Deborah Liu

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 7, 2019

14196227 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/196,227 03/04/2014 Deborah Liu 26295-26320 8319
87851 7590 10/07/2019
Facebook/Fenwick
Silicon Valley Center
801 California Street
Mountain View, CA 94041
EXAMINER
PALAVECINO, KATHLEEN GAGE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/07/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
fwfacebookpatents@fenwick.com
ptoc@fenwick.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DEBORAH LIU
____________________

Appeal 2018-006943
Application 14/196,227
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before DENISE M. POTHIER, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–7. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant identifies Facebook, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal
Brief 2, filed February 20, 2018 (“App. Br.”).
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BACKGROUND
This patent application concerns a social networking system that
personalizes a user’s “transaction flow” based on the user’s experience. See,
e.g., Specification ¶¶ 3–7, filed March 4, 2014 (“Spec.”). For example, the
system can change the information and options presented to a user during
the purchase of in-application items based on the user’s experience with
digital currencies. See Spec ¶ 7. For users new to digital currencies, the
system can display item costs “in real-world currencies rather than digital
currency” and provide “more instruction [on] how to perform a purchase”
and “more opportunities to confirm or opt out of a transaction.” Spec. ¶ 7.
For users experienced with digital currencies, the system may “streamline
the process to avoid burdening the users with choices that the social
networking system predicts will be affirmed anyway.” Spec. ¶ 7.
Claim 1, the sole independent claim, illustrates the claimed invention:
1. A method comprising:
[a] receiving transaction information for a plurality of
users of a social networking system from a plurality of
applications interfacing with the social networking system, the
transaction information comprising historical purchase data for
application-related items purchased by the users from the
plurality of applications;
[b] receiving a request from an interfacing application for
a transaction flow for a user, the transaction flow comprising at
least one interaction requesting user input to complete the
transaction;
[c] determining the user’s experience with transactions
based on the transaction information;
[d] determining, by a computer processor, the transaction
flow from a plurality of different transaction flows comprising
differing interactions to complete the transaction, the determined
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transaction flow based on the user’s experience with
transactions; and
[e] sending the determined transaction flow to the
interfacing application;
[f] receiving a transaction request for the user from the
interfacing application;
[g] processing the transaction request; and
[h] sending the interfacing application a confirmation
responsive to the transaction request being processed.
App. Br. 13 (bracketed letters added).
REJECTIONS
Claims Basis References
1–7 § 101
1–4, 6, and 7 § 103(a) Ramalingam
2 and
Hirson3
5 § 103(a) Ramalingam, Hirson, and McCown4

DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and Appellant’s
arguments. We disagree with Appellant that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1–7 under § 101. For this rejection, as consistent with the discussion
below, we adopt the Examiner’s reasoning, findings, and conclusions on
pages 2–6 of the Final Office Action mailed June 20, 2017 (“Final Act.”)
and pages 3–4 of the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 20, 2018 (“Ans.”).
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–7
under § 103. We address these rejections in turn.

2 Ramalingam et al. (US 8,140,403 B2; March 20, 2012).
3 Hirson (US 2011/0082772 A1; April 7, 2011).
4 McCown (US 2011/0231292 A1; September 22, 2011).
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Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has revised its guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites subject matter that falls within one of the abstract idea
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groupings listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we
then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised
Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the § 101
rejection. Appellant argues claims 1–7 together, so as permitted by 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal for this ground of rejection
based on claim 1.
Abstract Idea
The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
includes “mental processes,” that is, processes that people can perform in
their minds or using pen and paper. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52 & n.14. The Examiner determined that claim 1 recites subject matter that
falls in this abstract idea grouping. See, e.g., Final Act. 4 (determining that
claim 1 is directed to “an ‘idea of itself’”), 5 (stating that people can perform
the determining steps recited in limitations [c] and [d] “mentally or using
pen and paper”); see also USPTO, July 2015 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility at 5, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-
2015-update.pdf (explaining that the category “an idea of itself” includes
mental processes).
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We agree that claim 1 recites mental processes. Limitations [c] and [d]
respectively recite “determining the user’s experience with transactions
based on the transaction information” and “determining, by a computer
processor, the transaction flow from a plurality of different transaction flows
comprising differing interactions to complete the transaction, the determined
transaction flow based on the user’s experience with transactions.” App. Br.
13. Neither claim 1 nor the written description meaningfully limits the scope
of these limitations. Although claim 1 recites what each determination is
“based on,” claim 1 does not recite how the method performs each
determination. See App. Br. 13. As for the written description, it discloses
that the invention “compile[s] and analyze[s]” certain information “to
determine a user’s competency level with digital currencies and the purchase
of application related digital items,” but does not limit this process to a
particular algorithm. Spec. ¶ 44. Similarly, the written description indicates
that the invention determines a transaction flow for a user “based on a user’s
competency with digital currencies and application related digital item
purchases” but does not require that the invention do so in a particular
manner. Spec. ¶ 46.
Because neither claim 1 nor the written description meaningfully
limits the scope of limitations [c] and [d], these limitations are broad enough
to encompass acts that people can perform mentally or using pen and paper.
See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim’s steps could “be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” when neither the claim
nor the written description limited the steps to a particular algorithm). For
example, people can mentally determine a user’s experience with
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transactions by counting the number of transactions that a user has
completed and associating an experience level with that number. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶ 44 (explaining that the disclosed invention determines a user’s
competency level based on information that can include “the number of
items purchased, prices paid, frequency of purchases, gifts purchased for
other users, whether digital currency or real-world currency was used, along
with other purchase metrics”). Similarly, people can determine a transaction
flow from a plurality of transaction flows based on the user’s experience
with transactions by mentally selecting a transaction flow from a list of
transaction flows based on the user’s experience level. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 46
(explaining that the disclosed system “may determine a user’s competency
with digital currencies and application related digital item purchases and use
the competency to determine a transaction flow for the user”).
Because limitations [c] and [d] encompass acts that people can
perform mentally or using pen and paper, claim 1 recites mental processes.
See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (determining that a claim is drawn to
“unpatentable mental processes” when the claim’s steps could “be
performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper”). This
is true even though limitation [d] explicitly requires that a computer
processor perform the recited “determining” step. “Courts have examined
claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.” Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That
purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a
computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v.
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Benson.”); Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its
broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for
the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category . . . .”).
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us otherwise. Appellant
contends that the Examiner’s reliance on the non-precedential SmartGene5
decision violates a November 2016 Patent Office memorandum. See App.
Br. 5. That memorandum encourages examiners to “avoid relying upon or
citing non-precedential decisions” such as SmartGene unless the facts at
hand “uniquely match” those in the non-precedential decision. USPTO,
Memorandum on Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions at 4 (Nov. 2,
2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/McRo-Bascom-
Memo.pdf (“November 2016 Memo”). But the memorandum does not
affirmatively bar examiners from relying on non-precedential decisions in
other circumstances. See November 2016 Memo 4. We thus see no
reversible error in the Examiner’s reliance on SmartGene.
Appellant next contends that the Examiner’s characterization of the
mental processes is an “overgeneralization[]” that is “detached from the
specific limitations recited in the claims.” App. Br. 5. But an examiner can
describe an abstract idea at different levels of generality without affecting
the patent-eligibility analysis. Cf. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d
1229, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction. . . . The Board’s slight revision of
its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.”). That is

5 SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
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the case here. Regardless of the level of generality used to describe the
abstract idea recited in claim 1, the result is the same—claim 1 recites
mental processes. Cf. Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software,
Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Although not as broad as the
district court’s abstract idea of organizing data, it is nonetheless an abstract
concept.”).
Appellant argues that Office guidance “does not state that a step
recited in the claim that can be performed in the human mind or using a pen
and paper renders the whole claim to be directed to an idea ‘of itself.’” App.
Br. 6. Appellant argues that “[s]imply because a limitation starts with the
verb ‘determining’ does not mean that the limitation can be performed in the
human mind or by a human using a pen and paper.” App. Br. 6. Appellant
contends that in Thales6 the Federal Circuit determined that a claim that
recites a single “determining” step that “arguably could have been
performed by a human with pen and paper” was patent eligible. App. Br. 6.
We see no merit in these arguments. Limitations [c] and [d] do not
encompass mental processes merely because they start with the word
“determining.” As discussed above, limitations [c] and [d] are so broadly
drawn that they encompass acts that people can perform mentally or using
pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372–73. Although this does
not end the patent-eligibility inquiry, see Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
53–56, on this record, this analysis is sufficient to establish that claim 1
recites mental processes. As for Thales, in that case the patent-eligible claim
was “directed to systems and methods that use inertial sensors in a non-
conventional manner.” Thales, 850 F.3d at 1348–49. Appellant has not

6 Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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persuasively argued that claim 1 is directed to a similar non-conventional
use of components.
Finally, Appellant argues that claim 1 “clearly do[es] not tie up all
possible ways of using” the abstract idea. App. Br. 7; see also App. Br. 8
(making similar arguments). Even if this is true, that does not show that
claim 1 is patent eligible. “While preemption may signal patent ineligible
subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In any event, claim 1 also recites certain methods of organizing
human activity, another of the abstract idea groupings listed in the Revised
Guidance, see Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Claim 1 recites a
method that includes limitations [a]-[h] reproduced above. The recited
method (1) receives specified user transaction information, (2) receives a
request for a transaction flow for a user, (3) determines the user’s experience
with transactions based on the transaction information, and (4) determines
the transaction flow from a plurality of different transaction flows based on
the user’s experience with transactions. See App. Br. 13. The method also
(5) sends the determined transaction flow, (6) receives a transaction request
for the user, (7) processes the request, and (8) sends a confirmation
responsive to the transaction request being processed. See App. Br. 13.
This method of tailoring a transaction flow based on a user’s
transaction experience, processing a received transaction, and confirming
that the transaction has been processed is a commercial practice that is
similar to other commercial practices that courts have determined are
abstract ideas. See, e.g., Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No.
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2018-1697, 2019 WL 2896449, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 5, 2019) (targeted
marketing); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (offer-based price optimization); Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(customizing content); Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1013
(C.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 622 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (targeted
advertising); OpenTV, Inc. v. Netflix Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 886, 892–93 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (targeted programming); Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
No. CV 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446, at *3–4 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014)
(upselling). Claim 1 thus recites certain methods of organizing human
activity. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (explaining that certain
methods of organizing human activity include “commercial or legal
interactions” and “fundamental economic principles or practices”).
Because we determine that claim 1 recites abstract ideas, we next
consider whether claim 1 integrates these abstract ideas into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we
consider whether there are any additional elements beyond the abstract ideas
that, individually or in combination, “integrate the [abstract ideas] into a
practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55.
For the recited mental processes, the additional elements include
limitations [a], [b], [e]-[h], and the “computer processor” recited in
limitation [d]. See App. Br. 13. Limitations [a], [b], [e], [f], and [h] recite
components such as “a social networking system,” “a plurality of
applications interfacing with the social networking system,” and “an
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interfacing application.” App. Br. 13. The written description indicates that
these components are conventional. For example, the written description
discloses that “[s]ocial networking systems have become prevalent in recent
years . . . .” Spec. ¶ 3. The written description explains that “social
networking systems have evolved into platforms for accessing and
interacting with different types of applications provided by third parties. For
example, many computer games exist that are hosted by third parties and
that interface with and through the social networking system . . . .” Spec. ¶ 4.
The written description also notes that “[i]n order to unify the user
experience for social networking systems and the applications integrated
within them, social networking systems have implemented unified digital
currencies that may be used in any of the applications integrated with the
social networking system.” Spec. ¶ 4.
The functions recited in these limitations are also conventional.
Limitations [a], [b], [e], [f], and [h] recite receiving or sending certain data.
See App. Br. 13. Sending and receiving data are conventional computer
functions. See, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over
a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
Limitation [g] recites “processing the transaction request.” App. Br. 13. This
limitation recites a result without specifying how the claimed method
accomplishes the result. The written description does not limit the recited
processing to a particular method but indicates that this step consists of
debiting a user’s account. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 49 (“[T]he third party server 120
communicates with social networking system 130 to conduct 340 the
transaction. The social networking system 130 debits 345 the user’s account
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the cost of the transaction.”), Fig. 3, items 340, 345. This type of electronic
recordkeeping is a conventional computer function. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225 (“Using a computer to create and maintain ‘shadow’ accounts
amounts to electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a
computer.”).
Limitations [a], [b], and [e]-[h] also recite insignificant extra-solution
activity. Limitations [a] and [b] gather information and a request for the
claimed method. See App. Br. 13. Such data gathering is insignificant pre-
solution activity. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1366 (“Moreover, as
discussed above, even if some physical steps are required to obtain
information from the database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard,
clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability.”). And as discussed above, limitations [e]-[h] recite
conventional sending, receiving, and processing steps that occur after the
method performs the mental processes recited in limitations [c] and [d]. See
App. Br. 13; see also buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355; Alice, 573 U.S. at 225.
These conventional steps are token post-solution activity. See Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (determining that “the use of well-known
random analysis techniques” was token post-solution activity).
As for the computer processor recited in limitation [d], the written
description does not indicate that the processor is anything other than a
conventional computer processor that performs conventional functions. In
fact, the written description states that invention can use “a general-purpose
computing device.” Spec. ¶ 68.
At bottom, the additional elements discussed above encompass
conventional components and functions. These conventional components
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and functions do not integrate the mental processes into a practical
application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that
provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)).
Appellant contends that “the additional limitations provide more than
merely applying the proposed abstract idea, as the claims apply the proposed
exception by describing for determining a transaction flow to be used in
conjunction with an interfacing application.” App. Br. 8; see also App. Br.
8–9 (arguing that limitations [c] and [d] “recite steps that are significantly
more than merely restricting the use of the abstract idea to a particular
technological environment”). But as discussed above, the determining steps
recited in limitations [c] and [d] form part of the identified mental processes.
The abstract idea itself cannot integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application. See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive
concept, ‘no matter how groundbreaking the advance.’” (quoting SAP Am.,
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
Appellant also asserts that claim 1 “improve[s] the efficiency of using
an electronic device in the context of online commerce or online transactions
by adapting the purchase flows based on a determined level of experience of
the user using the electronic device.” App. Br. 10. Appellant has presented
no persuasive evidence or reasoning to support this assertion. Regardless,
adjusting the purchase flow based on a user’s experience is part of the
identified abstract idea, and as discussed above, the abstract idea itself
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cannot integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Trading
Techs. Int’l, 921 F.3d at 1093.
For the recited certain methods of organizing human activity, the
additional elements include the recited “social networking system,”
“plurality of applications interfacing with the social networking system,”
“interfacing application,” and “computer processor.” See App. Br. 13. As
discussed above, these elements are conventional. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 3–4,
49, 68. As also discussed above, to the extent that the claimed method
requires that these components perform certain functions, those functions are
conventional. See buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355; Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. These
conventional components and functions do not integrate the recited certain
methods of organizing human activity into a practical application. See Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24.
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). As noted above, this requires us to evaluate
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements recited in claim
1 perform “well-understood, routine and conventional functions.” Final Act.
6. Although Appellant contends that this finding lacks adequate support, see
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Reply Brief 3, filed June 19, 2018 (“Reply Br.”), we disagree. As discussed
above, for the recited mental processes, limitations [a], [b], [e], [f], and [h]
recite the conventional computer functions of receiving or sending data. See
App. Br. 13; buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That a computer receives and
sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not
even arguably inventive.”). And limitation [g] encompasses the conventional
computer function of electronic recordkeeping. See App. Br. 13; Alice, 573
U.S. at 225 (“Using a computer to create and maintain ‘shadow’ accounts
amounts to electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a
computer.”). As for the recited certain methods of organizing human
activity, as noted above, largely the same analysis applies to the additional
elements for this abstract idea.
In sum, whether we consider the additional elements alone or in an
ordered combination, the additional elements do no more than “simply
append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 56. We thus determine that claim 1 lacks an inventive concept.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, we determine that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea and does not have an inventive concept. We thus sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 101.

Section 103 Rejection
Claim 1 recites “determining, by a computer processor, the transaction
flow from a plurality of different transaction flows comprising differing
interactions to complete the transaction, the determined transaction flow
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based on the user’s experience with transactions.” App. Br. 13. The
Examiner found that Ramalingam teaches or suggests this limitation because
Ramalingam discloses completing a purchase “using preference information
612 . . . which in some implementations, may be used to automate the
purchase” and “[i]n other implementations, completing the purchase at
operation 616 may involve only a single interaction between the user and the
mobile device.” Final Act. 8–9 (quoting Ramalingam 12:16–21).
Appellant contends that Ramalingam does not teach or suggest the
“determining” limitation at issue because Ramalingam’s preference
information is not equivalent to the recited “user’s experience with
transactions.” App. Br. 11; see also Reply Br. 5. Appellant also argues that
the cited part of Ramalingam does not disclose determining a transaction
flow based on the disclosed preference information and thus does not teach
or suggest “determining. . . the transaction flow from a plurality of different
transaction flows comprising differing interactions . . . the determined
transaction flow based on the user’s experience with transactions.” App. Br.
11; see also Reply Br. 5–6.
We agree with Appellant. Even if the recited “user’s experience with
transactions” encompasses Ramalingam’s preference information, the
Examiner has not shown that Ramalingam teaches using this information to
determine a transaction flow. The cited portions of Ramalingam disclose that
a transaction may “be completed using preference information 612 . . . to
automate the purchase” and “[i]n other implementations, completing the
purchase at operation 616 may involve only a single interaction between the
user and the mobile device.” Ramalingam 12:15–21. It is unclear that the
“other implementations” discussed in the cited portion of Ramalingam use
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preference information in any manner, let alone use the information to select
the interactions involved in completing a transaction. See Ramalingam
12:16–21. And the Examiner has not adequately explained why one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the cited part of Ramalingam to
suggest using preference information to select the interactions involved in
completing a transaction. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 4–5. On this record, we
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 103. Because
claims 2–7 depend from claim 1, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of these claims under § 103.

DECISION
Claims Rejected Basis References Affirmed Reversed
1–7 § 101 1–7
1–4, 6, and 7 § 103 Ramalingam and Hirson
1–4, 6, and
7
5 § 103
Ramalingam,
Hirson, and
McCown
5
Outcome 1–7

Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No
period for taking any action in connection with this appeal may be extended
under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED