01997270
02-06-2001
Delilah M. Paul, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Delilah M. Paul v. U.S. Postal Service
01997270
February 6, 2001
.
Delilah M. Paul,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01997270
Agency No. 1-G-741-0011-99
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency
final decision dated September 10, 1999, finding that it was in compliance
with the terms of the February 12, 1999 settlement agreement into
which the parties entered.<1> See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. �
1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
Management will not place a PTF [part-time transitional], bargaining unit
craft employee, or 204B [supervisor], in a position higher than an initial
level supervisor until all EAS [executive appointment schedule], SDO's
[supervisor of distribution operations] and managers in the facility
are given the opportunity for advancement on any and all details of
higher level manager's position within the Tulsa P&D [Processing and
Distribution] plant, except for emergency situations and then for a
period of no more than 14 days.
Ten (10) days notice will be given for EAS, SDO's and managers to apply
for vacant or newly created higher level assignment.
Complainant submitted Form 2564-A (Information for Pre-complaint
Counseling), dated July 8, 1999, to the agency's EEO office claiming
that the plant manager failed to adhere to the settlement agreement,
and requested that it be implemented in the future. Specifically,
complainant alleged that from May 22, 1999 to May 24, 1999, management
level positions were filled with non-management level employees without
the ten-day notice to mid-level managers required in the settlement
agreement. As evidence, complainant attached an official agency
memorandum dated May 6, 1999, detailing at least thirteen �management
changes� to take place effective May 22, 1999.
After obtaining additional information from complainant and the plant
manager, the agency responded to complainant by letter dated August 13,
1999, and again in its September 10, 1999 final decision, concluding that
the settlement agreement had not been breached. The agency made reference
to the plant manager's response that none of the personnel identified in
the May 6, 1999 memorandum were PTF's, bargaining unit craft employees,
or 204B supervisors, and that the settlement agreement was limited only
to management opportunities offered to these categories of employees.
Moreover, the agency determined that complainant failed to submit her
breach allegation in writing within thirty days of the date of the claimed
breach, as required by the settlement agreement. The agency discredited
complainant's explanation that she first called the EEO office to obtain
information and the appropriate form to use to submit her breach claim.
On appeal, complainant argues that her breach claim should not be time
barred, and that the plant manager should not be permitted to breach
the settlement agreement to the detriment of all mid-level managers.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, review of the May 6, 1999 memorandum reflects that
all of the affected personnel where either MDO's (and one acting MDO),
supervisors, or associate supervisors prior to the change in management
position. Therefore, as indicated by the agency, none of these management
position changes involved PTF's, bargaining unit craft employees, or 204B
supervisors moving into management level positions. Furthermore, based on
the plain meaning of the provisions at issue, we agree with the agency's
determination that the terms of the settlement agreement apply only
when management level opportunities are being made available to PTF's,
bargaining unit craft employees, or 204B supervisors. Consequently, we
find that the settlement agreement did not obligate the agency to provide
the ten-day notice to its mid-level managers prior to implementing the
management changes detailed in the May 6, 1999 memorandum.
For the reasons set forth above, we find that the agency properly
concluded that the terms of the settlement agreement were not been
breached in this case, and we AFFIRM the agency's determination.<2>
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 6, 2001
__________________
Date
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
__________________
Date
______________________________
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply
to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the
administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply
the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2Given our determination herein regarding the merits of complainant's
breach claim, we need not address the agency's contentions regarding
the timeliness of that claim.