Darik Muhammad, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 16, 2009
0120091559 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 16, 2009)

0120091559

07-16-2009

Darik Muhammad, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Darik Muhammad,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091559

Agency No. 1G-771-0012-08

Hearing No. 460-2008-00139X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's January 28, 2009 final order concerning his equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

On January 31, 2008, complainant, a Mail Handler assigned to the

Beaumont Processing and Distribution Center in Beaumont, Texas filed

the instant formal EEO complaint. Therein, complainant claimed the

agency discriminated against him on the bases of religion (Islam) and

in reprisal for prior protected activity when:

on December 25, 2007, he was not allowed to work the Christmas

holiday.

Following an investigation by the agency, complainant was given the

choice of either a final agency decision (FAD) or a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing.

The AJ assigned to the case granted the agency's motion for a decision

without a hearing. The AJ found that complainant had not established a

prima facie case of religious discrimination, but that he had established

a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination. The AJ further found

that even assuming complainant established a prima facie case on both

bases, the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions which complainant failed to show were a pretext for

discrimination.

The Commissions regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact.29 C.F.R � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 245 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence

of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage

and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's

favor. Id at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such

that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving

party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). The AJ may

properly issue a decision without a hearing only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See

Petty v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No.0120024206 July 11, 2003).

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part

analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglass Corporation v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish

a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if

unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e.,

that prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp

v. Waters, 438 U.S,567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden complainant bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by preponderance

of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited

reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.502 (1993).

The AJ noted that complainant assigned to Tour 1 signed the volunteer list

to work the 2007 Christmas holiday which was his non-scheduled day. While

making the Christmas schedule, agency management erred in assuming that

complainant had medical restrictions to prevent him from working overtime;

and because complainant had not volunteered the two prior holidays,

agency management did not schedule him. Instead, a senior female mail

handler assigned to Tour 1 was scheduled to work on December 25, 2007,

and she declined to work. After completing his tour on December 24,

2007, complainant informed his supervisor that he volunteered to work

Christmas. In response, his supervisor asked complainant if he would work

on December 25, 2007 and he responded, "I will work if I receive written

apology that [the named female employee who was earlier assigned to work

on December 25, 2007] was scheduled in error." Complainant's supervisor

informed complainant that he (the supervisor) did not have authority

to write an apology. Complainant left the office without responding

that he would work on December 25, 2007. Due to lack of complainant's

lack of commitment and no coverage for Tour 1 another mail handler from

Tour 2 volunteered to work on December 25, 2007.

The AJ properly determined that the agency articulated legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for its actions and that his supervisor

acknowledged the error and apologized for the error and offered

complainant the opportunity to work on December 25, 2007, and that

complainant did not establish that this reason was a pretext for

discrimination.

The AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate

and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that

discrimination occurred. After a review of the record in its entirety,

including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is

the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM

the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 16, 2009

__________________

Date

5

0120091559

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013