Dennison Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 27, 1967

168 N.L.R.B. 1012 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

1012 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dennison Manufacturing Company and United
Papermakers and Paperworkers , AFL-CIO and
Dennison Employees Committee , Party to the Con-
tract
Dennison Manufacturing Company and United
Papermakers and Paperworkers , AFL-CIO, Peti-
tioner. Cases 1-CA-5080, 1-RC-8287, and
1-RC-8350
December 27, 1967
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTIONS
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On May 2, 1966, Trial Examiner David E. Davis
issued his Decision in the above-entitled con-
solidated proceeding, finding that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, by contributing financial and
other support to the Dennison Employees Commit-
tee, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom, and take certain affirmative action, as
set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
The Trial Examiner also found merit in certain ob-
jections to the elections filed in Cases 1-RC-8287
and 8350, and recommended that new elections be
ordered.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the Dennison
Employees Committee filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's specific 8(a)(2) findings, and briefs in
support of such exceptions; the Charging Party
filed cross-exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
failure to find domination; and the General Counsel
filed no exceptions, but, in his brief, urged the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board to find that Respond-
ent unlawfully dominated the Dennison Em-
ployees Committee in view of the evidence adduced
at the hearing.
The Board, on November 1, 1966, issued an
Order, finding the allegation of a violation of Sec-
ion 8(a)(2) in the complaint sufficient to include an
allegation of employer domination, and remanding
the proceeding to the Trial Examiner for further
hearings to afford Respondent an opportunity to
raise any defenses, and to enable the parties to ad-
duce additional evidence and present legal argu-
ment on that issue. Thereafter, on November' 17,
1966, the Board denied Respondent's motion for
reconsideration of the Board's Order as well as its
request for oral argument before the Board.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connec-
tion with these cases to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearings herein and finds that
no prejudicial error was committed. I The rulings
are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered
the entire record in these cases, including the
evidence adduced at both hearings, the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision and Supplemental Decision, and
the exceptions thereto and briefs, and hereby
adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner's Decisions.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, dated April
20, 1967, and orders that the Respondent,
Dennison Manufacturing Company, Framingham,
Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as so
modified:
Delete from paragraph 2(c) of the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order that part thereof
which reads "to be furnished" and substitute
therefor "on forms provided ...."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the elections held
on June 15, 1965, in Cases 1-RC-8287 and 8350,
be, and they hereby are, set aside, and that such
proceedings be, and they hereby are, remanded to
the Regional Director for Region 1 for the purpose
of conducting new elections at such time as he
deems circumstances permit the free choice of a
bargaining representative.
[Direction of Second Elections omitted from
publication.]
' The Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner's refusal to con-
duct a hearing de novo and admit all relevant evidence without regard to
the earlier hearing, indicated his bias or prejudgment of these cases and
denied Respondent a fair hearing. We reject Respondent's contention of
bias. The Respondent argues basically that evidence was excluded and
that the Trial Examiner's rejection of offers of proof tainted the hearing
notwithstanding his later reversal of that ruling In fact, the record shows
that not only were all offers of proof permitted, but testimony of witnesses
was admitted without regard to whether similar evidence had been ad-
duced at the earlier hearing. Further, Respondent and the Committee
have not specified any evidence in support of Respondent's defense which
they assert they were not allowed to adduce, and our review of the record
reveals none. Accordingly, there is no showing of prejudice to the parties.
2 In adopting the Trial Examiner's finding of unlawful domination, we
rely, inter alia, on Respondent's control over the administration of the
Committee's day-to-day affairs via representation on its important Com-
mittee on Procedure, as revealed by the "Constitution" of the Committee
which was received in evidence, as well as Respondent's implicit power,
by virtue of the structure of the Committee, to control not only the com-
position but the continued existence of the Committee through exercise of
its managerial authority. Tuscaroba Plastics Co., 167 NLRB 1059,
The Carpenter Steel Company, 76 NLRB 670.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID E. DAVIS, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed
on July 19, 1965, a complaint was issued on September
8, 1965, in Case 1-CA-5080, alleging that Dennison
Manufacturing Company, Respondent herein, had en-
gaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning
168 NLRB No. 131
DENNISON MFG. CO.
of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, herein called the Act. This case was
consolidated with objections to elections in Cases
1-RC-8287 and 1-RC-8350. Copies of the Order con-
solidating cases, complaint and notice of hearing were
served on the parties.' Respondent filed an answer deny-
ing that it had engaged in the unfair labor practices al-
leged. A hearing was held before me, the duly designated
Trial Examiner, in these consolidated cases at Boston,
Massachusetts, February 1, 3, and 4, 1966. All parties
were represented and were afforded a full opportunity to
be heard, to participate in the hearing, to introduce rele-
vant evidence bearing on the issues, to argue the issues
orally on the record, and to file briefs and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Counsel for the
General Counsel, herein called General Counsel, the
Respondent, Dennison Employees Committee, and the
Charging Party submitted briefs which have been fully
considered. Various motions have been made by the
Respondent to dismiss the complaint and the objections
to the elections.2 These motions are disposed of in the fol-
lowing findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and I
find that the Respondent, a Nevada corporation, at all
times material to this proceeding maintained its principal
office and place of business at 300 Howard Street in
Framingham, Massachusetts, and an office and place of
business at Maynard, Massachusetts. At these locations
the Respondent is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of paper jewelry boxes, price marking tags,
and related paper products. In pursuance of its business,
the Respondent annually receives quantities of paper,
paper boxes, and goods valued in excess of $50,000 from
points located outside the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts and annually ships products valued in excess
of $50,000 from its locations at Framingham and
Maynard to points located outside the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. It is found that the Respondent is en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act and that it would effectuate the policies
of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
United Papermakers and Paperworkers , AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, and Dennison Employees Com-
mittee, herein called the Committee, are labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
' Dennison Employees Committee was in all material respects treated
as a party to this proceeding and is so regarded and found by me It was
served with copies of the charge, complaint and notice of hearing. It was
represented at the hearing by its president and was given full opportunity
to participate.
2 Counsel for Respondent moved by motion dated February 21, 1966,
to correct the transcript in certain respects. I deny the motion for the
reasons that I stated on the record of this hearing (p. 353, 1, 19-p 354, 1.
IH. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1013
A. The Allegations of the Complaint
The charge filed in behalf of the Union by its attorney
alleged that the Respondent was in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act in that the Respondent had
dominated and interfered with the formation and adminis-
tration of the Committee and had contributed financial
and other support to it. The General Counsel's complaint
issued by the Regional Director of Region 1, as amended
at the hearing, alleges that Respondent was in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act in that it had rendered
and was continuing to render unlawful aid, assistance,
and support to the Committee and that this conduct inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced and is continuing to
interfere with, restrain, and coerce its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7
of the Act. The Respondent denied each of the allegations
of the complaint.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the undersigned Trial
Examiner addressed himself to the parties and stated,11. .. if under all the circumstances here and all the
testimony and exhibits even though domination is not al-
leged, I would like you, to have you discuss, if I should
find domination here, my right to do so, and I want you to
examine Hughes Tool,3 the Board's decision, with
respect to that matter." Counsel for Respondent
protested that he would want to prepare his case to meet
such an allegation or at the very least that the complaint
should be amended in order to afford him an opportunity
to present evidence on domination. Counsel further
stated that he objected to having to argue this point in his
brief.
I also suggested that the parties discuss in their briefs
the appropriate remedy in the event that a finding of
assistance was made. I particularly requested discussion
whether disestablishment4 would be an appropriate
remedy in this case.
It is apparent that the question I posed is clearly distin-
guishable from that in Hughes Tool.5 In the latter case
the Board majority in agreement with the Trial Examiner
held that the Board was not precluded from proper con-
sideration as to whether the conduct of the Respondent
therein violated Section 8(b)(2) and (3) of the Act "when
facts have been alleged and fully litigated ... merely
because the General Counsel chose not to allege as a
legal conclusion that the pleaded and litigated facts vio-
late these sections of the Act." The instant case concerns
a violation of Section- 8(a)(2) which has been pleaded by
the General Counsel, but the General Counsel failed to
state in his complaint that the acts constituted "domina-
tion."
The distinguishing feature between the instant case and
Hughes Tool is that the General Counsel, here, did plead
that Respondent was in violation of 8(a)(2) but failed to
20, incl.)
3 The transcript reads "Udes Tool" and p. 365,1. 10, thereof, is hereby
corrected by substituting "Hughes Tool" for "Udes Tool."
4 The transcript reads, "this establishment " Accordingly p. 366, 1. 18
of the transcript is hereby corrected by substituting "disestablishment"
for "this establishment."
5 147 NLRB 1573.
1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
allege in his complaint that the conduct constituted
domination. However, I did assure counsel for the
Respondent on at least two occasions° that he would
make no findings which went beyond the allegations of
the complaint. As the General Counsel did not object to
these limitations and as the General Counsel has not
moved to amend the complaint by alleging domination, I
deem myself bound by the assurances made to counsel
for the Respondent and, therefore, I will abstain from
finding domination by Respondent of the Committee,
even though a strong argument has been made in the
Union's brief that this issue was fully litigated and ac-
tually deals with the remedy rather than the merits of the
complaint. 7
B. The Committee
1. The organization of the Committee and its
constitution
The only evidence introduced concerning the inception
and organization of the Committee is contained in Joint
Exhibit 7.8 This exhibit is a letter on the stationery of the
Respondent dated June 4, 1965, and addressed to
"Dennison Families." Apparently it was sent by the
Respondent as part of a preelection campaign against the
Union. The sections pertinent to the subject matters
presently under discussion read as follows:
. At a mass meeting held on July 2, 1919, the em-
ployees decided to elect two employees from each
department to draw up a constitution for the forma-
tion of a committee to represent the employees of the
Company in negotiating agreements with manage-
ment.
At another meeting of all employees on September
18, 1919, the constitution was approved. There have
been changes in the constitution from time to time,
but the purpose has always been as it was in the
beginning - to present all employees with a means of
settling all problems as they arise without having to
pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for this
privilege.
These 46 years have represented a long period of
peaceful coexistence between management and non-
management employees where the attitude of both
has been to maintain a mutually beneficial period of
labor peace rather than labor conflict. There have
been differences of opinion as there would be within
any company, but satisfactory solutions have been
worked out by the bargaining group through regular
committee and grievances procedures... .
The record establishes the fact that the Committee has
continued to exist and function from its inception in 1919
up to and including the present time. As mentioned in the
foregoing excerpt from the Respondent's letter, the con-
stitution of the Committee has been amended from time
to time. The last revision and printing of the constitution,
except for a revision in 1965, occurred in April 1959.9
Most pertinent to the issues in the proceeding are the
6 See transcript pp. 70-72 mcI. and p 160.
P The word "domination" has achieved, pursuant to Board decisions
and court approval, the stature of a word of art in that, where domination
of a labor organization is found, disestablishment may be ordered as an ap-
propriate remedy, while, where interference and/or assistance is found,
disestablishment of the labor organization would not be appropriate as a
remedy The Carpenter Steel Company, 76 NLRB 670, Hershey Metal
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
provisions of the constitution of the Committee contained
in article IV, section 1, 2, and 3, which are as follows:
ARTICLE IV.
CONFERENCE COMMITTEES
SECTION 1. STANDING CONFERENCE
COMMITTEES AND SUB-COMMITTEES
In order to bring about the cooperative con-
sideration and constructive develooment by the Em-
ployee Committee and the management, of the
recommendations or suggestions of either body, the
following Standing Conference of Sub-Committees
shall be appointed:
Conference Committees:
1. Procedure and Publicity.
2. Personnel - (Hours, Wages and Promotions,
Unemployment, and Classifications)
3. Older Service.
4. Returning Veterans.
5. Vacation.
6. Separation.
7. Prevention of Stealing.
8. Health & Accident.
9. Clerical Review
10. Service - (Building and Facilities, Health and
Safety and Service.)
11. Bond.
12. Unemployment Leaves.
13. Mechanical Classification.
14. Rules Governing Out-Time for 15-Year Em-
ployees
Sub-Committees:
1. By-Laws.
2. Tellers.
3. Labor Legislation.
4. Refreshment.
5. Fire Engineers.
6. Suggestions.
7. Bloodmobile.
These committees shall hold office until December
31 of the year for which they were appointed or until
the appointment of their successors. Conference
Committees shall consist of from two to six mem-
bers, one-half of whom shall be designated by the
management, and one-half by the Employee Com-
mittee. The Chairman of the Employee Committee
and the Chairman of the Central Committee shall
make appointments on behalf of the Employee Com-
mittee.
SECTION 2. COMMITTEE ON PROCE-
DURE-SPECIAL CONFERENCE COM-
MITTEES.
The Committee on Procedure shall consist of the
Chairman of the Employee Committee, the Vice
Products Company, 76 NLRB 695.
6 Ten Exhibits were marked and received as "Joint Exhibits" pursuant
to a stipulation in which all parties agreed that they were admissible as
evidence subject to the reservation that argument could be made with re-
gard to the weight to be given any or all of these exhibits.
9 The constitution is in evidence as Joint Exhibit 4
DENNISON MFG. CO. 1015
Chairman of the Employee Committee, and of two
members designated by the management. Whenever
the management or the Employee Committee has
prepared a recommendation for the consideration or
action of the other, the recommendation shall first be
sent to the Committee on Procedure. In regard to all
recommendations which are brought to it, except
those which relate directly to the revision of the con-
stitution and By-Laws, or to other matters of
procedure, the Committee on Procedure shall take
no direct action, but shall determine whether the
recommendation is of sufficient importance to be
referred to a Conference Committee. If so, it shall
forward the recommendation directly to the ap-
propriate Standing Conference Committee, if any. If
the recommendation does not come within the scope
of any Standing Conference Committee, the Com-
mittee on Procedure shall create a special committee
to deal with the question. Each such committee shall
consist of from two to six members, one-half ap-
pointed by the representatives of the management,
and one-half by the representatives of the Employee
Committee on the Committee on Procedure; but in
no case shall announcement be made of these ap-
pointments until the appointments have been brought
up for discussion of the full Committee on
Procedure. If the Committee on Procedure decides
that it is unnecessary to refer a recommendation to
a Conference Committee, it shall forward the recom-
mendation without amendment directly to the Em-
ployee Committee or to the management, as the case
requires.
By vote of the General Body a special committee
can be appointed to handle a problem regardless of
the powers of any standing conference committee.
Section 3. DUTIES OF CONFERENCE
COMMITTEES.
Every Conference Committee, whether standing
or special, shall discuss, investigate and at its discre-
tion, shall revise or add to all recommendations sub-
mitted to it, and through the Committee on
Procedure shall report its action and conclusions or
any new recommendations, to the person designated
by management for the consideration of manage-
ment, and to the Secretary of the Employee Commit-
tee for the consideration of the Employee Commit-
tee; but no action or conclusion of any Conference
Committee, except the action of the Committee on
Procedure in creating special Conference Commit-
tees and Classification Committees on Classifica-
tions, shall be binding unless and until it is expressly
authorized or ratified both by the Management and
by the Employee Committee.
Before arriving at a decision on a Classification,
one employee and/or his Respresentative and the
Division Manager or the Department Head will be
given the opportunity to appear, if they so desire, be-
fore the Personnel Committee, Clerical Review
Committee, or Mechanical Classification Commit-
tee.
All majority reports of the above Committees on
Classifications will be final. If one of the Committees
is unable to reach a majority decision on a Classifica-
tion, any subsequent decision made by management
in regard thereto is subject to the grievance
procedure.
Any Classification is subject to review by the ap-
propriate Classification Committee, upon request,
after one year from the date of the original decision
or date of the last previous reconsideration decision.
2. Additional findings concerning Committee
From my study of the constitution and the record of the
evidence adduced at the hearing, I make the following
findings concerning the Committee:
(a) The Committee regularly meets on company
premises on the first Monday of each month, it is known
also as the general body and consists at the present time
of 44 representatives who are known also as Department
Representatives. The Committee has no dues and no in-
come. It is fully financed by the Respondent and the
representatives suffer no loss of wages and are reim-
bursed expenses by the Respondent for time spent on the
committee business.' 0
(b) The rank-and-file employees, who number approx-
imately 2000 employees, never meet as a group, do not
pay dues, have no membership in the Committee, and do
not participate in the activities of the Committee, except
those employees who meet the following eligibility
requirements have a right to vote for a departmental
representative: (1) 18 years of age; (2) 1000 hours of em-
ployment by the Company; and (3) are working on the
day of election. Employees eligible to be elected as de-
partment representative and thus be a member of the
Committee or general body must meet the following eligi-
bility requirements: (1) 21 years of age; (2) employed 1
year by the company; and (3) be citizens of the United
States.
(c) The Respondent's personnel clerk prepares the
eligibility list of voters and those eligible for election as
departmental representative.
(d) The Respondent maintains a bulletin board and
rank-and-file employees and supervisors are notified of
the Committee's actions by a notice posted on the bulletin
board. All notices posted by the Committee must have
prior approval of management.
(e) The Respondent has a bargaining relationship with
other labor organizations each of which maintains a bul-
letin board on the company premises and on which they
can post notices to members without prior approval of
management."
(f) Members of the other unions are eligible to vote for
departmental ,representative or to hold any of the offices
of the Committee provided they meet the Committee's
eligibility requirements. However, the Committee does
10 The monthly cost of such financing is reflected in G.C Exh 11(a)
through 11(g) which indicate that the expenses for the Committee for
January 1965 were $3969, February $4692, March $5305, April $5300,
May $4583, June $5143, and July $4135.
11 These labor organizations and the approximate number of employees
in their respective 'units are as follows: Boston Photo-Engravers' Union
#3-18; Boston Electrotypers Union #11-13, Boston Typographers
Union # 13-16, Local # 16, International Brotherhood of Bookbinders-7,
International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North
America- 18, International Association of Machinists and Nobscot Lodge
#1973, District 38-130, Printing Specialties & Pressmen 's Union and its
Local #528-18 , and Lithographers and Photo -Engravers ' International
Union Boston 3-P-AFL-CIO7.
1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not bargain or process grievances concerning the em-
ployees in the various units represented by other unions.
(g) The Company customarily compensates em-
ployees who are members of other unions for time lost on
union business dealing with the Company.
(h) During 1965, the president of the Committee was
a member of the I.T.U. and in the unit represented by the
I.T.U. He has been president for 3 years. Seven other de-
partmental representatives are likewise members of other
unions and are employed in units represented by their
respective unions.12
(i) During the elections which are involved in these
proceedings some departmental representatives acted as
observers for the Employer and were paid for the time
spent while acting as observers. Departmental represent-
atives who were observers for the Union were not com-
pensated by the Company.
0) The Committee was not on the ballot in the election
because it had decided at a special meeting called by its
president not to intervene in the Board representation
proceedings and not to appear on the ballot as it was their
opinion that a vote against the Union would be equivalent
to a vote for the Committee.
(k) There are no formal agreements between the
Respondent and the Committee but announcements by
the Committee after assent by the Respondent constitute
an agreement between the Respondent and the Commit-
tee in behalf of the employees unrepresented by other
unions. Thereafter employees are informed by notices
posted on the bulletin board.
(1) The Committee consists of departmental represent-
atives in four plants of the Company, Framingham,
Maynard, Hudson, and Marlboro. Only two of the plants,
that in Framingham and Maynard, are involved in these
proceedings.
C. Unlawful Aid, Assistance, and Support
The principal witnesses in this proceeding were the
president of the Committee, Ambrose H. Fitch,13 and R.
L. Allen, Respondent's personnel manager.
Additionally, findings herein are based on the docu-
mentary exhibits which were in the possession of the
Committee and/or the Respondent. These documents
were produced promptly upon the request of the General
Counsel, Respondent's Counsel, or me. Moreover, coun-
sel for Respondent, the Committee representative, and
the General Counsel greatly expedited the hearing by
fully cooperating in gathering and marking the documents
in an orderly fashion.
I find that the Committee could not exist but for the un-
lawful aid, assistance, and support rendered by the
Respondent. To recite all the indicia of illegal aid,
assistance, and support would unnecessarily encumber
this Decision. It would seem, therefore, sufficient to
enumerate some of the more vital elements of the illegal
course of conduct engaged in by the Respondent.
Initially, it is clear that, under the provisions of the con-
stitution of the Committee, management has an equal
voice on the decisions of the key committees of the Com-
mittee and thus can veto any meaningful action of the
'2 See Joint Exh. 3
13 Fitch is a member of the LT U. and is employed in a unit represented
by the I.T.U. rather than the Committee.
11 Matters outside the 10(b) period have been considered by me as
background in evaluating the character of the Committee and Respond-
Committee. Significant in this regard is Respondent's Ex-
hibit 6 which bears the heading, "Dennison Employees
Committee." The Procedure Committee is the first stand-
ing conference committee -listed and consists of R. L. Al-
len, D. F. Prince, A. Fitch, and C. Merlini. This commit-
tee, under the constitution of the Committee and as
testified to by Fitch and Allen functions as the conduit for
all other committees and the general body.
I conclude that the procedure 'committee is in ac-
tuality the overseer of the entire structural organization
of the Committee. It allocates any action of the general
body to a subordinate committee, approves the agenda of
the general body, and approves completed actions for
posting on the bulletin' board subject to the approval of
management. The R. L. Allen on this Committee is the
personnel manager for all four of Respondent's plants and
is in charge of employment, employee fringe benefits pro-
grams, and negotiations with labor organizations for the
Respondent. D. F. Prince, another member of the
procedure committee, is the general manager of the ther-
rimage department. A. Fitch, a member of the LT.U., is
the president of the Committee, and C. Merlin is a press
operator. All other standing conference committees in ac-
cordance with the constitution of the Committee have
management representatives equal, in numbers to depart-
ment representatives. It was stipulated at the hearing that
all management representatives who are on committees
of the Committee are supervisors within the meaning of
the Act. The above description of the committees
establishes the fact that no decisions, especially in any of
the conference committees, can be made without manage-
ment approval because the conference committees are
equally divided between management and departmental
representatives.
The Committee does not now, and as far as this record
is concerned it has never, provided for membership of
employees or participation by them in committee activi-
ties, excepting the right to vote or to be elected as a
representative in accordance with ^ the eligibility rules.
The record establishes that there are no provisions in the
Committee's constitution for a general meeting of em-
ployees nor has there been one held since the formation
of the Committee in 1919. As noted, above results of
meetings with management and committee action are
posted on the bulletin board for employees' information
after approval by management.
Through the Committee's 47 years of existence there
has been no comprehensive trade agreement covering
wages, hours, and working conditions, employees have
had no opportunity to accept or reject any, agreements
reached by the Committee or the form of representation
that the Committee affords. 14 The Committee even
refused to participate by appearing on the ballot in the
election ordered by the Regional Director on the
representation petitions involved herein.
The foregoing recital establishes that the Respondent's
voice and participation in the affairs of the Committee
severely circumscribed and limited ' the Committee's _
freedom to function as a labor organization.ts
Accordingly, I find that the above constitutes unlawful in-
terference with the administration of the Committee in
ent's conduct within the 10(h) period
' Indicative of these limitations is "Article V III - Amendments." This
article provides that no amendment to the constitution of the Committee
shall be operative until referred to management if it alters the, relationships
established under the Employee Committee Plan;i,e., the Committee.
DENNISON MFG. CO.
violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
The record establishes that the financial contribution
to the Committee by the Respondent averages in excess
of $4,000 per month. The Committee has no funds, has
no source of income, and looks to the Respondent as its
sole source of finances. I find that this substantial finan-
cial contribution by the Respondent constitutes illegal
aid, assistance, and support of the Committee in violation
of Section 8(a)(2).
As the Committee could not function without the use
of the Respondent's premises for meetings and for con-
duct of its elections and is wholly dependent upon the
Respondent for supplies, stationery, secretarial services,
and lists of eligibility for voting and for election to office,
I find that this assistance which is furnished by the
Respondent likewise constitutes unlawful aid, assistance,
and support within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) of the
Act.
D. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion of Employees
The aid and assistance furnished by the Respondent,
and Respondent's interference with the administration of
the Committee, during the 6 months preceding the filing
of the charge, as described above, clearly inhibited em-
ployees in the free selection of a collective-bargaining
representative and constitutes interference, restraint, and
coercion of employees in violation of the rights guaran-
teed to them in Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so find.
The record establishes that even while the representa-
tion petitions were pending, through the election cam-
paign and continuing to the present time, the Respondent
has recognized the Committee and continued to par-
ticipate in the administration and functioning of the Com-
mittee through its supervisors who are management
representatives on the various conference and other com-
mittees; and that Respondent continued and is continuing
its aid, assistance, and support.
Shortly before the election, on June 4, 1965, Respond-
ent, on its letter head, addressed a letter to "Dennison
Families."16 This letter exhorted a vote against the Union
and praised the Committee's record of accomplishment.
It concluded with the hope that the employees would vote
not to change the present relationship. Inasmuch as I
have found above that the Committee was unlawfully
aided, assisted, and supported by the Respondent and
that Respondent interfered with the administration of the
Committee, the expression of preference contained in this
letter constitutes an independent violation of Section
8(a)(1) in that it interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in their rights under Section 7 of the Act. I so
find. It is also found that this constituted unlawful
assistance within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2).17
E. The Objections to the Election
Cases 1-RC-8287 and 8350 are involved in the objec-
tions to the election. The Union filed a petition on
16 Joint Exh. 8.
17 Atco-Surgical Supports, Inc., 157 NLRB 551.
18 The Employer, Respondent herein, filed a motion with the Regional
Director on July 1, 1965, requesting dismissal of the objections on
procedural grounds. The Acting Regional Director denied the motion and
stated his reasons therefor in his Supplemental Decisions. (G.C Exhs.
1(i) and (h).) As the Board has denied the Employer's appeal from the Act-
ing Regional Director's Supplemental Decision, I am bound by the ruling
1017
February 26, 1965, in Case 1-RC-8287 seeking to
represent certain employees at the Framingham, Mas-
sachusetts, plant. The Regional Director issued his deci-
sion and direction on May 10, 1965. The petition in Case
1-RC-8350 was filed by the Union on April 6, 1965, and
it covered certain employees in the Maynard, Mas-
sachusetts, plant. The decision and direction was also is-
sued by the Regional Director in the latter case on May
18, 1965. Both elections were held on June 15, 1965, and
resulted in rejection of the Union at both plants, 775
against and 443 for the Union in the Framingham plant.
The vote in the Maynard plant was 170 against and 59 for
the Union. The Committee did not appear on the ballot as
it had decided at a special meeting held on March 15,
1965, not to intervene in the representation proceedings.
Objections to the election were filed by the Union on
June 21, 1965.18
I have found above that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8 (a)(2) by conduct which constituted unlawful inter-
ference with the administration of the Committee and that
Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(2) by conduct
which constituted illegal aid, assistance, and support of
the Union. I have found also that Respondent has en-
gaged in certain conduct in violation of 8(a)(1). As the
acts, upon which I have predicated my findings above,
continued during the crucial time period which com-
mences with the filing of the petition to the time of the
election,19 I find that this conduct interfered with the em-
ployees' right to a free and untrammeled choice in the
elections. Accordingly, I shall order that the election held
on June 15, 1965, in Cases I-RC-8287 and 1-RC-8350,
be set aside and a new election conducted at an ap-
propriate time to be determined by the Regional Director
of Region 1.
F. Contention of the Parties and Concluding Findings
Respondent's brief concedes inferentially that the
Committee's freedom to function is limited and circum-
scribed when it states "As a practical matter, all action [s]
of the procedure committee require the approval of both
the Employee's Committee and the Respondent." In-
asmuch as the procedure committee is provided for in the
constitution of the Committee, the functioning of such a
key committee is certainly limited and subjected to the
Respondent's will and veto when "all actions of the
procedure committee" require the approval of the
Respondent. A bona fide labor organization cannot func-
tion in its day-to-day operations subject to an employer's
approval or veto. Neither can there be true arms length
dealing between a labor organization and management
when all matters that could concern the internal affairs of
the labor organization are subjected to approval or veto
by management in the initial stage by the equal represen-
tation of the procedure committee and the power of this
committee to fashion the agenda of the Committee.
The argument made by Respondent in its brief that the
employees could have elected representatives to effect
and find that the objections are properly before me. Moreover, the
Respondent is not prejudiced thereby as I make no findings based on the
documents that are the subject matter of the motion.
19 In Ideal Electric and Manufacturing Co., 134 NLRB 1275, the
Board established the principle that conduct in the period between the fil-
ing of the petition and the election which tends to prevent a free election
may be grounds for setting the election aside.
1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
changes in the structure or approach of the committee
lacks substance and ignores the actual facts. The con-
stitution of the Committee provides that no changes
therein may be made without management approval,
hence a rank-and-file movement to change the structure
or approach would be doomed to failure from its incep-
tion unless management approved. Moreover, when in
1965, a dissident group of employees did attempt to
secure help from another union, the Union herein, the
very existence of the Committee and its entire operating
structure constituted a barrier to a free and untrammeled
choice by the employees. The continued functioning of
the Committee during the 10(b) period and while the peti-
tion for election was pending, aided and abetted by the
continued illegal aid, asisistance, and support, acted as a
strong deterent and coercive force against a free expres-
sion of the employee's choice of a bargaining representa-
tive. I so find. Under these circumstances the Respond-
ent's contention that the Committee has majority sup-
port cannot be seriously advanced. At any rate, I believe
such an argument cannot be seriously considered and is
devoid of merit, for, if any majority status be attributed to
the Committee as a result of the election, the phrase
"coerced majority" is more descriptive of the Commit-
tee's representative status. In view of my findings herein,
I conclude contrary to Respondent's contention that the
Committee did not represent an uncoerced majority of
the employees at any time material herein.
Respondent, in its brief, urges as a basic defense to the
aid, assistance, and support afforded the Committee that
the limited use of the Respondent's time and property
was on the same basis permitted all other unions and that
it was no violation to do so. This argument begs the issue
and seems to be a plea in avoidance rather than a defense.
Initially, I must note, that illegal assistance and support
rendered to other unions is no defense to an allegation
that the Respondent violated the Act by its course of con-
duct with respect to the Committee. By this I do not in-
tend to imply that the Respondent acted wrongfully in
providing some aid and assistance to the eight other
unions with which it has a bargaining relationship. Not
only is the Respondent's conduct vis a vis other unions
not before me, but on the available evidence I see nothing
illegitimate in the relationship. The difference in the
structure of the Committee when contrasted with the
other unions, the constitution of the Committee, the con-
trol of the Respondent over the Committee's operations
and day-to-day functions, the lack of membership, the
total financial dependence of the Committee, and the sub-
stantial financial assistance to the Committee, all add up
to massive aid, assistance, and support far beyond the
point of tolerance, or that which can be called cooperative
assistance designed to foster a good relationship.
Moreover, it seems rather obvious that, as the Respond-
ent's relationship with the Committee anteceded, by
many years, its relationship with the other unions, the
Respondent was under great compulsion to extend to the
other unions the indulgences afforded them. Accordingly,
I reject the Respondent's defense based on its treatment
of the other unions.
The Respondent seeks to equate agreements reached
with the other unions with the relationship and operation
of the Committee. This argument is bottomed on a falla-
cious premise. A comparison is attempted by-alluding to
the fact that the various craft unions have negotiated with
the Employer provisions for various standing committees
consisting of both representatives of management and the
particular union. This comparison ignores the fundamen-
tal distinction that pervades Respondent's relationship
with the Committee. The standing committees, the
machinery for operation of the Committee, are not the
product of collective bargaining but are provided for in
the constitution of the Committee. Thus management by
various constitutional provisions is part and parcel of the
Committee and thereby has control, veto power, and the
right to approve every significant action of the Committee
and also has a constitutional right to participate on an
equal basis in the Committee's basic decisions and func-
tions. This sort of arrangement is a far cry from coopera-
tive joint committees which may be established through
negotiations. The mere existence of these constitutional
provisions under which the Committee operates is the
very antithesis of a truly independent labor. organization
capable of negotiating at arms length with management .21)
Wean Mfg. Co., 147 NLRB 112, and other cases like
Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc., 150 NLRB 579, cited by the
Respondent in its brief, support my foregoing conclusions
rather than the propositions advanced by the Respond-
ent. Hershey Metal Products Company, 76 NLRB 695,
also cited by the Respondent, is easily distinguished
because of the de minimis participation of management in
the affairs of the labor organization therein involved.
For the reasons stated at the outset of this decision, I
adhere to my conclusion that the circumstances of this
case require that I omit a specific finding of domination.
Accordingly, I deny the request of the Union's attorney,
as expressed in his brief, that I so find. 21
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
20 Cf Western Reserve Telephone Co., 138 NLRB 755, enfd 323 F.2d
564 (C A 6) where the court said , ".. Most of the meetings of the com-
mittee were held on company time at a conference room in respondent's
central office . Minutes were kept by the secretary to respondent's vice
president . The by-laws of the committee gave powers to the company
president which are not consistent with the free and independent bargain-
ing envisionedby the National LabarRelationsAct " (Emphasis supplied )
21 The denial of this request is not to be taken as a disagreement with his
argument that the situation here resembles Carpenter Steel Company, 76
NLRB 670, and that similar employee representation plans were dis-
established by the Board with the approval of the Supreme Court in
N.L R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U S 261, and
N.L.R.B. v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, 319 U.S
50
DENNISON MFG. CO.
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (2) by contributing financial and other support
to the Committee, I shall recommend it cease and desist
from so contributing, that it withdraw and withhold recog-
nition from the Committee as representative of its em-
ployees unless and until that organization shall have been
certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of
Respondent's employees, and that it cease giving effect
to any agreements oral or written with the Committee ex-
ecuted or renewed during the 6 months immediately
preceding the filing of the instant charge. 22
I shall further recommend that in the representation
proceedings, the Board vacate and set aside the elections
of June 15, 1965, and direct new elections at a time found
appropriate by the Regional Director of Region 1 of the
National Labor Relations Board.
As the unfair labor practices committed by the Re-
spondent are of a character striking at the roots of
employees rights safeguarded by the Act, I shall also
recommend that Respondent cease and desist from in-
fringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing factual findings and conclusions, I
come to the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union and the Committee are labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By contributing financial and other support to the
Committee during the 6-month period prior to the filing
of the charge, Respondent has interfered with the ad-
ministration of a labor organization in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
4. By continuing to deal with the Committee and con-
tinuing to contribute financial and other support to it dur-
ing the period after the filing of the representation peti-
tions to the date of the elections, Respondent illegally and
substantially affected the results of the Board-conducted
elections of June 15, 1965.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, I
recommend that Respondent, Dennison Manufacturing
Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Contributing financial or other support to the Com-
mittee or any successor thereto.
(b) Recognizing the Committee, or any successor
thereto, as the representative of its employees for the pur-
pose of bargaining collectively concerning conditions of
employment, unless and until said labor organization shall
have been certified by the Board as the exclusive
representative of such employees in an appropriate unit.
(c) Enforcing or maintaining any agreement, oral or
written, with the Committee entered into or renewed
within the 6-month period preceding the filing of the
charge to the present time, or any modifications, exten-
sions, supplements, or renewals thereof, unless and until
1019
said labor organization shall have been certified by the
Board as the exclusive representative of such employees
in an appropriate unit; Provided, that nothing herein shall
be construed as requiring Respondent to vary wages,
hours, seniority, or other substantive features of its em-
ployees' working conditions which may have been
established.
(d) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in their right to self-organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and to refrain from any and all such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from the Com-
mittee, or any successor thereto, as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of its employees, unless and until said
labor organization shall have been certified by the Board
as the exclusive representative of such employees in an
appropriate unit.
(b) Post at its plants in Framingham, Maynard, Hud-
son, and Marlboro, all of which are in Massachusetts, co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."23 Copies
of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.24
22 Nothing in this recommendation shall be construed to require
Respondent to vary wages, hours, seniority, or other substantive features
of its employees' working conditions which may have been established
pursuant to any prior agreements or understandings
28 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice, In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order,"
24 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 1, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith,"
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT interfere with the administration of
Dennison Employees Committee or aid, assist, or
1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contribute financial or other support to Dennison
Employees Committee or any successor thereto.
WE WILL NOT recognize Dennison Employees
Committee, or any successor, as representative of
our employees unless and until that labor organiza-
tion has been certified by the Board as the exclusive
representative of our employees in an appropriate
unit.
WE WILL NOT enforce or maintain any agreement,
oral or written, entered into with Dennison Em-
ployees Committee since January 20, 1965, or any
modification, extension, supplement, or renewal
thereof, unless and until that labor organization has
been certified by the Board as the exclusive
representative of our employees in an appropriate
unit.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their rights to organize; to form, join, or assist a labor
organization; to bargain collectively through a bar-
gaining agent chosen by themselves; to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; or
to refrain from any such activities (except to the ex-
tent that the right to refrain is limited by the lawful
enforcement of a lawful union-security requirement).
WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from
Dennison Employees Committee, or any successor
thereto, as the representative of our employees un-
less and until that labor organization has been cer-
tified by the Board as the exclusive representative of
our employees in an appropriate unit.
DENNISON MANUFACTUR-
ING COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 20th Floor,
John F. Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge and New
Sudbury Streets, Boston , Massachusetts 02203,
Telephone 617-223-3300.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL
DECISION
THE REMAND
DAVID E. DAVIS, Trial Examiner: On May 2, 1966,
the Trial Examiner issued his original decision in the
above-entitled consolidated proceeding following
hearings on February 1, 3, and 4, 1966. That decision
found that Respondent interfered with the administration
of Dennison Employees Committee by contributing
financial and other support to it during the 6-month
period prior to the filing of the charge. A finding was also
made that by continuing to deal with the Committee and
by continuing its financial and other support to the Com-
mittee during the period after the filing of the representa-
tion petitions to the date of the elections, Respondent
substantially affected the results of the Board-conducted
elections of June 15, 1965. Accordingly, the aforesaid
elections were ordered set aside.
The Trial Examiner further concluded in the Decision
that he was bound by the assurances made'to counsel for
Respondent during the course of the hearing that no
findings would go beyond the specific allegations of the
complaint. The Trial Examiner, therefore, abstained from
considering whether Respondent dominated the Commit-
tee.
On November 1, 1966, the Board issued an "Order
Remanding Case For Further Hearing," herein called
Remand Order. The Board in its Remand Order ex-
pressed the opinion that the allegation of a violation of
Section 8(a)(2) in the complaint was sufficient to include
an allegation of employer domination. The Remand
Order stated,
as the Respondent in the circumstances dis-
closed by the record was consequently unprepared
to meet the issue [of domination]; the Board is of the
further opinion that in the interest of a fair hearing,
the case should be remanded to the Trial Examiner
for the purposes of conducting further hearings on
the issue of employer domination, affording the
Respondent the opportunity of raising any defenses
it may have in such connection, and enabling the
parties to adduce additional evidence and present
legal argument thereon.
Pursuant to the Remand Order, the Trial Examiner
conducted a further hearing on February 13 and 14,
1967, at Boston, Massachusetts.
Upon the entire record in these proceedings including
the record made at the hearing held on remand, and after
careful consideration of the additional legal memoranda
submitted by the parties, the Trial Examiner makes the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recom-
mendations on the issue whether or not Respondent
dominated the Committee in violation of Section 8(a)(2)
of the Act:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. DISPOSITION OF MOTIONS
At the outset of the remanded hearing counsel for
Respondent made a series of motions in which he was
joined by counsel for the Committee, as follows:
1. That the Trial Examiner give the Respondent the
right to litigate just this issue (domination) through afi,nal
court of competent jurisdiction before getting into the
merits of the remanded issue, and to postpone any hear-
ing on the merits until such court has issued a ruling.
The motion was denied. The statutory provisions of the
Act in Section 10(e) and (f) establish the method of ob-
taining review of the Board's Decisions. Clearly the Trial
Examiner has no power or authority to stay the Board's
processes thereby ignoring the Board's remand and
bypassing the statutory provisions.
2. That a stipulation be entered into that Respondent,
by going forward on the merits, has waived no legal rights
to contest the legality of the Remand Order with the
Board and in the courts if necessary. Although this was
couched in terms of a request for a stipulation, the
DENNISON MFG. CO.
General Counsel and counsel for the Charging Party hav-
ing refused to enter into it, the Trial Examiner believes
some discussion under the above heading is necessary.
The Trial Examiner, at the hearing, stated: "I think what-
ever I say, I think you still have the right to go to the
Courts on it, so I don't think it is even necessary for me,
I'll express my opinion, I'll say you do have the right."
It is apparent that the request of counsel for Respond-
ent is rather vague. The Trial Examiner's response con-
stituted and was intended as a restatement of counsel's
rights under Section 10(e) and (f) of the Act to litigate the
question at the proper time . As such, I believe my state-
ment, opinion , or ruling is correct . In this connection, it
was brought to light that Respondent had filed a motion
with the Board, on November 14, 1966, requesting
reconsideration and reversal of the Board's Order of Re-
mand. This motion was denied by the Board on
November 17, 1966. The Trial Examiner also stated that
he was bound by the Board 's ruling and that he would
receive evidence and legal memoranda on the issue of
domination in accordance with the Board 's remand.
3. That the Trial Examiner strike the Remand Order
because the Board unnecessarily and unlawfully delayed
the conclusion of proceedings in violation of Section 6(a)
of the Administrative Procedure Act. This motion was
denied . There is no undue delay in the processing of this
case that is chargeable to the Board. The Board's Re-
mand Order comports with estblished custom, practice,
and procedure.
4. That the Trial Examiner strike the Remand Order
and transmit the case to the Board for a finding totally on
the basis of the allegation in the complaint relating to the
alleged unlawful assistance since the Respondent is being
compelled by the Board to try this case in a manner dif-
ferent than it would have tried the case if domination had
been specifically alleged in the complaint or in the specifi-
cation.
This motion was denied . Counsel for Respondent
misconceives the powers and duties of a Trial Examiner.
The lack of specificity as to the different manner in which
counsel would have tried the case is quite puzzling in-
asmuch as the Remand Order affords all parties an'oppor-
tunity to adduce additional evidence on the issue of
domination.
5. Respondent renewed a motion made at the earlier
hearing that the objections to the election filed by the
Charging Party be dismissed for lack of proper service on
Respondent.
This motion was again denied for the reasons stated in
my original decision.
6. That the matter of domination be dismissed because
the Board 's Remand Order was issued more than 6
months after the completion of that period. This motion
was denied. The Trial Examiner ruled that the same 10(b)
period that was applicable in the earlier hearing prevailed
in the hearing on remand ; i.e., that period 6 months prior
to the filing of the charge.
7. That none of the evidence presented at the earlier
hearing be considered on the issue of domination as this
was the first date that the Board had set for a hearing on
domination.
' Cf. Frito Company, Western Division V. N.L.R.B., 330 F.2d 458
(C.A. 9), where the court said "Once having elected to prosecute a com-
plaint before the Board , the General Counsel is cast in the role of prosecu-
tor in a judicial proceeding His authority as a prosecutor is not reviewable
by the Board, but this authority does not extend to control of the proceed-
1021
This motion was denied. The Board Order of Remand
permitted additional evidence on the question of domina-
tion. Clearly it would be contrary to the intent of the
Board's Remand Order to rule otherwise. Moreover, try-
ing the case de novo on the issue of domination would be
sheer duplication and time consuming.
8. That all evidence of domination in the earlier hear-
ing be stricken . This motion was denied . The reasons
stated above are equally appropriate to this motion.
Counsel for the Committee moved to dismiss as to
domination because the General Counsel had not
amended the complaint to allege domination.
This motion was denied . In keeping with the Board's
Remand Order , an amendment by General Counsel was
unnecessary . The Board 's Remand Order requires con-
sideration of the issue of domination even though the
General Counsel has not formally moved to specifically
amend. i
The Genercal Counsel, after introducing the formal
documents ,2 stated that he reoffered all the evidence, all
the testimony , and all the formal exhibits that were sub-
mitted in the earlier hearing and thereupon rested. Coun-
sel for the Charging Party adopted the General Counsel's
position. The Trial Examiner stated that all the evidence
in the earlier hearing would be considered on the issue of
domination in this Supplemental Decision.
As stated above, the Trial Examiner , in arriving' at his
decision herein , has considered all the evidence in both
hearings together with all the briefs.
H. THE EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF DOMINATION
A. Prefatory Statement
Long experience has shown that an individual's bar-
gaining power is greatly inferior to that of an employer.
Chief Justice Taft, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-
City Central Trades Council,3 stated the situation when
he said, "A single employee was helpless in dealing with
an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily
wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the
employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought
fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and
to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essen-
tial to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with
their employer."
Recognition of the foregoing conditions gave rise to
labor organizations and to the demand for injection of the
democratic doctrine of collective bargaining into indus-
try.
When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations
Act, it demonstrated in its preliminary findings a distinct
awareness that a major cause of industrial strife was the
denial by some employers of the right of employees to or-
ganize. The Act , therefore, was initially addressed to the
reduction of industrial strife by granting employees the
right to freely organize in unions of their own choosing.
Secondly the Act requires employees to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives so chosen. It is clear that
the fundamental concepts of the Act, therefore, are
mg itself. He cannot limit the scope of the decision which may be rendered
upon the evidence adduced."
2 G.C. Exh. IAA-1FF.
3 257 U.S. 184,209.
1022 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
designed to protect the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively. A company-dominated union is a
negation of that right as it places the employer on both
sides of the bargaining table and is a denial of the collec-
tive-bargaining principle.
The Act's guarantee of the right to freely choose
representatives to engage in collective bargaining in their
behalf is further predicated on the principle that the em-
ployees' interests are distinct and separate from that of
the employer's. Even though there are many areas in
which the employer's and employees' interests coincide
and are reconcilable, nevertheless, the struggle for a
greater share of the wealth renders their interests in a sen-
sitive area separate and distinct.
Many theorists regard every company union founded
on a plan or organization, which is limited in membership
to the employees of one plant or employer, as a negation
of the right of employees to bargain collectively. The Act,
as interpreted by the Board with support from the courts,
has not applied such a broad interpretation to every com-
pany union. Rather, only those company unions which
are employer dominated have been found by the Board to
be so tainted that they are incapable of engaging in bona
fide collective bargaining with their employees. There can
be little quarrel with this holding of the Board as it is axio-
matic that an organization cannot at once be anindepend-
ent labor organization and under the control of and
dominated by the employer. Employer control or domina-
tion of a labor organization is manifested in numerous
forms and varieties. Each situation stands separate and
distinct from another. However, certain indicia have a
direct nexus and are peculiar to employer-dominated
labor organizations. While the presence of a single or
even several criteria cannot by themselves warrant a con-
clusion of employer domination, the particular indicia
under scrutiny need not be present in numerical
abundance in order to sustain a conclusion that a labor or-
ganization is employer dominated.
B. Preliminary Findings
In order to avoid any semantical confusion of what the
Trial Examiner said in his original Decision or what may
be said hereinafter in this Supplemental Decision, it is
necessary to fix and define with more exactitude the
Dennison Employees, Committee, herein sometimes
called the Committee. The Committee meets the techni-
cal requirements of Section 2(5) of the Act to the extent
that it constitutes, as I have found, a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act. It is not composed of all
the employees of Respondent; in fact the overwhelming
majority of employees4 have no membership in the Com-
mittee. Respondent's employees, who meet the eligibility
requirements under the constitution of the Committee
merely have a right to vote for a departmental representa-
tive. The available evidence shows no restriction or
method from which it could be argued that each repre-
sentative thus elected represents an equal number of em-
ployees. Additionally, those of Respondent's employees
who meet certain constitutional requirements are eligible
to be elected as departmental representatives. It is these
representatives, 43 in number under the latest count, who
compose the general body and who have membership in
the Dennison Employees Committee. Additional mem-
bers of the Committee are those management representa-
tives,5 who are designated by management to serve on the
different conference committees. Thus the employee
representation plan involved in this case provides for
representatives of employees and representatives of
management. It is these representatives of employees and
the representatives of management who are members of,
and constitute, the Dennison Employees Committee .6
The general body, the various subcommittees, and the
conference committees have their duties and functions
described in the constitution of the Committee. Employee
representatives alone have membership in the general
body and the subcommittees. As they are subject to the
constitutional provisions , their independent functions are
thereby limited and their activities under the constitution
are intertwined with the management representatives in
the various conference committees.
Counsel for Respondent and the Committee? have at-
tempted to minimize the role of the procedure committee
by stating it is only a steering committee. The dictionary
defines "steering committee" as follows:
a managing or directing committee ; a committee
composed of leaders of the majority caucus that
determines the order in which business shall be taken
up in the U.S. legislative body.8
Consequently, even if the label of "steering commit-
tee" is applied to the procedure committee , it emerges as
the most powerful committee of the Committee as it must
approve the agenda and the order of business of the
general body and in this manner constitutes the managing
and directing committee of the Committee. The composi-
tion of the procedure committee9 establishes the fact that
it is composed of the leaders of the Committee. However,
the constitution of the Committee even gives greater
powers to the procedure committee . Section 2 of the con-
stitution provides : "Whenever the management or the
Employee Committee has prepared a recommendation
for the consideration, or action of the other, the recom-
mendation shall first be sent to the Committee on
Procedure."
This section further provides that while this committee
4 There are approximately 2,000 employees.
5 It is stipulated that all management representatives are supervisors
within the meaning of the Act.
' The, Trial Examiner 's original Decision is corrected in this regard. In
his original Decision , reference was made to the general body and the
Committee in terms which would indicate that one was the equivalent of
the other. Clearly, this is incorrect . Under the constitution , the general
body is merely a segment of the Committee . Fitch is the president of the
general body. Apparently, the Committee has no officers but operates
through the committees and does not meet as a group.
7 It should be noted that to the extent management is represented on the
Committee , counsel for the Committee is in effect representing manage-
ment while counsel for Respondent likewise represents the Committee to
the extent of Respondent 's interest in the Committee . I mention this
because of Respondent 's counsel 's insistence that he was privileged to
cross-examine Fitch, the general body president , as an adverse witness.
Moreover, the evidence shows that both counsel met prior to the hearing
together with Fitch, Allen, and other representatives of the Committee to
discuss the evidence to be presented I am not critical of the collaboration
between counsel ; but I believe that this fact affects counsel's asserted
right to cross-examine Fitch
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 1963.
Cf. Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Association , Inc., 118 NLRB
174. Here, unlike in the Nassau case , management members of the Com-
mittee include executives and officers of the Respondent. Management
representatives on the procedure committee were Allen, personnel
director and chief negotiator, and D . F. Prince, general manager of ther-
rimage Employee members were Fitch, president of the general body,
and its vice chairman, C. Merhni.
DENNISON MFG. CO.
may not take any direct action on matters "except those
which relate directly to the revision of the constitution
and By-Laws, or to other matters of procedure ... [it]
shall determine whether the recommendation is of suffi-
cient importance to be referred to the appropriate Stand-
ing Conference Committee." If there is no appropriate
conference committee, the procedure committee may
create one. All such committees, including the procedure
committee, consist of from two to six members, one half
of whom are management representatives. It is plain
therefore that management, by its right to equal represen-
tation on conference committees and on the procedure
committee, can exercise a veto over any effective action
by the general body or any other subordinate committee.
I am not overlooking that section 2 also provides that the
general body can appoint a special committee to handle
a problem regardless of the powers of any standing com-
mittee. But this provision hardly supplies the means
whereby the general body may exercise true independ-
ence. Section 3 of the constitution provides an addi-
tional obstacle in that ". . . no action or conclusion of any
Conference Committee, except the action of the Commit-
tee on Procedure in creating special Conference Commit-
tees and Classification and Classification Committees on
Classification, shall be binding unless and until it is ex-
pressly authorized or ratified by the Management and by
the Employee Committee."
Thus, management approval is required to finalize any
recommendation, even when made by a committee of the
Committee on which management has equal representa-
tion.
Respondent's counsel insists that the Trial Examiner
grossly erred when he stated in his Decision, ". . . the
constitution of the Committee provides that no changes
therein may be made without management approval,
hence a rank-and-file movement to change the structure
or approach would be doomed to failure from its incep-
tion unless management approved."10
In support of this position Fitch's testimony is quoted
as follows:
Q. (By Chandler) And as to amendments which
do not effect the relationship between the Employees
Committee and management, is there any need to go
to management?
A. No.
The crucial point on this issue is whether a rank-and-
file movement to change the approach or structure would
alter the relationship between the Committee and
management and thus require management approval
under the terms of the constitutional provision. Counsel,
in posing the above question to Fitch, specified the exclu-
sion of "amendments" which do not affect the "relation-
ship." The question and answer, therefore, are irrelevant
to the precise issue and have no evidentiary value as it
evades and excludes the crux of the question.
Other evidence, like the amendment to the constitution
concerning the calling in of a mediator, establishes the
10 Trial Examiner's Decision, section III, F.
" Tr, pp. 81-82, first hearing
iz Respondent attempted to adduce evidence that the Bookbinders lost
an arbitration decision concerning a grievance instituted because the
Respondent inaugurated an incentive plan without the Bookbinders' ap-
1023
soundness of the conclusion reached by the Trial Ex-
aminer . The evidence showed that in April 1965, in order
to permit the general body to request the State or Federal
Mediation Service, it was necessary to amend the con-
stitution in accordance with article VIII. Additionally,
there are many clauses in the constitution, if changed,
that would "affect the relationship between the Employee
Committee and Management." As the constitution is the
very instrument by which the Committee is governed, it
seems rather redundant to say that this constitutional
provision (article VIII) enshrines the structure of the
Committee subject to change only with management ap-
proval. The plain words of this article hardly need further
explication as its intent and meaning is quite apparent.
Accordingly, the Trial Examiner reiterates his finding
that a rank-and-file movement to change the structure or
approach of the Committee would be doomed to failure
from its inception unless management approved.
Especially is this true when the constitution itself makes
no provision for the participation of rank-and-file em-
ployees in the affairs of the Committee.
Respondent's brief refers to the following inter-
change: 11
TRIAL EXAMINER: So the Procedure Committee
has no veto power over a Conference Committee re-
port?
FITCH: No, its a steering committee.
TRIAL EXAMINER: Well, but can the Procedure
Committee prevent it going to the General Body?
FITCH: It never has.
TRIAL EXAMINER: Could they?
FITCH: I don't believe so.
In the face of the plain meaning of the constitutional
provisions referred to above, I find that Fitch's replies
and conclusions as quoted above display a determined
reluctance to face the realities of the constitutional provi-
sions which control the operations of the Committee.
I can only conclude that the Committee affords the em-
ployee representative opportunities to discuss, to
negotiate, to air grievances, to suggest improvements, and
to enter into arbitrations, but none of these things maybe
done as a matter of right. At any stage of these activities,
management, by its equal representation in the various
committees and by the constitutional provisions
discussed above, can bring all debate, discussion, and ac-
tivity to a halt and initiate its own program without
further consultation with the employee representatives.
On at least one occasion, the incentive plan of 1964,
management did exactly that after the general body
refused to approve the institution of the proposed incen-
tive plan.' On that occasion, the general body without any
resources and without independence had no alternative
but to accept management's decision. 12
As described above, the General Counsel and the
Charging Party rested on the record in the earlier hearing.
By agreement with counsel for Respondent, counsel for
the Committee proceeded to adduce additional evidence.
The first and only witness called by counsel for the Corn-
proval. As the arbitrator in that situation determined that the collective-
bargaining agreement between the parties permitted Respondent's uni-
lateral action, it had no relevancy to the instant proceedings. The evidence
concerning the Bookbinders was rejected by the Trial Examiner for that
reason.
1024 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mittee was Ambrose H. Fitch, president of the general
body of the Dennison Employees Committee. 13
The available evidence indicates that the employees,
subject to the eligibility rules of the constitution of the
Committee, vote once each year for a representative of
the department in which they are employed. This is the
extent of participation by the rank-and-file employees of
the Respondent in the affairs of the general body or the
Committee. The employee representatives so selected
compose the general body of the Dennison Employees
Committee. The remaining rank-and-file employees have
no general meetings; they are not consulted; they do not
acquiesce in or ratify any decisions of the general body or
the Committee; they do not pay dues; they do not select
any officers; and they have no voice in any action of the
general body or the Committee. An employee representa-
tive, in effect, receives a blank check and becomes part of
an exclusive club that has many privileges. Each
representative serves on several committees ; associates
in committees with management representatives;
receives payment for all time spent in committee
meetings or Committee business; and obviously attains
a position of stature in the plant. The available evidence
shows that there is no attempt to apportion the districts so
that each representative represents an equal number of
employees and it is established that certain employees,
like the president of the general body of the Committee,
are members of a craft union. Indeed, the president of the
general body and all members of other craft unions par-
ticipate in voting for the employee representatives who
compose the general body.
The participation of the craft employees seems rather
strange as they would appear to have little or no commu-
nity of interest with Respondent's other employees.
During the course of the remanded hearing, counsel for
the Committee and counsel for Respondent laid great
emphasis on the arbitration machinery. However, a fair
reading discloses that arbitration is not compulsory.
Management can refuse to go to arbitration, if it chooses.
The evidence that management, in the past, has not
refused to go to arbitration when requested by the central
committee and the general body does not contradict the
plain meaning of the arbitration proviso.14
At any rate, the evidence of arbitration, the negotiation
sessions of the fringe and wage committee, and that of the
processing of grievances merely indicate that the Com-
mittee meets the technical qualifications of a labor or-
ganization under the Act. Such evidence, while relevant
to consideration on the question of domination, is far
from controlling. Its, significance is completely undercut
when consideration is given to the, basic structure of the
Committee under the constitutional provisions which
establish management 's equal representation on the key
committees and the powerful procedure committee.
The voluminous documents submitted in evidence by
the Committee 's counsel , while impressive in quantity,
woefully fail to impress by their quality . An inspection15
of the documentary evidence lends support to the basic
defects in the Committee 's structure and its inability to
function as a genuine labor organization.
The Committee introduced an incomplete file of the
1961 negotiations" of the fringe and wage committee.17
One of the documents "' is the minutes of a joint negotia-
tion meeting at which all members were present. John
Joyce , an employee representative , during the course of
the meeting is quoted as having said , "Someone brought
out yesterday why when companies deal with a union it
is usually the union who says `this is it ,' but with us it is
never that way; it is always the company that says, `take
this or else."'
Robert Davis, another employee representative, then
added , "Some groups have said, `you get what they want
to give you and that 's all' and our people tell us to get in
there and fight for something."
Finally, W. A.,Y0 a third employee representative, then
said, "Possibly this year is not as good as some according
to you, but even though you have good years, we never
get what we ask for ... so we don't see how we can win
either way."
Richard L. Allen, Respondent's personnel director in
charge of labor relations , a member of this committee,
representing management , then closed the meeting with
the following statement , "We will give this matter very
serious consideration . Today we wanted to receive your
requests and get in as many facts as possible , I can't say
now when we can meet again , but we will advise your
chairman when it seems possible."
I deduce ', from the above that the employee representa-
tives , in a moment of frankness and frustration , expressed
the futility and sham of the negotiation procedures. It is
further obvious by this interchange that the joint sessions
were held at the convenience of management and at the
orders of management rather than at the mutual con-
venience of both parties.
Another joint meeting of this committee was held on
October 31 , 1961.20 At this time, an unidentified member
of the committee , presumably a management representa-
tive, said , "Management is overly generous . We have ar-
rived at a sticky point, we're willing to reshuffle ." "J. C."
(John Connor), an employee representative , then said,
"Bring in amediator. "
Whereupon , "R. W." (Richard Wallis ), a director of
is The record shows that Fitch has, been president of the general body
for approximately 3 years, that he is a member of the ITU, and that he is
employed in a bargaining unit represented by the ITU. Nevertheless,
Fitch votes for employee representatives of the Committee, has been
elected as an employee representative of theCommittee, and actively par-
ticipates in various other committees of the Committee . Fitch's testimony
was adduced, in large measure, through leading questions propounded by
both counsel for the Committee and counsel for Respondent. Fitch readily
cooperated by giving answers desired with few exceptions. I have given
little or no weight to Fitch's testimony where it is conclusionary or con-
tradicts the plain meaning of the documents in evidence.
1" The management representative and representative chosen by the
central committee must agree on a third member to enable arbitration to
proceed. Clearly if management refuses to agree, arbitration is frustrated.
Moreover, Respondent pays the arbitrator and all arbitration expenses. A
refusal to finance would terminate arbitration.
15 The Trial Examiner has carefully read each document and has reread
and carefully studied most of them.
16 Apparently the selection of the 1961 negotiations was made to
demonstrate that the "give and take" of the bargaining sessions was com-
parable to that engaged in by independent unions.
17 Membership of this committee is composed of an equal number of
employee representatives and management representatives . However,
employee representatives and management representatives apparently do
meet separately and then meet jointly. For purposes of this decision, I sig-
nify the joint meetings as negotiation sessions . This statement is made not
to disparage the wage and fringe committee, but in order not to minimize
the ever active knowledge that management does have the final decision
by virtue of its veto power.
18 Party to the Contract Exh 22-M.
is I identify W. A as Gregory Alluzio.
20 Party to the Contract Exh. 22-N.
DENNISON MFG. CO.
Respondent and a member of this committee, replied,
"This would be a regrettable move."
Here, management voices a clearly discernible threat
when signs of-revolt appear. Another report of a meeting
is set out in full below:21
The wage and fringe committee met this morning at
8 a.m. and discussed our position, and could not find
anything we could change or reshuffle to make this
proposal offered by management anything we would
want to bring to the general body.
Management came in at 10 a.m. and had nothing new
to offer at this moment we are waiting for Mr. Wallis
to come in at the meeting.
Mr. R. Wallis gave his views on the picture of busi-
ness as Dennison Directors see it and still stated the
offer they gave us was a generous offer.
We discussed retroactivity to great lengths. Manage-
ment requested a recess.
Management came back and told us, explain to the
general body that if they are willing to except this
proposal we will throw in October 1, retroactivity.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The complete transcript of Party to the Contract Ex-
hibit 22-M for October 24, 1961, establishes the fact that
management considered the wage and fringe employee
representatives not as equals but as employees subject to
management's orders. Thus, in the October meeting they
elicited by questions what had transpired at the meeting
of the general body and in the November meeting told the
members to take their proposal to the general body even
though, except for the retroactivity to October 7, there
was nothing which the employee representatives would
want to take to the general body.
Turning to the central committee upon which Respond-
ent and Committee counsel laid great stress, it is ap-
parent that it lacks ability to function not only because of
its internal weaknesses, but also because of the limita-
tions on matters concerning which it can grieve. As Fitch
testified, a grievance may be filed only where manage-
ment violates matters covered in the Foreman's
Handbook22 or in the constitution. This handbook, con-
sisting of about 150 pages, is in the possession of foremen
and representatives of the general body. There is no
evidence that a rank-and-file employee has access to it or
knows what it contains. I assume that, if any employee
felt that he might have a grievance, he could discuss the
matter with a foreman or a representative and the ap-
propriate section would be pointed out. This is a far cry,
however, from the right of an employee to secure a copy
of the union contract where there is a contract covering
employees. Nevertheless, Respondent insisted that all
matters covered by previous agreements between
Respondent and the Committee are included in the
Foreman's Handbook. If this is so, the employees are en-
21 Party to the Contract Exh. 22-Y.
22 TX Exh. t.
23 All reports of committees, including that of the general body, must go
through the procedure committee. It is argued that this is a routine or
ministerial act However, the latent power to nullify or obstruct is ever
present
1025
titled to have a copy to take home, to study, and to keep.
But this is not the case in Respondent's plant. Moreover,
the rules arrived at by mutual agreement and the rules
promulgated by management are indistinguishable in this
book. As it bears the title of Foreman's Handbook, it
would indicate that very little of its contents is considered
a matter of mutual agreement. The wording of the con-
tents of the Foreman's Handbook reinforces this belief.
In connection with the reference to mediation, it should
be noted that not until April 5, 1965, did the Committee
obtain the right to resort to this technique for the possible
solution of matters in controversy. This was accom-
plished by an amendment to the constitution of the Com-
mittee and required Respondent's consent. This sharply
brings into focus the extent of Respondent's control over
the Committee's procedure for dealing with Respondent.
A union, truly independent and dealing at arms length,
would hardly require an amendment to its constitution to
call in a mediator. Moreover, the incident tends to explain
Wallis' remark during the 1961 negotiations when the
question of mediation was raised by Conners that "This
would be a regrettable move."
The evidence showed that records of the key com-
mitees of the Committee are under the control of manage-
ment and may be examined only with management ap-
proval. Mary Lynch, an employee in the personnel de-
partment, under the supervision of Allen, the chief
negotiator and personnel director of Respondent, has cus-
tody of the current files of the Committee. These files are
kept in the personnel department and Mary Lynch has
the key to the files. Lynch also prepares the agenda of the
general body for the procedure committee23 of which she
is the clerk. Older documents pertaining to the Commit-
tee are maintained in files in a locked room to which
Hayward has the key. Hayward was identified as an
assistant in personnel.24 Fitch's testimony shows that it
was necessary for him to ask permission to inspect and
remove committee documents from this room.
C. Concluding Findings
A collective-bargaining agreement is one of the most
precious documents and is a valuable property to an em-
ployee. Like other agreements establishing property
rights, it is a legal document enforceable in the courts.
Like many other rights, the protections and benefits con-
tained in a union agreement must be understood by'each
member if they are to be fully realized and safeguarded.
Certainly, unless an employee possesses a copy of the
union agreement to study at his leisure, he cannot un-
derstand his rights under the agreement nor his conditions
of employment. It is well established and admitted by all
the parties that the Committee, in its various forms of ex-
istence since 1920, has not at any time been signatory or
party to a comprehensive labor agreement. It is true that
a labor organization which does not enter into a written,
comprehensive labor agreement, is not, thereby, per se,
an employer-dominated union. But, surely, such a factor
must be given considerable weight when it has persisted
24 Hayward's status as a supervisor under the Act was not established
However, this is of no consequence as it was admitted that Allen super-
vises him.
1026 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
over a protracted period of time, 47 years in this case. A
truly independent union could not and would not exist
under such circumstances for any reasonable length of
time. True collective bargaining under the Act requires
the signing of a written agreement embodying the terms
arrived at.25 Coupled with this factual situation is the
complete ignorance of the employees of those agree-
ments, rules, regulations, and working conditions except
upon consultation with a foreman or an employee
representative. Indeed, even the constitution governing
the Committee is available to employees only upon
request. It seems rather valid to infer under the circum-
stances that an employee making a request for a copy of
the constitution or a copy of the Foreman's Handbook,
would, at the very least, draw undue attention to himself.
Thus, it is clear that the foregoing distinctions between
the Committee and truly independent labor organizations
are legitimate considerations in the determination
whether or not the Committee is an employer-dominated
company union.
As set forth in the Trial Examiner's original Decision,
the Committee has no funds, collects no dues, meets on
company premises, utilizes company stationery and other
facilities, posts notices on the bulletin board only with
company approval, and even submits its records to the
Company for safekeeping. All of the foregoing constitute
additional valid considerations in the determination
whether the Committee is employer dominated. Independ-
ent unions do not exist on their employers' largesse. The
Committee does. As the Trial Examiner has previously
found, the Committee could not and would not exist ex-
cept for the substantial financial contributions of Re-
spondent. The significant amounts of money expended by
Respondent and the other factors enumerated above go
far beyond a reasonable interpretation of "co-operation"
between an employer and a labor organization.
The evidence disclosed that Respondent could and did
eliminate departments at will.26 Automatically, such an
elimination terminates the term of the employee represent-
ative of that department. This is not a casual circum-
stance but rather indicative of the Employer's control
over the composition of the employee representatives
making up the general body. Discharge of an employee
representative likewise eliminates such a representative
from the general body. This is another, not insignificant,
means by which employee representatives may be con-
trolled.
The failure to have even one general meeting of the em-
ployees since the formation of the Committee in 1920;
the participation of members of other unions in the selec-
tion of employee representatives; the selection of mem-
bers of other unions as employee representatives; the
restrictive eligibility rules governing the right of em-
ployees to vote and be selected as employee representa-
tives; and the eligibility of employees in the personnel de-
partment to vote and be elected as employee representa-
tives are additional factors worthy of consideration in the
determination whether the Committee is employer
dominated.27
Finally, as indicated above, the Committee under its
constitutional provisions, consists of management and
employee representatives. Such a labor organization is
repugnant to the declared purposes and policies of the
Act.28
It may well be, as it is argued, that this plan of em-
ployee representation has maintained industrial peace at
Respondent's plants for 47 years, but this is not the
methodology established by Congress to achieve that
end. To argue, in the year 1947, that benevolent paternal-
ism constitutes a better framework for the elimination of
industrial strife seems an exercise in futility. At the very
least, such an argument must be addressed to Congress.
In concluding this Decision, the Trial Examiner reaf-
firms the findings, rulings, and conclusions in his original
Decision except to the extent noted.
The Trial Examiner concludes that the Dennison Em-
ployees Committee is an employer-dominated company
union, subject to the control of Respondent, and exists at
the whim and caprice of Respondent; that the bargaining
engaged in, even in joint committee sessions, is a sham
and subterfuge which effectually deprives the employees
of their rights under Section 7 to freely choose represent-
atives for the purpose of collective bargaining; and that
the organization, structure, and operation of the Commit-
tee merely furnishes the employees with a semblance of
their rights under the Act but lacks character and sub-
stance.
The evidence shows that the existence of the Commit-
tee has proven a barrier to the realization by Respond-
ent's employees of their statutory rights under Section
7 of the Act. It thereby serves as a means of thwarting the
policy of collective bargaining.29 Under well established
precedent, such a labor organization must be dis-
established. The Trial Examiner will so order.
The remedy recommended in the Trial Examiner's
original Decision (V. The Remedy) is hereby rescinded
and the following is substituted therefor.
111. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (2) by contributing financial and other support
to the Committee, has interfered with the administration
of the affairs of the Committee, and has dominated the
Committee thus rendering the Committee incapable of
truly representing the employees as a bona fide
collective-bargaining representative of any of Respond-
ent's employees, it will be recommended that it cease
and desist from so assisting and interfering, that it
withdraw and withhold recognition from the Committee
as representative of any of its employees, that it
completely disestablish the Committee as the collective-
bargaining representative of any of its employees, and
25 N.L R B. v H J. Heinz Company, 311 U.S. 514.
2' This is so, even assuming that the primary concern was efficiency
and economy of operation,
27 Democracy does not spring into being by the mere grant of the right
to vote. It runs much deeper. In the American scheme, it includes the Bill
of Rights, the system of checks and balances, and the pervasive, tradi-
tional, national spirit of freedom The collective-bargaining principle of in-
dustrial democracy which the Act seeks to encourage cannot be nurtured
nor satisfied by the mere grant to rank-and-file employees of the right to
vote, once each year, for an employee representative
E8 Cf. Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Association, supra
2s N.L.R B. V. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc, 303 U S. 261. It is
rather striking to note the many similarities between the instant case and
the Greyhound case, particularly the affect of equal representation of
management on the key committees.
DENNISON MFG. CO. 1027
that it cease giving effect to any agreements with the
Committee executed or renewed during the 6-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the charge.30
It will be further recommended that in the representa-
tion proceedings the Board vacate and set aside the elec-
tions of June 15, 1965, and direct new elections at a time
found appropriate by the Regional Director for Region I
of the National Labor Relations Board.
As the unfair labor practices committed by the Respond-
ent are of a character striking at the very roots of em-
ployees' rights safeguarded by the Act, it will also be
recommended that Respondent cease and desist from in-
fringing in any manner upon employee rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing factual findings and conclusions,
the Trial Examiner comes to the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) and
(1) of the Act by its domination of the labor organization
known as the Dennison Employees Committee.
2. All conclusions of law set forth by the Trial Ex-
aminer in his original Decision are hereby affirmed and
are hereby incorporated by reference.
The Recommended Order issued by the Trial Ex-
aminer in the original Decision is rescinded and the fol-
lowing Recommended Order is substituted:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, in-
cluding the record of the remanded hearing, it is recom-
mended that Respondent, Dennison Manufacturing Com-
pany, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Contributing financial or other support to the Com-
mittee or any successor thereto.
(b) Recognizing the Committee, or any successor
thereto, as the representative of any of its employees for
the purpose of bargaining collectively concerning wages,
hours, and working conditions.
(c) Enforcing or maintaining any agreement, oral or
written, with the Committee entered into or renewed
within the 6-month period preceding the filing of the
charge to the present time, or any modifications, exten-
sions, supplements, or renewals thereof; Provided, that
nothing herein shall be construed as requiring Respond-
ent to vary wages, hours, seniority, or other substantive
features of its employees' working conditions which may
have been established.
(d) In any manner interfering with , restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any
and all such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from the Com-
mittee, or any successor thereto, as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of any of its employees.
(b) Completely disestablish the Dennison Employees
Committee as representative of any of its employees for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with it in
respect to grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or other conditions of work.
(c) Post at its plants in Framingham, Maynard, Hud-
son, and Marlboro, all of which are in Massachusetts, co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."31 Copies
of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be, maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Supplemental
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.32
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Cases 1-RC-8287
and 1-RC-8350 be severed from Case 1-CA-5080 and
be transferred to the Regional Director for processing in
conformity with the Decision herein.
3° Nothing in this recommendation shall be construed to require
Respondent to vary wages, hours , seniority , or other substantive features
of its employees' working conditions which may have been established
pursuant to any prior agreements or understandings.
31 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order." NB "Appendix" in the original decision is hereby recorded.
32 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 1, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from
Dennison Employees Committee , or any successor
thereto, as the representative of our employees.
WE WILL completely disestablish Dennison Em-
ployees Committee as representatives of any of our
employees for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with us in respect to grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or other conditions of work.
WE WILL NOT aid, assist, or contribute financial or
other support to Dennison Employees Committee or
any successor thereto.
WE WILL NOT recognize Dennison Employees
Committee, or any successor, as representative of
our employees.
335-845 O - 4® - 66
1028 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
WE WILL NOT enforce or maintain any agreement,
oral or written, entered into with Dennison Em-
ployees Committee since January 20, 1965, or any
modification, extension, supplement , or renewal
thereof.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their rights to organize; to form, join, or assist a labor
organization; to bargain collectively through a bar-
gaining agent chosen by themselves; to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; or
to refrain from any such activities (except to the ex-
tent that the right to refrain is limited by the lawful
enforcement of a lawful union-security requirement).
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DENNISON MANUFACTUR-
ING COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 20th Floor,
John F. Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge and New
Sudbury Streets, Boston, Massachusetts 02203,
Telephone 223-3300.