Deborah Kimberg et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 27, 2019

14479610 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/479,610 09/08/2014 Deborah Kimberg 21652-00395 1024
75564 7590 09/27/2019
DANIEL M. FITZGERALD (21652)
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
OYEBISI, OJO O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte DEBORAH KIMBERG,
SHAWN ERIC HAGMEIER, and DEREK RYAN REED1
________________

Appeal 2018-008942
Application 14/479,610
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–24, which constitute all of the pending claims.
App. Br. 2. These claims stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Action mailed October 20,
2017 (“Final Act.”) 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies MasterCard International
Incorporated as the real party in interest. Appeal Brief filed March 22, 2018
(“App. Br.”) 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant describes the present invention as follows:
A computer-implemented method for processing a real-
time money transfer with a screening payment network having a
screening module communicatively coupled to a server
computing device is provided. The method includes receiving a
request to transfer funds from a payor account associated with an
originating institution to a payee account associated with a
receiving institution. The request includes money transfer data
indicative of a payor’s identifying information. The method also
includes determining a sanction score based at least in part on the
money transfer data, the sanction score indicative of the
likelihood that the payor is on at least one sanctioned entity list.
The method also includes transmitting the money transfer data
and the sanction score to the receiving institution, and
transmitting a response message to the originating institution, the
response message indicating whether the receiving institution
authorizes or denies the request to transfer the funds.
Abstract.
Independent claim 1 is representative of the appealed claims.2 It is
reproduced below with formatting modified for clarity and emphasis added
to the claim language that recites an abstract idea:
1. A computer-implemented method for real-time processing
a money transfer with a payment network having a screening
module communicatively coupled to a server computing device,
wherein the server computing device includes a memory device
and a processor, said method comprising:

2 Appellant generally argues all of the claims together as a group. App.
Br. 8–12. But Appellant does present additional arguments for claims 6, 15,
and 22. Id. at 12–13. Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as
representative of claims 1–5, 7,–14, 16–21, 23, and 24. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We then separately address the additional arguments
raised for claims 6, 15, and 22.
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[i] storing, by the screening module, one or more sanctioned
entity lists including information identifying each sanctioned
entity included on each of the one or more sanctioned entity lists,
wherein the one or more sanctioned entity lists are transmitted
by a third party computing device in communication with the
payment network;
[ii] generating, by the screening module, an intermediate
sanction score for each of the one or more sanctioned entity lists;
[iii] assigning, by the screening module, the intermediate
sanction score to each of the one or more sanctioned entity lists;
[iv] receiving, by the screening module, from an originating
institution computing device, a single request message
requesting both (i) a transfer of funds and (ii) a sanction score
determination, the transfer of funds being a transfer of funds
from a payor account associated with an originating institution to
a payee account associated with a receiving institution, the single
request message including money transfer data indicative of at
least one of a payer’s identifying information, a payment amount,
and a payee account identifier;
[v] comparing, by the screening module, the payor’s
identifying information included in the single request message to
the identifying information of each sanctioned entity on the one
or more sanctioned entity lists;
[vi] determining, by the screening module, a sanction score
based at least in part on the intermediate sanction score assigned
to the one or more sanctioned entity lists and the money transfer
data, the sanction score indicative of the likelihood that the
payor is on the one or more sanctioned entity lists;
[vii] directly transmitting, by the screening module, the money
transfer data included in the single request message and the
sanction score determined by the screening module in a single
money transfer message to the receiving institution; and
[viii] transmitting, by the screening module, a response
message to the originating institution, the response message
indicating whether the receiving institution authorizes or denies
the request to transfer the funds.
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. SECTION 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and
Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
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rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE
In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”). Under the 2019
Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.

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ANALYSIS
Step 2A, Prong 1
Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Claim 1’s limitation [i] recites “storing . . . one or more sanctioned
entity lists including information identifying each sanctioned entity included
on each of the one or more sanctioned entity lists, wherein the one or more
sanctioned entity lists are transmitted by a third party computing device in
communication with the payment network.” Such storing of lists of
information reasonably can be characterized as reciting the pre-Internet
activity of recordkeeping. As such, limitation [i] reasonably can be
characterized as reciting a mental processes that can be performed in the
human mind or with the aid of pencil and paper. More specifically, the step
of limitation [i] reasonably can be characterized as reciting the mental
process of observation. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes mental
observations as patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
Moreover, this determination is not affected by the fact that
limitation [i] includes the clause “wherein the one or more sanctioned entity
lists are transmitted by a third party computing device in communication
with the payment network.” This wherein clause does not constitute a
recitation of an affirmative step of transmitting data. Rather, this wherein
clause merely describes the source from where the list originated. This
clause does not limit the substance or meaning of the data contained in the
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list. As such, this clause merely describes an intangible property of the data
that does not affect our characterization of the limitation as a mental step.
Limitation [ii] recites “generating . . . an intermediate sanction score
for each of the one or more sanctioned entity lists.” Limitation [iii] recites
“assigning . . . the intermediate sanction score to each of the one or more
sanctioned entity lists.” Such generating and assigning of a score reasonably
can be characterized as reciting either a mathematical calculation or a mental
process, such as a mental evaluation or judgment. The 2019 Guidance
expressly recognizes mathematical concepts including mathematical
calculations, as well as mental evaluations and judgments, as constituting
patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
Limitations [v] and [vi] read as follows:
[v] comparing . . . the payor’s identifying information included
in the single request message to the identifying information of
each sanctioned entity on the one or more sanctioned entity lists;
[and]
[vi] determining . . . a sanction score based at least in part on
the intermediate sanction score assigned to the one or more
sanctioned entity lists and the money transfer data, the sanction
score indicative of the likelihood that the payor is on the one or
more sanctioned entity lists.
Both of these limitations reasonably can be characterized as reciting
processes that can be performed in the human mind, such as mental
evaluations or judgments. As noted above, the 2019 Guidance expressly
recognizes mental evaluations and judgments as constituting patent-
ineligible abstract ideas.
Limitation [viii] recites “transmitting . . . a response message to the
originating institution, the response message indicating whether the
receiving institution authorizes or denies the request to transfer the funds.”
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Such transmitting of an indication of whether a request is authorized
reasonably can be characterized as reciting an opinion, which can be
formulated in the mind or performed with the aid of paper and pencil. The
2019 Guidance expressly recognizes such mental processes as constituting
patent-ineligible abstract ideas.
For these reasons, each of limitations [i]–[iii], [v], [vi], and [viii]
reasonably can be characterized as reciting patent-ineligible subject matter.
Step 2A, Prong 2
Under step 2A, prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze
whether claim 1 recites additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
As explained in the prong-1 analysis above, limitation [i] reasonably
can be characterized as reciting a patent-ineligible mental process of storing
lists of information. Limitation [i] additionally can be characterized as
merely being directed to the insignificant extra-solution activity of storing
data. It was well understood that received computer data typically must be
stored—either in long-term storage or in a short-term cache or buffer so that
the data can be processed as intended. By determining that gathering,
transmitting, and displaying data constitutes insignificant extra-solution
activity, the courts implicitly have determined that storing data, per se, also
constitutes insignificant extra-solution activity.
Limitation [iv] reads as follows:
receiving, by the screening module, from an originating
institution computing device, a single request message
requesting both (i) a transfer of funds and (ii) a sanction score
determination, the transfer of funds being a transfer of funds
from a payor account associated with an originating institution to
a payee account associated with a receiving institution, the single
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request message including money transfer data indicative of at
least one of a payer’s identifying information, a payment amount,
and a payee account identifier.
This limitation does not add any meaningful limitations to the recited
abstract ideas because this limitation reasonably may be characterized as
merely being directed to insignificant pre-solution activity:
An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data for
use in a claimed process, e.g., a step of obtaining information
about credit card transactions, which is recited as part of a
claimed process of analyzing and manipulating the gathered
information by a series of steps in order to detect whether the
transactions were fraudulent.
MPEP § 2106.05(g).
Limitation [vii] recites “directly transmitting, by the screening
module, the money transfer data included in the single request message and
the sanction score determined by the screening module in a single money
transfer message to the receiving institution.” This limitation does not add
any meaningful limitations to the recited abstract ideas because this
limitation reasonably may be characterized as merely being directed to the
insignificant post-solution activity of transmitting data. E.g., Apple, Inc. v.
Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that
printing or downloading generated menus constituted insignificant extra-
solution activity).
Limitation [viii] also recites a step of transmitting data: “transmitting,
by the screening module, a response message to the originating institution,
the response message indicating whether the receiving institution authorizes
or denies the request to transfer the funds.” As such, limitation [viii] not
only can be interpreted reasonably as reciting an abstract idea, as explained
in the preceding section of this Analysis, but also reasonably can be
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interpreted as being directed to the insignificant post-solution activity of
transmitting data. As such, limitation [viii] does not add any meaningful
limitations to the recited abstract ideas.
Appellant argues that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because they focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology. App. Br. 9 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). According to Appellant,
An inventive system that resolves the problem of delays in
screening money transfers for participation by sanctioned entities
and processing the screened money transfers is not a mere matter
of “processing a money transfer” as asserted in the Office Action.
Rather, independent Claims 1, 11, and 18 clearly “focus on a
specific means or method that improves the relevant technology”
by receiving a single request message from an originating
institution that requests both (i) a transfer of funds and (ii) a
sanction score determination, and transmitting a single
transfer message to the receiving institution that includes
both the money transfer data and the determined sanction
score. In other words, Claim 1 recites not the result or effect of
any screened money transfer transaction, but rather a detailed set
of rules for accomplishing both screening and processing a
money transfer using a single request message.
App. Br. 10.
Appellant restates this argument in the Reply Brief:
the present claims are directed to improving conventional
industry practice in the field of screening electronic money
transfers, by addressing the specific problem of time delays
caused by the screening of each transfer. The recitation of a
single request message that enables money transfers to be
processed and screened in real-time results in increasing the
speed of traditional money transfers while providing the
capability to screen each money transfer.
Reply Br. filed Sept. 13, 2018 (“Reply Br.”) 2.
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This argument is unpersuasive. As discussed above, the disputed
limitations are recitations of a judicial exception; therefore these limitations
are not additional elements that can confer patent eligibility to the claims.
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (Prong Two requires “[i]dentifying
whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
judicial exception(s)”). Additionally, the fact that Appellant’s claims may
recite very specific approaches for optimizing the request protocol does not
mean the claims recite improvements to the functioning of a computer or to
any other technology or technical field. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 593
(“respondent incorrectly assumes that if a process application implements a
principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable
subject matter of § 101.”).
In the present case, the act of bundling two requests into a single
message does not constitute an improvement computer technology. Rather,
it merely constitutes an improvement to the underlying communication
protocol—an improvement to the underlying abstract idea of managing
interactions between people. See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899
F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a
claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract
idea is still an abstract idea”); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d
1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“What is needed is an inventive concept in the
non-abstract application realm”).
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For these reasons, Appellant does not persuade us that claim 1 is
directed to an improvement in the function of a computer or to any other
technology or technical field. MPEP § 2106.05(a). Nor is claim 1 directed
to a particular machine or transformation. MPEP § 2106.05(b), (c). Nor has
Appellant persuasively demonstrated that claim 1 adds any other meaningful
limitations. MPEP § 2106.05(e). Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade
us that claim 1 integrates the recited abstract ideas into a practical
application within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Step 2B
Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether
claim 1 adds any specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. 84 Fed. Reg. 56;
MPEP § 2106.05(d). We determine that claim 1 does not.
The only hardware or additional elements beyond the abstract idea of
claim 1 are the generically recited “payment network,” “screening module,”
“server computing device,” “memory device,” and “processor.” Appellant
do not point to sufficient evidence that any of these components are anything
other than well-understood, routine, and conventional, hardware components
or systems being used in their ordinary manner. App. Br. 8–13; Reply
Br. 1–4.
Furthermore, Appellant’s Specification supports the determination
that these components are well-understood, routine, and conventional:
Client systems 114 are interconnected to the Internet through
many interfaces including a network, such as a local area
network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), dial-in-
connections, cable modems, and special high-speed ISDN lines.
Client systems 114 could be any device capable of
interconnecting to the Internet including a web-based phone,
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personal digital assistant (PDA), or other web-based
connectable equipment.
Spec. ¶ 40 (emphasis added).
Network 100 also includes point-of-sale (POS) terminals
115, which are connected to client systems 114 and may be
connected to server system 112. . . . POS terminals 115 could be
any device capable of interconnecting to the Internet and
including an input device capable of reading information from a
cardholder’s financial transaction card.
Spec. ¶ 41 (emphasis added).
“In at least some embodiments, screening module 121 is integral with
server system 112. In other embodiments, screening module 121 is a stand-
alone module separate from server system 112.” Spec. ¶ 43.
Server system 112 is configured to be communicatively coupled
to various individuals, including employees 144 and to third
parties, e.g., account holders, customers, auditors, etc., 146 using
an ISP Internet connection 148. The communication in the
exemplary embodiment is illustrated as being performed using
the Internet, however, any other wide area network (WAN) type
communication can be utilized in other embodiments, i.e., the
systems and processes are not limited to being practiced using
the Internet. In addition, and rather than WAN 150, local area
network 136 could be used in place of WAN 150.
Spec. ¶ 48 (emphasis added).
User computing device 202 includes a processor 205 for
executing instructions. In some embodiments, executable
instructions are stored in a memory area 210. Processor 205 may
include one or more processing units (e.g., in a multi-core
configuration). Memory 210 is any device allowing information
such as executable instructions and/or other data to be stored
and retrieved. Memory 210 may include one or more computer
readable media.
Spec. ¶ 52 (emphasis added).
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Other examples are contained in the Specification that provide
evidence that the claimed hardware can entail conventional components used
in their ordinary manner. See Spec. ¶ 60 (discussing conventional storage
devices), ¶61 (discussing conventional storage interfaces), ¶ 62 (discussing
conventional memory), ¶ 73 (discussing conventional processors), and ¶ 74
(discussing conventional hardware and software more generally).
Appellant argues in relation to the step-2B inquiry, as follows:
the prior art treated screening as a separate process that required
a delay in processing the money transfer. The ordered
combination recited in Applicant’s independent Claims 1, 11,
and 18 moves the screening process to a new location as
compared to the prior art, namely the same server that processes
the money transfer transaction, which provides an advantage
over the prior art by receiving a single request message from an
originating institution that requests both (i) a transfer of funds
and (ii) a sanction score determination, and transmitting a single
transfer message to the receiving institution that includes both
the money transfer data and the determined sanction score, giving
the benefit of screening and transferring funds in real-time.
Notably, the unconventional nature of the ordered combination
in Applicant’s claims is evidenced by the acknowledged
allowability of the claims over the prior art. Thus, the ordered
combination of steps in independent Claims 1, 11, and 18
constitutes “significantly more” than the alleged abstract idea.
App. Br. 11–12.
As a threshold matter, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–
89 (1981). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea
is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
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And we have already addressed the other aspect of Appellant’s
argument in section 2A, prong 1, of the Analysis. Specifically, we explained
that an improvement to an abstract idea cannot be a basis for determining
that the claim recites significantly more than an abstract idea. Furthermore,
relying on a “processor” to “perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
For these reasons, we determine that claim 1 does not recite additional
elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception within
the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55; MPEP
§ 2106.05(d).
Preemption
Appellant additionally argues that the claims do not preempt other
methods of screening and processing a money transfer. App. Br. 12.
Appellant also argues that the additional limitations set forth in dependent
claims 6, 15, and 22 further narrow the claims against any threat of
preemption. Id. at 12–13.
These arguments are unpersuasive. We recognize that the Supreme
Court has described “the concern that drives this exclusionary principle
[i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject matter] as
one of pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. However, characterizing
preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as
characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. As our
reviewing court has explained: “The Supreme Court has made clear that the
principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to
patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in
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and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216).
Although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the
absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
Conclusions
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We,
likewise, sustain the 101 rejection of claims 2–24. Appellant’s separate
arguments for claims 6, 15, and 22 are not persuasive for the reasons set
forth above. And Appellant does not argue any of the remaining claims
separately. App. Br. 29.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–24 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED