Den-Tal-EZ, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 1991

303 N.L.R.B. 968 (N.L.R.B. 1991)

968
303 NLRB No. 148
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The General Counsel has filed cross-exceptions to the judge’s failure to
address a complaint allegation that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by its
unilateral announcement that it would return to its former merit review proce-
dures. The Respondent has admitted that on June 8, 1990, its president unilat-
erally announced to employees that the Respondent had determined to return
to its former merit review procedures in October 1990. Consequently, we find
merit in the cross-exceptions and conclude that the Respondent’s announced
decision to reinstitute merit review procedures, with the implicit prospect of
merit wage increases and promotions, represented an additional unilateral
change in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5).
2 In accord with the General Counsel’s cross-exceptions, we shall modify the
recommended Order to include specific affirmative language reflecting the
judge’s recommended remedy extending the certification year for 6 months
and requiring the Respondent to resume bargaining by reinstating its March
15, 1990 contract proposal, giving the Union a reasonable period of time in
which to accept or to respond to that proposal. In finding the contract proposal
reinstatement remedy appropriate, we rely on Mead Corp., 256 NLRB 686
(1981), enfd. 697 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1983).
We note that in Mead the Board suggested 20 days as a ‘‘guideline’’ for
what would be a ‘‘reasonable period of time’’ for the union to consider the
contract proposal which the employer was directed to reinstate. The Board
noted that the union in that case had itself indicated at one point that 20 days
was what it needed to act on the proposal. The Board incorporated the 20-
day period into its Order. In this case, the Respondent withdrew its proposal
5 days before the Union was scheduled to hold a ratification vote. Unlike in
Mead, however, the Respondent not only unlawfully withdrew its proposal but
also attempted to sever the Union’s ties to the bargaining unit by unlawfully
withdrawing recognition. In these circumstances, we find that more time than
the 5 days originally remaining before the ratification vote may reasonably be
required for the Union to consult unit employees and to formulate a response
to the reinstated proposal. In order to provide quidance to the parties con-
cerning this matter, we find that a reasonable time for the Union’s consider-
ation of the reinstated offer would be 30 days from the time of its reinstate-
ment, absent unusual circumstances.
1 All dates are in 1990 unless otherwise specified.
2 The Union filed the charge in Case 4–CA–18767 on March 26, and it filed
the charge in Case 4–CA–19065 on July 16.
3 The unopposed motions to correct the record are granted. The transcript
p. 57, L. 22, is corrected to change ‘‘counseled’’ to ‘‘counsel.’’
Star Dental Products, a Division of Den-Tal-EZ,
Inc. and District Lodge # 98, International As-
sociation of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL–CIO. Cases 4–CA–18767 and 4–CA–19065
July 31, 1991
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
On December 7, 1990, Administrative Law Judge
David L. Evans issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a brief an-
swering the exceptions and supporting the cross-excep-
tions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and con-
clusions, as modified here,1 and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Star
Dental Products, a Division of Den-Tal-EZ, Inc., Lan-
caster, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order
as modified.
Insert the following as paragraphs 2(b) and (c) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs.
‘‘(b) Recognize the Union upon resumption of bar-
gaining in good faith and for 6 months thereafter as if
the initial year of Board certification has not expired.
‘‘(c) Reinstate its unlawfully withdrawn March 15,
1990 contract offer and afford the Union a reasonable
period of time to accept that offer or to make counter-
proposals in light of changed circumstances.’’
Barbara C. Joseph, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael F. Kraemer, Esq. (White and Williams), of Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
Eugene Marcaccio, Grand Lodge Representative, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID L. EVANS, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on October 17, 1990,1
upon charges that were filed under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) by District Lodge #98, International As-
sociation of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO
(the Union) against Star Dental Products, a Division of Den-
Tal-EZ, Inc. (the Respondent), and upon a complaint that
was issued by the General Counsel on August 23 alleging
that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
certain announcements to employees and alleging that Re-
spondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) by its (admitted) with-
drawal of recognition of the Union during the year following
a Board certification of the Union and further that Respond-
ent had violated Section 8(a)(5) by certain unilateral actions
following said withdrawal of recognition.2 Respondent duly
filed an answer admitting jurisdiction but denying the com-
mission of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record3 and after considering the briefs
which have been filed, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent produces dental equipment at its Lancaster,
Pennsylvania facility. During the year preceding issuance of
the complaint, in the course and conduct of its business oper-
ations, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of
$500,000 and purchased and received materials valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located at points out-
side Pennsylvania. Therefore, Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act and the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
969DEN-TAL-EZ, INC.
4 These quotations, with marks supplied, are taken from Ruppert’s testimony
which was not disputed.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
Respondent employs about 90 production and maintenance
employees in the unit described below. On April 21, 1989,
the Board certified the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in said unit. The parties met
and bargained on 24 different dates between July 31, 1989,
and March 15. Before the March 15 meeting, Union Rep-
resentative Clark Ruppert, Jr. told Respondent’s negotiating
committee, headed by Attorney Michael F. Kraemer, that the
Union wanted the Company’s ‘‘last, best and final offer’’ by
March 15. On March 15, Kraemer presented a complete pro-
posal, incorporating all previous ‘‘tentative’’ agreements, and
restating Respondent’s position on the open items. Ruppert
asked Kraemer if that was ‘‘their last best and final offer.’’
Kraemer replied, ‘‘This is final. I don’t like the term ‘best
and final.’’’ After the union committee reviewed the offer,
Ruppert told Kraemer that ‘‘we are going to take it to the
membership on the 25th’’ of March.4
On March 20, Respondent’s attorney sent Ruppert a letter
stating:
This letter is to inform you that the company now
has a good faith basis for believing that the Machinists’
Union no longer enjoys the support of a majority of the
bargaining unit employees. In light of this development,
we are withdrawing, effective immediately, the com-
pany’s proposal made on March 19 [sic], 1990.
On March 26, Ruppert responded by letter of that date re-
questing continued bargaining. Respondent did not reply to
Ruppert.
The parties stipulated that, without prior notice to or con-
sultation with the Union, Respondent, on or about June 8: (1)
granted the unit employees a wage increase of 4 percent; (2)
gave the unit employees an economic adjustment equivalent
to a 4-percent wage increase retroactive to October 1989; and
(3) instituted a policy of allowing employees to carry over
a maximum of 5 days of sick leave annually. These are the
unilateral actions alleged in the complaint as violations of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The complaint further alleges as violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act:
On or about June 8, 1990 the Respondent, acting
through its agent and representatives, held a meeting of
its unit employees at the facility and engaged in the fol-
lowing conduct:
(a) Informed them that the Respondent had stopped
negotiating with the Union and had no intention of re-
suming bargaining with theUnion.
(b) [Company President] Richard Tresfz informed
them that they would be receiving a four (4) percent
pay raise immediately because the Union no longer rep-
resented them.
Respondent did conduct a meeting on June 8, at which, ac-
cording to a stipulated transcription, Kraemer told the em-
ployees, inter alia:
In April of last year, a majority of the employees voted
for the Union and the committee from the shop. Those
negotiations took a while and the parties failed to reach
agreement. We then were presented, in the middle of
March, with a petition signed by a majority of the peo-
ple who were working for the Company and the peti-
tion said that the majority no longer wished to be rep-
resented by the Union. When the Company received
that petition, the Company then withdrew its last offer
and communicated that to the Union, as well as to the
employees, and there have been no sessions, no collec-
tive bargaining meetings, since that date.
Kraemer went on to say that because of the presentation
of the petition, the Respondent’s position is lawful and ‘‘the
company has no further bargaining obligation.’’
According to the same transcript, Tresfz followed Kraemer
and announced that, as a ‘‘non-Union shop’’ the Company
was free to change policies and benefits, that it was in the
process of doing so, and that the employees were getting a
4-percent wage increase.
As Kraemer indicated would be the case, there has been
no further bargaining between the parties.
Employee Barry Boyer filed a decertification petition on
April 23, attaching the employee petition referred to above
by Kraemer. The decertification petition was dismissed by a
Regional Director’s letter of May 30, which states that the
Region had decided that, because of the Respondent’s refusal
to bargain as alleged in this case, no question concerning
representation could be raised, citing Big Three Industries,
201 NLRB 197 (1973).
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The purpose of the Act is to promote industrial peace. To
that end, the Board has consistently interpreted the statutory
framework to require that its certifications of collective-bar-
gaining representatives be essentially uncontestable for a pe-
riod of 12 months. Kimberly-Clark, 61 NLRB 90 (1945).
In Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), the Supreme
Court approved the Kimberly-Clark rule stating that a certifi-
cation based on an election must be ‘‘unusual cir-
cumstances’’ such as (1) a schism within the certified union,
(2) the defunctness of the union, or (3) radical fluctuation in
the size of the bargaining unit within a short period of time.
Absent such circumstances, ‘‘self-help,’’ in the form of a re-
fusal to bargain based on doubts about a union’s continuing
majority status, is available only after the expiration of the
certification year. As stated by Justice Frankfurter at 348
U.S. 103:
The underlying purpose of this statute is industrial
peace. To allow employers to rely on employees’ rights
in refusing to bargain with the formally designated
union is not conducive to that end; it is inimical to it.
The employee right referred to was the employees’ right to
express in a petition to their employer their dissatisfaction
with the certified union, the employee right on which Re-
spondent relies herein.
Respondent suggests the occurrence of no unusual cir-
cumstance the same as, or even remotely similar to, the three
exceptions to the Kimberly-Clark rule that are listed in
970 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 Bluefield Produce Co., 117 NLRB 1660 (1957); Peninsula Asphalt Co.,
127 NLRB 136, 146 (1960); Holly-General Co., 129 NLRB 1098, 1103
(1961).
6 On brief, Respondent urges reconsideration. Research has confirmed my
opinion stated at the hearing that the creation and presentation of such a peti-
tion, alone, during a certification year has not been held to be a justifiable
basis for a withdrawal of recognition since the 1954 decision of the Supreme
Court in Brooks. Therefore, the document and testimony were, indeed, irrele-
vant, and I adhere to my rulings.
7 Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 69 NLRB 935 (1946); Jasper Wood Products
Co., 72 NLRB 1306 (1947); NLRB v. Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co., 199
F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1952); and Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 204
F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1953). Reprehensibly, Respondent cites the last two cases
without mention of the fact that they were considered, and rejected, in Brooks.
8 Hemet Casting Co., 260 NLRB 437 (1982) (withdrawal of recognition
after a contract expired); Kaydee Metal Products Corp., 195 NLRB 687 (1972)
(withdrawal of recognition after certification year expired).
9 Br. 7 and 8.
10 On the withdrawal of recognition issue, Alva Allen Industries is the only
authority that Respondent’s counsel cites with an degree of integrity. While
easily distinguishable, at least Alva Allen Industries came after Brooks and in-
volves the same substantive issue. Counsel’s other ‘‘authorities’’ were before
Brooks or involved other issues. See fns. 7 and 8. Those citations, and Coun-
sel’s disingenuous half-quote of Satilla Rural Electric, are a disservice to this
court and beneath any acceptable standard of advocacy by a member of the
bar.
11 See Big Three Industries, supra.
Brooks. The only ‘‘unusual circumstance’’ advanced by Re-
spondent as a defense for its actions is a March 20 receipt
of an employee petition expressing a desire to terminate rep-
resentation by the certified collective-bargaining representa-
tive, precisely the defense asserted, and found lacking, in
Brooks.
Of course, subsequent to Brooks the Board has consist-
ently, and specifically, held that a petition reflecting such a
‘‘change of mind’’ by employees during the certification
year does not constitute an ‘‘unusual circumstance’’ under
Brooks.5 For this reason I rejected Respondent’s offers of
testimony about the presentation of the petition to manage-
ment, and the petition itself, as irrelevant.6
The Respondent cites cases that preceded Brooks7 and
cases that did not involve the issue of withdrawal of recogni-
tion during the certification year,8 but nowhere in its brief
does Respondent cite a post-Brooks case that stands for the
proposition that such an employee petition, alone, gives an
employer license to withdraw recognition within the certifi-
cation year.
The closest Respondent’s brief comes to advancing some
ostensible basis for its actions is the following statement:
The only question concerning the lawfulness of Star
Dental’s conduct relates to the fact that the refusal to
bargain occurred eleven months after the Board certifi-
cation issued, rather than one year afterwards. This
should make no difference, as the one year standard ‘‘is
not an absolute rule without exception.’’ NLRB v.
Satilla Rural Electric, 322 F.2d 251, 253, 47 LC
¶ 18,389 (5th Cir. 1963).9
The entire sentence from which Respondent takes the Satilla
quotation is:
Moreover, while it is not an absolute rule without ex-
ception that once a certification is made the Union’s
representative must continue to be recognized for at
least a year, see NLRB v. Florida Citrus Canners Coop-
erative, 5 Cir., 288 F.2d 630, nevertheless it is also true
that the Company is not relieved of its duty to bargain
with a Union within the certification year merely be-
cause a majority of employees may have defected from
the Union. [Emphasis added.]
The Fifth Circuit, citing Brooks, accordingly rejected the pre-
cise contention made by Respondent here.
Finally, Respondent cites Alva Allen Industries, 369 F.2d
310 (8th Cir. 1966). In that case the Eighth Circuit found an
‘‘unusual circumstance’’ under Brooks, which justified a cer-
tification-year refusal to bargain, in the union’s abandonment
of replaced strikers and a concurrent refusal by the union to
represent strike replacements. Here, the Union was actively
seeking bargaining on behalf of all employees whom it rep-
resented at the time of the withdrawal of recognition, and
continued to do so to the end, and after the end, of the cer-
tification year.10
The Eighth Circuit in Alva Allen Industries found that,
while the employer withdrew recognition 11 days short of
the end of the certification year, there had been bargaining
for a ‘‘reasonable period’’ of time under Brooks. It also held
that, given the circumstance of the union’s abandonment of
the employees whom it represented, there was no possibility
of agreement if the parties bargained any longer, and no pur-
pose in requiring the employer to bargain for 11 additional
days. In this case, any criterion of reasonableness would have
called for at least 5 more days of recognition of, and bar-
gaining with, the Union. That meager amount of time may
well have resulted in 10 acceptance of Kraemer’s complete,
‘‘firm,’’ proposal of March 15, and therefore a contract. Of
course, Respondent knew that there is no explanation for the
precipitous withdrawal of recognition on March 20 other
than that Respondent wished to avoid the sanction of another
well-established rule—majority status may not be questioned
during the term of a contract—in the event that the union
had accepted the March 15 offer.
In summary, Respondent seized on the then legally mean-
ingless employee petition11 as a mechanism for escape from
its statutory duty to bargain when it would have been more
‘‘reasonable’’ to follow the plainly stated, Supreme Court-ap-
proved law, and allow the bargaining processes to continue
for at least 5 more days. (That is, if ever a case warranted
invocation of the Brooks presumption, this is it.)
Because Respondent was not privileged to thusly withdraw
recognition from the Union before the end of the certification
year, it follows that its withdrawal of recognition on March
20 was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, as
were its stipulated unilateral actions, as I find and conclude.
Moreover, it was an independent violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act for Kraemer to have told the employees
that Respondent would no longer bargain with the Board-cer-
tified collective-bargaining representative. Van Dorn Plastic
Machinery Co., 265 NLRB 864 (1982); May Department
Stores Co., 191 NLRB 928 (1971), Chairman Miller dis-
senting on this point.
Finally, Tresfz announced, in effect, that, as a result of Re-
spondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition, Respondent
was able to, and was going to, grant to the unit employees
retroactive and future wage increases. This announcement
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in two different respects.
First, the announcement itself ties the benefits directly to Re-
971DEN-TAL-EZ, INC.
12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
spondent’s unlawful actions, and it thereby became part of
the unlawful act itself. Second, by the announcement the em-
ployees were being told that they were being rewarded for
the putative repudiation of the Union, a lesson not likely to
be forgotten by employees if a timely decertification effort
is subsequently pursued.
Therefore, Tresfz’ June 8 announcement, as well as
Kraemer’s, tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce the
unit employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as I further find and
conclude.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I shall rec-
ommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act. In this regard I shall recommend that the
certification be extended for an additional 6 months and that
the Respondent be obligated to bargain with the Union dur-
ing that period as if the year following certification had not
expired. Such an extension will provide the parties with a
reasonable interval in which to resume negotiations and, pos-
sibly, reach agreement, without unnecessarily delaying an
otherwise timely exercise of the employees’ right to termi-
nate their representation by the Union, if they hereafter so
desire. See Dominguez Valley Hospital, 287 NLRB 149, 151
(1987).
In order to restore, as near as possible, the status quo ante,
I shall further recommend that when bargaining pursuant to
this order begins, Respondent shall be required to reinstitute,
and reoffer, its March 15, 1990 offer to the Union. The
Union shall be given a reasonable amount of time to accept
the offer or to make counterproposals in light of changed cir-
cumstances.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Star Dental Products, a Division of Den-Tal-EZ, Inc. is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. District Lodge #98, International Association of Ma-
chinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. The following employees of Respondent constitute an
appropriate unit for bargaining under Section 9(a) of the Act.
INCLUDED: All production and maintenance employ-
ees, including Company temporary employees.
EXCLUDED: All other employees including agency
temporary employees, research and development em-
ployees, production contract department employees, of-
fice clerical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
4. At all time since April 21, 1989, the Union has been,
and is, the exclusive representative of the employees in the
above-described unit for purposes of collective bargaining
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on June
8, 1990, by the following acts and conduct:
(a) Telling its employees that it had stopped negotiating
with the Union, and telling its employees that Respondent
had no intention of resuming bargaining with the Union, at
a time when it had a lawful obligation to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union.
(b) Telling its employees that they would be receiving in-
creased benefits because the Union no longer represented
them when, in fact, the Union lawfully did represent them.
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
on March 20, 1990, by withdrawing recognition of the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the above-described unit, and by thereafter fail-
ing and refusing to recognize the Union as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of the employees in said
unit.
7. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
on June 8, 1990, by granting wage and other benefit in-
creases to the employees in the above-described unit without
prior notice to the Union and without having afforded the
Union an opportunity to negotiate and bargain on such mat-
ters as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in said unit.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, Star Dental Products, a Division of Den-
Tal-EZ, Inc., Lancaster, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling its employees that it had stopped negotiating
with the Union, or telling its employees that it has no inten-
tion of resuming bargaining with the Union, at a time when
it has a lawful obligation to recognize and bargain with the
Union.
(b) Telling its employees that they will be receiving in-
creased benefits because the Union no longer represents them
when, in fact, the Union lawfully does represent them.
(c) Refusing to bargain with District Lodge #98, Inter-
national Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL–CIO, by:
(1) Withdrawing recognition of the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees
and by thereafter failing and refusing to recognize the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in said unit.
(2) Granting wage and other benefit increases to the em-
ployees in the unit without prior notice to the Union and
without having afforded the Union opportunity to negotiate
and bargain on such matters as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of the unit employees. The appropriate
collective-bargaining unit is:
INCLUDED: All production and maintenance employ-
ees, including Company temporary employees.
EXCLUDED: All other employees including agency
temporary employees, research and development em-
972 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of ap-
peals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor
Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.’’
ployees, production contract department employees, of-
fice clerical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the unit concerning terms
and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its Lancaster, Pennsylvania facility copies of
the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’13 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized rep-
resentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of those rights by telling our em-
ployee that we have stopped negotiating with District Lodge
#98, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, AFL–CIO or by telling our employees that we have
no intention of resuming bargaining with the Union, at a
time when we have a lawful obligation to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union.
WE WILL NOT inform our employees that they will be re-
ceiving increased benefits because the Union no longer rep-
resents them when, in fact, the Union lawfully does represent
them.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union by with-
drawing recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the unit de-
scribed below, and by thereafter failing and refusing to rec-
ognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of the employees in said unit, at a time when we
are not lawfully permitted to do so.
WE WILL NOT grant wage or other benefit increases to our
employees in the unit described below without prior notice
to the Union and without having affording the Union an op-
portunity to negotiate and bargain on such matters as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining represetative of our employees
in said unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed to you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively in good faith
concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with District Lodge #9 International Association
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining represetative of our employees in
the bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL regard the Union as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the employee in the bargaining unit described below
as if the Union’s initial year of certification has been ex-
tended for an additional 6 months from the commencement
of bargaining pursuant to the Board’s Order in this case. If
an understanding is reached, WE WILL embody it in a written,
signed agreement, WE WILL reinstitute, and reoffer, our
March 15, 1990 offer to the Union, and WE WILL give the
Union a reasonable amount of time to accept that offer or
to make counterproposals in light of changed circumstances.
The bargaining unit is:
INCLUDED: All production and maintenance employ-
ees, including Company temporary employees.
EXCLUDED: All other employees including agency
temporary employees, research and development em-
ployees, production contract department employees, of-
fice clerical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
STAR DENTAL PRODUCTS, A DIVISION OF
DEN-TAL-EZ, INC.