Dennis Turner, Appellant,v.Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 4, 1999
01973400 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 4, 1999)

01973400

11-04-1999

Dennis Turner, Appellant, v. Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.


Dennis Turner, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal Nos. 01973400; 01973409

v. ) Agency No. P-94-8497

)

Janet Reno, )

Attorney General, )

Department of Justice, )

(Federal Bureau of Prisons), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated appeals of two final agency decision (FAD)

concerning his complaints of unlawful employment discrimination on the

bases of race (Black) and reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. Appellant alleged in one formal complaint filed with the agency

that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and reprisal when

the facility Warden (FW): (1) suspended him for fourteen (14) days without

pay for a first time infraction of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) procedures.

In a separate complaint, appellant alleged discrimination on the basis

of race when the FW: (2) placed him on home duty status from October 18,

1993 until March 6, 1994; and (3) treated him less favorably than his

non-Black peers and colleagues, beginning in March of 1993, by altering

his Performance Appraisal and being critical of his job performance.

The appeals are accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001,

and will be considered together by the Commission. For the following

reasons, the agency's decisions are AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that appellant was employed as a Correctional Counselor

with the BOP, at the agency's Federal Correctional Institution in

Florence, Colorado (�facility�), when the above-stated allegations of

discrimination occurred. Appellant alleged that there were several

incidents occurring in 1993 in which he was treated less favorably than

non-Black employees, including a lowering of his Performance Appraisal,

talk by other employees about him, comments about his work by management

and other events which appellant believed demonstrated that the Associate

Warden discriminated against him. Appellant alleges that he was placed

on home duty beginning on October 18, 1993 pending the investigation of a

violation of the standards of employee conduct. Shortly after appellant

returned to work on March 4, 1994, he received a letter notifying him

of a proposal to demote him from his Correctional Counselor position

at the GS-9 level to that of a Correctional Officer at the GS-8 level,

based on the charges that appellant violated employee standards by:

(1) allowing inmates to make telephone calls at government expense;

(2) unauthorized use of government mail; (3) allowing an inmate to

receive a package without proper authorization; and (4) failure to follow

policy when mailing inmate packages. On May 10, 1994, the FW suspended

appellant for fourteen (14) days without pay beginning May 16, 1994,

for his violation of security. In issuing the suspension, the FW found

that appellant admitted violating charges (2) and (4).

Appellant has alleged that he received the suspension in retaliation for

prior EEO activity as well as for his conversations with the media and

the office of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell alleging discrimination

and mismanagement at the facility.

Believing he was a victim of discrimination, appellant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed formal complaints on April 8, 1994

for allegations (2) and (3), and on July 6, 1994 for allegation (1).

At the conclusion of the simultaneous investigations, appellant was

informed of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge, or request a final

decision by the agency. After initially requesting a hearing before an

Administrative Judge, appellant withdrew that request and requested that

the agency issue final agency decisions regarding both complaints.

The first FAD issued by the agency on February 7, 1997, addressed

allegation (1) and concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima

facie case of race discrimination because he presented no evidence

that similarly situated individuals not in his protected classes

were treated differently under similar circumstances. In so finding,

the FAD noted that other facility employees mentioned by appellant as

receiving letters of reprimand rather than a suspension for a first

offense had less serious infractions and did not involve matters of

facility security, and thus these employees were not similarly situated.

In addition, the FAD found that appellant failed to demonstrate that the

agency retaliated against him due to his protected activity. The FAD

found that the suspension was solely related to appellant's breach of

facility security and was not the result of retaliation by the FW.

The FAD issued on February 27, 1997, which addressed allegations (2)

and (3), found that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of

race discrimination, as there was insufficient evidence that similarly

situated individuals not in appellant's protected group were not placed

on home duty while a facility investigation was pending. Nevertheless,

the FAD found that the FW placed appellant on home duty for legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons, namely, that employees are generally

placed on home duty status where matters of security are involved and

an investigation is ongoing. The FAD found that appellant failed to

demonstrate that the agency's reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

The FAD further found that there were no similarly situated employees

not in appellant's protected class who were treated more favorably

by management in areas such as Performance Appraisals or critique of

work performance. Appellant makes no new arguments on appeal, while

the agency requests that we affirm both its FADs.

After a careful review of the record, based on McDonnell Douglas

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation

for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd

545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation

cases), the Commission finds that the FAD issued on February 7, 1997,

and the FAD issued on February 27, 1997, summarized the relevant

facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies and laws.

We agree with the FAD which addressed allegation (1) that appellant

failed to present sufficient evidence that the agency's actions in

suspending him for fourteen (14) days in March of 1994 were motivated

by discriminatory animus toward appellant's race or by retaliation

for his prior EEO activity or his comments to the media or Senator

Campbell. We further agree with the FAD which addressed allegations

(2) and (3) that appellant failed to demonstrate that he was placed

on home duty or received less favorable treatment by management due

to race discrimination. In addition, we agree with the FAD's finding

that in any event, the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for placing appellant on home duty and these reasons were not

demonstrated to be pretextual in nature. We thus discern no basis to

disturb the FAD's findings of no discrimination which were based on a

detailed assessment of the record. Therefore, after a careful review

of the record and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in

this decision, we AFFIRM the FADs issued on February 7 and 27, 1997.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which

to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

November 4, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations