DELPHI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 27, 2020

2019001744 (P.T.A.B. May. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/990,237 01/07/2016 Richard J. Boyer DP-322527 7217
22851 7590 05/27/2020
Aptiv Technologies Limited
P.O. Box 5052
M/C 483-400-502
Troy, MI 48007-5052
EXAMINER
WONG, TITUS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2185
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
kandace.k.powell@aptiv.com
michele.m.piscitelli@aptiv.com
patent@aptiv.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RICHARD J. BOYER and JOHN F. HEFFRON
Appeal 2019-001744
Application 14/990,237
Technology Center 2100
Before DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, JESSICA C. KAISER, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 6–10, and 12–14. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 3–5 and 11 have been cancelled.
We AFFIRM and designate our affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF
REJECTION under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Delphi
Technologies, LLC, formerly Delphi Technologies, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/990,237

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1 is the sole independent claim.2 Claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. A Universal Serial Bus (USB) cable assembly configured
to interconnect a USB device disposed within a motor vehicle to
a USB hub disposed within the same motor vehicle, said USB
cable assembly comprising:
a first connector configured to interface with the USB hub;
a second connector configured to interface with the USB
device;
an active signal conditioning circuit connected to the
second connector and integral to the second connector;
a plurality of wire cables interconnecting the active signal
conditioning circuit to the first connector, wherein the signal
conditioning circuit is provided electrical power from the USB
hub via two of the plurality of wire cables and wherein the USB
cable assembly includes no circuitry other than the plurality of
wire cables intermediate the active signal conditioning circuit
and the first connector; and
a housing encapsulating the second connector and the
active signal conditioning circuit.

2 This Decision refers to: (1) Appellant’s Specification filed January 7, 2016
(“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed April 10, 2018;
(3) the Advisory Action (“Adv. Act.”) mailed May 15, 2015 (4) the Appeal
Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed October 3, 2018; (5) the Examiner’s Answer
(“Ans.”) mailed December 13, 2018; and (6) the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”)
filed December 18, 2018.
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Application 14/990,237

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REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Bandholz US 7,394,281 B1 July 1, 2008
Jin US 2013/0156088 A1 June 20, 2013
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 6–10, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) and Jin.3
Final Act. 3–5.
The Examiner rejects claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over AAPA, Jin, and Bandholz. Id. at 5–6.
Our review in this appeal is limited to the above rejections and the
issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP
§ 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) and 41.39(a)(1).
OPINION
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding Jin teaches “a
housing encapsulating the second connector and the active signal
conditioning circuit,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 10–13; Reply Br. 4–
5. Specifically, Appellant argues “Jin is silent regarding any sort of
housing.” Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 5. Appellant further argues “Jin does
not identify or indicate any element within [Jin’s alleged] ‘housing’ 403 . . .
as corresponding to a connector.” Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 5. Still further,
Appellant argues the Examiner improperly relies on inherency to find that

3 The Final Rejection lists claim 5 in the rejection over AAPA and Jin. Final
Act. 3. However, claim 5 has been cancelled. Appeal Br. 16. As such, we
understand the rejection over AAPA and Jin to only include claims 1, 2, 6–
10, and 12.
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Jin describes a housing encapsulating connectors. Reply Br. 4–5.
Additionally, Appellant argues that “Appellant cannot reasonably determine
which ‘element’ of the claim is believed to correspond with which element
of Fig. 4 cited in the [Final Action]. In other words, Appellant is not put on
notice as to the rationale behind the rejection and cannot adequately
determine whether such basis is proper.” Appeal Br. 11.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, AAPA teaches a “second
connector.” Final Act. 3 (citing Spec. ¶ 2). Indeed, the background section
of the Specification describes “an extension USB cable to connect the USB
device with the USB port,” the USB port further connected to a USB hub.
Spec. ¶ 2. The Examiner further finds, and we agree, Jin also teaches a
“connector” that connects USB devices. Ans. 3–4 (citing Jin ¶ 55, Fig. 4).
In particular, Jin describes a signal conditioner that is “differentially coupled
over a differential coupling 402” to a USB 3.0 source 401. Jin ¶ 55, Fig. 4.
Still further, the Examiner finds, and we agree, Jin’s “signal conditioner,
such as . . . de-emphasizer 403” (Jin ¶ 55, Fig. 4) teaches “an active signal
conditioning circuit” (Final Act. 3). The Examiner additionally finds that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have “understood” that Jin’s de-
emphasizer 403 would have been encased in a housing, as indicated by the
box in Figure 4 surrounding de-emphasizer 403. See Ans. 3; see also Final
Act. 8. Further, the Examiner concludes that it would have been “obvious to
one having ordinary skill in the art to have a housing surrounding electrical
components/circuitry so that [those electrical components/circuitry are]
protected.” Adv. Act. 2.
Even if, as Appellant argues, “Jin is silent regarding any sort of
housing” or a connector within a housing (Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 5), we
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agree with the Examiner that it would have been obvious to use a housing to
encapsulate electrical components and circuitry (Adv. Act. 2). The skilled
artisan would have been well-acquainted with the use of a housing to
encapsulate connectors and circuitry. For example, Bandholz describes a
“computer 12[,] such as BladeCenter®” including “USB root hub 10”; such
computers are known to encapsulate their components within a housing.
Bandholz 2:46–48. In light of the skilled artisan’s familiarity with the use of
housings to encapsulate electrical components, we agree with the Examiner
that it would have been obvious to encapsulate the claimed electrical
components, i.e., “the second connector and the active signal conditioning
circuit,” in a housing. As the Examiner points out (Adv. Act. 2), the skilled
artisan would have been motivated to do so in order to protect the electrical
components from damage. For example, in a vehicle, electrical components
may be unintentionally flung about when the vehicle is in motion, or the
electrical components may be accidentally stepped on when passengers enter
and exit the vehicle. Encapsulating the electrical components in a housing
would protect the components from such damage.
Furthermore, because we agree with the Examiner that including a
housing to encapsulate connectors and circuitry would have been obvious
(Adv. Act. 2), Appellant’s argument that Jin does not inherently disclose
such a housing (Reply Br. 4–5) is unpersuasive. Even if Jin does not
inherently disclose a housing that encapsulates connectors and circuitry, as
discussed above, the Examiner has sufficiently shown it would have been
obvious to do so.
Additionally, although Appellant argues that Appellant is “forced to
guess which features in the cited art the Examiner believed to disclose” the
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claimed “housing encapsulating the second connector and the active signal
conditioning circuit” (Appeal Br. 11–12), as our discussion above explains,
each of the Appellant’s contested features is either taught by the
combination of AAPA and Jin or would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art. For example, the Examiner points out (Final Act. 3;
Ans. 3) that Jin’s “signal conditioner, such as . . . de-emphasizer 403” (Jin
¶ 55, Fig. 3) teaches an “active signal conditioning circuit.” The Examiner
also points out that AAPA, describing connecting a USB cable to a USB
device (Spec. ¶ 2) and Jin, describing a differential coupler 402 (Jin ¶ 55),
both teach a “second connector” (Final Act. 3; see Ans. 4). Still further, as
discussed above, the Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to use
a housing, as housings were known to the skilled artisan, to encapsulate the
second connector and the active signal conditioning circuit. Adv. Act. 2.
Appellant further contends the Examiner improperly combined AAPA
and Jin. Appeal Br. 10. In particular, Appellant argues “the Examiner’s
proposed rationale for combining the AAPA with Jin is merely conclusory
and lacks any rational underpinning supported by the record.” Appeal
Br. 10. However, the Examiner expressly stated at least two rationales in
support of obviousness, which Appellant does not address. Final Act. 4;
Adv. Act. 2. For example, the Examiner states one of ordinary skill in the
art would have combined AAPA and Jin “in order to increase the distance of
SuperSpeed USB device data transfer without compromising the integrity of
signal.” Final Act. 4 (citing Jin ¶ 5). The Examiner also states that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have included a housing encapsulating
electrical components in order to protect those components, as discussed
above. Adv. Act. 2. Appellant does not address either of those rationales,
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let alone explain why either of those rationales is “conclusory” or otherwise
inadequate. See Appeal Br. 10. Accordingly, Appellant provides no
persuasive argument or evidence persuading us the Examiner’s rationale is
improper.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 as obvious over the combination of AAP and Jin. However, because
our decision affirming the Examiner’s rejection expands upon the
Examiner’s reasoning by referring, for example, to Bandholz to show the
knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, we designate our
affirmance of the rejection of claim 1 as a new ground of rejection pursuant
to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Further, Appellant does not argue separate patentability for dependent
claims 2, 6–10, and 12–14, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 1.
See Appeal Br. 9–13. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we
affirm the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2, 6–10, and 12–14,
also designating our affirmance as a new ground.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1, 2, 6–
10, 12
103 AAPA, Jin 1, 2, 6–
10, 12
1, 2, 6–
10, 12
13, 14 103 AAPA, Jin,
Bandholz
13, 14 13, 14
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 6–
10, 12–14
1, 2, 6–
10, 12–
14
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Application 14/990,237

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides:
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of
the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so
rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the
examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the
examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the
examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously
of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner,
overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the
decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may
again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard
under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request
for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state
with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
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Application 14/990,237

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AFFIRMED
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)