DCD IDID Enterprise, LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 26, 2019

87465751 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2019)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: August 26, 2019

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re DCD IDID Enterprise, LLC
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Serial No. 87465751
_____

Molly B. Markley of Young Basile Hanlon & Macfarlane, P.C.,
for DCD IDID Enterprise, LLC.
Aubrey Biache, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 123,
Susan Hayash, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Zervas, Heasley, and Larkin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
DCD IDID Enterprise, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the mark ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS in standard characters (IGNITION
SYSTEMS disclaimed) for goods identified (as amended) as a “keyless entry system
and keyless ignition switch system for retrofit installation into classic and hot rod
automotive vehicles comprised of electric wire harnesses for automobiles, controller
Serial No. 87465751
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box in the nature of electrical controllers, microprocessor, electronic signal receiver,
and keyfob with electronic signal transponder and button,” in International Class 9.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that the
mark so resembles the registered mark shown below:

(I.D. SYSTEMS disclaimed) for “wireless transmitters and receivers for use with
vehicles and other powered assets,” in International Class 9,2 as to be likely, when
used on or in connection with the goods identified in the application, to cause
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.
When the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant appealed and
requested reconsideration, 4 TTABVUE,3 which was denied. 5 TTABVUE. Applicant
and the Examining Attorney have filed briefs. We affirm the refusal to register.

1 Application Serial No. 87465571 was filed on May 26, 2017 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark and
first use of the mark in commerce at least as early as November 30, 2016. Applicant amended
the application during prosecution to change its filing basis to seek registration under Section
1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce.
2 The cited Registration No. 3054321 issued on January 31, 2006 and was last renewed in
2016. The registrant describes the mark as consisting of “an incomplete circle forming the
stylized letters ‘I’ and ‘D’ with the dot over the letter ‘I’ in the color red and the words ‘I. D.
Systems’ in black.” The colors red and black are claimed as features of the mark.
3 Citations in this opinion to the briefs and the reconsideration request refer to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system. Turdin v. Tribolite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d 1473, 1476 n.6
(TTAB 2014). Specifically, the number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry
number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the page number(s) of the docket
entry where the cited materials appear.
Serial No. 87465751
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I. Evidentiary Issues
Before proceeding to the merits of the refusal, we address two evidentiary matters.
Applicant attached to its brief copies of three registrations that it owns, which it
claims explain how the “ID” portion of the applied-for mark will be perceived by
consumers. 7 TTABVUE 6, 12-17. These registrations were not made of record during
prosecution. The Examining Attorney “objects to this new evidence and requests that
the Board disregard it.” 9 TTABVUE 6.
Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d), provides that the “record in the
application should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal,” and that “[e]vidence
should not be filed with the Board after the filing of a notice of appeal.” “If the
appellant . . . desires to introduce additional evidence after an appeal is filed, the
appellant . . . should submit a request to the Board to suspend the appeal and to
remand the application for further examination.” Id. Applicant did not do so, and we
sustain the Examining Attorney’s objection to Applicant’s untimely evidence and
have given it no consideration in our decision. See, e.g., In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC,
126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
The Examining Attorney appears to request the Board to take judicial notice of
dictionary definitions of the words “ignition” and “vehicle” from the MERRIAM
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com). 9 TTABVUE 9 n.3; 18 n.22.
The definitions were not attached to the Examining Attorney’s brief, but “the Board
may, sua sponte, take judicial notice of dictionary definitions,” In re Jimmy Moore
Serial No. 87465751
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LLC, 119 USPQ2d 1764, 1768 (TTAB 2016), and we take judicial notice of these
definitions and will consider them for any probative value that they may have.
II. Record on Appeal4
The record on appeal includes Applicant’s specimen of use;5 dictionary definitions
of the words “system” and “transponder,” made of record by the Examining Attorney;6
pages from the website at abbreviations.com regarding the significance of “ID” and
“I.D.” in the involved marks, made of record by the Examining Attorney;7 Internet
webpages regarding keyless entry and ignition systems, and wireless transmitters
and receivers, made of record by the Examining Attorney;8 a page from the website
of the owner of the cited registration at id-systems.com,9 and a page from Applicant’s
website,10 both made of record by Applicant; third-party registrations of marks for
the same or similar goods as identified in the application and cited registration, made

4 Citations in this opinion to the application record are to pages in the Trademark Status &
Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”).
5 The Examining Attorney found the specimen to be unacceptable, August 17, 2017 Office
Action at TSDR 1, and as noted above, Applicant responded by amending its filing basis to
seek registration under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act. February 16, 2018 Response to
Office Action at TSDR 1.
6 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 5-12.
7 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 2-7.
8 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 13-24; May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 8-
48.
9 February 16, 2018 Response to Office Action at TSDR 2; 4 TTABVUE 12 (October 31, 2018
Request for Reconsideration).
10 4 TTABVUE 13 (October 31, 2018 Request for Reconsideration).
Serial No. 87465751
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of record by the Examining Attorney;11 and articles regarding classic cars and their
restoration, made of record by both Applicant,12 and the Examining Attorney.13
III. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). Our determination of likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). We consider each DuPont factor for which there is
evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d
1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Two key factors in every § 2(d) case are the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks
and the goods or services because the “fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes
to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or
services] and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). Both Applicant and the
Examining Attorney address these key factors. 7 TTABVUE 4-9; 9 TTABVUE 7-19.
Both also discuss the third DuPont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity of

11 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at 49-66.
12 4 TTABVUE 14-33 (October 31, 2018 Request for Reconsideration).
13 5 TTABVUE 4-39 (November 21, 2018 Denial of Request for Reconsideration).
Serial No. 87465751
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established, likely-to-continue trade channels, and the fourth DuPont factor, the
sophistication of the relevant consumers. 7 TTABVUE 9-10; 9 TTABVUE 19-21.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
The first DuPont factor is “‘the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.’” Palm
Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369,
73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567).
“Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re
White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)). “The proper test is not a side-
by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently
similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the
marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc.
v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quotation omitted). “The proper perspective on which the analysis must focus is on
the recollection of the average customer, who retains a general rather than specific
impression of marks.” In re i.am.symbolic, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1630 (TTAB 2018)
(citations omitted). The average customers of the goods identified in the application
include owners of a “classic and hot rod automotive vehicle” who seeks to retrofit the
vehicle with a keyless entry and keyless ignition system, and, as discussed below,
may also include service providers who perform the retrofit. As discussed below, the
average customers are also customers of the goods identified in the cited registration.
Serial No. 87465751
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1. Applicant’s Arguments
Applicant acknowledges that the marks “share some similarities,” 7 TTABVUE
4, but claims that they “are not similar in appearance, sound or connotation.” Id.
Applicant argues that the cited registered mark is “a weak indicator of source because
it is descriptive of the goods (essentially vehicle identification systems),” and that the
“distinctive portion of the cited mark is the design which is not incorporated into
Applicant’s mark.” Id. Applicant argues that the marks look different because the
letters “ID” in its mark are not separated by periods, and that the ID “portion of the
marks has different connotations” because “[i]n the cited mark, the ‘ID’ refers to
‘identification’ while Applicant’s mark refers to a portion of Applicant’s corporate
name, IDIDIT.” Id. Applicant also focuses on the presence of the word IGNITION in
its mark, which it claims “changes the appearance and sound of the marks.” Id.
Applicant dismisses the common presence of the elements “ID” and “SYSTEM” in
the marks on the ground that it “is well settled that highly suggestive and widely
used marks are not entitled to a broad scope of protection.” Id. at 5. Applicant claims
that the Examining Attorney improperly “discounts the different connotation of ID in
Applicant’s mark because the definition of ID means identification” in the cited mark,
while “ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS does not make sense when referenced as
identification ignition systems.” Id. at 5-6. Applicant also argues that “the phrase
‘ignition systems’ in Applicant’s mark is a phrase read together and has relevant
meaning.” Id. at 6. Applicant concludes that the “addition of ‘IGNITION’ and meaning
of ID in Applicant’s mark in combination with the distinctive design used by the cited
mark is enough to distinguish the marks from one another.” Id.
Serial No. 87465751
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2. The Examining Attorney’s Arguments
The Examining Attorney responds that “the marks are similar because they both
contain the word ID and SYSTEMS.” 9 TTABVUE 7. She argues that “both marks
contain variations of the abbreviation ID at the beginning,” and that a “consumer’s
eye would be drawn to this word, and the consumer would be more likely to utilize it
in calling for the goods.” Id. at 8. She also claims that “the marks have a similar
syntax; they start with the wording ID followed by SYSTEMS,” id., and that the
marks “are also confusingly similar because the wording ID.IGNITION SYSTMS
and I.D. SYSTEMS convey analogous meanings” because “I.D. and ID are commonly
recognized as abbreviations for IDENTIFICATION.” Id. at 9. According to the
Examining Attorney, “it is reasonable to expect consumers to view both I.D. and ID
as abbreviations for identification, rather than registrant’s usage of the wording I.D.
representing identification and applicant’s usage of the wording ID representing
applicant’s corporate name, IDIDIT.” Id.
The Examining Attorney further argues that “[t]he additional wording IGNITION
in applicant’s mark does not obviate the similarity of the marks,” id. at 10, because
“both marks convey the meaning that they are devices for a common purpose which
emanate from the same source, ID” and “Applicant’s mark simply specifies that its
purpose[ ] is for igniting fuel mixture.” Id. at 9. She claims that the “wording
IGNITION is not distinctive; rather, it is generic” because it “appears in Applicant’s
identification of goods.” Id. at 14.
With respect to the design element in the cited mark, the Examining Attorney
argues that it “does not overcome the similarity of the marks” because Applicant’s
Serial No. 87465751
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mark is in standard character form and Applicant “may display its mark with a
similar design as registrant’s mark and cause confusion as to the source of the goods,”
9 TTABVUE 13, and because “consumers are going to look toward the wording in
registrant’s mark as the identifier of registrant’s goods, rather than the design.” Id.
at 11. She rejects Applicant’s claim that the cited mark is weak because “applicant
has not submitted any timely evidence of third-party registrations to supports its
contention” and cannot rely on the fact that the entire literal element of the cited
mark has been disclaimed because “a disclaimer does not remove the disclaimed
portions from the mark for the purposes of comparing the marks in a likelihood of
confusion determination,” and the “public is generally not aware of disclaimers in
trademark applications and registrations that reside only in the USPTO’s records.”
Id. at 12.
3. Analysis of Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
The marks are ID.IGNITION SYSTEM in standard characters (IGNITION
SYSTEMS disclaimed) and (I. D. SYSTEMS disclaimed). We
turn first to the cited mark, which contains both a design element, and a word
element that has been disclaimed in its entirety, because Applicant and the
Examining Attorney disagree about its dominant portion.
The marks must be considered in their entireties, but “‘in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
Serial No. 87465751
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their entireties.’” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751
(Fed. Cir. 1985)). Applicant argues that the design is the distinctive portion of the
cited mark, 7 TTABVUE 4, while the Examining Attorney argues that consumers will
look to the words “as the identifier of registrant’s goods, rather than the design.” 9
TTABVUE 11. We agree with the Examining Attorney.
In composite marks such as the cited mark, “the words are normally accorded
greater weight because they are likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers,
to be remembered by them, and to be used by them to request the goods.” In re
Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra
Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “This makes sense
given that the literal component of brand names likely will appear alone when used
in text and will be spoken when requested by consumers.” Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at
1911. Applicant argues that this general principle does not apply to the cited mark,
however, because the “entire word potion of the mark ‘i.d. systems’ is disclaimed
because it is descriptive of the goods (essentially vehicle identification systems).” 7
TTABVUE 4.
In Viterra, the Federal Circuit noted that “the dominant portion of a composite
word and design mark is the literal portion, even where the literal portion has been
disclaimed.” Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). In Viterra, the
Serial No. 87465751
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Board had found that the words “X-Seed” were the dominant portion of the applicant’s
mark, shown below:

even though the word “seed” had been disclaimed. The applicant argued on appeal
that “the dominant portion of the X-Seed Mark actually is the stylized letter ‘X’ and
cannot include ‘-Seed,’ particularly because the registrant used a hyphen to separate
‘X’ from ‘Seed’ and disclaimed the term ‘Seed.’” Id. The Federal Circuit rejected that
argument, holding that “‘disclaimed matter still forms a part of the mark and cannot
be ignored in determining likelihood of confusion,’” id. (quoting Giant Food, 218
USPQ at 395), and pointing out that in Giant Food, it had found “‘that the term
‘GIANT’ was the dominant portion of a mark consisting of the words GIANT
HAMBURGERS with a large background design, even though the applicant
disclaimed ‘GIANT HAMBURGERS.’” Id. (quoting Giant Food, 218 USPQ at 395).
The Federal Circuit noted in Viterra that that case was not one “where a larger
design is separate and independent from the literal features of the mark.” Id. The
cited mark here, reproduced again below, differs from the mark in Viterra insofar as
the design element is not a backdrop for the words, but rather is “separate and
independent from the literal features of the mark.” Id.

Serial No. 87465751
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We find, however, that this does not make the design element of the cited mark its
dominant element. As the Federal Circuit explained in Viterra, whether or not the
words in a composite mark have been disclaimed, they “likely will appear alone when
used in text and will be spoken when requested by consumers.” Id. This is confirmed
in the case of the cited mark by a page from the registrant’s website at id-systems.com
that Applicant made of record. It displays the cited mark and shows that the
registrant identifies itself as “I.D. Systems”:

Serial No. 87465751
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4 TTABVUE 12 (October 31, 2018 Request for Reconsideration). We can infer from
the registrant’s use of the words I.D. SYSTEMS that notwithstanding the disclaimer
of those words in the cited registration, consumers will use them to refer to the
registrant, and to call for its products, because the “public is unaware of disclaimers
that ‘quietly reside’ in the records of the Office.” Aquitaine Wine USA, 126 USPQ2d
at 1188 (quoting In re Wada, 48 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (TTAB 1998)). See also Nat’l
Data, 224 USPQ at 751 (“The public is unaware of what words have been disclaimed
during prosecution of the trademark application at the PTO”); Giant Food, 218 USPQ
at 395 (“disclaimers are not helpful in preventing likelihood of confusion in the mind
of the consumer, because he is unaware of their existence”). The relatively
nondescript nature of the oval design element in the cited mark,14 and the likely use
by consumers of the words in the cited mark to identify the source of the goods,
notwithstanding their disclaimer in the registration, are rational reasons to find that
the words I.D. SYSTEMS, not the design element, are the dominant portion of the
cited mark.15 We turn now to a comparison of the marks in their entireties, giving

14 As noted above, the registrant described the design element of its mark as “an incomplete
circle forming the stylized letters ‘I’ and ‘D’ with the dot over the letter ‘I’ in the color red.”
As explained in Section 808.02 of the TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(“TMEP”) (Oct. 2018), “a description cannot be used to restrict the likely public perception of
a mark” and “a mark’s meaning is based on the impression actually created by the mark in
the minds of consumers, not on the impression that the applicant states the mark is intended
to convey.” We doubt that consumers would view the design in the abstract manner in which
it is described by the registrant, but to the extent that it was, it would reinforce the
dominance of the words, which begin with I.D.
15 Applicant also argues that the cited mark is “a weak indicator of source and should be
limited in its scope,” 7 TTABVUE 4, and that “highly suggestive and widely used marks are
not entitled to a broad scope of protection.” Id. at 5. The registrant’s disclaimer of the words
I.D. SYSTEMS in the cited mark reflects the presumed descriptiveness of those words, but
even conceptually weak registered marks are protected under Section 2(d). See, e.g., King
Serial No. 87465751
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greater weight in that comparison to the words I.D. SYSTEMS in the cited mark than
to the oval design element.
Applicant’s mark ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS and the dominant literal portion of the
cited mark I.D. SYSTEMS have similar structures when read and verbalized, as each
begins with the letters ID and ends with the word SYSTEMS. It is significant that in
both marks, the letters ID are the first literal element because “it is often the first
part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and
remembered.” Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB
1988). See also Detroit Athletic Co., 128 USPQ2d at 1050; Palm Bay Imps., 73
USPQ2d at 1692. It is particularly likely here that the letters ID will be “impressed
upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered,” Presto Prods., 9 USPQ2d at 1897,
because the words SYSTEMS and IGNITION SYSTEMS that follow the letters ID in
both marks, and are modified by them, have little or no source-identifying capacity

Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA 1974);
cf. In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., 120 USPQ2d 1738, 1743-45 (TTAB 2016) (conceptually weak
marks registered on the Supplemental Register are protected under Section 2(d)). Applicant
has submitted no evidence of third-party registrations of marks containing the disclaimed
words, which might show that this segment of the cited mark “has a normally understood
and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that
segment is relatively weak,” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115
USPQ2d 1671, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted), and no evidence of third-
party use of marks containing those words, which might show that they are “widely used,” 7
TTABVUE 4, and “that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora of such similar
marks that customers ‘have been educated to distinguish between [such] marks on the bases
of minute distinctions.’” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d
1315, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at
1694). On this record, we cannot find that the conceptual weakness of the cited mark
materially affects our analysis of its similarity to the applied-for mark.
Serial No. 87465751
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per se in either mark. The initial letters ID have the most source-identifying
significance in the words in both marks.
Because the literal portions of the I.D. SYSTEMS and ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS
marks both begin with ID and end with SYSTEMS, they are similar in overall
appearance and sound. Those similarities outweigh the differences resulting from the
presence of the oval design in the cited mark and the presence of the word IGNITION
in Applicant’s mark. We must take into account “the recollection of the average
customer, who retains a general rather than specific impression of marks,”
i.am.symbolic, 127 USPQ2d at 1630, and the fact that the “marks ‘must be considered
. . . in light of the fallibility of human memory’ and ‘not on the basis of side-by-side
comparison.’” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (quoting San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 565
F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1977)). See also Neutrogena Corp. v. Bristol-Myers
Co., 410 F.2d 1391, 161 USPQ 687, 688 (CCPA 1969) (many consumers “may have
but dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or the other of the
involved marks”). To the extent that the marks differ in appearance and sound
because an oval design appears in the cited mark, but not in Applicant’s,16 and the

16 The Examining Attorney argues that Applicant may display its standard character
ID.IGNITION SYSTEM mark “with a similar design as registrant’s mark and cause
confusion as to the source of the goods,” 9 TTABVUE 13, but we cannot make such an
assumption. We “must consider that the literal elements of the mark (the words and the
letters) may be presented in any font style, size or color, including the same font, size and
color of the literal portions of [the cited] mark,” Aquitaine Wine USA, 118 USPQ2d at 1186,
but “[w]hen we are comparing a standard character mark to a word + design mark for Section
2(d) purposes, we will consider variations of the depictions of the standard character mark
only with regard to ‘font style, size, or color of the ‘words, letters, numbers, or any combination
Serial No. 87465751
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word IGNITION appears in Applicant’s mark, but not in the cited mark, consumers
with “dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or the other of the
involved marks,” id., and who have retained only a general impression of their
appearance and pronunciation, are unlikely to differentiate the marks in either
appearance or sound on the basis of these differences.17
Applicant appears to claim that the key difference between the marks is in
connotation and commercial impression. Applicant argues that “the ID portion of the
marks has different connotations,” specifically “identification” in the cited mark and
“a portion of Applicant’s corporate name, IDIDIT” in Applicant’s mark, 7 TTABVUE
4, and that ‘unlike the cited mark where ID SYSTEMS means identification,
ID.IGNITION SYSTEM does not make sense when referenced as identification
ignition systems.” Id. at 4-5. There is nothing on the face of Applicant’s ID.IGNITION
SYSTEMS mark, however, that supports either argument, or that signals to
consumers that “ID” does not have the same meaning in Applicant’s mark that
Applicant’s attributes to it in the cited mark. “[W]e must look to the likely consumer
perception of the mark in connection with the identified goods, rather than applicant’s
intended connotation.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 USPQ2d 1868, 1886
(TTAB 2011). See also TMEP Section 1207.01(b)(v) (citing cases in which the meaning
of otherwise identical marks differed in the context of different goods). Applicant’s

thereof.’” Id. at 1187 (citing Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98
USPQ2d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1909).
17 It seems even less likely that consumers will differentiate the marks in appearance because
“‘ID is not separated by periods” in Applicant’s mark. 7 TTABVUE 4.
Serial No. 87465751
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goods are a “keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch system for retrofit
installation into classic and hot rod automotive vehicles comprised of electric wire
harnesses for automobiles, controller box in the nature of electrical controllers,
microprocessor, electronic signal receiver, and keyfob with electronic signal
transponder and button.” In the context of those goods, which allow a vehicle owner
to enter and start the vehicle remotely, it is at least plausible that consumers would
understand “ID” in Applicant’s mark to mean “identification,” or a “card or badge
used to identify the bearer,”18 because the keyfob that activates the system is a form
of identification of the owner. At the very least, there is nothing on the face of the
mark to indicate that “ID” in Applicant’s mark has the meaning attributed to it by
Applicant,19 or any meaning other than its most common one as an initialism
referring to identification or a form of identification.20
As discussed below, the goods identified in the registration as “wireless
transmitters and receivers for use with vehicles and other powered assets” encompass
component parts of Applicant’s “keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch
system.” A purchaser or repairer of one of Applicant’s ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS
keyless entry and ignition systems who is exposed to the cited mark, which is
dominated by the words I.D. SYSTEMS and used in connection with replacement

18 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 3.
19 Applicant seeks registration of ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS alone, without other elements of
its claimed corporate identity. We may consider the applied-for mark only as it is shown in
Applicant’s drawing, not as it is actually used. Aquitaine Wine USA, 126 USPQ2d at 1186
(citing cases).
20 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 2-7.
Serial No. 87465751
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parts for that system, could readily believe that those parts are affiliated with the
manufacturer of the ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS keyless entry system and ignition
system.
There are differences between the marks in appearance and sound when they are
considered in their entireties, but their similarities in those means of comparison,
and in connotation and commercial impression, outweigh their differences. We find
that the first DuPont factor supports a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and Channels of Trade
The second DuPont factor “considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration,’” Detroit Athletic
Co., 128 USPQ2d at 1051 (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567), while the third DuPont
factor “considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels.” Id. at 1052 (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). Our analysis under
these factors is based on the identifications of goods in the application and the cited
registration. Id.; Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317,
110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161-63 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
It is “‘not necessary that the products . . . be identical or even competitive to
support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.’” Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1722
(quoting 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)).
“[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the respective products are related in some
manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they
Serial No. 87465751
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could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.’” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
The goods identified in the application are a “keyless entry system and keyless
ignition switch system for retrofit installation into classic and hot rod automotive
vehicles comprised of electric wire harnesses for automobiles, controller box in the
nature of electrical controllers, microprocessor, electronic signal receiver, and keyfob
with electronic signal transponder and button.” The goods identified in the cited
registration are “wireless transmitters and receivers for use with vehicles and other
powered assets.” Applicant and the Examining Attorney take very different views of
the nature of these goods, particularly those identified in the cited registration.
1. Applicant’s Arguments
Applicant argues that while the goods are “remotely related, [they] are different
and targeted to different consumers.” 7 TTABVUE 6. Applicant describes its goods as
“ignition systems for installation into vehicles” that are “used to put a keyless ignition
system into a hot rod or customize a vehicle.” Id. Applicant describes the goods in the
cited registration as “transmitters and receivers for controlling, tracking and
managing vehicles, such as a fleet of fork lifts and tracker trailers,” id. at 7, which
are “used for mobile asset management of commercial and industrial vehicles” as part
of “an identification system used to keep track of and manage fleets of vehicles.” Id.
at 7-8. Applicant bases the latter description on extrinsic evidence of the registrant’s
Serial No. 87465751
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use of the cited mark, in the form of a page from the registrant’s website. Id. at 9.21
Applicant concludes that
[w]hile both of the goods relate to the general field of
vehicles, one is used as an automotive part in the classic
car industry and the other is used in connection with
tracking a variety of vehicles. The goods have such
different purposes and are sold to different purchaser[s],
they are sufficiently unrelated so that confusion in the
marketplace is unlikely.
Id.
2. The Examining Attorney’s Arguments
The Examining Attorney argues that the goods are related because “Applicant’s
keyless entry systems and keyless ignition switch systems contain registrant’s
goods.” 9 TTABVUE 15. Specifically, she argues that Applicant’s “goods feature
registrant’s goods as a component of the keyless entry and keyless ignition systems,”
that “these goods are used together to perform a specific function” id. at 17, and that
“customers may view registrant’s goods as replacement parts for applicant’s goods.”
Id.
The Examining Attorney bases these arguments on the presence of the word
“transponder” in the portion of Applicant’s identification of goods that states that they
are comprised in part of [a] “keyfob with electronic signal transponder.” Id. at 16. We
display below an example of a “keyfob”:

21 4 TTABVUE 12 (October 31, 2018 Request for Reconsideration).
Serial No. 87465751
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22
The Examining Attorney cites a dictionary definition of “transponder” as “‘[a] radio
or radar transmitter-receiver activated for transmission by reception of a
predetermined signal,’” id.,23 and argues that “[A]pplicant’s goods contain
transmitters and receivers.” Id. She cites “multiple examples of third parties offering
remote keyless entry systems and keyless ignition systems” that “feature
transmitters and receivers,” id., as well as third-party registrations of marks “for use
in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of both applicant
and registrant in this case.” Id.
The Examining Attorney rejects Applicant’s argument that the registrant’s goods
are “used for mobile asset management of commercial and industrial vehicles” as part
of “an identification system used to keep track of and manage fleets of vehicles.” 7
TTABVUE 7-8. She does so because “according to registrant’s identification of goods,
there are no limitations as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of
purchasers,” and “Registrant’s goods contain[ ] the broad language ‘for use with

22 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 19.
23 Id. at TSDR 12 (THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (ahdictionary.com)).
Serial No. 87465751
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vehicles and other powered assets,” 9 TTABVUE 18, which she argues means that
“registrant’s wireless transmitters and receivers can be used on forklifts, tractor
trailers, hot roads, classic cars, and anything else that would be encompassed by the
wording ‘vehicles and other powered assets.’” Id. The Examining Attorney further
argues that “registrant’s identification of goods does not limit the function of the
wireless transmitters or receivers,” such that “these goods can perform any function
that wireless transmitters and receivers can perform.” Id. She concludes that
“registrant’s wireless transmitters and receivers can be used for retrofit installation
into classic and hot rod automobile vehicles . . . .” Id. at 19.
3. Analysis of Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and
Channels of Trade
The “wireless transmitters and receivers” identified in the cited registration are
broadly described, and are unrestricted except as to their field of use. Accordingly, we
must presume them to include all types of “wireless transmitters and receivers” that
could be used “with vehicles and other powered assets.” See, e.g., In re FCA US LLC,
126 USPQ2d 1214, 1219 (TTAB 2018) (holding that “[w]e must presume that
Applicant’s goods include all goods of the type identified, i.e., all ‘passenger
automobiles [and] their structural parts,’ as well as all kinds of automotive ‘trim and
badges’” and that “[w]e consider Registrant’s services to include installation of all
kinds of specialty automotive equipment, and not merely equipment to enhance off-
road capability”); In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006).24

24 The nature and scope of the goods identified in the cited registration cannot be limited
based on Applicant’s extrinsic evidence from the registrant’s website of the registrant’s
current actual use of the registered mark. 7 TTABVUE 9 (“[t]he owner of the cited mark sells
Serial No. 87465751
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A “transponder,” one component of the “keyfob with electronic signal transponder”
that is part of Applicant’s “keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch system,”
is a type of “wireless transmitter and receiver” that can be “use[d] with vehicles and
other powered assets.” In addition, the “electronic signal receiver” that is part of
Applicant’s keyless systems is another form of a “wireless . . . receiver” “use[d] with
vehicles and other powered assets.” Accordingly, we agree with the Examining
Attorney that Applicant’s “keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch system
for retrofit installation into classic and hot rod automotive vehicles comprised of
electric wire harnesses for automobiles, controller box in the nature of electrical
controllers, microprocessor, electronic signal receiver, and keyfob with electronic
signal transponder and button” contains the goods identified in the cited registration.
The record shows that “wireless transmitters and receivers” and “electronic signal
receiver” are integral (indeed indispensable) components of keyless entry and ignition
systems for automobiles. A keyfob (like the one shown above) is a “wireless

transmitters and receivers and these goods are not sold as vehicle parts,” but rather are “used
to identify and track any powered asset, such as a fork lift or a rental car fleet (Exhibit D,
previously submitted as Exhibit A in Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration”)). See In re La
Peregrina Ltd., 86 USPQ2d 1645, 1647 (TTAB 2008) (“applicant’s reliance on registrant’s
website in an attempt to restrict the scope of registrant’s goods is to no avail” because “an
applicant may not restrict the scope of the goods covered in the cited registration by argument
or extrinsic evidence”); In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763, 764 (TTAB 1986) (an
applicant cannot “restrict the scope of its goods in its application and the scope of the goods
covered in the cited registration by extrinsic argument and evidence while neither the
recitation of goods in applicant’s application nor the recitation of goods in the cited
registration is so restricted”). Applicant’s entire argument on the second DuPont factor is
based on the registrant’s actual use of the registered mark, 7 TTABVUE 7-9, not on the
identification of goods in the cited registration.
Serial No. 87465751
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transmitter,” and we display below examples of record evidence regarding the use of
“wireless transmitters and receivers” in keyless entry and ignition systems:
25

25 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 9 (emphasis supplied by the Examining Attorney).
Serial No. 87465751
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26
27

26 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 18. This webpage identifies certain components as
“transceivers.” The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online
dictionaries that exist in printed form or regular fixed editions. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac
v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ
505 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006). We take
judicial notice that a “transceiver” is “a radio transmitter-receiver that uses many of the same
components for both transmission and reception.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
(merriam-webster.com, last accessed on August 22, 2019).
27 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 21 (emphasis supplied by the Examining Attorney).
Serial No. 87465751
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28
The Examining Attorney also made of record third-party registrations of marks
for goods identified as “keyless entry systems for vehicles comprised of a
microprocessor, electronic signal receiver and keyfob with electronic signal
transponder,”29 or a “keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch system for
automotive vehicles comprised of a microprocessor, electronic signal receiver and
keyfob with electronic signal transponder.”30 These registrations confirm that
“electronic signal receivers” and “electronic signal transponders” are integral parts of
a “keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch system” for automobiles.

28 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 21.
29 Id. at TSDR 49-51.
30 Id. at TSDR 52-66.
Serial No. 87465751
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We have long recognized that a finished product, and a component part of that
product, are related for purposes of the second DuPont factor because the sale of those
goods under the same or similar marks may give rise to a likelihood of confusion. In
re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910, 911 (TTAB 1978) (finding a likelihood of
confusion arising from use of THUNDERBOLT for cartridge heaters and THOR’S 3
IN 1 THUNDERBOLT and design for electrically energized ovens because “there
exists an intimate relationship between a finished product such as registrant’s oven
and the component parts which comprise such oven such as applicant’s cartridge
heater”); see also In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202 (TTAB 2009)
(finding that goods identified as “electric motors for machines” were related to goods
identified as “air compressors and parts therefor” because “the record show[ed] that
an electric motor is or can be an essential component and/or replacement part of an
air compressor”); Teledyne Techs., Inc. v. W. Skyways, Inc., 78 USPQ2d 1203, 1207
(TTAB 2006) (finding that ignition harnesses for piston aircraft engines and aircraft
engines were “commercially related” because harnesses were a component part of
aircraft engines). Because “wireless transmitters and receivers for use with vehicles”
are indispensable components of a “keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch
system for retrofit installation into classic and hot rod automotive vehicles comprised
of electric wire harnesses for automobiles, controller box in the nature of electrical
controllers, microprocessor, electronic signal receiver, and keyfob with electronic
signal transponder and button,” the goods identified in the cited registration could be
sold as replacement parts for the original “electronic signal receiver[s]” and “keyfob
Serial No. 87465751
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with electronic signal transponder and button.” Under the circumstances, in addition
to possible confusion on the part of the owner of an ID. IGNITION SYSTEM keyless
entry and ignition system seeking to replace an “electronic signal receiver” or “keyfob
with electronic signal transponder and button” with a “wireless transmitter” or
“wireless receiver” sold under the registered mark, there are additional scenarios
“where a likelihood of confusion could exist where a finished product and a component
of such finished product were sold under the same or similar marks.” Int’l Tel. & Tel.,
197 USPQ at 911 (discussing possible confusion on the part of repairers of the finished
product and competitors of the producer of the finished product).
We find that the “the respective products are related in some manner” and that
“the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to
the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source,” Coach Servs., 101
USPQ2d at 1722 (internal quotation marks omitted), when sold under similar marks.
The second DuPont factor supports a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
With respect to the third DuPont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity in the
channels of trade, Applicant argues that its “goods are typically sold to car
enthusiasts who are customizing their automobile,” while the goods in the cited
registration “are targeted towards owners of multiple vehicle assets, typically in a
commercial or industrial setting.” 7 TTABVUE 9. Like Applicant’s argument
regarding the nature of the goods themselves, this argument is incorrectly premised
on extrinsic evidence of the registrant’s actual current use of its mark, rather than
evidence regarding the channels of trade and classes of consumers for all types of
Serial No. 87465751
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“wireless transmitters and receivers for use with vehicles and other powered assets,”
the goods as identified in the cited registration. The Examining Attorney correctly
points out that in the absence of limitations as to channels of trade or classes of
purchasers in the identifications of goods, “the presumption is that the goods . . . move
in all trade channels normal for such goods . . . and are available to all potential
classes of ordinary consumers of such goods . . . .” 9 TTABVUE 19 (citing In re I-Coat
Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1738 (TTAB 2018)).
It is self-evident that the purchasers or installers of a “keyless entry system and
keyless ignition switch system for retrofit installation into classic and hot rod
automotive vehicles comprised of electric wire harnesses for automobiles, controller
box in the nature of electrical controllers, microprocessor, electronic signal receiver,
and keyfob with electronic signal transponder and button,” may also be purchasers of
replacement parts for those systems, such as the “wireless transmitters and receivers
for use with vehicles” identified in the cited registration. Indeed, the “car enthusiast
who uses [Applicant’s] product to retrofit an ignition system into a car that does not
have a keyless ignition system,” and “the mechanics who are able to work on these
cars” to retrofit them, or to repair installed systems, 7 TTABVUE 10, are logically the
primary, if not exclusive, customers for replacement parts for those systems.
Accordingly, the classes of consumers for the keyless systems and their replacement
parts overlap and more likely are one and the same.
The record shows that Applicant and other sellers of keyless entry and ignition
systems sell systems through their own websites, and that at least some of those
Serial No. 87465751
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sellers also sell replacement parts through the same websites. 31 Applicant’s website
lists the ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS system together with multiple other products
under the heading “Accessories.”32 The webpages of other sellers of keyless entry and
ignition systems similarly list various components and accessories, and some discuss
product updates and service and support.33 One specifically states that defective parts
will be replaced under warranty “F.O.B. our factory without charge provided the
defective part(s) is returned to our factory,”34 while another refers to “Ford
Replacement and Performance Harnesses.”35 The Examining Attorney also made of
record pages from the website of Pep Boys, an automotive products retailer, showing
a replacement keyfob for Chrysler, Dodge, and Jeep keyless entry systems,36 but it is
not clear whether that retailer or others like also sell keyless entry and ignition
systems per se.
The record shows at least some overlap in the channels of trade for the systems
and replacement parts for the systems. In addition, it shows that replacement parts
for keyless entry and ignition systems are produced or sold by at least some of the
companies who produced the systems themselves, as well as by independent

31 We can infer from the sale of systems and parts through these websites that those goods
are also sold together in any brick-and-mortar world stores operated by these sellers.
32 May 26, 2017 Specimen at TSDR 1.
33 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 21-24; May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 13-
48.
34 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at 34.
35 Id. at 35.
36 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 19-20.
Serial No. 87465751
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companies.37 That is significant because the car owners, system installers, and
repairers who install systems sold under the ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS mark and seek
replacement parts for those systems may do so from companies other than those who
produce the systems. We find that the third DuPont factor supports a finding of a
likelihood of confusion.
C. Sophistication of Purchasers
The fourth DuPont factor considers “‘the conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.’” Stone
Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1162 (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). Our analysis of this
factor must “be based ‘on the least sophisticated potential purchasers’” of the relevant
goods. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163 (quoting Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Fage Dairy Proc.
Indus. S.A., 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1600 (TTAB 2011), judgment set aside on other
grounds, 2014 WL 343267 (TTAB 2014)).
Applicant argues that the customers for its goods are car enthusiasts who use
Applicant’s keyless systems to retrofit their classic cars and hot rods, and that such
“[p]urchasers with knowledge of how to retrofit a classic car or hot rod with an
ignition system have a high level of knowledge with respect to these types of cars and
the industry.” 7 TTABVUE 10. According to Applicant, if “a purchase of Applicant’s
goods comes into contact with the goods in the cited registration, [the customer is]
very knowledgeable in the industry and not likely to believe that goods used for such

37 For example, the producer of the replacement keyfobs sold through the Pep Boys website
describes itself as “the leading provider of replacement remote transmitters for factor keyless
entry and aftermarket alarm systems.” Id.
Serial No. 87465751
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different purposes in a different industry emanate from the same source merely
because the goods both contain wireless transmission technology.” Id.
This argument once again is incorrectly premised on extrinsic evidence of the
registrant’s actual current use of its mark, rather than on the sophistication of the
customers for the goods that are broadly identified in the cited registration as
including replacement parts for keyless entry and ignition systems. Nevertheless, we
agree that the record suggests that some purchasers of keyless entry and ignition
systems and their replacement parts are likely to purchase carefully. The record
shows that classic cars and hot rods are high-involvement products owned by car
enthusiasts, and that keyless entry and ignition systems for vehicles may cost several
hundred dollars.38 Purchasers of the systems themselves are likely to exercise a
heightened degree of care in making purchases.
At the same time, however, and not surprisingly, the record suggests that
replacement parts for such systems are considerably less expensive.39 Owners or
repairers of keyless entry and ignition systems who seek replacement wireless
transmitters and receivers or electronic signal receivers for the systems may not
exercise the same high degree of care as would be exercised in the original purchase
of the systems themselves. Cf. FCA US, 126 USPQ2d at 1224 (finding that customers

38 May 5, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 13-20 (offering iKey systems “From $599); id. at
21-22 (offering Electric Life system for $117.30); id. at 23-24 (offering Flaming River system
for $798.47); id. at 35-44 (offering Ron Francis Wiring system for $649.95); 4 TTABVUE 13
(October 31, 2018 Request for Reconsideration) (offering Applicant’s systems for between
$330 and $740).
39 August 17, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 19-20 (offering replacement keyfob for various
vehicles for $49.99).
Serial No. 87465751
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for the applicant’s “automobiles, structural parts, trim and badges” would “likely
exercise care in purchasing Applicant’s cars, with high attention to the source of the
goods, but less care (although still elevated care) in purchasing replacement parts or
trim”). We find that the least sophisticated potential purchasers of replacement
wireless transmitters and receivers or electronic signal receivers for keyless entry
and ignition systems would likely exercise more than ordinary care in the purchase
decision. The fourth DuPont factor thus weighs slightly against a finding of likelihood
of confusion.
D. Balancing the DuPont Factors
Three of the four pertinent DuPont factors support a finding of a likelihood of
confusion: The marks are similar, the goods are related, and the channels of trade
and classes of purchasers overlap. The least sophisticated potential purchasers of
replacement parts for the goods identified in the application are likely to exercise an
elevated degree of care in the purchase decision, but that it not enough to render
confusion unlikely in view of the other factors, especially given that the record is
devoid of evidence of third-party use or registration of ID-formative marks for the
subject goods that might show that consumers can distinguish between the marks on
the basis of the modest differences between them. We find that a consumer or repairer
of a keyless entry and ignition system for classic cars and hot rods sold under the
ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS mark who is exposed to replacement “wireless transmitters
and receivers for use with vehicles” sold under the mark is
likely to believe mistakenly that those replacement parts originate with, or are
Serial No. 87465751
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sponsored or authorized by, the producer of the ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS system. For
the above reasons, we conclude that Applicant’s applied-for mark, as used in
connection with the goods identified in the application, so resembles the cited
registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive, under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.