Debbie A. Cousins, Complainant,v.Mary E. Peters, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 1, 2009
0120072572 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 1, 2009)

0120072572

07-01-2009

Debbie A. Cousins, Complainant, v. Mary E. Peters, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.


Debbie A. Cousins,

Complainant,

v.

Mary E. Peters,

Secretary,

Department of Transportation,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120072572

Hearing No. 100200500739X

Agency No. 200518818FRA02

DECISION

On May 10, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's April

20, 2007 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant

worked as an Administrative Specialist at the agency's Washington,

D.C. facility. The record reveals that complainant was the subject of an

Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation after the OIG received

an anonymous call about preferential treatment afforded to complainant

by her supervisor, with whom she was allegedly having an inappropriate

relationship. This supervisor resigned in March 2004. Complainant filed

an EEO complaint in response to this investigation, which was dismissed

and not appealed. On May 18, 2004, an interim report detailing the

OIG's findings was released. The final report was released in July 2004.

On October 15, 2004, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

she was discriminated against on the basis of reprisal for prior EEO

activity when:

1. on June 8, 2004, she learned that she did not receive an Office

of Safety performance award;

2. on June 30, 2004, she learned that the employee who initiated

the OIG investigation would be returning to the office and would be

seated directly across from her;

3. on July 14, 2004, she was denied a promotion when the Acting

Associate Administrator of Safety informed her that the position for

which she had applied would be canceled.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. Over complainant's objections, the AJ assigned

to the case granted the agency's March 20, 2006 motion for a decision

without a hearing and issued a decision in favor of the agency without

a hearing on April 6, 2007.

In his decision, the AJ found that complainant was denied the performance

award after the Office of Human Resources forwarded the award to the Chief

Counsel because of the findings in the OIG Interim Report. The AJ found

that the Senior Attorney Advisor in the Office of Chief Counsel determined

the award should not be made because of the fact that complainant's former

supervisor had recommended it, and because of evidence that complainant

had lied to the OIG during the investigation. Although complainant argued

that her performance merited the award, the AJ found that complainant

failed to dispute the agency's reasons for its actions. Likewise, the

AJ found that complainant was denied the promotion for the same reasons,

and because of the fact that complainant's former supervisor had written

the position description, and some of the duties were not supported.

Moreover, the Office of Human Resources stated that they thought the

vacancy announcement should be cancelled until a replacement for the

supervisor was found, who could then assist in the selection process.

The AJ found no evidence of pretext.

Finally, complainant alleged she was subjected to a hostile work

environment when she was forced to sit across from the individual who

allegedly initiated the OIG investigation. The AJ found that, as a

matter of law, this allegation did not rise to the level of a hostile

work environment because it was neither severe nor pervasive.

The agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding

that complainant failed to prove that she was subjected to discrimination

as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant states there are disputes of material fact which

render the AJ's decision erroneous. Specifically, complainant states

that the OIG investigation ultimately determined that complainant

was not guilty of time and attendance fraud. Accordingly, this casts

doubt on the agency's purported reason for its actions. In response,

the agency contends that even if the OIG ultimately did not find that

complainant was guilty of fraud, the agency took the actions it did for

the appearance of impropriety, including complainant taking a trip to

Orlando, Florida with her supervisor and misuse of government equipment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and

factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from

an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see

also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999)

(providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision

without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed

de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case

with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)

or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and

legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional

discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal

employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,

� VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that

the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and

legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC

"review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including

any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its

decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its

interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary

judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

After a review of the record, we find the AJ was correct in issuing

a decision without a hearing as no dispute of material fact exists.

Complainant's primary argument is that the OIG ultimately found that

she did not commit time and attendance fraud, and therefore, there is a

dispute of material fact as to whether she was retaliated against when she

was denied the performance award, and when she was denied the promotion.

However, we find there is no dispute that, at the time, the agency was

operating under the findings of the interim report, which determined

that there was evidence to support that an inappropriate relationship

between complainant and her supervisor existed. Although the OIG

ultimately found no evidence of fraud on the part of complainant, agency

officials were, in fact, aware of the allegations against complainant,

as well as the suggestion of favoritism. Complainant did not dispute,

with evidence, that this was the agency's motive at the time, as opposed

to the fact that she had filed an EEO complaint. Further, the record

reveals that the agency decided to cancel the vacancy announcement until

the replacement supervisor was selected and could participate in the

selection process. Complainant failed to present evidence that this

was inconsistent with prior procedure, or was retaliatory in any way.

Finally, as for complainant's claim of harassment, we find complainant

failed to present sufficient evidence of severe or pervasive conduct

that would rise to the level of a hostile work environment.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the agency's

final action.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 1, 2009

Date

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0120072572

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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