David BLUNDELL et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 2, 2021

2020001420 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/925,292 06/24/2013 David BLUNDELL 00008-0022-00000 5707
114629 7590 06/02/2021
Bookoff McAndrews
2020 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
EXAMINER
CALDERON IV, ALVARO R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2173
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Kross@bomcip.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
usptomail@bomcip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID BLUNDELL, STEFFEN HOFFMAN,
ANIL NARASIPURAM, and TESSA PETRICH

Appeal 2020-001420
Application 13/925,292
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1– 7, 11–16, 20–22, 24, 25, and 27, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. Claims 8–10, 17–19, 23, and 26 are canceled.
We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We Affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest in this
appeal is interest is Oath Inc. See Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
Introduction
Embodiments of Appellant’s invention on appeal relate to “graphical
user interfaces for navigating content applications and, more particularly, to
control elements for navigating between different content views via a
graphical user interface of a device, such as within a mobile application.”
Spec. ¶ 1.
Representative Claim 1
1. A computer-implemented method for providing navigation
control across multiple layers of content views within a mobile
application, the method comprising:

[L1] providing a navigation control scheme, wherein the
navigation control scheme comprises a first layer of content views and
a second layer of content views, the navigation control scheme further
comprising a main view controller, a background navigation
controller, and a foreground navigation controller, wherein the
background navigation controller manages a set of content views in
the second layer of content views, wherein the foreground navigation
controller manages a set of content views for the first layer of content
views, and wherein each set of content views in the second layer of
content views corresponds to each content view in the first layer of
content views;
[L2] providing, by the main view controller, navigation control
between the first layer of content views and the second layer of
content views;

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed September 20, 2018
(“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed June 18, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer, mailed October 15, 2019 (“Ans.”); and Reply Brief,
filed December 13, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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providing, by the foreground navigation controller, at least one
of status information and content to the background navigation
controller, wherein the foreground navigation controller further
comprises a custom navigation controller for providing navigation
control between custom views based on user input received through a
user control element, wherein the user control element is one of a jog
wheel and a calendar icon;
providing, by the foreground navigation controller, the first
layer of content views that are each selectable by a user for display via
a graphical user interface of an application executable at a mobile
device, wherein the first layer of content views relates to a subject
matter topic and includes [L3] a plurality of content previews, each
content preview comprising a display icon previewing content related
to one of a plurality of subject matter sub-topics, each one of the
plurality of subject matter subtopics relating thematically to the
subject matter topic, and wherein the display icon previewing content
comprises a pictorial depiction of each one of the plurality of subject
matter sub-topics, wherein each one of the plurality of subject matter
sub-topics includes content related to a physical location including at
least one of a neighborhood, a city, and a town, and wherein the first
layer of content views includes a plurality of different users within a
group of users related to the physical location and includes a user
generated media associated with a user of the group of users, the
physical location, and a subject matter topic specific to the at least one
of the neighborhood, the city, and the town;
obtaining, by the background navigation controller, content
views for the second layer in response to receiving user input
selecting at least one of the content views in the first layer, the content
views for the second layer being based on the content view selected in
the first layer;
providing, by the background navigation controller, the second
layer of content views that are each selectable by the user for display
via the graphical user interface of the application executable at the
mobile device;
providing, by the main view controller, navigation controls, via
the graphical user interface, that indicate which content preview of the
plurality of content previews is being displayed, wherein the
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navigation controls include a plurality of menu elements, each menu
element corresponding to a content view of the second layer of
content views;
enabling, by the main view controller, the user to navigate
between the first layer of content views and the second layer of
content views by manipulating a slider of the navigation controls
provided via the graphical user interface; and
automatically updating the content views for the second layer
when the user selects one of a different content view in the first layer
and a content view in the second layer.
Appeal Br. 18–20. Claims App. (disputed claim limitations L1–L3
bracketed and emphasized).

Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner
Name Reference Date
Kinnunen et al. (“Kinnunen”) US 2010/0110105 A1 May 6, 2010
Jin et al. (“Jin ’389) US 2013/0067389 A1 Mar. 14, 2013
Jin et al. (“Jin ’203”) US 8,555,203 B1 Oct. 8, 2013

Rejection
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1– 7, 11–16, 20–22,
24, 25, 27 103 Jin ’203, Kinnunen, Jin ’389

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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited
or waived.3 See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Throughout this opinion, we
give the claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”)
consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1997). We highlight and address specific findings and arguments
for emphasis in our analysis below.

Rejection of Representative Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
over Jin ’203, Kinnunen, and Jin ’389

Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, did the Examiner err by finding that
the cited combination of Jin ’203, Kinnunen, and Jin ’389 teaches or
suggests the following disputed limitations L1, L2, and L3 of independent
claim 1?

3 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(some internal citations omitted):
It is well established that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture.”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). “Whereas
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)) (additional citations omitted). The two scenarios
can have different consequences for challenges raised on
appeal, id. at 733–34, and for that reason, it is worth attending
to which label is the right one in a particular case.
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[L1] providing a navigation control scheme, wherein the
navigation control scheme comprises a first layer of content views and
a second layer of content views, the navigation control scheme further
comprising a main view controller, a background navigation
controller, and a foreground navigation controller, wherein the
background navigation controller manages a set of content views in
the second layer of content views, wherein the foreground navigation
controller manages a set of content views for the first layer of content
views, and wherein each set of content views in the second layer of
content views corresponds to each content view in the first layer of
content views;
[L2] providing, by the main view controller, navigation control
between the first layer of content views and the second layer of
content views; [and]
[L3] a plurality of content previews, each content preview
comprising a display icon previewing content related to one of a
plurality of subject matter sub-topics . . . .
Claim 1 (emphasis added).
Limitation L1 of Claim 1
Regarding limitation L1, Appellant contends:
In Jin ’203, there is no mention of a main view controller, a
background navigation controller, or a foreground navigation
controller. Much less does Jin ’203 disclose “wherein the
background navigation controller manages a set of content
views in the second layer of content views, wherein the
foreground navigation controller manages a set of content views
for the first layer of content views, and wherein each set of
content views in the second layer of content views corresponds
to each content view in the first layer of content views.”
Instead, Jin ’203 discloses map based search applications for
generating lists associated with a map display area (See
Jin ’203, 4B, 4H-4J, and col. 4, line 57 - col. 5, line 27). Based
on this alone, the rejections should be reversed by the Board.
Appeal Br. 14.
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Regarding claim 1, limitation L1, we find even if arguendo Jin ’203
does not teach or suggest limitation L1, Appellant has not addressed the
Examiner’s second mapping that alternatively reads limitation L1 on the
secondary Kinnunen reference, as set forth by the Examiner on page 7 of the
Final Action. In particular, the Examiner also maps claim 1, limitation L1 to
at least paragraphs 24–26 and 46–49 of Kinnunen, which the Examiner finds
teach or suggest, inter alia:
a background navigation controller (e.g. background manager
78) [that] manages a set of content views in the second layer of
content views, wherein the foreground navigation controller
(e.g. foreground manager 80) manages a set of content views
for the first layer of content views, and wherein each set of
content views in the second layer of content views corresponds
to each content view in the first layer of content views.
Final Act. 7 (emphasis added).
Because Appellant does not address the Examiner’s specific
alternative findings regarding the secondary Kinnunen reference in either
Brief, on this record, we find the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, limitation
L1, is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Arguments not timely
made regarding the Examiner’s specific alternative findings pertaining to the
secondary Kinnunen reference are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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Limitation L2 of Claim 1
[L2] providing, by the main view controller, navigation control
between the first layer of content views and the second layer of
content views; (emphasis added).

Regarding limitation L2, Appellant contends:
Moreover, Jin ’203 fails to teach or suggest, “providing by the
main controller, navigation control between the first layer of
content views and the second layer of content views,” as recited
in independent claims 1, 11, and 20. The Examiner states
that Jin ’203 discloses the recited limitations (Final Action,
page 3, “figs. 4B & 4H, col. 2, lines 32-44”). Appellant
respectfully disagrees. As discussed above, Jin ’203 merely
diseases a graphical user interface (“GUI”) that includes an icon
stack comprising a plurality of icons in an area within the GUI,
whereby the icons overlap. (See Jin ’203 at col. 2, lines 33-35).
Based on this alone, the rejections should be reversed by the
Board.
Appeal Br. 15.
We begin with claim construction of limitation L2 of claim 1. We
turn to the Specification for context regarding the BRI of the “main view
controller.” We find Appellant does not expressly define the claim term
“main view controller” in the claims or in the Specification. Instead,
Appellant merely provides non-limiting descriptions of exemplary
supporting embodiments in the Specification. In particular, the Specification
describes:
Main view controller 302 may be configured to receive user
input based on the user's interaction with particular control
elements of the GUI. Such user input may be received from a
user input device coupled to the mobile device. Examples of
such a user input device include, but are not limited to, a
mouse, a joystick, a game controller, a QWERTY keyboard,
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touch-screen, microphone, a T9 keyboard, or any other user
input device. Main view controller 302 may be configured to
receive the user input and vary the currently displayed content
view or a position of the content view, as displayed on the
screen of the mobile device.
Spec. ¶ 39 (emphasis added).
Given that the “main view controller” that provides “navigation
control between the first layer of content views and the second layer of
content views” can encompass a “user input device coupled to the mobile
device . . . [such as ] a mouse, a joystick, a game controller, a QWERTY
keyboard, touch-screen, microphone, a T9 keyboard, or any other user input
device” (id.), on this record, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s claim
interpretation is overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the
Specification. Id.4
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner (see Ans. 2–3) that the
claimed “main view controller” that provides “navigation control between
the first layer of content views and the second layer of content views” is
taught or suggested by the computing device in Jin ’203 that includes a
graphical user interface (GUI) and one or more input devices. See, e.g., Jin
’203 at column 3, lines 34–40:
Client 103 is a computing device such as a laptop, notebook,
desktop, or handheld computing device. Client 103 generally
comprises a display 104 and one or more input devices such as
a keyboard and/or pointing device or other input device as will
be known to those skilled in the art. In some embodiments
client 103 is capable of running a Web browser.

4 Because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad
construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or
patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).
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(emphasis added).
Limitation L3 of Claim 1
[L3] a plurality of content previews, each content preview
comprising a display icon previewing content related to one of a
plurality of subject matter sub-topics . . . . (emphasis added).

Regarding limitation L3, Appellant asserts that Jin ’203 fails to teach
or suggest, “a plurality of content previews, each content preview
comprising a display icon previewing content related to a subject matter
topic.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant notes that the Examiner finds that “Jin
’203 discloses ‘a plurality of content previews, each content preview
comprising a display icon previewing content related to a subject matter
topic.’ (Final Action, page 4, “Figures 4H-J & col. 2, lines 33-44”).” Appeal
Br. 14.
Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s findings, and contends:
Jin ’203 instead discloses a graphical user interface (“GUI”)
that includes an icon stack comprising a plurality of icons in an
area within the GUI, whereby the icons overlap. (See Jin ’203
at col. 2, lines 33-35). FIGS. 4H, 41, and 4J of Jin ’203, for
example, present a “stack” of icons 429, or an icon stack 430,
on a map image 424 (Id. at col. 9, ll. 12-16). The icons of Jin
’203 themselves do not preview content related to a subject
matter topic but instead are representative of indexed
information (Id. at col. 4, ll. 13-22; “items ... listed in a “yellow
pages” directory, Id.at col. 4, ll. 26-28; “a list of frequently-
searched category families”, Id. at col. 5, ll. 1-14; “list items
found within selected category families, Id. at col. 5, ll. 15-17;
“list of frequently used categories, Id. at col. 6, ll. 35-49;
locations of items displayed on a map using icons, Id. at col. 8,
ll. 5-16). Based on this alone, the rejections should be reversed
by the Board.
Appeal Br. 15–16 (emphasis added).
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As evidence in support of the rejection of limitation L3 of claim 1, the
Examiner relies upon Jin ’203, at “figs. 3 & 4A-J, col. 2 lines 33-44, col. 4
lines 4-34, col. 5 lines 1-23 & 41-46, col. 6 lines 16-61, col. 7 lines 1-30 &
49-67, and col. 8 lines 1-19 & 28-58.” Final Act. 3.
The Examiner also provides an explanation of the mapping:
The first layer of content views includes a plurality of content
previews, where each content preview comprises a display icon
previewing content related to a subject matter topic and
concomitant sub-topic (see, e.g. the icons previewing content
related to a respective subject matter topic in figs. 4H-J & col. 2
lines 33-44), including previewing content related to a physical
location including a neighborhood, city, or town.
Final Act. 4.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant essentially restates:
The icons of Jin ’203 themselves do not preview content related
to a subject matter topic but instead are representative of
indexed information (Id. at col. 4, II. 13-22; “items ... listed in a
“yellow pages” directory, Id.at col. 4, II. 26-28; “a list of
frequently-searched category families”, Id. at col. 5, II. 1-
14; “list items found within selected category families, Id. at
col. 5, II. 15-17; “list of frequently used categories, Id. at col. 6,
II. 35-49; locations of items displayed on a map using icons, Id.
at col. 8, II. 5-16).
Reply Br. 15.
As an initial matter of claim construction, we conclude that the
limitation L3 claim language “content related to one of a plurality of subject
matter sub-topics” encompasses under BRI any type of content related to at
least one of a plurality of sub-topics, which further broadly encompass any
sub-topics. See supra, n4. Claim 1.

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We emphasize that Figures 4H and 4I of Jin ’203 depict content views
including search results that are superimposed on a map as “icon stack 430.”
As explained by Jin ’203, “an icon stack 430 is created whenever two or
more items 208 to be represented on map image 424 share the same
geographic location.” Col. 9, ll. 22–24. Further, “when a user moves a
mouse or other pointing device over an icon 429, overlay box 426, depicted
in FIG. 4I, is presented over map image 424.” Jin ’203, col. 8, ll. 16–19.
Moreover, Appellant acknowledges that Jin ’203 describes “an icon
stack 430, on a map image 424 (Id. at col. 9, ll. 12-16).” Appeal Br. 14
(emphasis added). Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, we find
icon stack 430 (Fig. 4H) of Jin ’203 teaches or suggests the claim 1,
limitation L3, “display icon” and the associated step.
Given our claim construction above, we find a preponderance of the
evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that at least Figures 4H and 4I
(and associated descriptions) teach or suggest the disputed limitation L3 (“a
plurality of content previews, each content preview comprising a display
icon previewing content related to one of a plurality of subject matter sub-
topics),” within the meaning of claim 1.
We also emphasize that “the question under 35 USC 103 is not merely
what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck &
Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re
Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)) (emphasis added). See also
MPEP § 2123.

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Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we agree with and
adopt the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal
conclusion that limitation L3 of claim 1 is obvious over the collective
teachings or suggestions of Jin ’203, Kinnunen, and Jin ’389.5
For at least the aforementioned reasons regarding our analysis of
disputed limitations L1, L2, and L3, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
representative independent claim 1.

Remaining Grouped Claims 2– 7, 11–16, 20–22, 24, 25, and 27
In view of the lack of any substantive, separate arguments for
patentability directed to the obviousness rejection of remaining claims 2–7,
11–16, 20–22, 24, 25, and 27, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these
claims which fall with representative independent claim 1. Arguments not
made are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Additional Issues Raised in the Reply Brief
In the Reply Brief (3), Appellant raises new issues regarding proper
notice under the due process clause, and purported “arbitrary and capricious”
actions by the Examiner under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 706 et seq.).

5 See Icon Health and Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate
the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not
expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal
conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings).

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To the extent that Appellant’s arguments might be considered timely
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2), we agree with Appellant that procedural due
process requires notice and a fair opportunity for Appellant to respond. See
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) (“The essence of
due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be
given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’”) (internal
citation omitted)
We note the Federal Circuit has held, “the prima facie case is merely a
procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of
production.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007):
[A]ll that is required of the office to meet its prima facie burden
of production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection
and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently
articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice
requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 132. As the statute itself instructs,
the examiner must “notify the applicant,” “stating the reasons
for such rejection,” “together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging the propriety of
continuing prosecution of his application.”
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
This burden is met by “adequately explain[ing] the shortcomings it
perceives so that the applicant is properly notified and able to respond.”
Hyatt, 492 F.3d at 1370. It is only “when a rejection is so uninformative that
it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the
grounds for rejection” that the prima facie burden has not been met and the
rejection violates the minimal requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Chester v.
Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

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Here, we do not agree with Appellant that the Examiner has set forth a
rejection so uninformative that it prevents the Appellant from recognizing
and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection, such that the prima facie
burden has not been met, and the rejection violates the minimal notice
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). See Chester, 906 F.2d at 1578.
Nor do we agree that Appellant has been denied sufficient notice and
a fair opportunity to respond to the Examiner’s underlying factual findings
and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, such that procedural due
process has been violated.

CONCLUSION
On this record, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, we
conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–7, 11–16, 20–22, 24,
25, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited combination of Jin ’203,
Kinnunen, and Jin ’389.

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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7,
11–16,
20–22, 24,
25, 27
103 Jin ’203, Kinnunen, Jin ’389
1–7,
11–16,
20–22, 24,
25, 27

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED