David Jason. Hunt

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 25, 2019

12910118 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/910,118 10/22/2010 David Jason Hunt CHA920100012US1 7374
45095 7590 09/25/2019
HOFFMAN WARNICK LLC
540 Broadway
4th Floor
ALBANY, NY 12207
EXAMINER
WHITAKER, ANDREW B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/25/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOCommunications@hoffmanwarnick.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DAVID JASON HUNT
____________________

Appeal 2018-004822
Application 12/910,118
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 3–7, 12–14, 17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

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BACKGROUND
This patent application concerns “registering wholesale devices to a
service provider account.” Specification ¶ 1, filed October 22, 2010
(“Spec.”). Claims 1, 7, and 14 are independent. Claim 1 illustrates the
claimed invention:
1. A system comprising:
at least one computing device including computerized
wholesale device registration system including:
a registration framework for:
obtaining a wholesale device initiation request
including from a user:
identification of an initiating device for registering
a wholesale device without display capabilities;
wholesale device identification information;
querying a device database to determine capabilities
of the initiating device, wherein the capabilities of the
initiating device include at least one of data transfer
capabilities, device input capabilities, or display
capabilities;
selecting a registration completion plug-in based
upon the initiation request and the capabilities of the
initiating device;
wherein the registration completion plug-in
authenticates the wholesale device without display
capabilities and a subscriber associated with the wholesale
device without display capabilities by providing
instructions to the user to power cycle the wholesale
device without display capabilities; and
monitoring a network connected to the initiating
device and the wholesale device without display
capabilities for a power cycle event associated with the
wholesale device without display capabilities after
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providing the instructions to the user to power cycle the
wholesale device without display capabilities.
Appeal Brief 16, filed November 8, 2017 (“App. Br.”).
REJECTIONS
Claims Basis References
1, 3–7, 12–14, 17, 19,
and 20 § 101
1 and 5 § 103 Kuhn,
1 Gavrylyako,2
and Hausman3
3, 4, 7, 12–14, 17, 19,
and 20 § 103
Kuhn, Gavrylyako,
Hausman, and Ansari4

DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and Appellant’s
arguments. Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1, 3–7, 12–14, 17, 19, and 20 under § 101. For this
rejection, as consistent with the discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s
reasoning, findings, and conclusions on pages 2–4 and 6–9 of the Final
Office Action mailed July 13, 2017 (“Final Act.”) and pages 3–6 of the
Examiner’s Answer mailed February 8, 2018 (“Ans.”). As for the rejection
of claims 1, 3–5, 7, 12–14, 17, 19, and 20 under § 103, Appellant has
persuaded us that the Examiner erred. We address these rejections in turn.
Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and

1 Kuhn (US 6,961,567 B1; Nov. 1, 2005).
2 Gavrylyako et al. (US 8,224,308 B1; July 17, 2012).
3 Hausman et al. (US 2005/0261026 A1; Nov. 24, 2005).
4 Ansari et al. (US 2010/0235433 A1; Sept. 16, 2010).
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useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has revised its guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites subject matter that falls within one of the abstract idea
groupings listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we
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then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised
Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the § 101
rejection. Appellant argues claims 1, 3–7, 12–14, 17, 19, and 20 together for
this rejection, so as permitted by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the
appeal for this rejection based on claim 1.
Abstract Idea
The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
includes “mental processes.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The
Examiner determined that claim 1 recites subject matter that falls within this
abstract idea grouping. See Final Act. 6–7 (determining that claim 1 includes
limitations that encompass steps “that can be performed mentally” or an
“abstract idea itself”); Ans. 3 (determining that claim 1 recites “an abstract
idea itself”); see also USPTO, July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility
at 5, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-
update.pdf (explaining that the category “an idea of itself” includes mental
processes).
We agree. Claim 1 recites (1) “obtaining a wholesale device initiation
request including from a user:” “identification of an initiating device for
registering a wholesale device without display capabilities” and “wholesale
device identification information.” App. Br. 16. Claim 1 also recites (2)
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“querying a device database to determine capabilities of the initiating device,
wherein the capabilities of the initiating device include at least one of data
transfer capabilities, device input capabilities, or display capabilities.” App.
Br. 16. People can perform the functions recited in these limitations by, for
instance, reading data from a preexisting database. See CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining
that a claim step that “requires ‘obtaining information about other
transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is identified with the [
] credit card transaction’ . . . can be performed by a human who simply reads
records of Internet credit card transactions from a preexisting database”).
Indeed, the written description explains that with respect to “obtaining” data
(e.g., subscriber credential data 150, wholesale device data 152, and other
device 154 data) “[i]t is understood that the corresponding data can be
obtained using any solution.” Spec. ¶ 76 (emphasis added). In any case, even
if these limitations required physical acts, these limitations would not make
claim 1 patent eligible because they simply gather data. See CyberSource,
654 F.3d at 1372 (“[E]ven if some physical steps are required to obtain
information from the database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard,
clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability.”).
Claim 1 also recites (3) “selecting a registration completion plug-in
based upon the initiation request and the capabilities of the initiating device”
and (4) “wherein the registration completion plug-in authenticates the
wholesale device without display capabilities and a subscriber associated
with the wholesale device without display capabilities by providing
instructions to the user to power cycle the wholesale device without display
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capabilities.” App. Br. 16. The “selecting a registration completion plug-in”
limitation requires selecting a registration completion plug-in “based upon”
certain elements but does not otherwise meaningfully limit how the selecting
occurs. App. Br. 16. This limitation thus encompasses people mentally using
the specified elements to select an appropriate plug-in from a list of plug-ins.
See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373 (determining that a step “is so broadly
worded that it encompasses literally any method” for performing the step,
including “even logical reasoning that can be performed entirely in the
human mind”); cf. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“But merely selecting information, by content or
source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to
differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes . . . .”).
As for the “wherein the registration completion plug-in authenticates”
limitation, this limitation specifies how the registration plug-in authenticates
the recited device and associated subscriber: “by providing instructions to
the user to power cycle the wholesale device without display capabilities.”
App. Br. 16. People can provide the recited instructions by writing them on a
piece of paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (determining that a claim
is directed to “unpatentable mental processes” because the claim’s steps
“can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and
paper”); cf. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d
1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The series of steps covered by the asserted
claims—borrower applies for a loan, a third party calculates the borrower’s
credit grading, lenders provide loan pricing information to the third party
based on the borrower's credit grading, and only thereafter (at the election of
the borrower) the borrower discloses its identity to a lender—could all be
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performed by humans without a computer.”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,
970 n.1, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (determining that a claim that recites
“requiring a complainant to submit a request for arbitration resolution to the
mandatory arbitration system” “claim[s] the mental process of resolving a
legal dispute between two parties by the decision of a human arbitrator”).
Because each of the limitations discussed above encompasses an act
that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, claim 1
recites mental processes. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372. This is true
even though claim 1 recites that computer components perform the functions
recited in these limitations. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That
purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a
computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson.”); Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its
broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for
the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category . . . .”). Claim 1 therefore recites an abstract idea.
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us otherwise. Appellant
argues that the Examiner “fail[ed] to demonstrate why the features of the
claims are similar to [the] abstract ideas outlined in” Patent Office guidance.
App. Br. 6–7. According to Appellant, the Examiner “merely point[ed]” to
the claim limitations and Patent Office guidance and determined that “the
entirety of [the] claims [is] directed to an abstract idea.” App. Br. 7; see also
Reply Brief 6–7, filed April 6, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
We disagree. The Examiner did not “merely point[]” to the claim
limitations and Patent Office guidance to show that claim 1 recites an
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abstract idea. Rather, in addition to citing Patent Office guidance, the
Examiner explained that the claimed invention involves concepts that are
similar to concepts that courts have determined are abstract ideas. See, e.g.,
Final Act. 6–7. This approach is consistent with Federal Circuit precedent
and Patent Office guidance. See, e.g., Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that when
determining whether a claim is drawn to an abstract idea, “the decisional
mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar
or parallel descriptive nature can be seen . . . .”); USPTO, May 2016 Subject
Matter Eligibility Update at 2–3, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-memo.pdf (explaining that “[c]iting to an
appropriate court decision that supports the identification of the subject
matter recited in the claim language as an abstract idea is a best practice that
will advance prosecution”).
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next consider whether
claim 1 integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we consider whether there are any
additional elements beyond the abstract idea that, individually or in
combination, “integrate the [abstract idea] into a practical application, using
one or more of the considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
The additional elements in claim 1 include the recited “at least one
computing device including [a] computerized wholesale device registration
system” that in turn contains “a registration framework.” App. Br. 16. The
additional elements also include “an initiating device,” “a wholesale device
without display capabilities,” “a device database,” “a registration completion
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plug-in,” and “a network connected to the initiating device and the
wholesale device without display capabilities.” App. Br. 16. Finally, the
additional elements include the step of “monitoring a network connected to
the initiating device and the wholesale device without display capabilities
for a power cycle event associated with the wholesale device without display
capabilities after providing the instructions to the user to power cycle the
wholesale device without display capabilities.” App. Br. 16.
The written description indicates that each of these elements
encompasses a conventional component. For example, the written
description discloses that “computing device 104 can comprise any general
purpose computing article of manufacture capable of executing computer
program code installed by a user (e.g., a personal computer, server, handheld
device, etc.).” Spec. ¶ 23. The written description also discloses that an
initiating device includes “another device 170” or “other device 170” such as
“a smartphone, a netbook, a message phone, or another device connected to
a service provider network,” as well as “devices, mechanisms, or channels
without traditional service provider relationships.” Spec. ¶ 25; see also Spec.
¶¶ 22 (describing “another device 170”), 27 (explaining that an embodiment
of the claimed invention “determines whether the initiating device is a
wholesale device 160 or another device 170”). Similarly, the written
description indicates that a wholesale device without display capabilities
includes so-called “emerging devices” that a “device developer typically
markets and sells . . . directly to the consumer” that lack display capabilities.
Spec. ¶¶ 2–3.
As for the remaining elements, the written description describes these
elements in a manner that shows that the elements are conventional. For
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example, the written description indicates that the “wholesale device
registration system” “registration framework,” and “registration completion
plug-in” encompass “computer program code” and discloses that “[i]n each
case, the program code . . . can be created using standard programming and
engineering techniques.” Spec. ¶¶ 22–23, Fig. 1, items 106, 306, 406. Other
than disclosing that these elements can be created using standard techniques,
the written description generally describes these components in functional,
result-oriented terms with few technical details. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 25–31
(describing operations performed by wholesale device registration system
106, framework 306, and registration completion plug-in 406). The written
description describes the recited device database and network in a similar
fashion. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 27 (explaining the disclosed process uses data
from a wholesale device database), 66 (disclosing the whole device
registration system monitors for an event coming from a cell tower). These
descriptions show that these components are conventional. See Hybritech
Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“[A] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the
art.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in
implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component
(software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the
abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
The written description describes the “monitoring” step in much the
same way. Like the other elements discussed above, the written description
describes the recited monitoring in functional, result-oriented terms and says
little about how the invention performs this function. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 66
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(“[T]he wholesale device registration system 106 could monitor for a SIP
REGISTER event coming from the same cell tower as the initiated device
(other device 170).”). This indicates that this step is conventional. See
Hybritech Inc., 802 F.2d at 1384; Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1331.
Whether we consider these additional elements individually or as an
ordered combination, the elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Using conventional components such as the recited
computing device, wholesale device registration system, and registration
framework as tools to implement an abstract idea does not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24
(“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of
‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]
itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). And adding conventional post-
solution monitoring activity to the abstract idea does not make the abstract
idea patentable. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (determining
“the use of well-known random analysis techniques” was token post-solution
activity that did not make the abstract idea patent eligible); Intellectual
Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1328–29 (“While limiting the index to XML tags
certainly narrows the scope of the claims, in this instance, it is simply akin to
limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token post solution
components that do not convert the otherwise ineligible concept into an
inventive concept.”).
Appellant disagrees and contends that the Examiner “impermissibly
broadened” the abstract idea “so as to swallow all features which could be
considered under the ‘significantly more’ analysis.” App. Br. 7. Appellant
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argues that doing so allowed the Examiner to “ignore[] various features of
[claim 1] . . . [that] go beyond any judicial exception, and which when
combined, recite significantly more than any judicial exception.” App. Br. 8;
see also Reply Br. 5–6. In particular, Appellant asserts that the recited
“monitoring” amounts to “significantly more” than the identified abstract
idea. App. Br. 8–9.
We see no merit in these arguments. To begin, Appellant
mischaracterizes the extent of the identified abstract idea. For example,
Appellant asserts that the Examiner determined that the recited “monitoring”
forms part of the abstract idea. See App. Br. 7–8. But the Examiner
determined that this limitation is an additional element, not part of the
abstract idea. See Final Act. 4 (determining that the “monitoring” step
involves “extrasolution data gathering activities which do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea(s) previously identified” (emphasis
added)), 7 (determining that the “monitoring” step involves “extrasolution
data gathering activities”). In any event, although Appellant argues that the
Examiner impermissibly broadened the identified abstract idea, Appellant
has not persuasively explained why the aspects of the claimed invention that
the Examiner determined encompass an abstract idea fail to do so. Similarly,
Appellant has provided no persuasive evidence or reasoning to support the
assertion that the “monitoring” limitation amounts to significantly more than
the identified abstract idea. As explained above, the recited monitoring is
insignificant post-solution activity and thus does not make claim 1 patent
eligible. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612; Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1328.
Appellant also contends that the written description “describes various
benefits to [the] claimed approach when compared with the problem of a
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service provider activating a customer’s devices.” App. Br. 9 (citing Spec.
¶¶ 11, 25–31); see also Reply Br. 7–8. But the alleged benefits provided by
the “claimed approach” flow from the recited abstract idea, and the abstract
idea itself cannot integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See
Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(“The abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive concept, ‘no matter
how groundbreaking the advance.’” (quoting SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
Appellant points out that claim 1 recites “tangible, practical
components” such as an initiating device and the associated figures show
“the real-world, tangible characteristics of the claimed subject matter.”
Reply Br. 3. Appellant argues the claimed invention thus “cannot reasonably
be construed as abstract.” Reply Br. 3. But it is beyond reasonable dispute at
this point that reciting physical components alone does not make an abstract
idea patent eligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84 (explaining that in Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) the Court “held that simply implementing a
mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, was not a
patentable application of that principle”); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375
(“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed
by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.”); Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a
claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in
the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is
still in the mental processes category . . . .”).
Appellant also argues the claimed invention does “not preempt all
instances of any alleged judicial exception.” App. Br. 10 (emphasis omitted);
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see also Reply Br. 4. Even if the claimed invention does not completely
preempt a judicial exception, a lack of total preemption does not establish
that claim 1 is patent eligible. “While preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). As discussed above, this requires us to evaluate
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements recited in claim
1 “perform generic computer functions” and “do not rise to what is
considered more than well-understood, routine, and conventional activity.”
Final Act. 8. We agree. As discussed above, the written description indicates
that the additional elements are conventional, and to the extent that the
written description describes the functions performed by these elements, the
written description describes the functions at a high level of generality and
largely does not describe the particulars of how the claimed invention
implements these functions. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 25–31 (describing the
functions in the authentication process), 66 (describing monitoring a
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network). This shows that these functions are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. See Hybritech Inc., 802 F.2d at 1384; Intellectual Ventures I,
850 F.3d at 1331; see also USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19,
2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that
describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional
elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to
describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a)” can show that the elements are well understood, routine, and
conventional). Therefore, whether we consider the additional elements
individually or in combination, these elements do not provide an inventive
concept.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we determine that claim 1 is directed
to an abstract idea and does not have an inventive concept. We therefore
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 101.
Section 103 Rejection
Claim 1 recites “monitoring a network connected to the initiating
device and the wholesale device without display capabilities for a power
cycle event associated with the wholesale device without display capabilities
after providing the instructions to the user to power cycle the wholesale
device without display capabilities.” App. Br. 16. Appellant contends that
the Examiner has not shown that the combination of Kuhn, Gavrylyako, and
Hausman teaches or suggests this limitation. See App. Br. 12–14. Appellant
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asserts that the Examiner relied on Hausman for this limitation and argues
that cited parts of Hausman do not teach or suggest the recited monitoring.
See App. Br. 12–14.
We agree with Appellant. The Examiner acknowledged that the
combination of Kuhn and Gavrylyako does not teach this limitation but
found that Hausman remedied this deficiency. See Final Act. 12–13.
However, the Examiner did not sufficiently explain why the cited portions of
Hausman teach or suggest this limitation. See Final Act. 12–13; Ans. 6–7.
On this record, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and its
dependent claims. Because the Examiner’s rejections of independent claims
7 and 14 suffer from similar flaws, we also do not sustain the rejections of
these claims and their respective dependent claims.

DECISION
Claims
Rejected Basis References Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–7, 12–
14, 17, 19,
and 20
§ 101
1, 3–7, 12–
14, 17, 19,
and 20

1 and 5 § 103
Kuhn,
Gavrylyako,
and
Hausman
1 and 5
3, 4, 7, 12–
14, 17, 19,
and 20
§ 103
Kuhn,
Gavrylyako,
Hausman,
and Ansari

3, 4, 7, 12–
14, 17, 19,
and 20
Outcome
1, 3–7, 12–
14, 17, 19,
and 20

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Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No
period for taking any action in connection with this appeal may be extended
under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED