1
(119-0334US1)
5323
61947 7590 07/31/2019
Apple - Blank Rome
c/o Blank Rome LLP
717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400
HOUSTON, TX 77002
EXAMINER
SADANANDA, ABHIJIT B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
houstonpatents@blankrome.com
mbrininger@blankrome.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DEVRIM VAROGLU and SWAPNIL DAVE
____________

Appeal 2017-009858
Application 13/597,8941
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Apple Inc. (Appeal Br.
3).

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Devrim Varoglu and Swapnil Dave (Appellants) seek review under
35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 1–4 and 37–55, the only claims
pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The Appellants invented a way to improve the flexibility in
electronically scheduling an event between two or more parties using a
scheduling application. Specification para. 1.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 47, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
47. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
[1] receiving from a user interface of a first electronic device,
electronic scheduling parameters for creating a proposed
event in an electronic schedule stored in the first
electronic device,
the electronic schedule includes a plurality of existing
scheduled events for an initiator of the proposed event;
[2] automatically search[ing], using the first electronic device,
through the electronic schedule,
one or more other electronic schedules stored in the first
electronic device, or both,

2 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.,” filed February 2, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed July 13,
2017), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 22, 2017), and
Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed September 22, 2016).
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using the electronic scheduling parameters to extract a
plurality of available event time periods for the initiator
of the proposed event;
[3] updat[ing], using the first electronic device,
the electronic scheduling parameters based on the
automatic search
to account for the existing scheduled events and the
available event time periods for the proposed event;
[4] identify[ing], using the first electronic device,
a plurality of electronic user accounts associated [with] a
plurality of invitees for the proposed event with the user
interface;
[5] transmit[ting], using the first electronic device and over a
computer network,
the updated electronic scheduling parameters to the one
or more other electronic devices associated with the
electronic user accounts
based on a ranking order of the invitees,
the updated electronic scheduling parameters includ[ing]
the ranking order of the invitees;
[6] receiv[ing], using the first electronic device and over the
computer network,
one or more modified sets of electronic scheduling
parameters associated with the at least one of the
invitees,
the one or more received modified sets of electronic
scheduling parameters include[ing] invitee available time
periods determined from the updated electronic
scheduling parameters;
and
[7] transmit[ting], using the first electronic device and over the
computer network, to the one or more other electronic devices
an electronic invitation for the proposed event
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that is based on the one or more modified sets of
electronic scheduling parameters.
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Edlund US 2005/0102245 A1 May 12, 2005
Nelken US 2006/0200374 A1 Sept. 7, 2006
Bhogal US 2009/0083105 A1 Mar. 26, 2009
O'Sullivan US 2009/0171700 A1 July 2, 2009
Claims 1–4 and 37–55 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1, 2, 37–45, 47–51, 53, and 54 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal.
Claims 4, 46, 523, and 55 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken.
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Edlund, Bhogal, and O’Sullivan.
ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the
claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired.
The issues of obviousness turn primarily on whether the claims recite
communications from and to a particular device.
FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

3 Claim 52 recites “the device of claim 51 . . .” Claim 51 is a method claim,
not a device claim. We take this to be a typographic error that should be
corrected.
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Facts Related to the Prior Art
Edlund
01. Edlund is directed to negotiating the details of a meeting such
as time without requiring participants to relinquish control of their
calendars or information on their calendars to a meeting organizer.
Edlund para. 1.
02. Edlund describes separating the negotiation from the invitation.
Edlund decentralizes the negotiation, removing the burden of
negotiation from the meeting organizer. Instead, the meeting
organizer delegates the process to a negotiation object. Each
participant interacts with the negotiation object until a mutually
satisfactory time is determined. The negotiation process saves the
meeting organizer from managing the details of the negotiation.
Edlund empowers the meeting participants to book the meeting
organizer’s time rather than the meeting organizer booking the
participant's time, providing a more successful and less time-
consuming approach to scheduling meetings. Edlund para. 16.
03. Edlund describes an organizer initiating a negotiation by
specifying the known meeting attributes. The organizer also
“offers” time interval(s) when he is willing to meet, associating
with each interval his level of desirability and an aggregate view
of the free time of all the participants, if available. Edlund para.
18.
04. Edlund describes a participant accesses the negotiation upon
being notified of a pending negotiation. The participant offers the
time interval(s) when he is willing to meet, associating with each
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interval his own level of desirability in meeting at that time. A
participant may offer time intervals other than that originally
proposed by the organizer. A participant indicates his preferences
on the time intervals. Edlund para. 19.
05. Edlund describes the organizer viewing the integrated
scheduling information contained within the negotiation to
determine the meeting time after all participants have responded to
the negotiation. The organizer then selects the actual start time of
the meeting, the duration having already been defined. Based on
the information provided by the participants and the original
meeting bounds, the organizer finalizes the negotiation.
Finalizing the negotiation initiates an invitation for the event,
which comprises the date/time of the meeting, the location,
subject, participants, etc. Edlund para. 20.
06. Edlund describes a negotiation object that integrates all
scheduling related information. As an aggregate, the negotiation
objects for past and current events provide a history from which
patterns can be detected. These patterns of activity can be used to
facilitate current or future negotiations by enabling automatic
processing. Automatic processing can encompass, when
appropriate, such things as preselecting the bounds of negotiation
based on a user's scheduled events, preselecting the earliest start
and end points, preselecting participants based on the subject of
the event, optimizing the finalization of an event, and accepting an
event. Edlund para. 26.
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07. Edlund describes a negotiation server that interacts with a
negotiation persister to store, retrieve or update negotiations in a
negotiation database. In addition, the negotiation server interacts
with a notifier to issue notifications when new negotiations, have
been created. Further, the negotiation server interacts with a
negotiation finalizer to finalize negotiations. Furthermore, the
negotiation server uses a calendar retriever to access free-time
information from external calendaring systems. Edlund para. 54.
08. Edlund describes a meeting organizer reviewing schedule
information for one participant or for all participants as an
aggregate. The system displays an aggregate of responses from
participants in participants’ aggregated timeline. An aggregate of
the participant's calendar is shown in participants' aggregated
calendar. Access to participant's calendars is not required;
however, if available, Edlund uses information in an electronic
calendar maintained by participants to present an overview to the
meeting organizer exposing potential conflicts. Edlund paras. 77–
78.
Bhogal
09. Bhogal is directed to scheduling meetings. Bhogal para. 2.
10. Bhogal describes sending a meeting invitation to the invitees
of a meeting, wherein the meeting is contingent upon a
dependency rule associated with at least one invitee's attendance.
Typically, the meeting invitation specifies a time and place for the
meeting. The system receives responses back from at least some
of the invitees, including positive responses from the invitees
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subject to the dependency rule. In response to receiving these
acceptances for the meeting back, the system can continue setting
up the meeting. Bhogal para. 7.
11. Bhogal describes sending invitations to the required attendees
and waiting to get their responses back before sending invitations
to others. In this way, the system can avoid having to cancel a
meeting because a required attendee cannot be at the meeting.
Bhogal para. 37.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1–4 and 37–55 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more
STEP 14
Claim 47, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us
is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
STEP 2
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question,
. . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and
“as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a

4 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 FR 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Revised Guidance”).
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patent-eligible application. [The Court] described step two of
this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Intl, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citations omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first
determine what the claims are directed to. This begins by determining
whether the claims recite one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Then, if claims recite a judicial
exception, determining whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited
judicial exception, or whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance at 54. If
the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally determining
whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the additional
elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the recited
judicial exception.
STEP 2A Prong 1
At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method
claim 47 recites receiving, updating, and transmitting parameter data,
searching schedule data, identifying user data, and transmitting invitation
data. Searching and identifying are rudimentary forms of computer analysis.
Thus, claim 47 recites receiving, updating, analyzing, and transmitting data.
None of the limitations recite technological implementation details for any
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of these steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible
means.
From this we see that claim 47 does not recite the judicial exceptions
of either natural phenomena or laws of nature.
Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract
idea are patent in-eligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which
extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas
include (1) mathematical concepts5, (2) certain methods of organizing
human activity6, and (3) mental processes7. Among those certain methods
of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people. Like
those concepts, claim 47 recites the concept of managing an assembly of
people. Specifically, claim 47 recites operations that would ordinarily take
place in advising one to schedule an event based on user ranking data and
updated parameters. The advice to schedule an event based on user ranking
data and updated parameters involves inviting attendees, which is a social
act, and receiving scheduling parameters, which is an act ordinarily
performed in the stream of scheduling. For example, claim 47 recites

5 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
6 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014); Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
7 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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“transmitting . . . an electronic invitation,” which is an activity that would
take place whenever one is inviting attendees for an event interaction among
people. Similarly, claim 1 recites “receiving . . . scheduling parameters,”
which is also characteristic of scheduling a gathering of people.
The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to scheduling an
event among a plurality of users. Final Act. 6.
The preamble to claim 47 does not recite what it is to achieve, but the
steps in claim 47 result in modifying schedule parameter data and sending
invitation data for an event absent any technological mechanism other than a
conventional computer for doing so.
As to the specific limitations, limitations 1 and 6 recite receiving data.
Limitations 5 and 7 recite transmitting data. Limitation 3 recites updating
data. Limitations 2 and 4 recite conventional data analysis of parameter
data, which advise one to apply generic functions to get to these results. The
limitations thus recite advice for scheduling an event based on user ranking
data and updated parameters. To advocate scheduling an event based on
user ranking data and updated parameters is conceptual advice for results
desired and not technological operations.
The Specification at paragraph 1 describes the invention as relating to
improving the flexibility in electronically scheduling an event between two
or more parties using a scheduling application. Thus, all this intrinsic
evidence shows that claim 47 is directed to processing data to create and
send data representing an event invitation, i.e. managing an assembly of
people. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination.
This in turn is an example of managing personal behavior or relationships
or interactions between people as a certain method of organizing human
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activity because managing an assembly of people is managing and the object
of the management is a meeting, which is an interaction, of people. The
concept of managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on
user ranking data and updated parameters is one idea for getting a common
time for the assembly. The steps recited in claim 47 are part of how this
might conceptually be premised.
Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to abstract ideas
when they recited similar subject matter. Digitech Image Techs, LLC v.
Elecs for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (2014)(process of taking plural
data sets and combining them into a single data set); Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
(2014)( data collection, recognition, and storage); Affinity Labs of Texas,
LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (2016)(features such as a
customized user interface do not convert the abstract idea of delivering
media content into a concrete solution to a problem).
Alternately, this is an example of concepts performed in the human mind
as mental processes because the steps of receiving, updating, analyzing, and
transmitting data mimic human thought processes of observation, evaluation,
judgment, and opinion, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data
interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Claim 47, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses
generic computer technology to perform data reception, update, analysis,
and transmission and does not recite an improvement to a particular
computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.
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Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract
because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer
animation”). As such, claim 47 is directed to receiving, updating, analyzing,
and transmitting data, and not a technological implementation or application
of that idea.
From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 47 is directed
to managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user
ranking data and updated parameters, which is a way of managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people identified in the
Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea.
STEP 2A Prong 2
The next issue is whether claim 47 not only recites, but is more
precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to
some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to,
this concept i.e. integrated into a practical application.8
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At
some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”
Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply
because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of
such concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’” we have said,
remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying
the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that
claim the “‘buildin[g] block[s]’” of human ingenuity and those
that integrate the building blocks into something more.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted).

8 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981).
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Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the
computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results,
devoid of implementation details. Steps 1 and 6 are pure data gathering
steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Steps 5
and 7 are conventional activity, such as storing, transmitting, or displaying
the results. Steps 2 and 4 recite generic computer processing expressed in
terms of results desired by any and all possible means and so present no
more than conceptual advice. All purported inventive aspects reside in how
the data is interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process
physically enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing
technologically achieves those results.
Viewed as a whole, Appellants’ claim 47 simply recites the concept of
managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user
ranking data and updated parameters as performed by a generic computer.
This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this concept
and the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters,
and do not recite any particular implementation.
Claim 47 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the
computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology
or technical field. The 23 pages of specification spell out different generic
equipment9 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the
particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the
concept of managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on
user ranking data and updated parameters under different scenarios. They

9 The Specification describes a personal digital assistant (PDA); personal
music player, mobile telephone, notebook, laptop or tablet computer,
desktop computer; or server computer. Spec. para. 37.
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do not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer
functions. Instead, claim 47 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more
than an instruction to apply managing an assembly of people by scheduling
an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26.
None of the limitations reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies
or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for
a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses
a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture
that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial
exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception.
We conclude that claim 47 is directed to achieving the result of managing
an assembly of people by advising one to schedule an event based on user
ranking data and updated parameters, as distinguished from a technological
improvement for achieving or applying that result. This amounts to
managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people,
which fall within certain methods of organizing human activity that
constitute abstract ideas. The claim does not integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application.
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STEP 2B
The next issue is whether claim 47 provides an inventive concept because
the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly more than
the recited judicial exception.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter
the analysis at Mayo step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract
idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer for receiving, updating, analyzing, and transmitting data amounts
to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a
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computer. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional
computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See
Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Also see In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d
1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of
the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be
achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”).
None of these activities are used in some unconventional manner nor do any
produce some unexpected result. Appellants do not contend they invented
any of these activities. In short, each step does no more than require a
generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data
operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is
‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does
not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP America, Inc.
v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants’ claim 47 add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-update-analysis-
transmission is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving,
selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving
payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data
retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission),
Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d
1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling,
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and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and
conventional.
We conclude that claim 47 does not provide an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception.
REMAINING CLAIMS
Claim 47 is representative. The remaining method claims merely
describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical
application of that concept.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long “warn[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101“in
ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art.’”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any
particular machine.
LEGAL CONCLUSION
From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not
recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any
other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular
transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the
claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of certain
methods of organizing human activity as exemplified by the managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people of
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managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user
ranking data and updated parameters, without significantly more.
APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS
As to Appellants’ Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s
determinations and analysis from Final Action 6–9 and Answer 3–7 and
reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the Reply Brief.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the claims are
distinguishable from those in Electric Power Group. Reply Br. 3–7.
Appellants first contend that
when combining together the functions of determining an initial
set of electronic scheduling parameters, updating the electronic
scheduling parameters according to search results from
electronic schedules, transmitting the updated electronic
scheduling parameters to user accounts according to the invitees
ranking order, and receiving a modified set of electronic
scheduling parameters associated with the invitees, claims 1-4
and 37-55 as a whole differ from claim 12 of the ’710 Patent in
Electric Power Group. In particular, the combined functions
recited in claims 1-4 and 37-55 produce a particular solution
that hones in on one or more relevant time periods prior to
generating electronic invitations relating to the electronic event
scheduling technology.
Reply Br. 6. “Honing in” is a conceptual result and not a technological
implementation. The result is information, not technological improvement.
Information per se is abstract. “Information, whether displayed in the form
of price values or P&L values, is abstract.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG
LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019). An abstract idea, however
useful, remains an abstract idea. “That the automation can ‘result in life
altering consequences,’ is laudable, but it does not render it any less
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abstract.” Univ. of Florida Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916
F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that
claims 1-4 and 37-55 provide how to generate electronic
scheduling parameters and the unique way of communicating
electronic scheduling parameters amongst multiple electronic
devices. Claims 1-4 and 37-55 provide a particular way to
achieve a desired outcome of electronically scheduling and
generating electronic event invitations to improve electronic
event scheduling technology.
Reply Br. at id. The “how to generate electronic scheduling parameters” of
this argument is recited as receiving and updating the parameters. The
update is “based on the automatic search to account for the existing
scheduled events and the available event time periods for the
proposed event,” but this is no more than a recitation of criteria and
operand data used with no recitation of how they are used technologically,
or even mathematically. The “unique way of communicating electronic
scheduling parameters amongst multiple electronic devices” of this
argument is recited as “transmit[ting], using the first electronic device and
over a computer network, the updated electronic scheduling parameters to
the one or more other electronic devices” and “transmitting, using the first
electronic device and over the computer network, to the one or more other
electronic devices an electronic invitation.” This is conventional data
transmission. To the extent Appellants rely on the “based on a ranking order
of the invitees” limitation to narrow the transmission step, the claim does not
recite how or in what manner the transmission is so based, and in any event,
this would only affect the criteria for sequencing and filtering data, not the
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transmission step itself. Such use of criteria, sequencing, and filtering
themselves are conventional data processing operations.
Claims 1, 2, 37–45, 47–51, 53, and 54 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal
Edlund describes a user who is a meeting organizer, beginning the
scheduling process by searching that user’s device for schedule data and
then forwarding that to a server that then distributes notifications to other
users who are to attend and accept responses back. Because it is the server
that performs such communications, Appellants argue
the combination of Edlund and Bhogal fails to disclose this
subject matter because (1) Edlund’s negotiation server 15 is not
an electronic device associated with a user account of an
invitee; [and] (2) Edlund does not send the updated electronic
scheduling parameters from the first electronic device (i.e., the
meeting organizer's electronic device) to the electronic devices
associated with the invitees (i.e., participants)[.]
App. Br. 19. Similarly, Appellants contend that
the combination of Edlund and Bhogal fails to disclose
“receiv[ing], by the first electronic device and over the
computer network, a modified sets of electronic scheduling
parameters ...wherein each of the received modified sets of
electronic scheduling parameters include invitee available time
periods determined from the updated electronic scheduling
parameters.”
App. Br. 24. We agree that as to non-transitory program storage device
claims 1 and 53 and device claim 41, and their dependent claims, Edlund
does not recite these limitations because Edlund communicates through the
server instead of a user’s device. The Examiner made no determinations as
to the obviousness of using a server as contrasted with the user device.
Method claim 47 and its dependent claims, however, do not recite
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performing these from or to the user device, but only using the device. The
claims do not recite or narrow the manner, implementation, scope, or level
of indirection of such “using.” Edlund describes initiating the entire
sequence from a user’s device, and this initiation in turn leads to the server
performing the communications. In this sense, Edlund uses the first user’s
device to perform the recited communications.
Claims 4, 46, 52, and 55 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken
These claims are not separately argued.
Claim 3 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund,
Bhogal, and O’Sullivan
This claim depends from claim 1 and is not separately argued.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 1–4 and 37–55 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 37–45, 53, and 54 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal is improper.
The rejection of claims 47–51 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal is proper.
The rejection of claims 4, 46, and 55 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken is improper.
The rejection of claim 52 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken is proper.
The rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Edlund, Bhogal, and O’Sullivan is improper.
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DECISION
The rejection of claims 1–4 and 37–55 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED