Detlef Krampe et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 18, 2019

15278525 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/278,525 09/28/2016 DETLEF KRAMPE KRAMPE 1036
20151 7590 11/18/2019
HENRY M FEIEREISEN, LLC
HENRY M FEIEREISEN
35 West 35th Street
SUITE 900
NEW YORK, NY 10001
EXAMINER
AIELLO, JEFFREY P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2864
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
INFO@FEIEREISENLLC.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DETLEF KRAMPE and AMIT VERMA
____________

Appeal 2018-007164
Application 15/278,525
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.

Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge REPKO.

Opinion Concurring in Judgment filed by Administrative Patent Judge
THOMAS

REPKO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–15 and 17. Br. 2.2 Claim 16 was canceled. An

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1, 80333 München,
Germany. Br. 2.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Final Office Action (“Final”),
mailed August 30, 2017; the Advisory Action (“Advisory”), mailed
November 20, 2017; the Appeal Brief (“Br.”), filed January 9, 2018; and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”), mailed April 30, 2018
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oral hearing was held on August 13, 2019. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to monitoring an electronically closed-
loop or open-loop controlled machine part. Spec. ¶ 2. Closed-loop or open-
loop controlled machine parts can be pumps, motors, robots, cranes,
frequency converters, among other things. Id. ¶ 4. According to the
Specification, previous approaches to monitoring parts involved determining
a static configuration at the outset and do not take into consideration age or
operating conditions. Id. ¶ 10. The invention, however, uses a group of
comparable machine parts as an initial level for detecting errors. Id. ¶ 14.
According to the Specification, the group-based approach allows the
monitoring configuration to be determined dynamically and accounts for
many factors, including age and wear. Id. ¶ 15.
Claims 1 and 13 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. A method for error detection and monitoring of an
electronically closed-loop or open-loop controlled machine part,
comprising:
recording and storing operating parameters and
monitoring parameters of machine parts;
determining a comparison group of comparable machine
parts and comparable operating parameters based on the recorded
and stored operating parameters and a machine part to be
compared;
using a statistical analysis procedure for creating a
threshold value based on the determined comparison group, and
using the statistical analysis procedure for detecting a variance
of at least one state or at least one of the monitoring parameters
based on the threshold value;
assigning the variance to the machine part; and
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outputting an alarm by an alarm system when the variance
exceeds a predefined value.
Br. 10.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–15 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final 2–5.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4–13, 15, and 17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Smith (U.S. Patent Application Publication US
2007/0109301 A1; published May 17, 2007). Final 5–9.
The Examiner rejects claims 3 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
obvious over Smith and Keenan (U.S. Patent Application Publication US
2004/0260431 A1; published Dec. 23, 2004). Final 10–11.

THE REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
I. Principles of Law
Under § 101, patent-eligible subject matter is defined as “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. But courts have long
held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 70–71 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
These ineligible concepts are implicit exceptions to the statutory categories.
Id. at 71.
The Supreme Court articulated a two-step subject-matter eligibility
test in Mayo and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208
(2014). Alice/Mayo step one asks whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial
exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. In Alice/Mayo step two, we consider “the
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elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to
determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79,
78). Step two is described as a search for an “inventive concept.” Id.
The USPTO published revised guidance on patent subject matter
eligibility. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (USPTO Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Step 1 of the USPTO’s
eligibility analysis asks whether the claimed subject matter falls within the
four statutory categories of invention. Id. at 53–54. Under Step 2A, Prong
One of the Guidance, we determine if the claim recites a judicial exception,
including particular groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes). Id. at
52–53. If so, we then analyze the claim to determine whether the recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application under Step 2A,
Prong Two of the Guidance. Id. at 53–55; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
Only if the claim fails to integrate the exception and thus is “directed
to” the judicial exception, do we then look to whether the claim adds a
specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)) or whether the claim simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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II. Overview of the Examiner’s Rejection
The Examiner determines that representative3 claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea. Final 2. The Examiner determines that the additional elements
do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Id. at 4.
III. Overview of Appellant’s Arguments4
Appellant argues that the claims are directed to a “specific tangible
improvement to industrial application.” Br. 5. Appellant argues that “the
method and system of the present invention also change the way the
machine parts operate.” Id.
IV. Does the claim recite a judicial exception?
A. Step 2A, Prong One of the Guidance
We first consider whether the claim recites a judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. “[A] claim recites a judicial exception when
the judicial exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in the claim.” October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 1 (USPTO Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf
The Guidance synthesizes the key concepts identified by the courts as
abstract ideas into three primary subject-matter groupings: mathematical

3 Appellant argues claims 1–12 as a group. See Br. 4–5. So we select claim 1
as representative of this group in this analysis. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
4 “Except as provided for in [37 C.F.R.] §§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any
arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused
consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities, and mental
processes. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim 1 recites an
abstract idea within the Guidance’s mental-process grouping. In the sections
that follow, we explain how the claim sets forth or describes an evaluation or
judgment that can practically be performed in the mind or with the
assistance of pen and paper. See id. at 52 n. 14 (collecting cases).
B. “determining a comparison group of comparable machine parts and
comparable operating parameters”
Claim 1 recites, in part, “determining a comparison group of
comparable machine parts and comparable operating parameters based on
the recorded and stored operating parameters and a machine part to be
compared.” Br. 10.
The recited “comparison group of comparable machine parts” is a
family of comparable or similar machine parts with comparable or similar
operating parameters. Spec. ¶ 33. The operating parameters can be
environmental parameters, location, type of load, type of use, among other
things. Id. ¶ 32. The parameters can be recorded by sensors or manually by
an operator. Id.
Considering this, the recited determination can practically be
performed mentally or with paper and pencil by comparing machine parts or
parameters. See id. ¶ 34. For example, a person can determine whether the
parts are (1) “identical or similar machine parts from a specific product
family from a specific manufacturer, e.g. machine parts from a specific
product family of an automotive manufacturer” or (2) “machine parts from a
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specific product family from a specific manufacturer and the machine parts
perform similar tasks (e.g. welding).” Id.
In this way, the recited determination is an evaluation that can
practically be performed in the mind.
C. “using a statistical analysis procedure for creating a threshold”
Claim 1 recites, in part, “using a statistical analysis procedure for
creating a threshold value based on the determined comparison group, and
using the statistical analysis procedure for detecting a variance of at least
one state or at least one of the monitoring parameters based on the threshold
value.” Br. 10. The Specification discloses analyzing three or more
parameters for machine parts. Spec. ¶¶ 41–44. The number of machine parts
can be four. See, e.g., id. ¶ 29, Fig. 1. According to the Specification, the
recited “statistical analysis” procedure uses “simple average analysis
procedures.” Id. ¶¶ 39, 44. Because the recited analysis can involve simple
average analysis procedures on as few as three parameters and a small
number of machines, the disclosed analysis can practically be calculated
mentally or with the assistance of pen and paper. See id. ¶¶ 38–44.
D. “assigning the variance to the machine part”
The recited step of “assigning the variance to the machine part” could
practically be performed mentally or manually with the assistance of pen and
paper. For instance, the corresponding variances could be recorded with a
pen on a paper listing the machine parts.
To summarize, claim 1 recites an evaluation that, when considered in
the context of the claim as a whole, can practically be performed in the mind
with the assistance of pen and paper. Thus, claim 1 recites a concept that
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falls within the Guidance’s subject-matter grouping of mental processes. For
all the above reasons, claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
V. Is the claim “directed to” the recited judicial exception?
A. Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now proceed to determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. When a claim recites a judicial
exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, the
claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id.
We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations,
or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See
id. at 55 n.24. In claim 1, the additional elements include (1) “recording and
storing operating parameters and monitoring parameters of machine parts”
and (2) “outputting an alarm by an alarm system when the variance exceeds
a predefined value.” For the reasons discussed below, we determine that
these additional elements do not indicate that the judicial exception is
integrated into a practical application.
B. “recording and storing”
Claim 1 recites, in part, “recording and storing operating parameters
and monitoring parameters of machine parts.” Br. 10. The operating
parameters can be environmental parameters, location, type of load, type of
use, among other things. Spec. ¶ 32. The monitoring parameters can be
temperature or other similar parameters. Id. The Specification explains that
“[t]he recording can for example be performed using sensors.” Id. ¶ 28.
To the extent that the claimed method involves sensors, we see
nothing that indicates that the claim uses a particular configuration of
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sensors and a particular method of using the raw data from the sensors, for
example, which may indicate that the claim is directed to a technological
improvement. See Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343,
1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cited in MPEP § 2106.05(a) II (describing
improvements to technology beyond computer functions). Rather, an
operator can manually input the parameters. Spec. ¶ 32. This indicates that
the method is not “a new and useful technique for using sensors,” like the
claims in Thales, for instance. See 850 F.3d at 1349.
Here, the recording-and-storing step “adds insignificant extra-solution
activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Courts have
found that such activity may not integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Id. The Guidance explains that insignificant extra-
solution activity includes “mere data gathering such as a step of obtaining
information about credit card transactions so that the information can be
analyzed” to detect fraudulent transactions. Id. at 55 n.31; CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(analyzing the step of obtaining transaction data and determining that “such
data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability”); see also
MPEP § 2106.05(g) (instructing examiners that “[a]n example of pre-
solution activity is a step of gathering data for use in a claimed process”).
The MPEP further instructs examiners that courts have recognized
that the function of “[s]toring and retrieving information in memory” can be
“insignificant extra-solution activity.” MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(collecting
cases). Also, the Federal Circuit has “held that mere ‘[data-gathering] step[s]
cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.’” CyberSource, 654
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F.3d at 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Grams,
888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
Thus, the recited recording-and-storing step, considered individually
and in combination with the other limitations, does not indicate that the
claim integrates the abstract idea into a practical application.
C. “outputting”
Claim 1 recites, in part, “outputting an alarm by an alarm system
when the variance exceeds a predefined value.” Br. 10.
This step is insufficient to integrate the recited abstract idea into a
practical application. For example, the Federal Circuit determined that
displaying accessed data on a user’s device without more may not be
sufficient to render a claim patent eligible. Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL,
Inc., 896 F.3d. 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Similarly, the outputting step
here merely reports the result of a comparison of the variance with a
predefined value. For example, the Specification explains that an alarm can
be “output/displayed when the variance is too high.” Spec. ¶ 29. In this way,
it merely adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the recited mental
process. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (explaining that “courts have also
identified examples in which a judicial exception has not been integrated
into a practical application,” including “an additional element that adds
insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception”).
Appellant argues that the alarm requires machine parts. Br. 5. But the
claim only nominally recites an alarm, which at most is a field-of-use
limitation. For example, the MPEP instructs Examiners that Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584 (1978) is an example of a field-of-use limitation. MPEP
§ 2106.05(h). The claimed invention in Flook calculated an updated value
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for an alarm limit “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion
of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586. The court found that the claim was
ineligible. Id. at 590. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
“exalt[] form over substance” because a competent claim drafter could
attach a limitation on the field of use (e.g., the petrochemical and oil-refining
fields) to almost any mathematical formula. Id.
Similarly, the alarm system here simply limits the analysis to a field
of use. At most, the alarm merely reports the result. In this way, it does not
impose a meaningful limitation on the claim. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
55 (explaining that “courts have also identified examples in which a judicial
exception has not been integrated into a practical application,” including
when “an additional element does no more than generally link the use of a
judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of
use.”).
Thus, the outputting step, considered individually and in combination
with the other limitations, does not indicate that the claim integrates the
abstract idea into a practical application.
D. The Combination
Appellant argues that the claims are directed to a “specific tangible
improvement to industrial application,” which is “achieved by the method
steps and the system components in their interaction and interjunction.”
Br. 5. Appellant, however, does not explain how the described “industrial
application” relates to the Alice/Mayo framework that is applied to
determine subject-matter eligibility here. For instance, Appellant’s remarks
lack any citation to the relevant case law. See id. at 4–5.
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Under the Guidance, it is true that an improvement to technology or a
technical field, for example, indicates that the claim may have integrated the
judicial exception into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
But Appellant has not shown that this is the case here. A claim to a judicial
exception cannot be made eligible, for example, “simply by having the
applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for [a] formula to a
particular technological use.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n.14, quoted in MPEP
§ 2106.05(h).
To the extent that the claimed method “can be implemented locally on
a computer, or as an application in a cloud” (Spec. ¶ 45), mere “instructions
to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely [using] a computer
as a tool to perform the abstract idea” indicates that the judicial exception
has not been integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55.
Thus, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments about claim 1’s
reliance on machine parts or an industrial process. See Br. 4–5.
E. Other Indicia of Integration
Claim 1 does not recite the other indicia of integration listed in the
Guidance. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. For instance, “[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)) (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2106.05(c). Yet
“not all transformations . . . infuse an otherwise ineligible claim with an
‘inventive concept.’” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Unlike some eligible transformations, claim 1’s
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method does not transform a physical object or substance. See, e.g., Diehr,
450 U.S. at 184 (a process that transforms rubber).
Thus, claim 1 is directed to the identified abstract idea.
VI. Does the claim provide an inventive concept?
A. Step 2B of the Guidance
To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, the
additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to
determine whether (1) they add a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field
or (2) they simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Also, we
reevaluate our conclusions about the additional elements that we presented
in Step 2A, Prong Two. Id.
B. “recording and storing”
Claim 1 recites, in part, “recording and storing operating parameters
and monitoring parameters of machine parts.” Br. 10.
Here, the recording-and-storing step is claimed generically. Similarly,
the Federal Circuit has determined that “storing test results in a ‘machine-
readable medium’” was well-understood, routine, and conventional activity
previously known to the industry. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am.,
Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (determining that “storing pricing
information, retrieving applicable pricing information” were well-
understood, routine, and conventional activity). The MPEP also instructs
examiners that courts have recognized the function of “[s]toring and
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retrieving information in memory” as well‐understood, routine, and
conventional functions when they are claimed generically. MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II) (citing Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334). Here, the recording-and-
storing step requires no more than a generic computer. Spec. ¶ 45. Thus, we
agree with the Examiner that the recording and storing, as generically recited
in claim 1, is well‐understood, routine, and conventional activity. See
Final 4.
We also reevaluate our conclusions about whether the recited
recording-and-storing step integrates the abstract idea into a practical
application. See supra § V.B. Because this step adds nothing more than well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities, those conclusions stand.
Considering both our previous conclusions and the findings about well‐
understood, routine, and conventional activity, we determine that the
claimed step does not indicate that the claim provides an inventive concept.
C. “outputting”
Claim 1 recites, in part, “outputting an alarm by an alarm system
when the variance exceeds a predefined value.” Br. 10.
As discussed above, the “outputting” step merely reports the result of
the previous calculations. The MPEP notes that courts have found reporting
information and gathering statistics to be well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity when these operations are claimed in a merely generic
way (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution
activity. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (citing OIP, 788 F.3d at 1363 (discussing
presenting offers and gathering statistics)). Here, the Specification explains
that an alarm can be “output/displayed when the variance is too high.” Spec.
¶ 28–29. But apart from this well-understood, routine, and conventional
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activity, the Specification does not further disclose the details of the alarm
system. See, e.g., id. On this record, claim 1 generically recites outputting an
alarm resulting from gathered statistics, which as discussed in the MPEP and
in OIP, is nothing more than well-understood, routine, and conventional
activity.
We also reevaluate our conclusions about whether the outputting step
integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. See supra § V.C.
Because the outputting step adds nothing more than well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities, those conclusions stand. Considering
both our previous conclusions and the findings about well‐understood,
routine, and conventional activity, we determine that the claimed outputting
step does not indicate that the claim provides an inventive concept.
D. The Combination
Appellant does not identify any inventive concept in the recited
combination of steps or any specific arrangement of computing components.
See Br. 4–5. And to the extent that the claimed method “can be implemented
locally on a computer, or as an application in a cloud” (Spec. ¶ 45), using a
computer “only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive
calculations,” may not impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.
Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266,
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Similarly, the MPEP instructs examiners that courts
recognize that using a computer for performing repetitive calculations may
be well‐understood, routine, and conventional when claimed generically,
which is the case here. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(ii) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at
594; Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278).
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At most, the improvement that Appellant describes is to the recited
determinations and analysis, which are part of the abstract idea itself. Yet
“[w]hat is needed is an inventive concept in the non-abstract application
realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018). “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
On this record, the limitations—considered individually and in
combination—do not provide an inventive concept.
E. Conclusion
Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the § 101 rejection of representative
claim 1 and claims 2–12, which are not argued separately. See supra n.3.
VII. Claims 13–15 and 17
Independent claim 13 recites limitations in means-plus-function form
with functions similar to the steps recited in claim 1.
For instance, claim 13 recites a statistical-analysis procedure unit
corresponding to the analysis step in claim 1. Because the recited analysis
can involve simple average analysis procedures on as few as three
parameters and a small number of machines, as discussed above, the
disclosed analysis can practically be calculated mentally or with the
assistance of pen and paper. See Spec. ¶¶ 38–44. As for the recited unit, the
structure in the Specification corresponding to the statistical-analysis
procedure unit is a computer processor. See id. ¶ 45 (“The method/system
can be implemented locally on a computer, or as an application in a cloud.”).
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“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers
performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
n.14. So even if claim 13’s functions “can be implemented locally on a
computer, or as an application in a cloud” (Spec. ¶ 45), which are generic
computer components, then it is still in the mental-processes category
because the steps can practically be performed in the mind. See Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14. Thus, claim 13 recites the same abstract idea as
claim 1 under the Guidance’s Step 2A, Prong One. See supra § IV.
Under the Guidance’s Step 2A Prong Two, claim 13’s additional
elements include (1) a “first means for recording and storing operating
parameters and monitoring parameters of machine parts by using sensors
and/or manually by an operator” and (2) “an alarm system outputting an
alarm when the variance exceeds a predefined value.” These limitations
correspond to the recording and outputting steps recited in claim 1.
Also, to the extent that claim 13 recites a computer, we note that using
the computing device to achieve a solution more quickly may not be
sufficient to show an improvement to computer technology. See Versata,
793 F.3d at 1335; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)(II) (instructing examiners
that a “commonplace business method being applied on a general purpose
computer” may not be sufficient to show an improvement). Here, the
computing device is used as a tool in its ordinary capacity for its calculating
function. See Spec. ¶ 45.
Indeed, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the
claim is an indication that the abstract idea has been integrated into a
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practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. But a general-purpose
processor that merely executes the judicial exception—as is the case here—
is not a particular machine. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cited in MPEP § 2106.05(b)(I). Essentially, the
recited computing device is a general-purpose computer that executes the
abstract idea. See Spec. ¶ 45. So for the same reasons discussed above (see
supra § V), claim 13 is directed to the abstract idea under the Guidance’s
Step 2A Prong Two.
Under the Guidance’s Step 2B, the same reasons discussed for claim 1
apply to claim 13. See supra § VI. Also, to the extent that claim 13 recites a
computer, the MPEP instructs examiners that the courts have recognized that
performing repetitive calculations can be a well‐understood, routine, and
conventional function when claimed generically. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)
(citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (computing or readjusting alarm limit values);
Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s
claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of
repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the
scope of those claims.”)). In claim 13, there is no indication that the claimed
calculations require any specialized computer function. Rather, claim 13
uses a general-purpose computer only for its most basic function: executing
the calculations. Thus, we agree that the claimed computing device is well‐
understood, routine, and conventional. Final 4.
Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 13
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the § 101 rejection of claim 13 and
claims 14, 15 and 17, which are not argued separately. See Br. 4–5.

Appeal 2018-007164
Application 15/278,525

19
THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION
I. The Examiner’s Rejection
The Examiner determines that representative5 claim 1 is anticipated
by Smith. Final 6. According to the Examiner, Smith discloses that the
recited “statistical analysis” is based on a comparison group because Smith’s
enterprise-wide information system (“EWIS”) 27 collects data and sends it
to data-analysis applications 10 that use the data to predict future problems
or failures. Ans. 10 (citing Smith ¶ 43).
II. Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant argues that, unlike the claimed invention, Smith does not
perform a statistical analysis of a comparison group of machine parts to
determine the upper and lower bounds. Br. 6.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner combines different
embodiments from Smith. Id.
III. Analysis
Claim 1 recites, in part, “using a statistical analysis procedure for
creating a threshold value based on the determined comparison group.”
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
The plain language of claim 1 requires that the recited “comparison
group” is a group of “comparable machine parts and comparable operating
parameters.” For example, the Specification lists that the group can be (1)
“identical or similar machine parts from a specific product family from a
specific manufacturer, e.g. machine parts from a specific product family of

5 Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 4–13, 15, and 17 as a group. See Br. 5–7. We
select claim 1 as representative of claims 1, 2, 4–13, 15, and 17 for the
anticipation rejection. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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20
an automotive manufacturer” or (2) “machine parts from a specific product
family from a specific manufacturer and the machine parts perform similar
tasks (e.g. welding),” among other things. Spec. ¶ 34. But the disclosed “list
is intended only for illustration and is neither complete nor definitive.”
Id. ¶ 35. So under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the group can
include other types of comparable machine parts and comparable operating
parameters.
Consistent with the example about “similar machine parts” in the
Specification (id. ¶ 34, item i), Smith states that the disclosed application
can “compare similar equipment” (Smith ¶ 59). Smith also discloses that
EWIS 27 collects “data from various pieces of equipment and/or machinery
(i.e., one or more devices).” Smith ¶ 43. Because Smith compares a group of
similar equipment in this way, the weight of the evidence here favors the
Examiner’s finding that Smith discloses a “comparison group.” Final 6;
Ans. 10.
We also agree with the Examiner that Smith’s analysis is “based on
the determined comparison group.” Final 6; Ans. 10. In particular, Smith’s
EWIS 27 collects “data from various pieces of equipment and/or machinery
(i.e., one or more devices)” and makes this data “available for the data
analysis applications 10.” Smith ¶ 43; see also Smith ¶ 59 (discussing
“similar equipment”). According to Smith, “[t]he data analysis applications
10 can use the information collected to monitor the current activity of
equipment or machinery, as well as to predict future problems or failures.”
Id. ¶ 43.
For example, application 35 can compare “similar equipment,” and
with the data, the user can determine minimum and maximum values.
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Id. ¶ 59. The data collected by the EWIS establishes a baseline or normal
range of values for monitored parameters. Id. ¶ 60. Values that fall outside
the normal range indicate that the equipment is not operating correctly. Id.
Because Smith’s EWIS collects data that establishes a “normal range” for
the parameters in this way, Smith establishes a baseline or normal range of
values for monitored parameters by “statistical analysis” based on data
collected from a “comparison group,” as recited. Id.
In sum, we agree with the Examiner that Smith discloses using a
statistical analysis procedure for creating a threshold value (i.e., Smith’s
analysis that creates the normal range) based on the determined comparison
group. See Ans. 10–11.
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
combines different embodiments from Smith. Br. 6. Apart from stating that
this can be seen from the Office Action, Appellant provides little support for
this argument. See id. Here, the Examiner relies upon the embodiment from
Smith that analyzes collected data. For example, the Examiner cites Smith’s
paragraph 59, which discusses analyzing parameters over time. See, e.g.,
Final 6 (citing Smith ¶ 59); Ans. 10 (citing Smith ¶ 59). Appellant has not
sufficiently explained which other embodiments are being combined by the
Examiner. See Br. 5–7.
Thus, we sustain the anticipation rejection of representative claim 1
and claims 2, 4–13, 15, and 17, which are not argued separately (see supra
n.5).

Appeal 2018-007164
Application 15/278,525

22
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION
Claim 3 depends from claim 2, which in turn, depends from
independent claim 1. Claim 14 depends from independent claim 13. In
arguing for the patentability of claims 3 and 14, Appellant refers to the
arguments presented for independent claim 1. Br. 7. As discussed above,
these arguments are unpersuasive. So for the reasons discussed in connection
with claim 1, we also sustain the rejections of claims 3 and 14.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15 and 17.
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1–15, 17 101 Eligibility 1–15, 17
1, 2, 4–13,
15, 17
102 Smith 1, 2, 4–13, 15,
17

3, 14 103 Smith, Keenan 3, 14
Overall
Outcome
1–15, 17

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge, concurs in the Judgment.