01964355
02-23-2000
Deborah Brown, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Northeast/New York Metro Region), Agency.
Deborah Brown v. United States Postal Service
01964355
February 23, 2000
Deborah Brown, )
Complainant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01964355
) Agency No. 60-0177-93
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
(Northeast/New York Metro Region), )
Agency. )
___________________________________)
DECISION
Complainant timely appealed to the final agency decision concerning her
Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq. <1> The Commission
accepts this appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.
In a formal complaint dated March 31, 1993, complainant, a former
JCL Computer Systems Specialist, Level 16, alleged that the agency
discriminated against her based on race (Black), color (unspecified), sex
(female), and age (41) when her position and duties were abolished due to
a consolidation of the New York Postal Data Center with the Minneapolis
Postal Data Center. The agency accepted the complaint and conducted
an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency
informed complainant of her right to request either a hearing before
an EEOC administrative judge or a final agency decision on the record.
Complainant requested a final agency decision. On April 2, 1996, the
agency issued a final decision finding no discrimination.
By letter dated December 14, 1992, complainant was informed that due to
the consolidation of the New York Postal Data Center (NYPDC) with the
Minneapolis Postal Data Center (MPDC), her position would be abolished
on February 19, 1993, and that she would be involuntarily reassigned
to the MPDC, effective February 20, 1993. Complainant declined the
reassignment to MPDC. Therefore, in accordance with a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Union, the agency reassigned complainant to the
Carteret, New Jersey Post Office as a Distribution Window Clerk, Level 5.
The former NYPDC roster revealed that approximately 284 employees
lost their positions as a result of the closing. There were 181 male
employees which represented 64% of the staff, and 103 female employees
representing 36% of the staff. Also, 132 of the employees were White,
not of Hispanic Origin, 81 were Black, not of Hispanic Origin, 36 Asian
or Pacific Islander, 33 Hispanic, and two were Native Alaskan or American
Indian. Their ages ranged from 25 years of age to 78 years of age.
In its final decision, the agency found that complainant established an
inference of race discrimination because the NYPDC had a much greater
percentage of Black employees (29 percent) than either the MPDC (11
percent) or the San Mateo PDC (13 percent). Additionally, Whites, were
46 percent of the NYPDC employees, compared to 86 percent of the MPDCs'
employees and 38 percent of San Mateo's PDC.
Notwithstanding its finding above, the agency found that management
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to
close the NYPDC. Management officials testified that the decision to
close NYPDC was in response to two 1990 studies that concluded that
consolidating postal service computer operations into fewer facilities
would result in enhanced efficiency and cost savings for the agency.
Based on these studies, the agency made plans to consolidate computer
operations into two large data centers located in Minneapolis and
San Mateo. This began with the move of the St. Louis PDC to San Mateo
during July 1992. The decision to select these two sites was based on
several factors including the PDCs' respective sizes (i.e., numbers of
employees), available office space, cost of space, and the possibility
of consolidating additional non-computer data center functions (i.e.,
accounting and information systems) into other Postal Data Centers'
operations. Management decided to retain the MPDC and San Mateo PDC,
because they were large, while the NYPDC and Wilkes-Barre PDCs were the
smallest centers. In addition, both MPDC and San Mateo were housed in
government-owned buildings that had the capacity to expand. Consolidating
computer operations into these centers yielded potentially greater cost
savings than placing them in the NYPDC, which occupied expensive leased
space in New York City (costing almost twice as much as Minneapolis).
Finally, it was determined that the accounting and information system
functions of the NYPDC could be readily consolidated into the four
remaining data centers, and that moving those functions was more cost
effective than retaining them at the NYPDC. The agency projected that
by closing the NYPDC, it would yield cost savings in excess of $40
million dollars over the next five years.
The agency further found that although the decision to close the
NYPDC may have had a disproportionate effect on some of the agency's
minority workers, its impact was actually greater for White employees
who comprised a larger share of the NYPDC work force. The agency
concluded that complainant failed to present any evidence that would
support her allegations that the agency was motivated by discriminatory
considerations in closing the NYPDC. Furthermore, the agency concluded
that complainant failed to prove that her sex, color, race or age, or
the sex/age composition of the NYPDC work force were factors management
considered in deciding to close the NYPDC.
Complainant's allegations of race, color, sex, and age discrimination,
in addition to being asserted under the theory of disparate treatment,
also employed the theory of adverse impact. Thus, with respect to
the adverse impact approach, the intent of the employer is not the
dispositive issue. In such cases, the Commission's focus is on the
effect or impact of a facially neutral practice or policy, i.e., the
decision to close the NYPDC facility, on complainant's protected classes
(race - Black) (color - unspecified), (sex - female), and (age - 41).
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under a
disparate impact analysis, complainant must show that the challenged
practice or policy disproportionately impacted members of her protected
class. Specifically, complainant must: (1) identify the specific
practice or policy challenged; (2) show a statistical disparity; and (3)
show that the disparity is linked to the challenged policy or practice.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
If the complainant establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact,
the burden shifts to the agency to provide a business justification for
the challenged action. See Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991). Pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, once a prima facie case is established, the agency
has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is job-related and
consistent with business necessity. If the agency satisfies this burden,
complainant may nevertheless prevail if he provides an alternative
employment practice that would accomplish the same goal with a less
adverse impact on his protected class.
After a thorough review of the record, and both parties' statement's on
appeal, the Commission concludes that the agency sufficiently rebutted any
prima facie case of disparate treatment and provided a sufficient defense
to alleged adverse impact. In the context of this case, the agency's
arguments relating to enhanced efficiency and cost savings resulting
from consolidation in Minneapolis are sufficient to meet its burden.
The reason for the challenged action, while articulated as a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason, also suffices as a legitimate business
justification and satisfies the agency's burden under both the disparate
treatment and adverse impact theories of discrimination.
Among other things, complainant argues on appeal that the agency's
projected $40 million cost savings would be impossible in light of the
fact that the NYPDC had a binding "unbreakable lease" lease agreement
until 1999. Complainant also contends that many of the provisions of
the negotiated contract that were used to closed the NYPDC were still
being contested by the postal union. Also, complainant argues that
the agency manipulated facts and statistics in an effort to slant the
make-up of the Postal Data Center population, that the agency improperly
relied on statistics relating to the impact on all females as opposed to
minority females, and that the agency improperly represented the NYPDC
as the smaller of the data centers for consolidation purposes.
We find that the agency adequately addressed complainant's issues in its
final decision and its statement on appeal. For instance, in regards to
the issue of the agency's savings from office space, the agency provided
that its lease of the office building where NYPDC was located was binding
until 1998-1999. However, the agency had plans to temporarily utilize the
NYPDC space after the restructuring for its new Area Office operation.
It explained that this avoided the need to locate other space to lease.
The agency also stated once the Area Office moved to another location,
it would take steps to terminate the lease. Furthermore, other options
for the use of the NYPDC existed, such as subletting the space when it
became available. Also, the agency provided that the pending arbitration
with the Union related to the issue of rate retention for the bargaining
unit employees of the NYPDC who were reassigned to other bargaining unit
positions in the agency's New York Metropolitan Area and did not address
the closing of the NYPDC. The agency further noted that it provided
statistical analyses regarding the impact of the NYPDC consolidation
on female and Black Employees at the NYPDC because complainant alleged
both bases in her complaint and focused her argument primarily on the
basis of race. Finally, in response to complainant's assertion that the
NYPDC had more computer equipment and functions, the agency noted that
complainant failed to present any evidence in support of this contention.
In any event, the agency asserted that the studies upon which its decision
was based provided ample justification for the consolidation of computer
functions and pointed to several efficiencies to be gained.
We find that complainant has failed to show that the consolidation
of NYPDC with MPDC served no legitimate business reason or that an
alternative plan, serving the same purpose with less of an adverse impact
on complainant's protected class(es), was available. In the agency's
response to Congressional Conferees concerning its justifications
for the NYPDC's closure, the agency identified annual operations costs
savings as well as overhead cost savings that it projected to yield from
the consolidation. It also provided that its decision to consolidate
was based on a need to become more efficient and remain competitive.
Complainant has not shown that these reasons are pretextual or false.
Neither has complainant brought forth evidence of a less onerous method
for meeting the agency's goals. Accordingly, complainant has not
established a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.
In accordance with this decision, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's
final decision of no discrimination in violation of Title VII or the ADEA.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
February 23, 2000
________________ _____________________________
Date Carlton Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_______________________
Date
__________________________
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.