Deshonda R. Goode, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (New York Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 20, 2011
0120111182 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 20, 2011)

0120111182

12-20-2011

Deshonda R. Goode, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (New York Metro Area), Agency.




Deshonda R. Goode,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(New York Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120111182

Hearing No. 520-2010-00293X

Agency No. 4A117008009

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s November 19, 2010,

final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Letter Carrier at the Hempstead, New York Post Office.

On November 24, 2009, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race/national origin

(African American), color (Black), and reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when, on June

24, 2009, she was issued a notice of removal.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

timely requested a hearing. Without objections from either party, the AJ

assigned to the case issued a decision without a hearing on October 28,

2010. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s

finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her

to discrimination as alleged.

In her decision, the AJ found Complainant was removed from her position

on the charge of Failure to Operate a Motor Vehicle in a Safe Manner/

Failure to Follow Instructions. Briefly, the notice of removal indicated

Complainant was observed failing to wear her seat belt, making a u-turn,

and failing to have her vehicle door closed when entering or crossing an

intersection. The AJ noted that Complainant had four previous accidents

within the past five years. There were two vehicle accidents and two

industrial accidents. In addition, Complainant had six worker’s

compensation claims for work-related injuries.

The AJ found that Complainant established a prima facie case of

discrimination because she asserted that she was treated more harshly

than other employees who were not within her protected class. However,

management witnesses provided evidence that many employees outside of

her protected class were punished for similar actions. The AJ also

noted that among the other employees who were disciplined, only four had

any previous violations. The AJ indicated that it was undisputed that

Complainant had received two 14-day suspension letters and four seven-day

suspension letters, as well as a letter of warning. The Agency asserted

that Complainant was removed because of her inability to work in a safe

manner and because her work performance and attendance had not shown

any improvement. The AJ concluded that Complainant failed to show that

the Agency’s reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal

and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision

without holding a hearing is not appropriate.

Upon review of the record we find that the AJ properly found that the

instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. The record is

adequately developed and there are no identified disputes of material

fact. Moreover, we note that both parties moved for a decision by

summary judgment.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with, however, when the agency has articulated legitimate and

nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United States Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983);

Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842

(November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency’s explanation is a

pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Upon review of the record we find that Complainant has failed to prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s reasons for its

actions were a pretext for discrimination. Rather, as noted by the AJ,

Complainant had a history of accidents and a lengthy disciplinary record

including previous 14-day and 7-day suspensions. Thus, the Agency’s

legitimate reasons for its actions are well supported by the undisputed

evidence of record.

Accordingly, the Agency’s final decision is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 20, 2011

__________________

Date

2

0120111182

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120111182