Dave Alberto Tavares. Cavalcanti et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 4, 2019

13141495 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/141,495 06/22/2011 Dave Alberto Tavares Cavalcanti 2008P01817WOUS 5467
24737 7590 12/04/2019
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
SMITH, JOSHUA Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2477
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVE ALBERTO TAVARES CAVALCANTI and
JIANFENG WANG

Appeal 2018-001229
Application 13/141,495
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–10, and 12–15.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Koninklijke Phillips Electronics N.V. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claim 2 was previously canceled. The Examiner has indicated that claims
3 and 11 contain allowable subject matter. Final Act. 17.
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INVENTION
The present invention is directed to self-coexistence of devices in
wireless communication networks. Spec. 1:7–8. Claim 1 is illustrative of
the invention and is reproduced below.
1. A method for enabling self-coexistence of devices in a
flexible wireless system that includes first and second wireless
networks, the method comprising:
employing, by the first and second wireless networks, a
flexible medium access control (Flex-MAC) protocol, which
supports both centralized and distributed modes and enables a
transition from one operation mode to another, the first and
second wireless networks sharing a frequency band;
discovering a second device is operable in the second
wireless network that overlaps with the first wireless network
based on whether a beacon or a frame received from the second
device under the Flex-MAC protocol includes at least a second
network identifier different from a first network identifier of a
first device, wherein at least two or more devices in a first
group share the first network identifier and at least two or more
other devices in a second group share the second network
identifier;
reporting the discovered second device to the first device
operable in the first wireless network;
determining when an adjustment is needed between a
first beacon period of the first device and a second beacon
period of the second device; and
adjusting a first beacon period start time (BPST) of the
first device with a second BPST of the second device when the
adjustment is needed.

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REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Fong et al. US 2002/0072382 A1 June 13, 2002
Long et al. US 2006/0040701 A1 Feb. 23, 2006
Wu et al. US 2008/0228878 A1 Sept. 18, 2008

REJECTION
Claims 1, 4–10, and 12–15 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Long, Fong, and Wu.

ANALYSIS
Independent Claims 1 and 15
Appellant contends the combination of Long, Fong, and Wu does not
teach “a flexible medium access control (Flex-MAC) protocol, which
supports both centralized and distributed modes and enables a transition
from one operation mode to another,” as recited in claims 1 and 15. Appeal
Br. 9–10, 13; Reply Br. 2–4. Appellant argues Fong does not use the term
“Flex-MAC,” and that Fong’s general disclosure of flexibility in supporting
different types of users and service providers does not teach the claimed
“Flex-MAC protocol.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant contends it has acted as its
own lexicographer by providing in the Specification a definition of Flex-
MAC protocol: enabling a smooth transition from one operation mode to
another, i.e., from a distributed operation mode to a centralized operation
mode (and vice versa), without interrupting ongoing connections. Appeal
Br. 10; Reply Br. 2–3 (citing Spec. 2:6–103). Accordingly, Appellant argues

3 Appellant cites to paragraph 7 of the U.S. Pre-grant Publication
2011/0255500 A1 for the instant application, which is the equivalent of
Specification 2:6–10.
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the broadest reasonable interpretation of “Flex-MAC protocol,” consistent
with the Specification, must include enabling smooth mode transitions
without interrupting ongoing connections. Reply Br. 2–4. Appellant
contends Fong is silent with regard to a “smooth transition” and “without
interrupting ongoing connections,” and, therefore, Fong does not teach the
claimed “Flex-MAC protocol.” Appeal Br. 10 (emphasis omitted); Reply
Br. 2–4.
Appellant’s contentions do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection. Firstly, we agree with the Examiner that the features of the
Specification cited by Appellant, i.e., a “smooth transition” and “without
interrupting ongoing connections,” are not positively recited in claim 1 or
claim 15. Ans. 20. Next, to act as a lexicographer and provide an explicit
definition of “Flex-MAC protocol” that would require such features,
Appellant must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term”
other than its plain and ordinary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “[T]he inventor’s written
description of the invention, for example, is relevant and controlling insofar
as it provides clear lexicography.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). The Specification
describes a “flexible MAC (Flex-MAC) protocol is designed to support both
centralized and distributed modes and to enable a smooth transition from one
operation mode to another.” Spec. 2:6–8. Even assuming that this
description provides clear lexicography for “Flex-MAC protocol,” Appellant
has not clearly defined the scope of “a smooth transition.” Rather, the next
sentence in the Specification discloses that “a Flex-MAC typically enables
the devices to switch from a distributed to centralized operation mode (and
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vice versa) without interrupting ongoing connections.” Id. at 2:8–10
(emphasis added). A transition that “typically” occurs without interrupting
ongoing connections is merely one embodiment that is a non-limiting
example of what a “smooth transition” in the Flex-MAC protocol may
include, and does not provide a clear definition of “smooth transition.” A
particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read
into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Thus, we do not agree with Appellant that the claimed “transition
from one operation mode to another” in the Flex-MAC protocol, and more
specifically a “smooth” transition between modes, must require a transition
without interrupting ongoing connections.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Fong teaches a medium access
control (MAC) sub-layer with distributed MAC and centralized MAC sub-
layers. Appeal Br. 18 (citing Fong ¶ 23). Fong further teaches “provid[ing]
reliable layer 2 data transport and/or byte count integrity when a data
application switches from the distributed mode to the centralized mode as
well as when a data application switches from the centralized mode to the
distributed mode.” Ans. 19–20 (citing Fong ¶ 27) (emphasis omitted).
Based on the above discussion of the disputed claim limitations, we agree
with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable interpretation, consistent
with Appellant’s disclosure, of a “Flex-MAC protocol” does not preclude
Fong’s MAC protocol that provides reliable data transport and byte count
integrity when transitioning from a distributed operation mode to a
centralized operation mode (and vice versa). Id.; see In re Am. Acad. Of Sci.
Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he PTO is obligated to
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give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination.”).
In other words, by providing reliable layer 2 data transport and/or byte count
integrity, we find Fong teaches a smooth transition with reliable data when
transitioning between distributed mode and centralized mode (see Ans. 19–
20). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Fong teaches the claimed “Flex-
MAC protocol.”
Appellant also contends the combination of Long, Fong, and Wu does
not teach “the first and second wireless networks sharing a frequency band,”
as recited in claims 1 and 15, because Fong is silent regarding frequency
bands. Appeal Br. 10 (emphasis omitted). Appellant’s argument is not
persuasive of Examiner error, because the argument attacks the Fong
reference individually rather than the Examiner’s combination of Long,
Fong, and Wu. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“[O]ne
cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . .
the rejections are based on combinations of references.”)). Specifically, the
Examiner relied upon Wu, and not Fong, to teach the concept of sharing a
frequency band. Ans. 6 (citing Wu ¶ 65). Accordingly, Appellant’s
argument is not responsive to the Examiner’s stated rejection, and we are not
apprised of Examiner error.
Appellant further contends the combination of Long, Fong, and Wu
does not teach
discovering a second device is operable in the second wireless
network that overlaps with the first wireless network based on
whether a beacon or a frame received from the second device
under the Flex-MAC protocol includes at least a second
network identifier different from a first network identifier of a
first device,
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as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added), with similar language recited in
claim 15. Appeal Br. 10–12; Reply Br. 4–5. Appellant argues the claimed
“network identifier” is used to positively identify the network of a device,
whereas Long’s beacon period information element and group information
element can only be used to determine whether the beacon is from an alien
(i.e., different) network group. Appeal Br. 11 (citing Spec. 5:5–214); see
also Reply Br. 5. Appellant contends that, because Long’s information
elements do not convey as much information as the claimed network
identifiers, Long’s elements do not teach such network identifiers. Appeal
Br. 11.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. We
agree with the Examiner that nothing in the claims or the Specification
requires the network identifier to convey information to “positively identify
the network of a device.” Ans. 26–28. The portion of the Specification
cited by Appellant states:
The discovery procedure allows a device to discover an alien
group of devices, i.e., one or more devices sharing the wireless
medium (e.g., frequency band) as the discovering device, but
belonging to a different network (or subnet). A group of
devices is defined by a network address or any other network
identifier (NetID) that is shared by all devices in the
group. . . . Thus, by receiving a beacon, control or data frame
including an unknown NetID, the discovering device concludes
that an alien group of devices exists in the wireless system.
Spec. 5:8–19 (emphasis added).

4 Appellant cites to paragraph 22 of the U.S. Pre-grant Publication
2011/0255500 A1 for the instant application, which is the equivalent of
Specification 5:5–21.
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According to the Specification, devices belonging to an alien network
are detected because their network identifier is unknown to the first network.
Id. Appellant has not shown support in the Specification for “positively
identifying” this unknown network identifier and, thus, we agree with the
Examiner that the claimed step of discovering a second device based on a
“network identifier” does not require positively identifying the alien
network. Ans. 27–28. Further, the Specification broadly discloses the
NetID can be any network identifier that is shared by all devices in the
group. Spec. 5:12–14. Accordingly, the broadest reasonable interpretation,
consistent with Appellant’s disclosure, of “a second network identifier
different from a first network identifier” merely requires any network
identifying information included in a beacon or frame that is shared by all
devices in a group, where the second network information is different from,
and unknown to, the first network group. Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1369.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Long teaches a first
wireless network transmitting a beacon frame that includes a variety
of information elements associated with the beacon group (i.e., shared
by all devices in the group), including beacon period and other general
group information. Ans. 3, 22–24 (citing Long ¶¶ 17, 35–37, 60; Fig.
5). We agree with the Examiner that, because Long’s information
elements are associated with a particular beacon group, the
information elements serve to identify that beacon group (i.e., the
elements are network identifying information). Ans. 23–24 (citing
Long ¶¶ 36–37, 60). Long further teaches detecting a second device
in a second network, which is alien to and overlaps with the first
network, by examining the group information elements from the
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beacon frame of the alien network. Id. Long provides an example of
detecting an alien device by determining a difference between beacon
period start times in the first and second network. Id. Accordingly,
we agree with the Examiner that Long teaches the claimed step of
discovering a second device based on a “second network identifier”
(i.e., the alien network’s beacon information elements) that is
“different from a first network identifier” (i.e., detecting a difference
in the first network beacon information element and the unknown,
alien network beacon information element). Id.
For the reasons stated above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
the combination of Long, Fong, and Wu.
Remaining Dependent Claims
No separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent
claims. Appeal Br. 13. Thus, for the reasons stated with respect to
independent claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claims 4–10 and 12–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the
combination of Long, Fong, and Wu. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv); In re
King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989,
991 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–10,
12–15
103 Long, Fong, Wu 1, 4–10, 12–
15

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED