Dejene, Kebron G.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 14, 2020

14803031 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 14, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/803,031 07/18/2015 Kebron G. Dejene KDEJENE.002.US 1542
86671 7590 01/14/2020
Nwamu, P.C.
Patent and Trademark Law
7751 Carondelet Ave
Suite 405
Clayton, MO 63105
EXAMINER
SEOH, MINNAH L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/14/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
fidel@nwamu.com
ip.mail@nwamu.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KEBRON G. DEJENE
Appeal 2019-001742
Application 14/803,031
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 11–20. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as inventor, Kebron
Dejene. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed invention “relates generally to communication systems
and methods and more specifically to communication systems and methods
for executing agreements.” Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
providing a user computing device with a processor;
using said processor to receive a data file configured to
display plain text and/or images, the data file having one or more
predetermined areas wherein a signature of a signer that is using
said user computing device can be appended;
using captured video frames of the signer to digitally sign
one or more predetermined areas of the data file by using the
processor to initiate a video capture device on the user computing
device, generating a hash of the data file that is an identifier
uniquely associated with the data file;
using the video capture device to capture a plurality of
video frames of the signer verbalizing the uniquely associated
hash identifier;
using the processor to store, in memory, the data file and
the plurality of video frames, and associating said plurality of
video frames with said one or more of the predetermined areas
of the data file, wherein selection of at least one said
predetermined areas of the data file initiates a video player that
plays back the plurality of captured video frames to authenticate
the signer’s verbalizing the uniquely associated hash identifier of
the data file.
Appeal Br. 29 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTION
Claims 1, 3, 4, 9, and 11–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 3, 4, 9, and 11–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite.
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Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 11–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 18, and 19 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Udani (US 2012/0323796 Al,
published Dec. 20, 2012) and Rhoads et al. (US 2004/0153649 Al, published
Aug. 5, 2004) (“Rhoads”).
Claims 3, 8, 12, 14, 16, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Udani, Rhoads, and Wang et al. (US 2004/0143841 A1,
published July 22, 2004).
Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Udani, Rhoads, Wang, and Petta (US 2009/0282433 A1, published Nov. 12,
2009).
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Udani, Rhoads, and Bozinovic et al. (US 8,494,234 B1, issued July 23,
2013) (“Bozinovic”).
OPINION
Rejection of claims 1, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Independent claim 1 recites “captur[ing] a plurality of video frames of
the signer verbalizing the uniquely associated hash identifier.” Independent
claim 6 recites “captur[ing] a plurality of video frames of the signer
verbalizing a generated identifier uniquely associated with the data file.”
Independent claim 11 recites “captur[ing] a plurality of video frames of the
signer verbalizing the uniquely associated hash identifier of the data file.”
We are persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the combination
of Udani and Rhodes fails to disclose a signer verbalizing a hash of a unique
identifier of a document. Appeal Br. 8–11.
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The Examiner finds that Udani discloses the claimed “identifier
uniquely associated with the data file” at paragraph 235. Final Act. 29. The
Examiner also finds Udani discloses the video capture of a signer
“verbalizing the uniquely associated identifier” in paragraphs 165–68 of
Udani. Id. at 30.
In contrast, however, the Examiner later finds Udani does not disclose
capturing by video a signer verbalizing the identifier, but finds that Rhoads
discloses a hash embedded in a watermark, at paragraph 89, and capturing
with video “the signer verbalizing the uniquely associated hash identifier,” at
paragraph 102. Id. at 34–35.
In addition, the Examiner finds
the person in the video could do any action or verbalize any
information and this would not alter or inhibit the step or function
of capturing the video. Therefore, the content of the video has no
functional relationship to the underlying method step or function
of capturing the video, making the exact content similar to non-
functional descriptive material.
Id. at 31 (emphasis added). The Examiner further finds:
The identifier can be generated regardless of what it
represents and without being verbalized. Accordingly, the exact
content of the identifier are similar to non-functional
descriptive material while the element of verbalizing the
identifier to accept terms of the document is an intended use for
the generated identifier, which is merely data that can comprise
any information. Thus, this element does not distinguish the
claimed invention from the prior art.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
Udani discloses a system “to allow both the agreement provider and
the signer to record verbal acknowledgement to a written agreement,” and
“to record (using audio, video, and/or holography) the agreement signer
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and/or the agreement provider providing their verbal agreement to the terms
and conditions of the agreement.” Udani ¶¶ 166–68. We do not discern in
Udani capturing a plurality of video frames of the signer verbalizing the
uniquely associated hash identifier, as claimed.
Rhodes discloses embedding a hash of an image of a document for
printing, in a watermark which is then embedded in the image of the
document. See Rhodes ¶¶ 88–89. Rhodes also disclose storing a hash of the
text or image of the document in a database external to the document. See
id. ¶ 102. We do not discern in Rhodes, however, capturing a video of a
signer verbalizing a hash of a unique identifier of a document, or capturing a
signer verbalizing anything about an identifier or a document.
Thus, Udani and Rhodes, alone or in combination, fail to explicitly
disclose “captur[ing] a plurality of video frames of the signer verbalizing the
uniquely associated hash identifier,” as claimed. The Examiner instead
essentially articulates that Udani captures video of the signer verbalizing
something, and Rhoads discloses embedding a hash of a data file, so it
would have been obvious to have the signer verbalize the hash, adding that
the content of the verbalized hash identifier has no functional relationship to
the method. See Final Act. 33–36.
The Examiner, however, is incorrect that the identifier has no
functional relationship with the method, and is non-functional descriptive
material. The very essence of the claimed invention is that the identifier
uniquely identifies the precise terms and conditions of the agreement, and by
verbalizing this unique identifier, the method “uses captured video frames of
the signer to digitally sign one or more predetermined areas of the data file.”
The hash identifier represents a fundamental function in this method,
because it uniquely links the signer’s assent to the precise terms to which the
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assent applies. Because the Examiner has failed to establish that the
combination of Udani and Rhodes teach the method, medium, and system
steps of capturing a signer verbalizing a hash identifier that corresponds
uniquely to the document the signer is agreeing to, a prima facie case of
obviousness has not been established. For this reason, we do not sustain the
obviousness rejection of independent claims 1, 6, and 11, nor of dependent
claims 4, 9, 13, 18, and 19 that are covered by the same rejection.

Rejections of claims 3, 8, 12, 14, 15–17, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Because the Examiner has not established on the record that any of
Wang, Petta, or Bozinovic remedy the shortcomings in the combination of
Udani and Rhoads, we do not sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 3,
8, 12, 14, 15–17, and 20. See Final Act. 39–55.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
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intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether
the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
We agree with the Appellant that the Examiner has failed to provide
adequate evidence under current law to support the rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal Br. 18.
The Examiner explicitly identifies the following elements of the
independent claims as “additional elements” beyond the identified abstract
idea:
providing a user computing device with a processor,
using said processor to receive,
using captured video frames of the signer to digitally sign,
using the processor to initiate a video capture device on the user
computing device,
using the video capture device to capture a plurality of video
frames,
using the processor to store, in memory . . . and the plurality of
video frames, and associating said plurality of video
frames with said one or more of the predetermined areas
of the data file, [and]
initiat[ing] a video player that plays back the plurality of captured
video frames . . . verbalizing the uniquely associated hash
identifier of the data file.
Final Act. 19. The Examiner ultimately finds “the technological
components are simply performing routine and expected, if not
conventional functions (e.g., capture video using a video capture device,
‘store, in memory’)” and that “there is no unconventional aspect to the
invention as a whole.” Id. at 22.
In response to arguments advanced by the Appellant, the Examiner
states:
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Even under more recent guidance in the Berkheimer
memorandum regarding Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision, (April 19, 2018) prior art is only one
possible type of evidence that should be used to support a
finding under Step 2B that an additional element is well-
understood, routine, and conventional. Therefore, contrary to
the implication of Appellant’s statement, a claim can be
properly rejected under section 101 as directed to ineligible
subject matter without evidence that the “process required by
the claims exists in the prior art.”
Answer 17.
The Examiner’s findings that the “additional elements” are routine
and conventional, are conclusory and unsupported and, therefore,
insufficient to show that the additional elements are well-understood,
routine, and conventional. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Whether something is well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual
determination.”). The Examiner has not offered any evidence that this
particular combination of elements is well understood, routine, and
conventional. Id. (“Whether a particular technology is well-understood,
routine, and conventional goes beyond what was simply known in the prior
art. The mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art, for
example, does not mean it was well-understood, routine, and
conventional.”).
For this reason, the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case
of ineligibility under Step 2B of the Guidance. We thus do not sustain the
rejection of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph2
The Examiner finds various claims contain “subject matter which was
not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to
one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-
AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of
the claimed invention.” Final Act. 6.
New or amended claims which introduce elements or limitations
which are not supported by the as-filed disclosure violate the written
description requirement. See, e.g., In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967 (CCPA
1971). “The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an
applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not; the
applicant for a patent is therefore required ‘to recount his invention in such
detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his
original creation.’” Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc., 314 F.3d
1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Vas Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The fundamental factual inquiry is whether
the specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art
that, as of the filing date sought, applicant was in possession of the invention
as now claimed. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc., 935 F.2d at 1563-64.
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 9
As to these claims, the Appellant advances argument based on
“whether the specification meets the enablement requirement.” Appeal
Br. 24. The rejection, however, is not under the enablement requirement,
but instead under the written description requirement. See Final Act. 5–6

2 The Examiner indicates that the Application is examined under pre-AIA
law, and thus 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraph, not 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a) and (b). Final Act. 2.
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(“as failing to comply with the WRITTEN DESCRIPTION requirement.”).
Rather than, for example, arguing whether the claim language is disclosed in
the originally-filed claims, or that the Examiner’s rejection inappropriately
focuses on how the claimed invention performs the step, the Appellant’s
argument about enablement is not applicable to the pending rejection. The
Appellant’s further argument, therefore, related to undue experimentation,
and that the “genus/species analysis is not relevant,” also does not address
the written description requirement in the rejection.
Because the Appellant has not established error in the Examiner’s
rejection of these claims under the written description requirement, we
sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, and 9 as to this language, under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Claims 11–203
Additionally, as to claims 11–20, the Examiner finds “one of skill in
the art could not have determined that Applicant had possession of invention
because the disclosure fails to clearly link the steps or algorithms used to
perform the specialized ‘identification generation’ function in the present
invention to the programmed processor ‘identification generation engine’
recited in the claims.” Final Act. 8–9.
The Appellant argues “the term ‘engine’ in ‘identifier generation
engine’ is well-understood to mean a program that performs a function.”
Appeal Br. 25.
We agree with the Appellant. The Specification describes that
“Identifier generation module 216 can be software or hardware that

3 The additional rejection of claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
at page 9 of the Final Action, was withdrawn. Answer 4.
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generates identifiers associated with agreements in accordance with the
present invention. In one embodiment, identifiers are based on a hash of the
document that provides a unique identifier that can only be produced by the
document.” Spec. ¶ 45. This language establishes that the Appellant had
possession of a software or hardware module that generates identifiers based
on a hash of a document. Although this passage does not explain the
specific method employed for generating a hash, the Office has published
guidelines for “Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim
Limitations for Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112.” 84 F.R. 57 (2018), which
states:
[T]he specification must provide a sufficient description of an
invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve.
The level of detail required to satisfy the written description
requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the
claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant
technology. Information that is well known in the art need not be
described in detail in the specification.
Id. at 62.
The Appellant argues a hash function may include such examples as a
digital fingerprint or checksum, and that “one skilled in the art would be able
to practice the invention by applying hash functions to the document to
obtain a hash identifier without undue experimentation.” Appeal Br. 24.
We agree that the claimed software or hardware module, which broadly
generates a hash, encompasses methods well known to the ordinary artisan,
such that further explanation of a hash method is not necessary to
demonstrate the Appellant had possession of the “identifier generation
engine” of claim 11.
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For this reason, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 11–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement.

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph
Claim 3
The Appellant does not address the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3,
on the basis that “it is not clear whether the limitation is stating that the legal
‘terms’ being accepted by the signer is that the document is for no more than
a predetermined duration, or whether the limitation is specifying that the
predetermined duration is the ‘term’ of the agreement, notwithstanding the
legal provisions in the document.” Final Act. 10. We thus affirm pro forma
the rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
indefinite.
Claims 4, 9, and 13
Dependent claim 4 recites “generating for storage on a server, a hash
of the identifier, the plurality of the video frames and a name of the signer.”
Dependent claim 9 recites substantially identical language. Dependent claim
13 recites “wherein said server is configured to generate and store the
uniquely associated hash identifier that includes the plurality of the video
frames and a name of the signer.”
The Examiner determines “it is not clear whether the limitations
require a hash of the identifier, the frame, and the name separately from one
another, or if the claim requires that the hash is applied to the identifier,
frames, and name collectively,” and that for “similar reasons, it is not clear
how the hash identifier in claim 13 is generated.” Final Act. 11; see also id.
13–14.
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Although the Appellant included mention of claims 4 and 9 in
advancing arguments directed to this rejection, the argument is not
responsive to the issue raised by the Examiner as to what is included in the
stored hash of claims 4, 9, and 13. Appeal Br. 27. For this reason, we
sustain the rejection of claims 4, 9, and 13 as indefinite.
Claims 11–20
The Examiner rejects these claims as indefinite, on the basis that “the
written description fails to clearly link or associate the disclosed structure,
material, or acts to the claimed function such that one of ordinary skill in the
art would recognize what structure, material, or acts perform the claimed
function.” Final Act. 12.
As to claims 11–194, the Appellant, ignoring claim 20, argues that
“[b]ecause many portions of the specification including the original claims
disclose [a hash function], it is factual evidence that Appellant was in
possession of the invention.” Appeal Br. 27.
This argument, and the supporting evidence of the disclosure of hash
functions in the Specification and original claims, is relevant to a rejection
under the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, and was considered when addressing that rejection.
More on point, however, the Appellant argues “multiple parts of
Appellant’s Specification disclose the use of a hash function,” and that “the
concept of a cryptographic hash is relatively simple,” and thus the Appellant
“need not extensively disclose such a hash function.” Appeal Br. 26–27,
citing Spec. ¶¶ 45, 46, 86, 96, and 97.

4 The Appellant included claims 4 and 9 in this section, but the claim term
“identifier generation engine” is not recited in those claims.
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As to indefiniteness of computer-implemented functions construed
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, the specification must disclose an
algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or else the
claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Applicant may
‘‘express that algorithm in any understandable terms including as a
mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner
that provides sufficient structure.’’ Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523
F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
The Specification describes that “identifiers are based on a hash of the
document that provides a unique identifier that can only be produced by the
document,” and that “the identifier itself may be based on the document
itself. That is the identifier may be a hash of the document so that an
identifier that is uniquely associated with the document is created.” Spec.
¶¶ 45, 96. The Specification also discloses that one “may generate a hash of
sales agreement 632, which might include the unique identifier, the plurality
of video frames and/or signer 636’s information (e.g. the signer's name).”
Id. ¶ 86.
We are of the understanding that creating a hash identifier of a file is a
relatively simple, well-known function, with several options. Rhoads, for
example, discloses a “hash is a function that converts the identifier into
another number. One form of hash is a checksum, but there are many
others.” Rhoads ¶ 35. We thus consider the prose explanation in the
Specification that the hash may be based on the document, or on the
document also including the unique identifier, video frames, or signer, is an
adequate description of the algorithm behind the claim language. We thus
do not consider the claim language ambiguous, and do not sustain the
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rejection of claims 11–19, as to this language, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph. However, because the Appellant does not address the rejection
of claim 20, we sustain the rejection of that claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED-IN-PART.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 9,
11–20
112 First paragraph 1, 3, 4, 9 11–20
3, 4, 9, 11–
20
112 Second paragraph 3, 4, 9, 13,
20
11, 12, 14–
19
1, 3, 4, 6, 8,
9, 11–20
101 Eligibility 1, 3, 4, 6,
8, 9, 11–20
1, 4, 6, 9,
11, 13, 18,
19
103(a) Udani, Rhoads 1, 4, 6, 9,
11, 13, 18,
19
3, 8, 12, 14,
16, 17
103(a) Udani, Rhoads, Wang 3, 8, 12,
14, 16, 17
15 103(a) Udani, Rhoads, Wang,
Petta
15
20 103(a) Udani, Rhoads,
Bozinovic
20
Overall Outcome: 1, 3, 4, 9,
13, 20
6, 8, 11,
12, 14–19

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART