Darla W.,1 Complainant,v.Eric K. Fanning, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 30, 2016
0120142583 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 30, 2016)

0120142583

11-30-2016

Darla W.,1 Complainant, v. Eric K. Fanning, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Darla W.,1

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Fanning,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120142583

Hearing No. 440-2012-00104X

Agency No. ARRRIA11MAY02458

DECISION

On July 2, 2014, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's June 6, 2014, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Administrative Support Assistant at the Agency's Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center facility in Rock Island, Illinois.

On July 8, 2011, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of disability2 (Reactive Airway Disease/Asthma) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under an EEO statute that was unspecified in the record when:

1. From May 23 - 31, 2011, co-workers refused to train Complainant, and had been informed of Complainant's settlement agreement from a prior discrimination complaint;

2. On May 24, 2011, Complainant's acting supervisor (AS: no claimed disability) indicated to one of Complainant's co-workers (CW1) that the settlement agreement was "the motivating factor" for CW1's move to another location;

3. On an unknown date subsequent to May 23, 2011, AS directed Complainant to perform job duties in the shop area of building 208;

4. On occasions between May 23, - 31, 2011, AS told one of Complainant's coworkers, in Complainant's presence, that he would file a discrimination complaint against the co-worker3 if she was not "good;"

5. On May 26, 2011, AS instructed Complainant to comply with the Agency's protective clothing and equipment provisions; and

6. On May 31, 2011, AS and Complainant's regular supervisor (S: no claimed disability) directed Complainant not to set up her personal voicemail.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's November 9, 2012, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on May 19, 2014. Specifically, the AJ found that the Agency articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions and that Complainant failed to establish that such reasons were a pretext to mask discrimination and that Agency officials or co-workers harbored any animus against Complainant's protected bases. The AJ further found that AS and other Agency personnel were unaware of either Complainant's disability or her prior EEO activity. Finally, the AJ found that the actions complained of were insufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment.

The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate.

Upon review of the record we find that the AJ properly found that the instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. On appeal, Complainant argues that the AJ erred in issuing summary judgment because there are material facts at issue. However, in order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. While Complainant has pointed with some specificity to a number of facts in dispute, we do not find that she has also established that those facts are material to the resolution of this case.

In considering whether any of the actions, whether individually or collectively, constitute harassment, the Commission notes that in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it results in an alteration of the conditions of the complainant's employment. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3. To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that: (1)she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See McCleod v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01963810 (August 5, 1999) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).

Furthermore, in assessing whether the complainant has set forth an actionable claim of harassment, the conduct at issue must be viewed in the context of the totality of the circumstances, considering, inter alia, the nature and frequency of offensive encounters and the span of time over which the encounters occurred. See 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11(b); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, N 915 050, No. 137 (March 19, 1990); Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). However, as noted by the Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998): "simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment." The Court noted that such conduct "must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, [such] that a reasonable person would find [the work environment to be] hostile or abusive, and . . . that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." Id. See also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).

Following a review of the record we agree with the AJ that the actions complained of, even accepting they occurred as alleged, were not so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of Complainant's employment. We further note that, with the exception of claim No. 3, Complainant has not shown she was subjected to harassment that was either based on or involved her disability or EEO activity. In claim No. 3, Complainant alleges that being required to work in the shop area of building 208 went against her medical restrictions. However, AS articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his action when he denied that Complainant was required to work in the shop area and instead averred that he asked her to come pick up a bag of her belongings from his office which required Complainant "to enter the shop floor but for a very, very brief time." Report of Investigation (ROI) Fact Finding Conference, p. 18. AS further averred that Complainant did not specify until later that she was under a medical restriction preventing her from being on the shop floor. See id., p. 20. Complainant did not participate in the Agency investigation and did not provide an affidavit in response to AS's claims. On appeal, Complainant does not deny AS's claim that her time spent on the shop floor was momentary. See Complainant's Appeal Brief. With regard to the remaining allegations, Complainant has not shown she was subjected to harassment that was either based on or involved her disability or EEO activity, or that any harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Complainant's employment.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that the actions complained of were insufficiently severe or pervasive to create a discriminatory hostile work environment. We therefore AFFIRM the final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0416)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter

the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 30, 2016

__________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

2 For purposes of this decision the Commission assumes without finding that complainant is an individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g)(1).

3 In her Formal complaint, Complainant indicates that the threat was made against the co-worker. However on appeal, Complainant indicates that the threat was made against herself.

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