01992604
02-08-2002
David C. Kea, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.
David C. Kea v. United States Postal Service
01992604
February 8, 2002
.
David C. Kea,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01992604
Agency No. 4J-481-0023-97
Hearing No. 230-98-4002X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision
(FAD) concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of
unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.
BACKGROUND
The record reveals that complainant, a Carrier Technician at the Penniman
Branch in Plymouth Michigan, filed a formal EEO complaint on February
13, 1997, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the
basis of race (African-American) when:
(1) on October 10, 1996, his name was removed from the holiday overtime
list.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,
finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case
of race discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found that complainant
failed to demonstrate that similarly situated employees not in
complainant's protected class were treated differently under similar
circumstances when complainant's name was removed from the overtime
list. The AJ found that two similarly situated White employees also
had their names removed from the overtime list and were not required to
work overtime on Saturday, October 12, 1996. The AJ further found that
management did not force any employee to work overtime on that Saturday
because they obtained enough volunteers and complainant did not want to
work overtime on Saturday, October 12, 1996.
On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred when he compared
complainant with two White employees whose names were removed from the
list. Specifically, complainant contends that those employee agreed to
have their names removed, but complainant alleged that he never agreed
before his name was removed from the list.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where
a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary
standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not
sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must be
believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue
of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D
103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential
to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by
weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In
the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ may
properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that the
record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120
S.Ct 2097 (2000); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292,
310 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying McDonnell Douglas to disability cases);
and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976)
(applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal cases), the Commission concurs
with the AJ's finding that complainant did not establish a prima facie
case of discrimination based on race, since he did not demonstrate that
an employee outside of his protected group was treated more favorably
under similar circumstances. We find that on October 8, 1996, management
posted the first Holiday Schedule for Saturday, October 12, 1996, which
included complainant and five other White employees. The record reveals
that on October 10, 1996, another scheduled was posted, and management
had removed complainant's name and two other White employees. We note
that complainant's name was removed because he expressed that he did
not want to work on that day. Complainant did not present any evidence
that he wanted to work on that day nor did complainant present any other
evidence from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn.
In conclusion, after a de novo review of the record, we find that there
are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. The Commission finds
that the AJ correctly decided that summary judgment was appropriate
in this case, and the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant
facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We
discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision, therefore, we AFFIRM the
agency's final decision finding no discrimination.
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 8, 2002
__________________
Date