David Vogel et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 28, 20202020003943 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 28, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/591,832 01/07/2015 David Vogel V02.101 8458 26344 7590 12/28/2020 JENNIFER L. BALES MOUNTAIN VIEW PLAZA 1520 EUCLID CIRCLE LAFAYETTE, CO 80026-1250 EXAMINER MILLS JR., JOE E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3761 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/28/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): jbales@me.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DAVID VOGEL and GARY F. SKINNER Appeal 2020-003943 Application 14/591,832 Technology Center 3700 Before JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges. HILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 7, 9–13, 15, and 21–27.2 See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as the inventors, David Vogel and Gary Skinner. Appeal Br. 3. 2 Although claim 8 is included in the Office Action Summary of rejected claims (Final Act. 1), we note that there is no outstanding rejection of claim 8. See generally Final Act.; see also Appeal Br. 3, 20 (Claims App.). Appeal 2020-003943 Application 14/591,832 2 BACKGROUND Appellant’s invention relates to a force sensing control apparatus for welding machines. Claim 1, reproduced below with certain limitations italicized, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An apparatus for controlling welding power of a welding machine having a welding machine torch wielded by a welder, the apparatus comprising: a force sensing transducer assembly for directly sensing force applied by the welder at a pressing surface and for generating a force signal based on the sensed force, without movement past compression or deformation at the pressing surface; a control interface module for generating a welding machine control signal based upon the force signal, the control signal configured to control the welding power of the welding machine; a force signal transmission medium for transmitting the force signal to the control interface module; a control signal transmission medium for transmitting the control signal to the welding machine; and a welding power transmitting element for transmitting welding power to the welding machine torch, thereby controlling welding arc power. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Lawrence US 3,272,949 Sept. 13, 1966 Sajna US 6,386,023 B1 May 14, 2002 Wakasugi US 2004/0194550 A1 Oct. 7, 2004 Bland US 2009/0200283 A1 Aug. 13, 2009 Strifler US 2012/0065972 A1 Mar. 15, 2012 Upton US 2014/0144898 A1 May 29, 2014 Yoon US 2015/0305671 A1 Oct. 29, 2015 Appeal 2020-003943 Application 14/591,832 3 REJECTIONS I. Claims 1, 7, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Upton and Sajna. II. Claims 2–5, 10, 12, 13, and 21–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Upton, Sajna, and Bland. III. Claims 9 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Upton, Sajna, and Yoon. IV. Claims 24 and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Upton, Sajna, Bland, Strifler, and Lawrence. V. Claims 26 and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Upton, Sajna, and Wakasugi. ANALYSIS Rejection I; Obviousness based on Upton and Sajna The Examiner finds that Upton discloses many of the limitations of claim 1, including a force sensing transducer assembly for directly sensing force applied by the welder at a pressing surface and for generating a force signal based on the sensed force, but does not explicitly disclose that the sensed force is applied without movement past compression or deformation at the pressing surface. Final Act. 4–5. The Examiner finds that Sajna’s force sensing transducer detects motion based on a change in resistance, which according to the Examiner meets the claimed “movement” limitation. Id. at 5. The Examiner considers that it would have been have obvious to substitute Sajna’s transducer for that of Upton to predictably measure the force applied at the pressing surface. Id. According to the Examiner, such a substitute would advantageously reduce the required range of motion for Appeal 2020-003943 Application 14/591,832 4 control without altering how the operator uses the device, consistent with Upton’s stated goals. Id. at 5–6 (citing Upton ¶ 13). Appellant argues, inter alia, that the force in Upton applied by the welder is not directly sensed at a pressing surface; rather, Upton’s “sensor 82 detects the movement or position of the control lever.” Appeal Br. 9 (citing Upton ¶ 30). According to Appellant, Upton’s force is applied at one side of a lever and sensed at a different side of the lever. Id. The Examiner responds that there is no distinction between how Upton and the claimed invention operate because Upton “directly measure[s] the pressure applied to the control lever.” Ans. 5 (citing Upton ¶ 10). The Examiner asserts that the only difference is that Upton does not describe “compressive movement inherent in pressure transducers,” though Sanja describes such compressive movement. Id. (citing Upton ¶ 30). According to the Examiner, “detecting the motion of [Upton’s] control lever . . . is indistinct from directly sensing the force applied to the pressing surface described in the instant application. . . . There is no other way a pressure transducer could ‘detect’ motion.” Id. Appellant replies that, because Upton uses a control lever, any pressure transducer will be located at a different portion of the lever from the pressing surface. Reply Br. 3. In particular, Appellant asserts that “a lever by definition is a bar that rotates on a pivot,” and evidence was submitted that motion of a lever is not equivalent to motion of a force applied at a pressing surface. Id. at 2–3 (citing Appeal Br. 22 (Evidence App. K4, K5, K2A)). Appellant has the better position. Although we appreciate that Upton uses a force sensing transducer assembly for sensing force applied by the Appeal 2020-003943 Application 14/591,832 5 welder at a pressing surface, Upton’s use of a lever prevents Upton from directly3 sensing force applied at a pressing surface. See Upton ¶ 30 (“sensor 82 detects the movement or position of the control lever”). Rather, as Appellant correctly notes, the force is applied to one portion of the lever and sensed at a different portion of the lever. This is true even in the pressure transducer embodiment of Figure 7 of Upton. There, Upton’s lever would operate similarly to the extended arm of Sajna’s latch 8, in which “angular displacement of the latch pawl 8 . . . activates or depresses the plunger 20 to change the state of the pressure sensitive signal element.” Sajna 4:58–64, Fig. 4; see also Upton Fig. 4. By contrast, Appellant’s Specification discloses that “[a] force applied to the surface of finger button 4A . . . deflects the membrane 3 in the direction of the force.” Spec. 14:13– 14; Figs. 4, 5. Because the membrane is directly below the button, and deflects in the direction of the force, the membrane (of the transducer) is directly sensing the force. Construing the claims so that pressing on a portion of Upton’s lever to create a force that is sensed by a sensor at a different portion of the lever would read out the term “directly” from the claims, which we decline to do. Claims must not be construed so broadly as to vitiate an express limitation. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm., 988 F.2d 1165, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]o construe the claims in the manner suggested by TI would read an express limitation out of the claims. This, we will not do.”). 3 We construe the term directly in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as “with nothing or no one in between,” which is consistent with use of the term in Appellant’s Specification and arguments. Lexico.com (accessed Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.lexico.com/definition/directly. Appeal 2020-003943 Application 14/591,832 6 For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1, and claims 7 and 11, which depend from claim 1. Rejections II–V Rejections II–V rely on the same proposed combination of Upton and Sajna, with additional disclosure of Bland, Yoon, Strifler, Lawrence, or Wakasugi. The Examiner does not rely on the additional disclosure of Bland, Yoon, Strifler, Lawrence, or Wakasugi in any manner that would remedy the conclusion set forth in the rejection based on Upton and Sajna. We do not sustain Rejections II–V for the same reasons set forth above. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are reversed. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 7, 11 103 Upton, Sajna 1, 7, 11 2–5, 10, 12, 13, 21–23 103 Upton, Sajna, Bland 2–5, 10, 12, 13, 21–23 9, 15 103 Upton, Sajna, Yoon 9, 15 24, 25 103 Upton, Sajna, Bland, Strifler, Lawrence 24, 25 26, 27 103 Upton, Sajna, Wakasugi 26, 27 Overall Outcome: 1–5, 7, 9– 13, 15, 21– 27 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation