Decasper Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 22, 1986

278 N.L.R.B. 143 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

DECASPER CORP.
DeCasper Corporation and Upper South Depart-
ment, International , Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union , AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-22009 and 9-
RC-14689
22 January 1986
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
OF SECOND ELECTION
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 21 October 1985 Administrative Law Judge
Lowell Goerlich issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings,' findings, 2
and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, DeCasper
Corporation, Huntington, West Virginia, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election in
Case 9-RC-14689 is set aside and the case is re-
manded to the Regional Director for Region 9 to
conduct a new election when he deems the circum-
stances permit the free choice of a bargaining rep-
resentative.
[Direction of Second Election omitted from pub-
licaton.]
'The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law ,fudge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
2 The election petition was filed on 29 March 1985 rather than on 3
March 1985, as the judge found We rely only on the objectionable con-
duct occurring within the critical period as a basis for setting aside the
election
In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt, pro forma, the judge's
recommendations that Objections 1, 2, 5, and 6 be overruled
Vyrone Alex Cravanas, Esq., for the General Counsel.
James E. Nelson and Louis George, Esqs., of Huntington,
West Virginia, for the Respondent.
H. Victoria Hedian, Esq., of Lutherville, Maryland, for
the Charging Party Petitioner.
DECISION
143
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LOWELL GOERLICH, Administrative Law Judge. The
charge filed by Upper South Department, International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, ` AFL-CIO (the
Union), on 6 May 1985 was served on DeCasper Corpo-
ration, the Respondent, by certified mail on the same
date. A complaint and notice of hearing was'issued on 17
June 1985. In the complaint, among other things, it was
alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act, by unlawful 'surveil-
lance, interrogations, and threats to close its facility if
the employees chose the Union as their bargaining- repre-
sentative.
The Respondent filed a timely answer in which it
denied that it had committed the unfair labor practices
alleged.
On 20 June 1985 an order consolidating cases and re-
scheduling the hearing was entered, consolidating Cases
9-CA-22009 and 9-RC-14689. The latter case involved
objections to an election held on 16 May 1985.
The consolidated cases came on to be heard on 14 and
15 August 1985 at Huntington, West Virginia. Each
party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call,
examine,,and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally on
the record, to submit proposed, findings of . fact and con-
clusions, and to file briefs. All briefs have been carefully
considered.
On the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS, AND REASONS
THEREFOR
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
At all times material herein, the. Respondent, a West
Virginia corporation, has been engaged in the operation
of a garment factory in Huntington, West Virginia.
During the past 12 months, the Respondent, in the
course and conduct of its business operations described
above, derived gross revenues in excess of $100,000.
During the past 12 months, the Respondent, in the
course and conduct of its business operations described
above, performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for
firms located outside the State of West Virginia.
The Respondent is now, and has been 'at all times ma-
terial herein, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is now , and has been at all times material
herein , a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Union filed its petition for an election on 3 March
1985. An election was held on 16 May 1985 in which the
Union did not receive a majority of the votes cast. In the
278 NLRB No. 22
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meantime, as noted above, the Union filed unfair labor
practice charges upon which the General Counsel's com-
plaint in this case is based.
The Union had commenced its organizational cam-
paign in July 1984. Its first union meeting was convened
on 7 January 1985.
First: In the complaint the General Counsel alleges
that on 4 January 1985 the Respondent "created an im-
pression among its employees that their union activities
were under surveillance" and "coercively interrogated
employees regarding their union activities and the union
activities of fellow employees," and that "[o]n several
occasions during the period from January to March
1985, the exact dates being unkown to the undersigned,
threatened employees that Respondent would close its
facility if they selected the Union as their bargaining rep-
resentative."
In regard to these allegations the following relevant
evidence was offered by the parties:
Saundra Gail Bailey on 7 January 1985, around noon,
placed three handwritten notices "in the bathroom stalls"
announcing a union meeting at the Moose Hall on that
same date. Shortly thereafter, around 1 p.m., an employ-
ee meeting was announced over the PA system to con-
vene on the third floor where Bailey was working.
Samuel DeCasper, president of the Respondent, who
later spoke at the meeting, approached Bailey and Cathy
McDonie while they were ` talking about the Union and
the union meeting. He said, according to Bailey, "I can
tell that you all were talking about the union by the way
your lips were moving and [the]- expressions on your
faces." He was carrying in his hands the notices Bailey
had written and posted.'
Bailey also testified that DeCasper spoke at the em-
ployee meeting on 7 January 1985 and, while shaking the
notices, demanded to know who wrote them. DeCasper
said, according to Bailey:
"There's no such thing as a union." He said, why
did we need a union. He would close the doors if
we had a union. Why do we need a union because
he was doing all he could for us without one. And
he said he wanted to know who wrote the notes
and if they had the guts to tell him who wrote the
notes, to come to his office and tell him. . . . And
Mr. DeCasper said, "I may just go to Moose Hall
this evening myself." But he said, "I don't do that
no more because I don't drink anymore." Around
130 employees attended the meeting.'
'McDonie corroborated Bailey's testimony and added that DeCasper
had said, referring to the notices in his hand, "I want to know who wrote
these." DeCasper admitted that he had asked the two employees, "[A]re
you discussing the umon" but denied that he told them he could read
lips. After being shown his pretrial affidavit, however, he testified, "I
said that I made comments on various occasions that I can read lips
[t]o a lot of people "
'Employee Debra Lynn Chapman, who attended the meeting, quoted
DeCasper as saying that "there would be a meeting at the Moose Lodge
and that he would be there" and that "[w]ithin 10 days he would close
the doors [b]ecause of the union " (Chapman said she did not attend
the union meeting because "[w]e thought that he'd [DeCasper] be
there.") Employee Effie Mae Blevins testified, "He came up on the floor
and had some papers in his hands, and said that those was notes that was
found in the bathroom about a umon meeting And he wanted to know
DeCasper testified that the 7 January meeting was
"called specifically to inform the people that work was
being taken away because we could not meet the pro-
duction." In regard to the union meeting notices, De-
Casper testified, "I asked who did that, and that they
should have the courage to-or give me the courtesy to
ask me if they could put-or place notices anywhere in
the plant." He also testified that he "asked them to come
to [his] office . . . and let [hun] know" who posted the
union meeting notices and told them they should have
the "courage" to come to his office. He further said
"that there was no organized union in the plant, so why
would it be called a union meeting if there wasn't a
union." DeCasper also admitted that after the meeting
was over he said, "I think I'll go there myself, and I said,
no, I don't drink anymore." DeCasper denied that he
told employees that the plant would close. In view of
DeCasper's admissions and the testimony of the above-
mentioned employees, demeanor considered, I do not
credit the denials of DeCasper.3
Employee McDonie testified that "around August"
1984 DeCasper told her that "Mr. George 4 said he'd
shut the plant down before he'd let a union come in."
Employee Blevins testified that in the latter part of
January 1985 DeCasper "had" her in his office and asked
her whether she had attended the union meeting. She an-
swered, "Yes, I did." Nova Jean Edwards, a "floor
lady," was present. DeCasper testified that he did not
recall this incident. Blevins is credited.
Employee Beverly Adkins testified that "probably the
last of March" in a conversation in his office, among
other things, DeCasper asked her "if [she] could afford
the union-or if my mother could afford the union
dues." She answered that her husband made good
money.
Employee Charlotte Bledsoe testified that during the
fall of 1984 DeCasper in a conversation asked her "why
[she] wanted a union" and "what did the union ever do
for [her]."
McDonie testified that during a conversation on the
evening of 7 January 1985 in DeCasper's office, De-
Casper asked her if she was for the Union. She an-
swered, "Yes." He then asked her why; she answered
"because we weren't treated equally." He then asked for
an example, to which she complied. At another time on
the same day DeCasper said to her, referring to the
who had wrote the notes, said for them-said he would like to see them
down in his office. And-and he said that before he'd let a union come in
there, said he would shut the doors. And he said that they was wrong
about one flung because there was no umon and that he thought he'd just
come over to the Moose Lodge that night, too " Employee Ruth Gibson
recalled that DeCasper said that he thought he would go to the meeting
at the Moose Hall "[a]nd then he kind of laughed and said, `No, I think
I'd better not "' Employee Charlotte Faye Spears, a witness called by the
Respondent, admitted that DeCasper said, "I would like to know
who hung these notices up."
ain addition to the other considerations noted above and applicable
here, the testimony of current employees which is adverse to the interests
of their employer is unlikely to be false. Shop-Rite Supermarket, 231
NLRB 500, 505 fn 22 (1977); St Ann's Home, 221 NLRB 839, 844
(1975).
" George owns "80 percent of the company "
DECASPER CORP 145
union meeting notices, "If you didn't write these notes
yourself, then you know who did."
Second: The General Counsel finally alleges that the
Respondent "acting through Craig Reynolds . . . coer-
cively interrogated an employee regarding her union
sympathies" on or about 19 March 1985.
In respect to this allegation employee Mary Jacquelyn
Hutchinson testified that Production Manager Craig
Reynolds, after she had passed out union literature on 15
March 1985, called her into his office and said that he
"wondered why me." He asked her, if "they were doing
something that [she] didn't like." She answered, "[N]ot
really." Then he asked her what she wanted from the
Union. She answered, "[A]ll I need are benefits. We had
no insurance or anything." Reynolds replied that "we
were going to have profit sharing, and it was right
around the corner." She answered, "Well, we don't have
it yet, do we."
Reynolds admitted that he had a conversation with
Hutchinson in his office. He testified that he asked her
"why would she want a union at that time." Reynolds
testified further:
Okay, when I did talk to her, I did mention the fact
that, you know, she had had those couple of days
off because she appeared in the arts and crafts
show, and that, you know, I thanked her'at the time
too for working the overtime on a special machine
because we had an order to get out at that time.
So I asked her reason why-,she would want a
union in, because like I say, 'I was genuinely con-
cerned. She responded that-Tasked her if there
was anything that the Company was doing wrong
to make her want a union.
She said no, that everything was going fine and
that her main thing was benefits, and her main thing
was the drug program that the union offered, the
prescription program.
I mentioned to her then that like we had said
once the Company became profitable that we
would provide profit sharing and insurance, which
has always been stated since the inception of the
Company.
But'her main thing was the benefits.
McDonie testified that on 19 March 1985 Reynolds
asked her if she had signed a union card. She answered,
"Yes." Reynolds replied that, "he wasn't for the union
because he had worked in a company in Virginia that
was union and he didn't care for it at all, that they really
treated them dirty." Reynolds admitted that, he had
asked McDonie whether she had signed a card and testi-
fied further about the conversation:
I would ask her why she wanted the union, because
you know, like I say, I was genuinely concerned be-
cause she had come to us, you know, and practical-
ly begged us to hire her and give her a job, and she
had car payments or something like that to make,
and as soon as we got an opening, which we did
give her a job, so I was concerned, we had helped
her out, why was she wanting a union in, which I
had already previously mentioned her reasons
that-was like, she thought maybe she wasn't treat-
ed fairly as changing operations and stuff like that.
Third: The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by the following unlawful interrogations of employ-
ees: (1) DeCasper 's interrogations on 7 January 1985 in
which he sought to discover which employees posted the
notices for the union meeting to be held on 7 January
1985 at the Moose Hall;5 (2) DeCasper 's interrogation on
7 January 1985 addressed to employees as'to whether
they were discussing the Union ; and (3) DeCasper's in-
terrogation of employee Blevinss in his office as to
whether she had attended a union , meeting.
In Aladdin Hotel, 273 NLRB 773 (1984 ), the Board
said : "In Rossmore House, 269 NLRB [1176, 1177 (1984)],
the Board overruled PPG Industries [251 NLRB 1146
(1980)] and announced that it would henceforth evaluate
interrogations according to `whether under all of the cir-
cumslances the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain,
coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act."'
Applying this test , I find the above-questioning to be un-
lawful. The questioning occurred after the Respondent
had manifested its displeasure with the Union 's organiza-
tional campaign and during a period in which the Re-
spondent committed other unfair labor practices. (See
infra.) Nor is there credible evidence that the interroga-
tions were addressed to open union supporters. More-
over, the Respondent 's questioning implied the possibility
of some form of retaliation . See Saloon , 247 NLRB 1105
(1980), enfd . 647 F.2d 171 (9th Cir . 1981).6 -
Fourth : The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the
Act by Production Manager Reynold 's interrogation of
employee - Hutchinson on 15 March 1985 and of employ-
ee McDonie on 19 March 1985.
While posing questions to Hutchinson , Reynolds re-
minded her that she had had a couple of days off for the
arts and crafts show, with the implication that such favor
might be imperiled by her favoring the Union . Likewise,
in interrogating McDonie, Reynolds reminded her that
she begged the Respondent to hire her, that she had car
payments, and that the Respondent had helped her out
"why was she wanting a union ." Obviously , interroga-
tions which were addressed in an atmosphere created by
an employer which sounded in the withdrawal of bene-
fits for union affection must be illegal . Reynolds' interro-
gations met the Rossmore House test, supra.
Fifth: The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by DeCasper's statement to employees on 7 January
1985 that he might go to the union,meeting at the Moose
Hall.
DeCasper's remarks that he might attend the union
meeting created the impression among his employees that
their attendance at the meeting might be under surveil-
lance.
5Cf Spartan Plastic, 269 NLRB 546 (1984)
' The fact that any of the interrogations may have occurred in a
friendly conversation does not preclude a conclusion that the interroga-
tions were coercive NLRB v Naum Bros, 637 F 2d 589, 592 (6th Cir
1980).
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sixth: The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by DeCasper's statement to employees on 7 January
1985 that the Respondent would close the doors of the
plant if a union was in the plant. This threat of reprisal
was unlawful. Model A Motor Car Corp., 259 NLRB 555,
556 (1981).
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
A hearing was ordered on Objections 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and
7. The objections will be considered seriatim.
Objection 1. The Employer did not post the election
notices until 15 May 1985, the day before the election,
thereby depriving the employees of adequate notice of
the election as required by the Board's Rules and Regu-
lations.
The uncontradicted testimony of DeCasper indicates
that DeCasper received an election notice on 13 May
1985 at approximately 4 p.m. Since he received only one
copy he called Ms. McClure at the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and asked for additional copies. She referred
him to his counsel, who had no additional copies of the
notice. DeCasper again called McClure, who advised
him to post the notice where the employees were going
to vote. He informed her the employees would be voting
in the cafeteria. She told him to place the notice in the
cafeteria where the employees could see it. The plant
had closed at 3 p.m. The next morning, 14 May 1985, the
notice was placed above a coatrack in the cafeteria 5-1/2
feet from the floor. Apparently, the notice fell from the
posting spot. Later it was seen posted in the lobby where
it remained until the day after the election. The Union
also published notices of the date of the election. There
is no evidence that any employee failed to vote because
he or she did not know that the election was being held.
In the case relied on by the Charging Party, Kilgore
Corp., 203 NLRB 118 (1973), the Board said:
Because of the exigencies of each case, the Board
has never established a specified time prior to an
election for the posting of the election notice. In-
stead those details have been left to the discretion
of the Regional Director, who is in a position to
assess the requirements of each individual situation.
There is no credited evidence which indicates that the
Regional Director did not exercise his discretion as re-
quired by the statute under the circumstances of this
case. Objection I is not well taken and is overruled.
Objection 2. On 16 May 1985, the Employer engaged
in improper electioneering by approaching employees
during the polling period and asking them to vote for the
Employer.
Voting commenced on 16 May 1985 at 2 p.m. Em-
ployee Bledsoe testified that after the voting started but
before she voted DeCasper asked her at her machine "if
[she] would vote for him when [she] went down to
vote" and also said, "Just to remember his face when I
went to vote." DeCasper remembered talking to Bledsoe
after the election but did not "know if [he] talked to her
before or not." He did not recall his asking her to re-
member'his face on the day of the election.
Employee Chapman testified that after 2 p.m. on 16
May 1985 DeCasper asked her "how [she] was going to
vote" and "why [she] wanted a union." He also told her
"to remember his face." DeCasper testified that he did
not deny that he had asked Chapman "how she was
going to vote in the election" and said to her, "I would
appreciate it if she would vote against the union."
Blevins testified that she observed DeCasper talking to
the employees during the voting period.7
Employee Dolores Bias testified that on 16 May 1985
at "10 after 2:00" DeCasper walked up to her machine
and asked her if she would "do him a favor" and asked
her whether she would "vote for him." When DeCasper
was asked whether he had said to Bias on election day
"do me a favor and vote for me," he replied, "I don't
recall-we're talking-I don't recall, it could have been
in the morning, prior to that, I don't know, I honestly
don't."
DeCasper testified that at every opportunity he ex-
pressed to employees his opposition to the Union. He ad-
mitted that he had said to employees "remember my face
when you vote." I credit the employees' versions.
Since it appears that restrictions on union campaigning
on election day are limited to captive employee-audi-
ences (Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427 (1953)) and
sustained conversations with prospective voters waiting
to cast their ballots (Milchem, Inc., 170 NLRB 362
(1968); Locust Industries, 218 NLRB 717, 727 (1975)),
Objection 2 is overruled.
Objection 4. On 30 April 1985 the Respondent threat-
ened to close its facility if the employees voted for the
Union and suggested that all union supporters leave the
facility.
According to employee Phyllis Curnutte, DeCasper
addressed an employee meeting on 30 April 1985 and,
among other things, said that he "knew who the union
organizers was [sic] and that they could leave and leave
now." Hutchinson also testified that DeCasper said that
he "knew who the organizers were and that we could
get up and leave, that they'd be better off without us."
Hutchinson quoted DeCasper as saying, among other
things, that he had been "in a meeting with his Board of
Directors, and they had advised him to lay-off 50 people
or close the place down," and that he had 22 days to
show a profit, and it was in our hands or up to us to do
something about it. . . . He said that other garment fac-
tories are going out of business, they were closing down
all over. And that if he were union, he couldn't be com-
petitive."
Beverly Adkins read from her shorthand notes taken
at the meeting (which I consider to be the best evi-
dence). Among other things, her notes disclosed:
DeCasper admitted that he was in the plant areas during the voting
period. He testified:
I went to the second floor-you know, as I normally do, to check
the work, make sure the people are working, and also watching the
conduct of the election . number one, that we're not violating
the-the staff is not violating the election rules, nor are the people
that are representing-you know, those that are-that they're not
conducting a campaign
sDeCasper admitted the foregoing
DECASPER CORP.
He had talked with the board of directors, and their
opinion was to, lay 50 people off or close the doors
at the end of May, or to show a profit.... He
mentioned that he did know who the union girls
were that were trying to, get the union organizing
brought in .... You have no rights and no rights
at all. . . . For those of you who . . . only .. .
want to organize, do us both a favor and please
leave. He indicated that the girls who were working
with the union cards and getting them signed
should be devoting their energies and their time into
working instead of trying to intimidate the other
girls, then the plant would be successful. It's in our
hands.9
DeCasper testified, that the 30 April 1985 meeting was
in response to a leaflet which the Union had distributed
and that during the meeting he had informed the em-
ployees about a meeting which he had with the board of
directors.
The foregoing remarks of DeCasper made in his
speech to employees on 30 April 1985 were of such a
nature as to destroy, the laboratory conditions which the
Board -requires to be maintained during a Board-conduct-
ed election. See General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124
(1948). In DeCasper's speech were inferences of union
surveillance, suggestions that union advocates were un-
welcome in the plant and should leave, and implications
that the plant might close and employees would lose jobs
if the plant were unionized. Moreover, it was reasonable
for employees to draw these conclusions in view of the
statements made by DeCasper in his 7 January 1985
speech in which, among other things, he threatened to
close the plant if the Union became the bargaining agent.
In Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 233, 236 (5th
Cir. 1981), the court said: "The question is, not only what
the employer intended to imply but also what the em-
ployees could reasonably have inferred."
Objection 4 is well taken and is sustained.
Objection 5. On 25 April 1985 the Employer stated it
would not pay employees and threatened to close the
plant if a majority of the employees voted for the Union.
Employee Blevins testified that on 25 April 1985 De-
Casper in addressing an employee meeting said: "[H]e
told us that he could not meet payroll because he was
not getting production out, and that it wasn't no use to
take no more orders if the ladies couldn't get production
out, and that he may just have to close the plant down
by May 31st."
DeCasper said he called the 25 April 1985 meeting be-
cause he could not meet the payroll and that he did not
discuss the Union at the meeting.
The foregoing statements attributed to DeCasper did
not constitute an interference with the election. Objec-
tion 5 is overruled.
Objection 6. On 13 May 1985 the Employer interrogat-
ed an employee about how she was going to vote in the
election.
The Charging Party has not treated this objection in
its brief nor has any evidence been referred to in support
of this objection. Objection 6 is overruled.
9DeCasper admitted some statements of this character
147
',Objection 7. Based on the foregoing six objections, and
by other acts, the Employer destroyed the laboratory
conditions necessary for the voters to make a free choice
in the election.
To support this objection the Charging Party refers to
Reynold's interrogations, supra, which I have found to
constitute unfair labor practices within the critical elec-
tion period. Thus, Objection 7 is well taken and is sus-
tained.
Having found that the Respondent engaged in viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act during the critical
election campaign period,10 and engaged in certain other
misconduct which interfered with the conduct of the
election, I find that the Respondent has unlawfully inter-
fered with the employees' exercise of a free choice for or
against a bargaining representative. "Conduct violative
of Section 8(a)(1) is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes
with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in: an
election." Dal-Tex Optical- Co., 137 NLRB 1782, 1786
(1962); Concord Furniture Industries, 241 NLRB 643
(1979); GTE Automatic Electric, 196 NLRB 902 (1972).
I further find that, by reason of the unlawful interfer-
ence, the election conducted on 16 May 1985 should be
set aside and held.for naught. "If an election were won
by the employer through illegal conduct and-in violation
of law, the Union was wronged and it had a right to
have such an election set aside." NLRB v. Plaskolite,
Inc., 309 F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir. 1962).'
CONCLUSIONS OF, LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and it will
effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering "with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent unlawfully interfered with the rep-
resentation election held on 16 May 1985, and a new
election should be conducted.
THE REMEDY
It is recommended that the Respondent cease and
desist from its unfair labor practices and take certain af-
firmative action deemed necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed"
10See Ideal Electric Co., 134 NLRB 1275 (1961).
i'If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Continued
148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
The Respondent, DeCasper Corporation, Huntington,
West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unlawfully interrogating employees regarding their
union activities and sympathies or the union activities of
other employees.
(b) Unlawfully creating the impression among its em-
ployees that their union activities are under surveillance
by telling them that it may attend their union meetings.
(c) Unlawfully threatening its employees that it will
close its plant if the union obtains bargaining rights in
the plant.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its establishment at Huntington, West Vir-
ginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 9, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other
than those found in this decision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on 16
May 1985 be set aside and a new election be ordered in
conformity with the Board's practices and procedures.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully create the impression among
our employees that their union activities are under sur-
veillance by telling them that we may attend their union
meetings.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees
regarding their union activities or sympathies or the
union activities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully threaten our employees that
we will close our plant if Upper South Department,
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization, obtains bargaining
rights in our plant.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
DECASPER CORPORATION