David S. Winn, Complainant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 11, 2000
01984092 (E.E.O.C. May. 11, 2000)

01984092

05-11-2000

David S. Winn, Complainant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


David S. Winn v. Department of the Navy

01984092

May 11, 2000

David S. Winn, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01984092

v. ) Agency No. 95-00187-029

) Hearing No. 120-96-5521X

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant timely appeals from a final agency decision ("FAD") concerning

his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

For the reasons set forth below, the FAD is AFFIRMED.

Complainant has asthma and diabetes; also, as a result of an on-the-job

injury, he incurred extensive trauma to his back, including a herniated

disk. The parties do not dispute, and the Commission concurs, that

complainant is a qualified individual with a disability as defined

by 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(m).<2> Complainant was on workers' compensation

from 1987 to 1991, when he was placed in a position designed to meet

his restrictions pursuant to a program designed to utilize employees

receiving workers compensation. When he returned to work, complainant had

a number of restrictions, including a prohibition against walking more

than one hour a day and on being in extremely hot or cold temperatures.

Complainant was given a special chair to support his back and arms.

He was assigned to work in any of six toolrooms throughout the facility.

Complainant sought EEO counseling on April 25, 1995 and raised

several issues. In his formal EEO complaint, filed on June 5, 1995,

complainant alleged that he was discriminated against based on his

physical disabilities (herniated disk, asthma, diabetes and leg pain)

and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when: (a) he received a Notice Of

Proposed Suspension for being away from the job site on March 22, 1995;

(b) he received a Notice of Decision on Proposed Suspension on April

21, 1995; (c) these actions denied him due process; and (d) he was

not accommodated with a parking space within seventy five feet of his

work site. Complainant's complaint was accepted and investigated by the

agency, and a hearing was thereafter held before an EEOC Administrative

Judge ("AJ"). After the hearing, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision

("RD") which found that complainant had been subjected to discrimination

on the bases of his physical disabilities and reprisal when he was

suspended for ten days for being away from his work site. The AJ also

found that complainant had been denied reasonable accommodation when he

was not provided with a handicapped parking space within seventy five

feet of his work site and when he was not provided with a urinal within

seventy five feet of his work area prior to approximately July 1994.

The AJ awarded complainant $200,000 in compensatory damages.

With respect to the issue of parking, the record reveals that when

complainant returned to work in 1991, he was restricted from walking

more than one hour at a time. Of the six toolrooms in buildings at

the facility in question, all but one (in Building Z-398) permitted

complainant to park within seventy five feet of the building.

See complainant's testimony, Hearing Transcript ("HT") at 247. In May

1994, while complainant was assigned to Building Z-398, his walking was

further restricted to seventy five feet at a time. Complainant requested

and received a handicapped parking sticker.<3> As complainant's parking

area was still some 350 feet away, his supervisor arranged for another

employee to pick complainant up from the parking lot. However, this

arrangement lasted only a short while. Complainant then walked from

his assigned space to the toolroom for approximately three weeks, which

caused his back to hurt for several hours. Then complainant began to

park in a location within the prescribed distance until he was reassigned

to another building in approximately July 1994.

The RD stated that when complainant "returned to work in 1991, his medical

restrictions prohibited him from walking farther than seventy five feet."

The RD found that complainant was granted a space located over 350 feet

from the toolroom in Building Z-398, forcing him to walk this distance

for months, although it was noted that complainant was temporarily

accommodated by having an employee pick him up in the parking lot.

The RD stated that complainant "was never issued a space within his

limitations and ... was forced to continue to park illegally" causing him

to experience severe back pain and to receive numerous parking tickets.

The AJ criticized the agency for not only assigning complainant a parking

space outside the prescribed distance but for failing to grant him "a

sticker rather than a place" since (according to the AJ) a sticker would

have given complainant the flexibility to park in the closest available

handicapped space at each toolroom and saved the agency from having to

issue him an actual space at each toolroom.

In its FAD, the agency found that the RD included several clearly

erroneous findings of fact. First, while the RD implied that complainant

had not been granted a parking space meeting his medical restrictions

since he returned to work in 1991, the agency noted that it had granted

complainant a handicap parking decal when he requested one in 1991 and

granted him a second decal in May 1994 after complainant requested another

one.<4> See supra, n. 1. Second, the RD found that since returning to

work in 1991, complainant was prohibited from walking farther than seventy

five feet. However, in fact, complainant was medically authorized to

walk for up to one hour at a time until May 10, 1994. Third, while the

RD stated that complainant parked "illegally" after he began parking in a

closer space, and that he was held financially responsible for the tickets

he received as a result, complainant in fact testified that "somehow [his]

supervisor got rid of [the tickets] for [him]." HT at 221. However,

the FAD adopted the RD to the extent that it held that complainant was

denied reasonable accommodation for the approximately three week period

during May 1994, when he walked from the parking lot to Building Z-398.

With respect to the suspension, the record reflects that in December 1994,

complainant was assigned to the toolroom at Fort Story. Upon arrival,

he discovered that the chair he usually used to accommodate his back

injury was missing and that the thermostat was set to a high temperature.

Complainant placed a call the Industrial Equipment Mechanic Supervisor

(the "Supervisor"), but he was not at his desk. Complainant spoke

to a secretary, who indicated that she was sitting in complainant's

usual chair. Complainant stated: "Never mind, just tell the boss that

I'm here." The Supervisor never received a message that complainant

had telephoned. Complainant left the building and sat in his truck for

the rest of the day. Complainant maintained that, when he had been at

Fort Story on one other occasion, his chair was missing and he had been

instructed by the Supervisor to sit in his truck. The General Foreman

was informed that complainant was sleeping in his truck while on duty,

and he telephoned the Maintenance Department Head (the "Department Head"),

who in turn called the Supervisor. The Supervisor drove to Fort Story

although, as he anticipated, complainant was off duty by the time he

arrived. While the Supervisor confirmed that the toolroom offered only a

broken chair and a stool, the Supervisor denied that complainant asserted

that the temperature had affected his asthma. In any event, the agency

contended that complainant should have simply lowered the thermostat.

Complainant ultimately was issued a Letter of Suspension which charged

him with being away from his work site. Complainant was suspended for

ten days starting on May 1, 1995.

Complainant stated that this action resulted in trouble sleeping, rapid

heartbeats, and nausea. Complainant's physician diagnosed him as having

a stress reaction and took him out of work until March 18, 1996.

Before the AJ, the agency argued that the suspension was justified, noting

that complainant admitted leaving the worksite and failed to contact a

supervisor. While acknowledging its failure to provide complainant with

a chair which accommodated his disabilities, the agency asserted that

complainant elected to engage in misconduct by leaving the site without

proper notice to a supervisor and that this misconduct in turn led to

a number of complaints that complainant was sleeping in his vehicle.

The agency contended that complainant was disciplined for misconduct

and that it was not required to excuse such misconduct, even if the

misconduct had a nexus to a disability.

The RD found that the agency failed to accommodate complainant by

ensuring that he had an appropriate chair on the date in question.

Given that this failure forced complainant "to make his own accommodation

[and] that he had tried to contact his supervisor [who] had on one

other occasion allowed [him] to sit in his truck," the RD found it

"reasonable for [complainant] to conclude that sitting in his truck was

a suitable alternative." Accordingly, the AJ found that the suspension

constituted discrimination on the basis of disability but found that

complainant failed to present any evidence that it constituted reprisal.

The agency adopted the RD's finding that complainant's suspension

constituted disability discrimination.

The record reflects that complainant's diabetes and the medication used

to control its symptoms, caused incontinence. The EEO Counselor's

report indicates that during pre-complaint counseling in April 1995,

complainant discussed the agency's alleged failure to provide him with

nearby restroom facilities when he was assigned to Building Z-398 in 1991

to approximately July 1994, when he was reassigned to another building.

While this claim was not contained in complainant's formal EEO complaint,

the AJ included this issue at the hearing on the basis that the evidence

established that the agency had a pattern of denying him accommodation

for his disabilities.

With respect to this issue, the record indicates that when complainant

returned to work in 1991, he was assigned to Building Z-398 which lacked

a bathroom. The closest bathroom was located in an adjacent building.

Complainant asserted that he had requested that the agency install a

bathroom in his work area but this request was denied on the basis that

the toolroom did not have the necessary plumbing for installation of

a bathroom. However, complainant maintained that the agency installed

a deep sink instead. If he felt that he could not reach the restroom in

time, complainant urinated in the sink, cleaning it afterwards. In early

1994, the Department Head overheard a female employee complaining about

complainant's use of the sink. On March 30, 1994, the Department Head

issued complainant a Letter of Caution which stated that "[a]lthough you

may have a medical problem you are prohibited from urinating in the sink[;

if] you wish to request reassignment to another location you may do so;

otherwise I expect you to use the bathroom or to make other acceptable

arrangements."

Before the AJ, the agency contended that complainant never provided

any medical information indicating that he required nearby restroom

facilities because of his diabetes. Rather, the agency contended that

any location requirements resulted from his back injuries. As previously

noted, these injuries restricted complainant from walking for more than

an hour at a time prior to May 1994, and no more than seventy five feet

at a time after that date. The agency acknowledged that Building Z-398

did not have a bathroom and that the toolroom in that building was located

farther away from a bathroom than any other toolroom. However, an agency

official testified that he used a measuring wheel and actually measured

the distance between the door of Building Z-398 and the door of the mens'

bathroom in the adjacent building and that the distance was within seventy

five feet. HT at 72.<5> The agency contended that when complainant

returned to work in 1991 and requested the installation of a bathroom

closer to his work site, the request was denied on the basis that there

was a restroom within his walking restriction. The agency denied that it

subsequently installed the deep sink for complainant's use as a urinal,

although it acknowledged that the Supervisor was aware that complainant

would occasionally use the sink for urination and clean it afterward.

The RD found that complainant would at times have only thirty seconds to

reach a restroom and that he occasionally wet his pants when attempting to

reach the restroom. The RD stated that in 1991, complainant "presented

management with his medical records [indicating his] diabetic condition

and also brought in a note from his physician which explained that it

was necessary for [him] to have a restroom convenient to him." The AJ

found that the agency installed a deep sink in complainant's work area

in which he could urinate when he could not reach the closest bathroom.

In addition, the RD held that "the nearest restroom facilities were not

accessible to [complainant because they] were located in another building,

and in order to reach them, [complainant] would have been required to walk

beyond the limit of his walking restriction." RD at 24. The RD found

that because the Department Head had recently joined the facility, he was

"unaware of the circumstances," prior to the female employee's complaint

in early 1994, but that "after being made aware of the circumstances,"

he nonetheless issued complainant a Letter of Caution.

The AJ found that the provision of a sink rather than a urinal or a

portable toilet, or transferring complainant to a building with an

accessible restroom, was "outrageous and beyond credulity." RD at 24.

Accordingly, the AJ found that the agency did not act in good faith and,

therefore, was not shielded from compensatory damages pursuant to the

provisions of Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 1981a(b).

In its FAD, the agency found that the AJ erred in expanding the scope of

his jurisdiction to include this claim. The agency noted that complainant

did not raise this issue in his formal EEO complaint. The agency found

that complainant did not establish a continuing violation, in that the

accepted issues concerned accommodation for his back injuries and did

not present any questions concerning his diabetes. In addition, any

issue concerning the location of a restroom was resolved at the time of

complainant's assignment to another building in approximately July 1994,

and complainant did not seek EEO counseling until April 1995.

The agency noted that the AJ had based his award of $200,000 in

compensatory damages on the agency's actions with respect to the alleged

provision of a deep sink rather than a urinal, which the AJ found to be

"wholly unreasonable, unsanitary, and deeply embarrassing." RD at 29.

In addition, the amount of damages was based on the finding that the

agency "took an inexcusable and egregious period of time (over a year)

in which to provide [complainant] with a disability parking sticker even

though the [agency] knew of [his] need for a parking space within seventy

five feet," (RD at 29) whereas the sticker in fact had been provided on

May 15, 1994, five days after complainant submitted medical restrictions

reducing his walking from one hour to no more than seventy five feet

at a time. Accordingly, the agency found the AJ's award of damages to

be excessive. The agency awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages.

Complainant timely appeals, without comment. In its brief on appeal,

the agency reviews the record and asserts that the RD contains numerous

misstatements of fact and mis-characterizations of evidence, as well as

omissions and internal contradictions.<6> The agency contends that it

properly set the amount of compensatory damages at $10,000.

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be

upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial

evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera

Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

The Commission notes that complainant's severe, permanent back injuries

restricted him from lifting or carrying more than ten (10) pounds

and prohibited him from pulling, pushing, bending or climbing stairs.

Accordingly, the AJ properly determined that complainant was substantially

limited in his ability to perform the major life activities of walking,

performing manual tasks and working. In addition, the AJ properly

determined that since complainant neither testified nor produced

documentary evidence concerning his asthmatic condition, he failed

to establish that it substantially limited his ability to breathe.

The Commission notes that while complainant offered testimonial evidence

regarding his diabetes and that the medication required for treatment

caused incontinence, there is no documentary evidence in the record

concerning the diabetes or the medication.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

agency properly rejected the RD insofar as it found that complainant

was denied reasonable accommodation from 1991 to July 1994 due to

the agency's failure to ensure that appropriate restroom facilities

were located within seventy five feet of his work site. First, while

the RD found that complainant provided the agency with both medical

records regarding his diabetic condition and a note from his physician

stating that he needed a nearby restroom, as noted above, there are in

fact no such statements or records contained in the file (nor were any

introduced at the hearing or provided on appeal). Accordingly, the only

evidence of record supports the agency's contention that complainant

never provided such medical information nor asserted that his need for

a nearby restroom was due to his diabetes (as opposed to his limitations

on walking). Second, while the RD found that complainant was prohibited

from walking farther than seventy five feet since returning to work

in 1991, he was medically authorized to walk for up to one hour at a

time until May 10, 1994. Further, complainant was assigned to a work

site with appropriate restroom facilities in approximately July 1994

but did not seek EEO counseling until April 1995. Second, although

complainant raised this issue informally before the EEO Counselor,

he did not include it in his formal EEO complaint. In addition, the

claims accepted by the agency concerned accommodation of complainant's

back injury, and resultant restrictions on walking or sitting, and not

accommodation of complainant's diabetes. See supra, n. 5.

The Commission further finds no basis to disturb the FAD insofar as

it awarded complainant $10,000.00 in compensatory damages. While the

record indicates that complainant has received this award and that the

agency has posted the notice recommended by the AJ, this decision will

restate the appropriate relief in order to ensure that complainant has

the right to petition the Commission for enforcement if necessary.<7>

Therefore, it is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the FAD,

and the agency is directed to comply with the following ORDER.

ORDER

To the extent it has not yet done so, the agency is ORDERED to take the

following remedial actions:

(1) The agency shall pay complainant $10,000.00 is compensatory damages

and remove from complainant's personnel file all information concerning

the Notice of Decision on Proposed Suspension issued on April 21, 1995.

The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay and other

benefits due complainant for having served this 10-day suspension,

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar

days after the date this decision becomes final. Complainant shall

cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and

benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by

the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back

pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to complainant for

the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the

agency determines the amount it believes to be due. Complainant may

petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address set forth below.

(2) The agency shall conduct training for its supervisory personnel

at the Norfolk Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia, regarding their

obligations under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

(3) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance,

as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the foregoing corrective actions have been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at the Norfolk Public Works Center, Norfolk,

Virginia, facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice,

after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall

be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date

this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)

consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where

notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take

reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,

or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to

be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below,

within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he is entitled to an

award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the

complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall

be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of

fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE

FILED WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR

DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION.

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity

Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November

9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director,

Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible

postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it

is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable

filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified

and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or

opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0400)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 11, 2000

_______________ _____________________

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated ___________ which found that a

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL DISABILITY with respect

to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions

or privileges of employment.

The United States Department of the Navy, Public Works Center, Norfolk,

Virginia was found to have violated the Rehabilitation Act when it failed

to reasonably accommodate a qualified individual with a disability and

when it disciplined the employee because of the employee's disability.

The facility was ordered to conduct training for its supervisory

personnel, regarding their obligations under the Rehabilitation Act, to

pay the individual reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing

of the complaint, to expunge all records of the discipline from the

employee's official personnel file, to compensate the employee for pay

lost because of the discipline, and to pay the employee compensatory

damages.

This facility will comply with federal law and will not in any manner

restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who

exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or

who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment

opportunity law.

Date Posted: _____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website: WWW.EEOC.GOV.

3 The RD stated that it took the agency nearly a year to issue the

sticker. In the FAD, the agency found that the AJ misread the sticker's

expiration date of "5/15/95" as its issuance date. The record establishes

that the expiration date was May 15, 1995.

4 The decals are valid for one year and the employee is required to

request a decal after its expiration.

5 The estimated distance from the toolroom in Building Z-398 to its door

was approximately twenty to twenty five feet. Thus, the total distance

from the toolroom in Building Z-398 to the restroom in the adjacent

building was approximately one hundred feet. See, e.g., HT at 179.

6 The agency's appeal brief appears to contend that complainant was not

in fact subjected to discrimination with respect to his claims concerning

parking and the suspension. However, the Commission will not entertain

these arguments in light of the FAD's findings of discrimination.

7 In this regard, the Commission notes that while both the RD and the FAD

found that the suspension constituted discrimination, neither provided

that all records of the suspension would be removed from complainant's

official personnel file.