Debra A. Martin, Appellant,v.Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 1, 1999
01991209_r (E.E.O.C. Nov. 1, 1999)

01991209_r

11-01-1999

Debra A. Martin, Appellant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Debra A. Martin, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01991209

) Agency Nos. 980531

Daniel R. Glickman, ) 980765

Secretary, )

Department of Agriculture, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On November 24, 1998, appellant filed a timely appeal with this

Commission from a final agency decision (FAD) dated October 23, 1998,

pertaining to her complaints of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. In a formal complaint dated March 18, 1998

(Agency Number 980531), appellant alleged that she was subjected to

discrimination on the basis of race (African-American) when:

In 1982, appellant applied for a position at the county office and

subsequently was notified of her nonselection;

The agency failed to give appellant a performance award, resulting in

appellant's failure to receive a quality step increase in 1994 and 1995.

On or about January 27, 1998, appellant became aware that two Caucasian

co-workers, who received performance awards, were being paid at a

higher rate.

On June 12, 1998, appellant filed a separate formal complaint (Agency

Number 980765), alleging discrimination on the bases of race and in

reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

On April 29, 1998, appellant was denied training for the AG Credit

Training position.

In its October 23, 1998 FAD, the agency consolidated Agency Numbers

980531 and 980765. Therein, the agency accepted allegations (2)

and (3), but dismissed allegation (1) pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29

C.F.R. �1614.107(b), for untimely counselor contact. Specifically, the

agency found that appellant's explanation for her delay, that she realized

the selectee was of a different race when she reviewed old paperwork,

was not adequate to toll the forty-five (45) day limitations period.

On appeal, appellant disputes the reasoning stated in the agency's FAD.

Appellant contends that she filed a complaint as soon as she learned

that the selectee did not have the proper qualifications for the

position. Appellant argues that the agency's notification of appellant's

nonselection is not relevant to the timeliness of allegation (1) because

appellant was not aware until later that the selectee did not have a high

school education. Appellant notes that she did not receive training

on the EEO process until 1995, and was not aware of applicable time

limitations until that time.

The record includes the Counselor's Reports for both complaints. In the

report for Agency Number 980531, appellant's initial counselor contact

is listed as January 27, 1998. The record also includes a letter dated

March 20, 1982, informing appellant that she was not selected for a

position with the agency.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel

action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)

day limitation period is triggered. See Ball v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05880247 (July 6, 1988). Thus, the time

limitation can be triggered before all the facts that support a charge

of discrimination have become apparent, but not until a complainant

reasonably suspects discrimination.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that she was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that she did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence she was prevented

by circumstances beyond her control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

Generally, the Commission has held that nonselection is a discrete

action that should trigger a reasonable suspicion of discrimination at

the time of its occurrence. See Farrell v. Department of Health and

Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05940981 (Aug. 3, 1995) (nonselection

triggers reasonable suspicion when appellant knows of the nonselection,

and is aware of who was selected); see also Guba v. Department of the

Army, EEOC Request No. 05970635 (Jan. 21, 1999). Appellant admits that

she had knowledge of the EEO process and filing deadlines over two years

prior to her present complaint. We find, further, that appellant's

contention on appeal is insufficient to justify an extension of the

applicable time limit for almost fourteen (14) years. See Baldwin

County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam)

("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to

excuse lack of diligence"); Rys v. U.S. Postal Service, 886 F.2d 443,

446 (1st Cir. 1989) ("to find succor in equity a Title VII plaintiff must

have diligently pursued her claim"). Therefore, the agency's dismissal

of allegation (1) was proper.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

November 1, 1999

__________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations