David Skiba et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 10, 2020

14513362 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/513,362 10/14/2014 David Skiba 4366-660 1813
48500 7590 02/10/2020
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
CELANI, NICHOLAS P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2449
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/10/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID SKIBA, ANDREW MAHER, GEORGE ERHART and
VALENTINE C. MATULA
Appeal 2018-007286
Application 14/513,362
Technology Center 2400

Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, HUNG H. BUI, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

KHAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.

Appeal 2018-007286
Application 14/513,362
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant describes the invention as follows:
Contact centers often have a significant pool of troubleshooting
information related to devices that a customer may own or have
access to. Connecting the device to a resource of the contact
center presents challenges as customers and device
manufacturers are reluctant to provide direct connectivity from
the device to a public network, such as the Internet. A customer
communication device, such as a smart phone, with an
application allows a user to broker a communication between a
resource of a contact center and a device. As a benefit, the
customer can see and control the types of communication
occurring and approve or deny according to their comfort level.
When the resource-device session is concluded, the link is
terminated and cannot be resumed without again obtaining
approval.
Abstract.
Claim 1, reproduced below2, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A mobile communication device, comprising:
a first communication interface;
a second communication interface;
a third communication interface; and
a processor; and
wherein the first communication interface is operable to
connect, via a communications network, the mobile
communication device to a resource of a contact center;

2 Claim 1 as quoted in the Claims Appendix contains amendments that the
Examiner did not enter. See Advisory Act. (Jan. 18, 2018). The version of
claim 1 reproduced herein, does not contain those amendments.
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Application 14/513,362
3
wherein the second communication interface is operable
to connect, via a physical proximity-required communication,
the mobile communication device to a first accessible device;
wherein the processor, initiates a communication with
each of the resource of the contact center and the first accessible
device via the first communication interface and the second
communication interface, respectively;
wherein the third communication interface comprises at
least a portion of the first and second communication interfaces
and the processor brokers the communication between the
resource and the first accessible device, the communication
comprising an action, sent by the resource to the first accessible
device, to be performed by the first accessible device upon the
first accessible device receiving the action; and
wherein the processor causes the third communication
interface to selectively either allow or deny the portion of the
communication with the action in accordance with a permission
for the action.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Ban US 2007/0118638 A1 May 24, 2007
Stott US 2008/0117810 A1 May 22, 2008
Balgard US 2008/0139116 A1 June 12, 2008
Hickie US 2010/0081417 A1 April 1, 2010

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1–3, 6, 9–12, and 16–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Ban and Hickie. Final Act. 3–15.
2. Claims 4, 5, 13, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Ban, Hickie, and Stott. Final Act. 15–17.
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Application 14/513,362
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3. Claims 7, 8, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Ban, Hickie, and Balgard. Final Act. 17–19.
OPINION
REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner relies on Ban as teaching nearly all the limitations of
claim 1. Specifically, the Examiner finds Ban’s “information terminal”
teaches the claimed “mobile communication device,” Ban’s “server” teaches
the claimed “resource of a contact center,” and Ban’s “apparatus” teaches
the claimed “first accessible device.” Final Act. 4–5 (citing Ban ¶¶ 90–92,
97–99, 447, 460–461, Figs. 46, 47). The Examiner finds Ban’s information
terminal sits between Ban’s server and Ban’s apparatus and brokers the
communication between the two. Ans. 5. The Examiner, however, finds
that Ban “does not explicitly teach gating” (Final Act. 5) which refers to the
last limitation of claim 1 reciting “wherein the processor causes the third
communication interface to selectively either allow or deny the portion of
the communication with the action in accordance with a permission for the
action.” For this last limitation, the Examiner relies on Hickie’s teaching of
“white and black lists which check requested operations against access rules
and allow for actions to be either allowed or denied” combined with Ban’s
aforementioned teachings. Final Act. 6 (citing Hickie ¶¶ 80, 83, 133, 148).
Appellant argues3 “Ban, at the cited locations and elsewhere, teaches
no communication between server 1000 and apparatus 100. At no point

3 Appellant raises several arguments for the first time in the Reply Brief.
For example, Appellant argues the combination of Ban and Hickie does not
teach a “mobile communication device” and does not teach that the second
communication interface is operable to connect, via a physical proximity-
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does Ban’s server 1000 address or provide any communication to apparatus
100 nor does apparatus 100 address or provide any communication to server
1000, therefore, no communication exists between server 1000 and
apparatus 100. Accordingly, Appellant argues Ban fails to recite the claimed
‘third communication interface.’” Appeal Br. 7.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. First, Appellant’s
argument is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1. Claim 1 recites
that “processor brokers the communication between the resource and the
first accessible device, the communication comprising an action, sent by the
resource to the first accessible device.” Nothing in the claim requires that
the communication between the resource and first accessible device be
direct. Indeed, the claim indicates that the processor “brokers the
communication between the resource and the first accessible device”
suggesting that the communication be transmitted via the mobile
communication device. Thus, to the extent Appellant argues Ban does not
teach communication between Ban’s server and apparatus because such
communication is not direct, we disagree.
Second, Ban teaches that its information terminal acts as a relay
between the server and the apparatus. See Ban Figs. 2, 40, ¶¶ 90–95. Thus
the apparatus sends anomaly information to the server, via the information
terminal, and the server sends back a recovery instruction to the apparatus,

required communication, the mobile communication device to a first
accessible device. Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant waived these arguments by not
originally presenting them in the Appeal Brief. See 37 CFR § 41.41(b)(2)
(“Any argument raised in the reply brief which was not raised in the appeal
brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in the examiner’s answer,
including any designated new ground of rejection, will not be considered by
the Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”).
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via the information terminal. Therefore, we agree that Ban teaches
Appellant’s claimed “processor [that] brokers the communication between
the resource and the first accessible device, the communication comprising
an action, sent by the resource to the first accessible device.”
Appellant further argues the cited prior art fails to teach or suggest
“wherein the processor causes the third communication interface to
selectively either allow or deny the portion of the third communication with
the action in accordance with a permission for the action.” Specifically,
Appellant argues Hickie fails to teach this wherein clause because “even if
Hickie did disclose ‘gating’ . . . what is ‘gated’ is not taught by the art of
record.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant argues “[s]electively ‘gating’ a resource
due the resource being blacklisted/whitelisted fails to teach . . . allowing or
denying a portion of a communication comprising action.” Appeal Br. 8.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it attacks Hickie individually
and does not address the Examiner’s findings as a whole. The Examiner
relies on Ban as teaching the processor, the third communication interface,
the communication with an action. Final Act. 4–6. The Examiner relies on
Hickie only for the concept of allowing or denying certain operations. Final
Act. 6 (citing Hickie ¶¶ 80, 83, 133, 148). Thus, when Ban is modified by
Hickie’s teachings, the Examiner finds, and we agree, the combination
teaches a “processor [that] causes the third communication interface to
selectively either allow or deny the portion of the communication with the
action in accordance with a permission for the action” as claimed.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s combination requires Hickie to
change in order for the rejection to be maintained. Appeal Br. 8.
Specifically, Appellant argues Hickie must also have another component in
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which it is in communication with in the ‘third communication.’” Id. This
argument is unpersuasive, again because it attacks Hickie individually
without addressing the Examiner’s findings as a whole. The Examiner is not
relying on Hickie for teaching a third communication, only that certain
operations may be allowed or denied based on access rules. Final Act. 6.
The Examiner relies on Ban as teaching the three components involved in
the communication (i.e. the information terminal, the server, and the
apparatus). Thus, Appellant’s arguments that Hickie must disclose one of
these components is unpersuasive because Ban discloses each of those
components.
Appellant argues
[t]he claimed, “selectively either allow or deny the portion of the
third communication with the action,” remains absent from the
art of record. The ‘action,’ is ‘to be performed by the first
accessible device’ and stands rejected as being taught by Ban's
server which sends commands to the terminal (see, Final Office
Action, p. 5). However, Hickie which discloses a remote client
attempting to access a resource of an enterprise, is different and
fails to disclose that which is necessary to maintain the rejection.
While the claimed “action” is to be performed by an accessible
device, Hickie’s action is to be performed for a mobile device
and by a resource of the enterprise.
Appeal Br. 9. This argument is again unpersuasive for the same reasons as
those above, namely it fails to address the Examiner’s findings as a whole.
The action that is performed by the accessible device is taught by Ban. See
Final Act. 5 (citing Ban ¶¶ 369–370). Thus, even if Hickie’s action is
performed for a mobile device rather than by the mobile device, the
Examiner’s findings regarding Ban remedy this deficiency.
Appellant argues that no explanation of a motivation to combine the
references has been provided by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 10. We disagree.
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The Examiner articulates a reason with rational underpinning for combining
Ban with Hickie. Final Act. 6. In particular, the Examiner finds that one of
ordinary skill would have combined “Ban with the operation-level gating [of
Hickie] in order to allow granular access to resources in order to provide
remote devices access with the appropriate level of security.” Final Act. 6.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 and independent claims 12 and 18 which are argued together with
claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 11). We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of the
pending dependent claims which were not argued separately.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6, 9–
12, 16–20
103 Ban, Hickie 1–3, 6, 9–
12, 16–20

4, 5, 13, 14 103 Ban, Hickie, Stott 4, 5, 13, 14
7, 8, 15 103 Ban, Hickie,
Balgard
7, 8, 15
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2017).
AFFIRMED