Deirdra Brown, Complainant,v.Eric Holder, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 25, 2009
01-2007-2877_Brown (E.E.O.C. Feb. 25, 2009)

01-2007-2877_Brown

02-25-2009

Deirdra Brown, Complainant, v. Eric Holder, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.


Deirdra Brown,

Complainant,

v.

Eric Holder,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120072877

Agency No. A02011030

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's May 21, 2007 final decision concerning her

entitlement to attorney's fees.1

BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2006, the Commission concluded that complainant was

discriminated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., on the bases of sex

(female), race (African-American) and in reprisal for prior EEO activity

when (1) on April 5, 2002, the agency denied her request to attend a

training conference in France; and (2) by letter dated May 10, 2002,

the agency terminated her employment.2

On January 17, 2007, complainant's attorney (A1) submitted a Verified

Statement of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Fee Petition) which requested

payment of $143,937.05 in attorney's fees and costs for A1 and his

co-counsel (A2). The Fee Petition requested payment for 292.75 hours

incurred by A1 at an hourly rate of $350. The Fee Petition also requested

payment for 253.25 hours incurred by A2 at an hourly rate of $150.

On March 7, 2007, A1 submitted a Supplemental Verified Statement of

Attorney's Fees and Costs (Supplemental Fee Petition) requesting an

additional $10,250 in attorney's fees (i.e., 21 hours for A1 and 36

hours for A2) and $37.70 in costs. In total, complainant seeks payment

of $152,037.50 in attorney's fees and $3,937.05 in costs.

In its May 21, 2007 Final Agency Decision (FAD), the agency concluded

that complainant's request for payment for nearly 600 hours of attorney's

fees is "grossly excessive." In addition, the agency concluded that

complainant's attorneys failed to meet their burden in showing that the

hours worked were reasonably expended. Specifically, the agency found

that 20.25 hours of billing entries failed to identify the specific

work performed or the individual hours spent on a particular task.

The agency also concluded that a significant portion of the Fee Petition

seeks payment for work performed on unrelated matters. In addition,

the agency asserts that many other billing entries indicate an excessive

amount of billing when compared to the stage of the process and the small

amount of work product produced by complainant's attorneys. For example,

the agency noted that complainant's attorneys are seeking payment for: (1)

at least 23 hours of work performed in the furtherance of complainant's

supervisor's (C1) EEO complaint (i.e., a separate client and case); (2)

work performed in relation to two pro se civil complaints filed against

the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

and the Privacy Act; (3) work performed in relation to complainant's pro

se appeal to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals; (4) complainant's pro

se appeal filed with the Commission; (5) approximately 250 hours of work

related to discovery efforts conducted prior to complainant's voluntary

withdrawal of her hearing request; (6) approximately 130 hours of work

performed over a period of about three years when complainant was either

waiting for a final agency decision or waiting for a decision by the

Commission with respect to her appeal (i.e., inactive times during the

processing of complainant's EEO complaint); and (7) 37.25 hours of work

performed prior to the agency's notification of legal representation.3

After eliminating specific hours noted above, the agency applied

an across-the-board reduction of the remaining hours claimed by

complainant's attorneys (169.75 hours for A1 and 212.25 hours by A2 or

382.75 total hours). The agency asserts that a seventy-five percent

(75%) across-the-board reduction is appropriate when considering the

limited degree of success on the issues alleged in the EEO complaint

and, more importantly, given the complexity of the case and the nature

of the work billed. The agency noted that in light of the experience

and knowledge in federal EEO law that complainant's attorneys possess,

it was unclear why the attorneys required so much preparation, research

and consultation time, especially when no hearing was held. Moreover,

the agency noted that after the initial discovery period between February

and June 2003, the only tangible work product that was produced by either

A1 or A2 was the response to the agency's Request for Reconsideration in

February 2007 and the fee petitions.4 Moreover, the agency concluded that

the 250 hours of discovery-related billing which occurred between February

28, 2003 and the date complainant withdrew her request for a hearing on

June 27, 2003 (i.e., a period of four months) was excessive. The agency

also noted that the record indicates that complainant's attorneys billed

her case for work performed in C1's discrimination case as late as

August 23, 2004, at the time when complainant filed her pro se appeal.

While some of those hours were excluded by the agency as noted above,

the agency concluded that the Fee Petition contains numerous additional

entries regarding conferences between complainant, her attorneys, and C1,

which makes it impossible for the agency to determine what percentage of

such conferences were devoted solely to complainant's case. The agency

also found numerous billing entries in which it is impossible to determine

whether the work was related to the present case or to unrelated claims

filed under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act.

The agency concluded that, given the failure of the Fee Petition and

Supplemental Fee Petition to clearly show which hours were reasonably

expended and directly related to the EEO matter at issue herein,

an additional seventy-five percent (75%) reduction of the remaining

hours is appropriate. Accordingly, the agency calculated that 96

hours represents a reasonable number of hours that complainant's

attorneys expended in furtherance of the complaint at issue herein.

The agency further explained that because the hours claimed in the Fee

Petition were distributed fairly equally, it concluded that the total

number of reimbursed hours would be split evenly between each attorney.

Accordingly, the agency agreed to award A1 48 hours at his hourly rate

of $350 and to award A2 48 hours at his rate of $150, resulting in a

total attorney's fee award of $24,000.

The agency agreed to reimburse complainant $197.54 in photocopying costs.

However, the agency denied the reimbursement of additional costs because

complainant did not provide supporting documentation.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Title VII and the Commission's regulations authorize the award of

reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing complainant.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e); see also EEOC's Management Directive 110

(MD-110) (November 9, 1999) Chapter 11. Fee awards are typically

calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended times

a reasonable hourly rate, an amount also known as a lodestar. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(ii)(B); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984);

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).

All hours reasonably spent in processing the complaint are compensable,

but the number of hours should not include excessive, redundant or

otherwise unnecessary hours. MD-110 at 11-15. A reasonable hourly

rate is based on prevailing market rates in the relevant community

for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases. MD-110 at 11-6.

An application for attorney's fees must include a verified statement of

attorney's fees accompanied by an affidavit executed by the attorney of

record itemizing the attorney's charges for legal services. MD-110 at

11-9. While the attorney is not required to record in great detail

the manner in which each minute of his time was expended, the attorney

does have the burden of identifying the subject matters on which he

spent his time by submitting sufficiently detailed and contemporaneous

time records to ensure that the time spent was accurately recorded.

See Spencer v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 07A10035

(May 6, 2003). The attorney requesting the fee award has the burden

of proving, by specific evidence, entitlement to the requested fees and

costs. National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Department of Defense,

675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Koren v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05A20843 (February 18, 2003).

We agree with the agency that much of the work described in the billing

entries is so general and vague that it is impossible to determine the

reasonableness of the hours expended. In addition, it appears that

the fee petitions seek a fee award for a substantial amount of hours

expended on unrelated matters. We also note that the fee petitions seek

a fee award for numerous hours billed before notifying the agency of the

attorneys' representation of complainant.5 In addition, we find that

complainant's attorneys applied their full hourly rate to travel time.6

Accordingly, we agree with the agency that a fee reduction is warranted.

When a fee reduction is in order based on excessive hours, it is not

necessary for the Commission "to perform detailed analysis to determine

precisely the number of hours or type of work for which no compensation

is allowed; rather it is appropriate to reduce the hours claimed by an

across-the-board reduction." Abbate v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Appeal No. 01971418 (March 24, 2000) (citing, Finch v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880051 (July 15, 1988); see also Kloock

v. United States Postal Service, Petition No. 04A40012 (June 16, 2004);

Altman v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01A10691& 01A01571

(June 20, 2002).

Rather than following the agency's method of calculating the appropriate

fees by performing a line-by-line reduction on one portion of the

billing entries and an across-the-board reduction on another portion of

the billing entries, we find an across-the-board reduction on the total

number of billable hours to be more appropriate. Given the substantial

number of billing entries that are not sufficiently detailed or appear

inappropriate, we conclude that an across-the-board reduction of hours by

50% is reasonable. Further, while complainant did not prevail on every

aspect of her complaint, we find that a further reduction in the fee award

is not necessary since the successful and unsuccessful claims are closely

intertwined and to the extent they are subject to differentiation, the

50% reduction is sufficient. Blinick v. Department of Housing and Urban

Development, EEOC Appeal No. 07A20079 (February 3, 2004) (citing McGinnis

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05920150 (July 15, 1992)).

Accordingly, we find that complainant is entitled to reimbursement of

A1's fees in the amount of $54,908 (156.88 hours7 multiplied by an hourly

rate of $350) and A2's fees in the amount of $21,694.50 (144.63 hours8

multiplied by an hourly rate of $150) for a total attorney's fee award

of $76,602.50.

With respect to the claim for reimbursement of legal costs, we find that

the agency properly denied reimbursement of various costs incurred

by complainant, because the record is devoid of receipts, bills,

or other documentary evidence in support of such costs. See Canady

v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05890226 (December 27,

1989); Alston v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A54981 (February 3, 2006); Coard v. Department of Justice, EEOC

Appeal No. 01A30222 (February 27, 2004). The record does not support

an award of costs greater than $197.54.

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, including

consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision

of the Commission to MODIFY the final agency decision addressing the

amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. We conclude that complainant

is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of $76,602.50 and costs in

the amount of $197.54, for a total award of $76,800.04.

ORDER (C0900)

The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

Within thirty (30) days of the date on which this decision becomes

final, to the extent not done so previously, the agency shall tender to

complainant payment in the amount of $76,602.50 in attorney's fees and

$197.54 in costs, for a total of $76,800.04.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tends to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0408)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it

also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in

an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar

days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after

one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your

complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until

such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 25, 2009

Date

1 We note that while complainant requests the docketing of a Petition for

Enforcement (PFE) on the attorney's fee and other matters, no PFE has been

docketed to date because compliance efforts by the agency are ongoing.

2 The Commission did not find discrimination with respect to nine

other claims which alleged harassment and disparate treatment with

respect to: (1) false accusations made against complainant; (2) damage

to complainant's car; (3) complainant's work product being sabotaged;

(4) racial slurs and other verbal harassment toward complainant; (5)

poor performance appraisals; (6) the requirement that complainant take

the Alabama state bar examination; and (7) the agency's failure to

convert complainant to a permanent non-probationary employment status.

3 The agency also asserts that A1 and A2 improperly seek payment

calculated at their full hourly rates (rather than 50% of such rate)

for hours which they spent traveling for a mediation and deposition.

4 The record shows that complainant filed her appeal with the Commission

pro se.

5 Under 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(l)(iv), an attorney is entitled to fees

for services performed after the filing of a written complaint and after

the complainant has notified the agency that he or she is represented

by an attorney, except that fees are allowable for a reasonable period

of time prior to the notification of representation for any services

performed in reaching a determination to represent the complainant.

The Commission has previously found that an attorney may reasonably

expend up to two hours to make a determination regarding representation.

See Vincent v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05941012 (February

27, 1996); Sinnott v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01973683

(March 17, 2000).

6 The Commission has long held that the attorney's hourly rate should be

reduced by fifty percent (50%) for travel time. See Hooper v. Defense

Logistics Agency, EEOC Appeal No. 01873384 (May 3, 1988).

7 This amount of hours represents the total number of hours claimed by

A1 reduced by fifty percent (50%).

8 This amount of hours represents the total number of hours claimed by

A2 reduced by fifty percent (50%).

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0120072877

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013