Deauville Hotel

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 15, 1981

256 N.L.R.B. 561 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

DEAUVILLE HOTEL 561
Deauville Hotel and Flores Demetrio Gonzales.
Case 12-CA-7776
June 15, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 29, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Julius Cohn issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the Gener-
al Counsel each filed exceptions and a supporting
brief and subsequently filed an answering brief to
the exception raised by the other party to the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's Decision.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, to modify his remedy, 2 and to adopt his
recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Gon-
zales had been illegally discharged in January 1977
and improperly reinstated in May 1977. He also
found, however, that Gonzales had been dis-
charged again in May 1978 and, as no new charge
had been filed nor had the complaint been amend-
ed thereafter, he assumed that the discharge was
legal and terminated Gonzales' right to backpay
and reinstatement as of the date. The General
Counsel excepts to the refusal by the Administra-
tive Law Judge to order reinstatement and back-
pay after May 1978. We find merit in this excep-
tion.
Gonzales was reemployed by Respondent in
May 1977 but in a different position from that
which he previously occupied, at a substantially
lower rate of pay, and at the bottom of the senior-
ity list, which resulted in fewer and less desirable
hours. Rather than being assigned to the linen
room as he had been before the strike, he was
made a houseman. He worked under Augusto Feo,
who had been promoted to the head houseman po-
sition which Respondent claimed Gonzales had
held prior to his January 1977 discharge. When
Gonzales complained about his altered status, Re-
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
In vies f the crediting of the Charging Party by the Administrative
Law Judge. we find the accusation in Respondent's answering brief that
the General Counsel had suborned perjury by the Charging Part) to be
totally unwarranted and uncalled for
2 Backpay to the extent already recommended is to be determined In
the manner set forth in F: W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest as prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651
(1977) See, generally, IisL Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962)
256 NLRB No. 78
spondent threatened to discharge him if his protests
continued. In May 1978 Gonzales was discharged
again, allegedly for refusing to obey Feo's orders
and threatening to kill him. Gonzales conceded
that he had argued with Feo but denied making
any threats.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
finding that Respondent had not satisfied its obliga-
tion to reinstate Gonzales following his illegal dis-
charge in January 1977 and it therefore had a con-
tinuing obligation to offer him full reinstatement.
However, at the hearing, Respondent contended
that Gonzales was not entitled to reinstatement be-
cause he had been discharged for cause in May
1978 after threatening Feo's life.
The Administrative Law Judge properly re-
ceived the evidence on that issue because it bore
directly on whether Gonzales' continuing right to
reinstatement to his former position was forfeited.3
Nevertheless, after the issue was fully litigated, the
Administrative Law Judge failed to resolve the
conflict in testimony between Feo and Gonzales or
to decide whether the incident warranted Gonzales
losing his right to reinstatement. Rather, noting
that the General Counsel had not alleged that the
May discharge also violated the Act nor had a new
charge been filed, the Administrative Law Judge
concluded that he must assume the discharge was
not unlawful and cut off backpay and reinstatement
as of that date. We do not agree.
Inasmuch as Respondent's allegation of miscon-
duct was an affirmative defense to its continuing
duty to offer proper reinstatement, the General
Counsel did not have to add a new allegation to
the complaint and the Administrative Law Judge
should have made findings on this issue.
In making his determination, the Administrative
Law Judge must balance whatever misconduct he
finds against the established unfair labor practices
of Respondent in assessing whether Gonzales' con-
duct was so egregious as to warrant forfeiting of
his right to reinstatement and backpay,4 with any
doubts being resolved against the wrongdoer. Ac-
cordingly, we will remand this aspect of the case
to the Administrative Law Judge for further pro-
ceedings. After resolving the credibility conflicts,
he must determine whether the circumstances, in-
cluding Respondent's animus, the lapse of time, and
the possible casual connection between Gonzales'
illegal demotion and this quarrel with his replace-
ment, warrant a forfeiture of Gonzales' right to re-
instatement and backpay after May 1978.
:' Roy L. Burnham. a sole proprietor d, b a Bob .,-lmbulance Service, 183
NLRI 901 (1970)
4 (CT Saport Manor, Inc.. et al, d.'h/b/a Seaport Manor fir 4dultis. 248
NLRB 8Sht. 892 19O80): John Kinkel & Son, 157 Nl.RH 744. 746 (1966).
DEAUVLLE HOTEL
562 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Deauville
Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the said recommended Order except that
the attached notice is substituted for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-cap-
tioned proceeding be, and it hereby is, remanded to
Administrative Law Judge Julius Cohn for the lim-
ited purpose of making credibility findings with re-
spect to the May 1978 incidents and recommenda-
tions as to whether, under all of the circumstances,
the conduct engaged in by Gonzales was such as to
require the forfeiture of his right to reinstatement
and backpay after May 1978.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative
Law Judge shall prepare and serve on the parties a
Supplemental Decision setting forth the resolution
of such credibility issues, and findings and conclu-
sions with respect thereto. Copies of such Supple-
mental Decision shall be served on all the parties,
after which the provisions of Section 102.46 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amend-
ed, shall be applicable.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with dis-
charge should they continue to complain
among themselves about their working condi-
tions.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise dis-
criminate against any employee because of that
employee's protected activities or union activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail to reinstate employees,
who are so entitled, to a substantially equiva-
lent position, and further discriminate against
them with regard to wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions because of the protected activi-
ties in which they had engaged.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related matter
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make whole Flores Demetrio
Gonzales for any losses he may have sustained
by reason of the discrimination practiced
against him, plus interest.
DEAUVILLE HOTEL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JULIUS COHN, Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding was heard at Coral Gables, Florida, on March 6,
1980. Upon a charge filed on June 28, 1977, the Regional
Director for Region 12 issued a complaint on July 26,
1977, alleging that Deauville Hotel, herein called Re-
spondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by
discharging Flores Demetrio Gonzalez, the Charging
Party herein, on January 18, 1977. The complaint further
alleges that Respondent reinstated Gonzalez about May
21, 1977, but unlawfully failed to restore him to a sub-
stantially equivalent position and, further, gave him a less
desirable job and denied him other benefits to which he
was allegedly entitled. The complaint also alleges viola-
tion by Respondent of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
threatening Gonzalez with discharge unless he refrained
from complaining about working conditions. Respondent
filed an answer denying the commission of unfair labor
practices.
All parties were given opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-exam-
ine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. The
General Counsel and Respondent submitted briefs which
have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record
in the case and from my observation of the witnesses and
their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Respondent, a Florida corporation, has a principal
place of business in Miami Beach, Florida, where it is en-
gaged in the operation of a hotel. In the course of its op-
erations, Respondent annually grosses revenues in excess
of $500,000 and purchases goods, supplies, and materials
in excess of $50,000 which are shipped to it from places
outside the State of Florida. Respondent admits, and I
find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Hotel, Motel, Restaurant and Hi-Rise Employees and
Bartenders Union, Local 355, AFL-CIO, herein called
the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
DEAUVILLE HOTEL 563
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
During the period relevant herein, Respondent was a
member of Southern Florida Hotel and Motel Associ-
ation. The Association and four of its members, not in-
cluding Respondent herein, were parties to an extensive-
ly litigated case, in which the Union and certain individ-
uals were charging parties, decided by the Board and re-
ported at 245 NLRB 561 (1979). Some of the findings of
the Board therein are relevant to the instant case.
The Union had been for a number of years collective-
bargaining representative of employees of Association
members with a contract which expired on September
16, 1976. After unsuccessful negotiations, a strike com-
menced in December 1976 and continued until January
14, 1977, when the parties reached agreement on a new
contract. For the purposes herein, it is sufficient to state
that the agreement provided that all strikers would be re-
turned to work as the need arose starting immediately.
The exceptions to this were those strikers whose jobs
were eliminated and those employed in departments of
hotels which had been closed and would therefore not be
recalled until the particular department reopened.
The Board found that Union, after ratification vote,
signed the new agreement on Saturday, January 15,
1977, and the Association, after meeting with its mem-
bers on Monday, January 17, executed the contract at 11
a.m. and delivered it to the Union by messenger.
In the case cited above, the Board found many viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(Xl1) and (3) of the Act relating to em-
ployees discharged by the respondents therein after the
termination of the strike, of whom some were unlawfully
discharged for picketing on January 17, 1977.1
B. The Facts
Gonzalez had been employed by Respondent since
1965 and worked in the housekeeping department since
1971, when he was assigned to the linen room. Accord-
ing to Gonzalez, after a number of months the then
housekeeper designated him as a head linen man and
gave him a higher rate of pay. The housekeeper in 1977,
Mathew Ginsberg, referred to Gonzalez as the head hou-
seman. The title, if such did exist, makes no difference
with regard to the outcome of this matter. At the time of
the strike, Gonzalez was earning $186.20 per week for 6
days work and did not receive overtime. There is no dis-
pute that Gonzalez worked in the linen room where
there would normally be two other employees. His
duties consisted of sorting, counting, and setting up linen
on carts so that the housemen could distribute it to the
rooms. In addition Gonzalez had one other duty which
was his alone. He drove a truck to an outside laundry to
pick up clean linen as needed. There is some difference
in the testimony as to frequency with which Gonzalez
performed this chore. Respondent's witnesses stated that
this was a daily routine performed by Gonzalez as often
I It appears that the original charges filed in 245 NLRB 561 included
more than 20 hotel members of the Association. However the Union re-
quested withdrawal of charges against all hotels except the four named in
the complaint, presumably having arrived at settlements with the others
as twice a day. Assuming the correctness of Respond-
ent's version, it remains clear that the major portion of
his time was spent in his duties in the linen room. 2
Gonzalez had been a longtime union member who
joined the picket line when the strike started at Respond-
ent on December 26, until January 14, 1977, when pick-
eting stopped. On January 17, he reported back to work,
punched his clock and was called by Mathew Ginsberg,
then the executive housekeeper, who told him he would
be working 4 days a week. That day he worked in the
linen room as he usually did. He noticed three other em-
ployees in the linen room at the time, two women and
one man, whom he had not seen prior to the strike. That
afternoon, about I p.m., Gonzalez went outside to obtain
a pack of cigarettes for Ginsberg and noticed 15 or 20 of
Respondent's employees picketing. He went back to the
hotel and resumed work until the shop steward came by
and told him the contract had not as yet been signed and
that the employees had to walk out again. Gonzalez then
walked out and commenced picketing with the others.
Gonzalez also testified that he had spoken to the pickets
previously while out on his errand and had been told
that the contract had not been signed, Respondent was
not recognizing seniority, and a few of the employees
were fired. After a couple of hours he noticed the ban-
quet manager speaking to the steward who then told the
employees to stop picketing. Since this was approximate-
ly 3:30 p.m., which was the normal end of his workday,
and other employees were leaving the hotel, Gonzalez
went home.
The following morning, January 18, upon his arrival
Gonzalez was not permitted to punch in. He was told by
Ginsberg that there was no more work for him and he
should leave immediately. There is no dispute as to the
question of whether Gonzalez was discharged on Janu-
ary 18, since Stephan Delmont, operations manager of
Respondent, testified that he had observed Gonzalez
walking an "illegal" picket line on the afternoon of the
17th, had not returned that day, and therefore Respond-
ent no longer had any job for him. Delmont also stated
that during the strike Respondent had installed its own
laundry and Gonzalez' job of driving the linen truck was
thereby eliminated.
According to Delmont, Gonzalez was reinstated in
May 1977 as a houseman. Delmont said the laundry
truck job had been eliminated and previously Gonzalez
had been in and out of the linen room. Although Del-
mont characterized Gonzalez' previous job as head hou-
seman, upon his return he was made simply a houseman
whose duties were to clean and set up hotel rooms. Del-
mont acknowledged that Gonzalez had previously
worked 6 days as a salaried employee but upon his
return in May he was hourly paid as a houseman. Gonza-
2 At the hearing it appeared that Respondent was urging that Gonza-
lez was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act and perhaps that is
the explanation for its witnesses characterizing him as a "Head House-
man." However, in its brief, Respondent does not urge this contention.
Nevertheless it is clear from the record that Gonzalez had no authority
to hire, fire, discipline employees, or grant time off or overtime, nor is
there any evidence that he effectively recommended such actions Since
he did not exercise the indicia of supervisory authonty, I find that Gon-
zalez was not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act
DEAUVLLE HOTEL
564 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lez stated that he reported in May to a new housekeeper,
a Mrs. Lima, who sent him to a head houseman and was
assigned to work on one of the floors. He said at this
time there were about 15 or 20 housemen and he became
last in seniority. His name was always on the bottom of
the list for work assignments and as a result did not have
work upon occasion. In addition he could only obtain a
day off after others had chosen. His rate of pay as a hou-
seman in May 1977 was $2.69 an hour.
Gonzalez testified that because of these conditions he
had frequently protested to other employees, as a result
of which he was called by Delmont to the office who
said he had been doing him a favor by giving him a job,
and, if Gonzalez had any protest, he should go to the
Union. Delmont told him that if his protests continued,
he would be discharged.
Delmont also testified with respect to this incident. He
stated he had told Gonzalez he was informed that Gon-
zalez had been telling other workers not to listen to their
supervisor and not to do their job properly. Delmont
said although Gonzalez denied this, he told him he did
not want to hear it anymore and he, Delmont, would not
stand for it. Gonzalez was just supposed to do his job
and not tell anybody else what to do and what not to do
and he was creating trouble. Delmont said Gonzalez was
not complaining about his working conditions, as he had
testified, but was just telling everybody else what to do
and what not to do and not listening to his supervisor,
Augusto Feo, the head houseman. Gonzalez was also
telling other employees not to listen to Feo.
On the whole, I credit the version as related by Gon-
zalez. I found Delmont to be less than candid in his testi-
mony generally. For example, while it was quite clear
that Gonzalez' duties prior to the strike almost complete-
ly related to the linen room, as testified by the then
housekeeper Ginsberg, Delmont continually referred to
Gonzalez as the head houseman in an apparent effort to
characterize Gonzalez as a supervisor, who would there-
fore not be entitled to the protection of the Act in these
circumstances. Finally, upon cross-examination he ad-
mitted having seen Gonzalez on occasion in the linen
room. With respect to the alleged threats, Delmont ac-
knowledged that he was acting merely upon hearsay as
he did not know of any occasion where Gonzalez had
told employees not to do their jobs.
Gonzalez worked for Respondent as a houseman until
May 1978 when he was terminated.
C. Discussion and Analysis
Based upon the testimony and evidence credited just
above, I find that Delmont in May 1977 threatened Gon-
zalez with discharge should he continue to complain to
other employees about working conditions. By such con-
duct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
The principal issue is whether Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Gonza-
lez on January 18, 1977, because he had engaged in pick-
eting for several hours the previous afternoon. There is
no question that the facts occurred as alleged. Respond-
ent's contention is that the picketing on January 18 from
approximately I p.m. until 3:30 p.m. was illegal by virtue
of the Association and the Union prior thereto having
entered into a new collective-bargaining agreement con-
taining a no-strike clause.
In Southern Florida Hotel and Motel Association, et al,
supra, the Board found that the new Association contract
with the Union was executed on January 17, at 11 a.m.
and delivered to the Union. Thus the picketing herein,
which began at approximately 1 p.m., took place after
the signing of the agreement. However, in that case, in
similar circumstances, where picketing occurred between
2 p.m. and 4 p.m., the Board approved the Administra-
tive Law Judge's finding that, despite the occurrence of
picketing after the execution of the contract, such con-
duct "did not provide Respondents with justification for
discharging those employees." The Administrative Law
Judge determined that in a strike lasting 3 weeks, "A
period of time was needed for the air to clear and the
dust to settle." He found in that case that some employ-
ees who were reporting to work were not permitted to
work, others were admitted to work but were told they
had no seniority, all adding to a period of confusion.
Notwithstanding the fact that Respondent herein was not
a specific party to Southern Florida Hotel, nevertheless
the contract which was executed was the same, the cir-
cumstances were the same, and it is noted Gonzalez cre-
dibly testified that in conversation with the pickets, he
had been told some employees were not permitted to
work, conditions had changed, and employees had not
been restored to their seniority. It will be recalled that
when Gonzalez himself reported, he was told there was
only 4 days' work available to him. In view of the simi-
larities of the situation, I am constrained to follow the
Board's finding in the Southern Florida Hotel case.3 Ac-
cordingly, I find that by discharging Gonzalez on Janu-
ary 18, 1977, because he had engaged in the picketing on
the previous afternoon, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
In his testimony, Delmont indicated that by virtue of
Respondent having installed its own laundry, Gonzalez
had worked principally in the linen room and that the
driving of the truck to the outside laundry was only one
incident of his duties. As a matter of fact it is uncontra-
dicted that when Gonzalez returned to work on January
17 he spent that day, until the time he resumed picketing,
in the linen room to which he was assigned by Ginsberg.
Accordingly, I find that his job was not eliminated by
Respondent instituting its own laundry facility. In that
connection it is noted that this created work for linen
room employees who transported the linens from the
new hotel laundry room to the linen room.
When Gonzalez returned to work in May 1977 Re-
spondent further violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
not reinstating him to a substantially equivalent position.
Instead of restoring him to the linen room where he had
always worked, Respondent made him a houseman at a
lower rate of pay and with little or no seniority. In view
of my findings that Gonzalez had been unlawfully dis-
charged on January 18, he was entitled to backpay for
the period between that date and his reinstatement in
May, and reinstatement.
' See 245 NLRB 561, 589.
DEAUVILLE HOTEL 565
It is clear that when Gonzalez returned in May, there
were other employees working in the linen room. If, as
insisted by Respondent's witness, Gonzalez was head
houseman, he should then have been reinstated to that
position which apparently had been given by that time to
Feo, another employee.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section 111,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent described in section 1, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices I shall recommend that it be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain af-
firmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Gonzalez was finally terminated in May 1978. Re-
spondent alleges that it took this action because he had
refused to obey the orders of his supervisor, Feo, and
indeed had threatened his life. Gonzalez, while not deny-
ing that he had a dispute with Feo, denies having threat-
ened his life. However, I do not find it necessary to
make any findings with respect to this situation. The fact
remains that Gonzalez' employment was terminated at
that time. The General Counsel has not alleged that on
that occasion he was discharged unlawfully nor have I
been made aware of any other charge filed in connection
with that discharge. Accordingly, I have no alternative
but to assume that the termination involved no unlawful
conduct on the part of Respondent. Accordingly, I shall
not require Respondent to offer reinstatement to Gonza-
lez.
However, having found that Respondent unlawfully
discharged Gonzalez on January 18, 1977, I recommend
that Respondent be ordered to make him whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from that
discharge by payment to him of a sum of money equal to
the amount he normally would have earned as wages
and other benefits from the date of his discharge until
the date in May 1977 when he was reinstated, less net
earnings during that period. As I have further found that
Gonzalez was not reinstated to a substantially equivalent
position as that which he had enjoyed prior to January
18, 1977, I further recommend that Respondent be or-
dered to make him whole for any loss of earnings and
benefits resulting from Respondent's failure to do so in
May 1977, until his termination in May or June 1978.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening an employee with discharge should
he continue to complain about working conditions to
other employees, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(3) and (1) of the Act
by:
(a) Discharging Flores Demetrio Gonzalez because he
engaged in lawful picketing and other activities on behalf
of the Union.
(b) By failing to reinstate Gonzalez in May 1977 to a
substantially equivalent position, and by further discrimi-
nating against him after his reinstatement with regard to
his wages, hours, and working conditions, because he
had engaged in activities protected under the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER 4
The Respondent, Deauville Hotel, Miami Beach, Flor-
dia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge because
they complain among themselves about working condi-
tions.
(b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees because of their union activities including
picketing.
(c) Failing to reinstate employees to substantially
equivalent positions because of the protected activities in
which they were engaged.
(d) Discriminating against employees with regard to
their wages or other benefits because of their union and
other protected activities in which they had engaged.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole Flores Demetrio Gonzalez for his loss
of earnings and any other losses he may have sustained
by reason of the various acts of discrimination against
him in the manner set forth in the section of this Deci-
sion entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due.
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Lalbor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections shall be
deemed waived fr all purposes
DEA U VILLE ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . H O EL.
566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Post at its Miami Beach, Florida, place of business
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix. " 5
Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 12, after being duly signed by its au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
5 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.